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Introduction
History is the Nightmare from which I am trying to awake.
James Joyce, 19221
The writing of historical sociologies is inescapably wedded to the contexts in 
which they emerge; we write history but do not do so in conditions of our 
choosing. For decades, these conditions have been marked by ‘End of History’ 
triumphalism and claims that ‘there is no alternative’ to liberal capitalism. In turn, 
capitalism as a transient, historically specific and contradictory unit of study has 
been bracketed out of – if not completely wiped off – the scholarly and political 
agenda. Yet, after stock markets came crashing down in 2008, the force of history 
reasserted itself in a series of revolutions, occupations of public places, anti-aus-
terity protests, strikes, riots and anti-state movements taking place from London 
to Ferguson (Missouri), Athens, Cairo, Istanbul, Rojava, Santiago and beyond. 
Such movements have torn at the hubristic certainties of ‘capitalist realism’ and 
started to sporadically – if inconsistently – challenge such long-held ‘common 
sense’ truisms and the power structures that undergird them.
 Consequently, capitalism and critiques of it have reentered the public 
discourse in ways previously unimaginable. From mainstream media outlets to 
traditional academic publishing media, the tide has seemingly turned against 
the concept’s long banishment to the margins of radical Left critique and 
returned as a ‘respectable’ object of analysis. Indeed, a number of the most cele-
brated publications of recent years have in different ways oriented themselves 
around reinvestigating and understanding (both theoretically and historically) 
the meaning of capitalism, be they social democratic, Marxist, Keynesian or 
neoconservative.2 In universities across the world, students and scholars are 
now collaborating in ways that seek to challenge ruling class orthodoxies.3 As 
a recent New York Times article put it, ‘A specter is haunting university history 
departments: the specter of capitalism’.4
 This renewed attention to the study of capitalism is a welcome development, 
particularly as capitalism’s return to the limelight as the dramatis persona of 
modern history has come fit with a certain renaissance in Karl Marx’s critique 
of it. ‘Marx is Back’, lamented the Economist,5 and with it so too are an array 
of novel avenues for renewed Marxist-inspired understandings and critiques of 
capitalism, and particularly its formation as a historical mode of production. 
Why was capitalism successful in supplanting other modes of production? What 
propelled it to global dominance? And finally, what are its historical limits?
 This book cannot hope to offer complete answers to all of these questions. 
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Rather, our aim is to provide new theoretical and historical perspectives in 
which these questions can be re-examined and answered anew, hopefully better 
than previous attempts. Simply stated, we argue that the origins and history 
of capitalism can only be properly understood in international or geopolit-
ical terms, and that this very ‘internationality’ is constitutive of capitalism as 
a historical mode of production. Although this may seem intuitively obvious 
to many readers, in what follows we show that existing conceptions of capi-
talism have hitherto failed to take this internationality seriously. This has led to 
problematic theorisations of its origins and development that limit not only our 
histories, but also our critiques of the present.
 This distinctly geopolitical character of the origins of capitalism is brilliantly 
anticipated in German Renaissance painter Hans Holbein’s 1532 masterpiece 
The Ambassadors (Figure 0.1), which illustrates a meeting between French envoys 
Jean de Dinteville and George de Selve in London. The painting astounds 
because these two aristocratic subjects are placed at the periphery, and the only 
explicitly religious symbol, a cross, is veiled by a curtain. While these two pillars 
of medieval power – the church and aristocracy – are symbolically pushed to 
the side, an anamorphic skull and a table littered with objects – with commodi-
ties – occupy the focal point of the painting. Was this a prophetic, if unwitting, 
forecast of feudalism’s imminent decline? Did it anticipate a capitalist future 
where social relations would come to be ‘mediated by things’?6
 Notwithstanding such speculation, these objects constitute a vivid record of 
the geopolitical milieu that defined European7 international relations in the early 
16th century.8 The morbidity portrayed by the skull reminds us that death was at 
the forefront of European consciousness in this period – indeed, Holbein’s own 
life would be taken by plague in the autumn of 1543 in England just ten years 
after the painting was completed.9 In the immediate time of the painting, peasant 
revolts were sweeping through Christendom, leaving the ashes of serfdom in their 
wake. In preceding centuries, Europe had been ravaged by disease, precipitating 
a demographic crisis that had reduced Europe’s population by between 30 and 
60 per cent by the 15th century.
 On the bottom right-hand side of the table in the painting, a book of 
Lutheran hymns sits by a broken lute, signifying the discord in Christendom 
between Protestants and the Catholic Church. To the left of these items rests 
Martin Benhaim’s terrestrial globe, made under the commission of Nuremberg 
merchants seeking to break the Portuguese hold on the spice trade. The globe is 
tilted so that after European towns, ‘Affrica’ and ‘Brisilici R’. (Brazil) are the most 
legible markers. We can also see the Linea Divisionis Castellanorum et Portugal-
lenum (‘Line of division between Spain and Portugal’) demarcating the division of 
the New World between Habsburg Spain (west of the line) and Portugal (east of 
the line), here signifying the importance of these discoveries and the subsequent 
competition between European states over commercially profitable territories.
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 In front of the globe is Peter Apian’s A New and Well Grounded Instruc-
tion in All Merchant’s Arithmetic, an early textbook of commercial scholarship 
that covered profit–loss calculation, trading customs, navigation and route 
mapping. Placed alongside Benhaim’s globe, it demonstrates the inseparability 
of commercial interests from maritime exploration, as well as the increasingly 
global – and competitive – character of trade. Above these items, on the top of 
the table, numerous scientific instruments highlight the rapid development of 
techniques in seafaring. Continuing the theme of Christendom’s decline, these 
also indicate a mounting shift away from the divinity of religion as the predom-
inant episteme and towards the rationality of scientific inquiry and humanism. 
Finally, linking the resting arms of the two ambassadors, and tying the objects 
together, is a Turkic rug, indicating the rivalry between the Ottoman and 
Habsburg empires. The presence of this ‘Eastern’ commodity indicates that the 
numerous changes taking place in Europe in this period were often undergirded 
Figure 0.1 Hans Holbein, The Ambassadors, 1533
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by processes emanating from non-European sources, by social formations and 
actors that were unambiguously more powerful than anything seen in Europe at 
the time.
  Let us run through these themes once more: a demographic crisis brought 
about by the Black Death; the Ottoman–Habsburg rivalry; the discovery of the 
New World and its division along linearly demarcated spaces of sovereignty; 
the festering atmosphere of revolt and rebellion; the economic significance of 
colonisation. Each in their own way either captures or anticipates the central 
dynamics and historical processes behind the collapse of feudalism and the 
emergence of capitalist modernity. Moreover, running throughout the themes 
of the painting is a resolute awareness of the geopolitics behind these processes. 
The emphasis on the New World and the Ottoman Empire reminds us that the 
making of capitalism in Europe was not simply an intra-European phenomenon, 
but a decidedly international (or intersocietal) one: one in which non-European 
agency relentlessly impinged upon and (re)directed the trajectory and nature of 
European development. Tracing this international dimension in the origins of 
capitalism and the so-called ‘rise of the West’ is what concerns us in this book.
 Our primary motivation in making this argument is to subvert, and we hope 
displace, the dominant wisdom in the historiography and theoretical analyses 
of the period. For despite the latent centrality of ‘the international’ implied by 
Holbein’s painting, dominant theorisations of early modern Europe have been 
constructed with non-European societies in absentia. Whether in the sphere of 
politics, economy, culture or ideology, the emergence of capitalist modernity 
is generally understood as a sui generis development unique to Europe. Where 
non-European societies do figure, they are typically relegated to the status of a 
passive bystander, at the receiving end of Europe’s colonial whip, or a comparative 
foil – an Other – against which the specificity and superiority of Europe is defined. 
In short, the history of capitalism’s origins is an unmistakably Eurocentric history.
The Problem of Eurocentrism
So what exactly is Eurocentrism? At its core, it represents a distinctive mode 
of inquiry constituted by three interrelated assumptions about the form and 
nature of modern development.10 First, it conceives of the origins and sources 
of capitalist modernity as a product of developments primarily internal to 
Europe. Based on the assumption that any given trajectory of development is 
the product of a society’s own immanent dynamics, Eurocentrism locates the 
emergence of modernity exclusively within the hermetically sealed and socio-
culturally coherent geographical confines of Europe. Thus we find in cultural 
history that the flowering of the Renaissance was a solely intra-European 
phenomenon.11 Analyses of absolutism and the origins of the modern state 
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form are similarly conducted entirely on the terrain of Europe, with non- 
European cases appearing (if at all) comparatively.12 Dominant accounts of the 
rise of capitalism as either an economic form13 or a social system14 similarly 
place its origins squarely in Western Europe, while non-Europe is relegated to 
an exploited and passive periphery.15
 This internalist story of an autonomous and endogenous ‘rise of the 
West’ constitutes the founding myth of Eurocentrism.16 By positing a strong 
‘inside-out’ model of social causality (or methodological internalism) – whereby 
European development is conceptualised as endogenous and self-propelling – 
Europe is conceived as the permanent ‘core’ and ‘prime mover’ of history. In its 
worst forms, this can lend itself to an interpretation of European society and 
culture as somehow superior to the rest of the world. This second normative 
assumption of Eurocentrism can be termed historical priority, which articulates 
the historical distinction between tradition and modernity through a spatial 
separation of ‘West’ and ‘East’. Through this method, non-European societies 
have been opposed to Europe as an ideological Other against which the spec-
ificity and distinctiveness of Western modernity has been and continues to be 
defined.17 Through numerous sociological trends, the ‘East’ has in turn been 
(re)constructed as an intransigent and threatening foe representing a 
fundamental and irreconcilable challenge to the values of the ‘West’.18 
 In establishing this ‘Iron Curtain’19 of mutual obstinacy, both Eurocentric 
internalism and notions of historical priority have been reinforced, not only ideo-
logically but also materially. Expressed through either the comparative approach20 
or ‘methodological nationalism’,21 Eurocentrism tends to overlook the multiple 
and interactive character of social development. In doing so, it sets up an epistemo-
logical distinction between Europe and ‘the Rest’ as theoretically incommensurable 
objects of study, turning the study of the origins of capitalism into an exclusionary 
process in which the agency of non-European societies is erased or overlooked.
 From these two assumptions emerges a third predictive proposition: that the 
European experience of modernity is a universal stage of development through 
which all societies must pass. This stadial assumption posits a linear develop-
mentalism in which endogenous processes of social change – from tradition to 
modernity, feudalism to capitalism and so on – are conceived as universal stages 
which encompass all societies of the world, at different times and different 
places. These three propositions (methodological internalism, historical priority 
and linear developmentalism) make up the core of Eurocentric accounts.
Confronting the Problematic of Sociohistorical Difference
How the West Came to Rule challenges these assumptions by examining the 
‘extra-European’ geopolitical conditions and forms of agency conducive to 
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capitalism’s emergence as a distinctive mode of production over the longue durée. 
We do so by tracing the processes of societal transformation through an analysis 
of the various internationally determined historical dynamics, structures and 
agencies that emerged and unfolded over the late Medieval and early modern 
epochs. In this respect, we hope to contribute to what has proven in recent 
years to be a veritable historiographical revolution in the study of the early 
modern epoch. This has come from a disparate group of scholars challenging 
what they see as the fundamentally Eurocentric nature of extant theoretical and 
historical approaches to the genesis of capitalist modernity.22 Debates over the 
origins of capitalism have subsequently taken on new dimensions as scholars 
have forcefully problematised notions of a self-propelling ‘rise of the West’ 
while relativising the uniqueness of Western modernity.23 Once sidelined to the 
margins of historical and sociological investigation, the non-European sources, 
dynamics and experiences of capitalist modernity have thus been at the forefront 
of these literatures, acting as a much needed corrective to the essentialising, 
self-aggrandising narratives of an internally generated ‘European miracle’.
 Perhaps the most significant contribution of this body of literature has been 
the resolute focus on the relations of interconnection and co-constitution between 
‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’ in their joint, if uneven, making of the modern world. 
This attention to ‘the international’ as a thick space of social interaction and 
mutual constitution should put International Relations (IR) scholars in a unique 
position to make important contributions to these debates. Yet thus far, post- 
colonial and world history critiques24 have made little impact on the mainstream 
of the discipline, even after the historical sociological ‘turn’ in IR.25 Instead, 
historical sociological approaches to IR have been criticised for reproducing Euro-
centric assumptions, as they predominately conduct their analysis on the basis 
of European history.26 Many of the foundational engagements with history in IR 
have been – and continue to be – primarily carried out on the terrain of European 
history and intra-European dynamics.27 Where they do exist, substantive engage-
ments with non-European societies tend to emphasise the ‘Iron Curtain’ of 
ideological-cultural difference.28
 Calls for a genuinely ‘international historical sociology’29 have thus remained 
locked within this Eurocentric cage, as they have yet to fully provincialise 
Europe, treating it instead as the privileged locale and organic birthplace of capi-
talist modernity (see Chapter 1). To change this perspective is the central aim 
of How the West Came to Rule. Widening the spatial optic of capitalism’s emer-
gence beyond Europe over the longue durée, we offer a fundamental rethinking 
of the origins of capitalism and the emergence of Western domination that puts 
non-Western sources (both structural and agential) at the forefront of analysis. 
In doing so, we elucidate the manifold ways that ‘the West’ itself, as both an 
ideo-political and a socioeconomic entity, was only formed in and through its 
interactive relations with the extra-European world. These international dimen-
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sions are explored in the substantive historical chapters (Chapters 3 to 8). In 
each, we shift or decentre the sites of analysis on which most theoretical atten-
tion to the origins of capitalism and the ‘rise of the West’ has focused. Some 
of these sites are relatively unfamiliar or overlooked in the existing debates, 
as exemplified by the Mongolian and Ottoman Empires’ ‘contributions’ to the 
development of capitalism (see Chapters 3 and 4 respectively). However, we also 
revisit more familiar sites common to contemporary debates – for example, the 
role of the American ‘discoveries’ in the making of global capitalism (Chapter 
5), the ‘classical’ bourgeois revolutions in European history (Chapter 6), and 
the colonisation of Asia (Chapter 7 and 8) – precisely in order to make them 
unfamiliar through a more ‘international’, non-Eurocentric framework.
 In so doing, we also seek to go beyond extant contributions in world history 
and postcolonial literatures. That is, How the West Came to Rule does not aim 
simply to add new, non-European perspectives that might expand the empir-
ical scope of the study of capitalism’s origins. Rather, it offers an alternative 
framework through which our theorisation of capitalism might be significantly 
revised. We do so by drawing on and further refining Leon Trotsky’s theory 
of uneven and combined development which, we argue, uniquely incorporates 
a distinctly international dimension of causality into its very conception of 
development (see Chapter 2).30
 The debate on the transition to capitalism is a particularly apposite body 
of literature for assessing uneven and combined development’s efficacy in 
theorising social change as positions within it well demonstrate the very meth-
odological problems the theory seeks to overcome: specifically, the hardened 
division between ‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’ modes of explanation. In partic-
ular, the debates within (neo-)Marxist approaches have largely split between 
these two ‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’ poles. On the one side, scholars such as 
Maurice Dobb,31 Robert Brenner32 and Ellen Meiksins Wood33 locate the gener-
ative sources of capitalist social relations in the internal contradictions of feudal 
European societies, and particularly England. On the other, Paul Sweezy34 and 
Immanuel Wallerstein35 view capitalism as having developed from the growth 
of markets, commerce and trade in Europe over the Long Sixteenth Century 
(1450–1650). The main issue between these different positions revolves around 
whether the intensification of exchange relations (trade) or class conflict was 
the prime mover in the transition to capitalism. More recently, anti-Eurocentric 
scholars have broadened the debate in considering the emergence of antecedent 
forms of capitalism (or ‘proto-capitalism’) in the non-West, while further empha-
sising the contingent, or accidental, factors explaining the rise of a globally 
dominant Western European capitalism.36 Yet, for the most part, the anti- 
Eurocentrics have moved within the main methodological parameters set out 
by the original debate, accepting an essentially externalist explanation of the 
genesis of capitalism. By highlighting the spread of commerce and markets 
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as the prime movers, they equate ‘antediluvian forms’ of capital37 with 
capitalism.38
What is Capitalism?
The stark disagreements over precisely what factors were central in the making 
of capitalism beg the question: what is capitalism? In some respects this is a 
trick question, in that it conceals from view more than it opens to enquiry, since 
the content of capitalism is of a complexity that resists any single-line defini-
tion. Treating capitalism as ‘generalized commodity production’39 or ‘competitive 
accumulation of capital through the exploitation of wage-labour’40 or ‘market 
dependence’41 captures, in some respects, a ‘hard core’ around which it functions. 
However, the argument we advance in this book is that there is a wider complex 
web of social relations that stretch our understanding of capitalism far beyond 
what is captured in any of these phrases. We explicate further what these social 
relations are over the course of the book, progressively introducing more deter-
minations and categories that we consider crucial to the origins and reproduction 
of capitalism. For the time being, then, we restrict ourselves to identifying a basic 
heuristic framework through which we may theorise capitalism.
 To say what capitalism ‘is’ runs the risk of reducing capitalism to a thing, 
which tends to obscure the multivalent connections in society that facilitate, 
structure and ultimately limit its reproduction. More specifically, it carries the 
implication that any given social factor contains an essence that is logically 
independent of other factors to which it is related. Capital ‘as a thing’ is often 
understood simply as ‘profit’, or an accumulated pool of money, or perhaps 
machinery, whose existence is independent of wider social relations. Treating 
capital solely as a ‘thing’ therefore tends to naturalise and eternalise capitalism.
 In contrast, we follow Marx in conceiving capitalism as encompassing 
historically specific configurations of social relations and processes. Such a 
relational-processual approach helps us move away from ‘abstract one-sided’ 
self-representations of capitalism and toward uncovering the ‘concrete living 
aggregate’ of ‘definite social relationships’.42 For example, Marx’s observation 
that some categories (such as capital) necessarily presuppose others (such as 
wage-labour) allowed him to uncover, analyse and criticise an array of struc-
tural conditions of exploitation and power that reproduce the capitalist mode of 
production. This reminds us that just as social relations are historically specific 
and constructed, they can be transformed, abolished and reconstructed. Simi-
larly, the emphasis on process further begs a historicisation of the development 
of capitalism not as a fixed entity, but as one that morphs and reconfigures 
social relations according to certain historical problems, challenges, struggles, 
contradictions, limits and opportunities.
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 We hope this emphasis on process will assist us in moving away from any 
sociological or political position that posits a certain phase (or place) in capital-
ism’s history or geography as ‘pure’, ‘ideal-typical’, ‘unchanging’ or its ‘highest 
stage’. From such a perspective, we seek to subvert any attempts to read the 
history of capitalism as a linear progression of clearly discernible stages. Finally, 
‘process’ should help us capture one of the defining characteristics of capital 
as social relation, the necessity of its movement and motion – in production, 
circulation and realisation.
 In both senses, then – as social relations and as process – it might appear 
to make more sense to talk about capitalisms rather than capitalism. Indeed, a 
central thesis of this book is that the history of capitalism is a multiple, poly-
valent one, irreducible to any singular process or social relation. Nonetheless, 
we argue that there is a certain unity to its functioning that renders neces-
sary the study of the capitalist mode of production as an intelligible (albeit 
contradictory) object of analysis.
 Treating capitalism in such terms – as a contradictory social totality – helps 
us trace the ways in which multiple relations of domination, subordination and 
exploitation intersect with and reproduce each other. From this perspective, we 
argue that capitalism is best understood as a set of configurations, assemblages, 
or bundles of social relations and processes oriented around the systematic repro-
duction of the capital relation, but not reducible – either historically or logically 
– to that relation alone. By placing an emphasis on such configurations and 
assemblages, we also seek to highlight how the reproduction and competitive 
accumulation of capital through the exploitation of wage-labour presupposes 
a wide assortment of differentiated social relations that make this reproduction 
and accumulation possible. These relations may take numerous forms, such as 
coercive state apparatuses, ideologies and cultures of consent, or forms of power 
and exploitation that are not immediately given in or derivative of the simple 
capital–wage-labour relation, such as racism and patriarchy.
 To take one example, one of the great achievements of feminist scholarship 
has been to show how the existence of wage-labour presupposes a vast ‘repro-
ductive sphere’ that sits outside (albeit related to) the immediate production 
process. Here, non-waged forms of production – cooking, house-keeping, child-
bearing and so on – are fundamental to the reproduction of wage-labour, and 
capitalism as such. As we demonstrate throughout the book, such relations (and 
others) were absolutely crucial to both making the accumulation and reproduc-
tion of capital possible, and producing forms of subordination, exploitation 
and social stratification that were at the heart of alienating workers from their 
labour and from each other. We argue that an analysis of the making of capi-
talism should thus be one that seeks to disclose ever more complex webs, 
assemblages and bundles of social relations that feed into the origins and 
reproduction of capitalism as a mode of production.
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 In this book we argue that uneven and combined development provides a 
way into disclosing and analysing the historical emergence and development of 
such assemblages, which were and still are constitutive of capitalism. By consti-
tutive, we mean historically constitutive: that is, those historical processes that 
fed into the emergence and development of capitalism. But we also use ‘constitu-
tive’ to designate those relations and processes that continued to function (albeit 
in different forms) over the course of subsequent centuries, and persist today: 
that is, social relations that capitalism cannot do without. As we shall argue, 
what we consider ‘constitutive’ is considerably broader than many existing 
theorisations of capitalism. We argue that this necessitates a broader historical 
and geographical scope for the proper study of the origins of capitalism, and a 
theoretical framework capable of making this wider scope intelligible.
 Nonetheless, it must be stressed that what follows is not intended to be a 
‘total’ account of the origins of capitalism and the ‘rise of the West’. Indeed, our 
historical account cannot help but be partial, emphasising certain processes and 
leaving out others. Similarly, we must recognise that this is not a total history 
but one that privileges those processes that were central to the making of capi-
talism in Europe. This carries within itself its own dangers of Eurocentrism, 
in that non-European societies are studied only insofar as they are relevant to 
European development. We acknowledge the potential concerns that arise from 
this, but insist that something unique did happen in Europe that propelled it 
to global dominance at the expense of non-European societies. Uncovering the 
histories of subjugation and exploitation that lay behind this ‘rise’ is therefore 
crucial to critiquing the mythologising of European (or Western) exception-
alism. Taking Europe as an object of study in the telling of this history is both 
essential and unavoidable. Yet, insofar as gaps exist, we hope that the frame-
work we offer nonetheless provides scope and avenues for future research, 
and the incorporation of further historical processes that may complement our 
analysis. In this respect, we seek to provide a more inclusive account of the 
origins of capitalism that highlights hitherto significantly neglected aspects of 
the story: particularly, regarding the role of ‘the international’, ‘intersocietal’ and 
‘geopolitics’. Of course, this then begs the question: what are ‘the international’ 
and ‘geopolitics’?
What Is Geopolitics?
Most broadly defined, geopolitics and ‘the geopolitical’ can be conceived as 
encompassing both: first, the variegated processes and practices of commu-
nities, societies and states occupying, controlling, socialising, organising, 
protecting, and competing over territorial spaces and their inhabitant peoples 
and resources; and second, the multivalent forms of knowledge, discourses, 
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representations, ideologies and strategies, along with the articulations, modes 
and relations of power generated from such processes. From this perspective, 
we may then examine how the (re)production, structuring and organisation of 
space and the construction of human ‘territoriality’ itself are inherently social 
processes rooted in, conditioned by, and articulated through historically specific 
and changing power relations. This allows for the conceptualisation of territo-
rial spaces and the exchanges that take place within, across and between them 
as pivotal sites of social contestation, change and transformation.43
 Under capitalism, for example, specific forms of territoriality and other 
socially constructed spaces are being persistently constituted and reconstituted, 
borders continually drawn and redrawn, human geographies constantly fash-
ioned and refashioned in and through the uneven development, production, 
accumulation and circulation of capital across time and space, as well as by the 
resulting differentiated relations of power, domination, exploitation and conflict 
accompanying the global reproduction of capitalism as a social whole. Our focus 
on these geopolitical dimensions of development and reproduction is, then, 
not intended to reproduce the well-worn problems of geographical or geopo-
litical determinism. Rather, it aims to spatially broaden our analytical optic to 
the multiplicity of different ‘geo-social’ processes and determinations through 
which capitalism emerged. We would argue that such a spatial widening of 
our analytical imaginary is in fact a necessary methodological first step in any 
endeavour to furnish a genuinely non-Eurocentric theorisation of capitalism’s 
genesis and development. 
 In order to avoid (neo)realist (mis)conceptions of ‘the international’ as an 
absolutely autonomous, suprasocial sphere of geopolitical interactions,44 our 
uses of the concepts of ‘the international’ and ‘international system’ do not 
denote a permanent state of anarchy, or necessarily imply competition between 
discretely constituted political units in which the autonomous logic of this 
competition dictates their strategies. To make the realist move of deriving inter-
societal competition from political multiplicity is to unproblematically accept 
the anthropologically dubious assumption that societies necessarily threaten 
each other.45
 We must call out all such ahistorical reificatory and essentialist perspec-
tives for what they really are: thinly veiled rationalisation (intentional or not) 
of power politics in attaining states’ putative ‘national interests’. In short, they 
are particular representations and articulations of the hegemonic ideologies of 
modern world politics masquerading as social ‘scientific’ theories46 – traditional 
IR as ‘the Discipline of Western Supremacy’, as Kees van der Pijl aptly terms 
it.47 In direct contrast to such approaches, geopolitics, human territoriality and 
intersocietal/international conflict, along with the very demarcation of the 
geopolitical as such, must be conceptualised as emergent properties of a wider, 
interactive and uneven process of development.48
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 But with these definitions of ‘geopolitics and ‘the geopolitical’ at hand, 
honesty compels us to admit that the subtitle of this book (The Geopolitical 
Origins of Capitalism) is something of a misnomer. While we do indeed examine 
a wide range of sociohistorical processes that are, strictly speaking, geopolitical 
(such as great power rivalries, colonialism and war), many other developments 
we investigate are more properly captured under the rubric of ‘intersocietal’ or 
‘international’ relations, as exemplified by cross-cultural diffusions of trade, 
commerce, ideas, technologies and disease. We nonetheless settled on this 
subtitle not simply because it was catchier than, say, The Intersocietal Origins of 
Capitalism, but rather because it captures a fundamental point we are at pains 
to make throughout this book: that capitalism could only emerge, take root and 
reproduce itself – both domestically and internationally – through a violent, 
coercive, and often war-assisted process subjugating, dominating, and often 
annihilating many of those social forces that stood in its way – processes that 
continue to this day.
  In this sense, our book seeks to offer a ‘counter-history’ to the many liberal- 
inspired narratives emphasising the fundamentally pacifying and ‘civilising’ 
nature of capitalist development. They present a world where the spread of 
free trade and markets is equated with the promotion of a more cooperative 
and peaceful international order; one in which ‘globalisation’ is viewed as 
transforming contemporary international politics into a series of ‘positive-sum’ 
games whereby states can realise absolute gains; where increasingly integrated 
transnational circuits of capital and global market relations are in turn identi-
fied as advancing more liberal-democratic civic cultures, identities and norms.49 
As we demonstrate through the pages that follow, this is a conception of capi-
talist development that is fundamentally at odds with the historical record, both 
past and present.
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c h a p t e r  1
The Transition Debate: 
Theories and Critique
In order to examine the object of our investigation in its integrity, free from all 
disturbing subsidiary circumstances, we must treat the whole world as one nation, 
and assume that capitalist production is everywhere established and has possessed 
itself of every branch of industry.
Karl Marx, 18671
… events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historic surroundings 
led to totally different results. By studying each of these forms of evolution sepa-
rately and then comparing them one can easily find the clue to this phenomenon, 
but one will never arrive there by the universal passport of a general historico- 
philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical.
Karl Marx, 18772
Introduction
In this chapter, we critically assess a number of influential Marxist-inspired 
theorisations of the transition to capitalism. We focus on such Marxist-inspired 
perspectives not because they exhaust the range of possible approaches to theo-
rising the transition or because we think other perspectives have nothing to 
offer. Rather, we centre our attention on them because the Marxist tradition has 
arguably examined and debated the subject of capitalism’s genesis more than 
any other social theoretical tradition. For these reasons, our critical examina-
tion of other important perspectives to capitalism’s origins is in later chapters 
– Smithian approaches in Chapter 5, new institutionalism in Chapter 7, and 
neo-Weberian historical sociology and the California School in Chapter 8.
 The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines World- 
Systems approaches to the origins of capitalism, particularly through an 
engagement with the works of its most influential representative and 
‘founder’, Immanuel Wallerstein. While highlighting the important contri-
butions that World-System Theory (WST) has made to the study of 
capitalism’s genesis over the longue durée, we nonetheless argue that this 
approach – especially Wallerstein’s rendition of it – remains hamstrung by two 
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particularly debilitating problems: the unwitting reproduction of Eurocentrism 
 that erases non-European agency; and the inability to provide a sufficiently 
historicised conception of capitalism.
 The next section investigates the ‘Brenner thesis’ and the theoretical apparatus 
(Political Marxism) that Robert Brenner’s works on the transition to capitalism 
have engendered. We focus on three particularly problematic and interconnected 
issues in their theorisation of capitalism’s inception: first, their commitment 
to a methodologically internalist and concomitant Eurocentric (or Anglo- 
centric) analysis of the origins of capitalism; second, the resulting deficiencies 
in their examination of the relationship between the making of capitalism and 
geopolitics; and third, their highly abstract and minimalist conception of 
capitalism.
 In the third section, we consider the merits and problems of post- 
colonialism. The inclusion of postcolonial studies in our overview of the 
different approaches within the transition debate might seem unusual given that 
postcolonial scholars have predominantly focused on the experiences of moder-
nity outside – and subsequent to – the emergence of capitalism in Europe. The 
existence of capitalism is then something largely taken for granted by post- 
colonial studies – a point that we argue limits their ability to fully ‘provincialise’ 
Europe. We nonetheless also draw out the important methodological and theo-
retical contributions postcolonialism offers in the study of capitalism’s origins 
– contributions that we seek to take up and further develop in the chapters that 
follow.
The ‘Commercialisation Model’ Revisited: World- 
Systems Analysis and the Transition to Capitalism
The Making of the Modern World-System: The Wallerstein Thesis
The most systematic exposition of WST can be found in the works of Immanuel 
Wallerstein, who sought to bring together longue durée history writing with the 
anti-hegemonic politics of the 1960s Third World movements. From dependency 
theorists Wallerstein took the importance of colonisation in order to explain 
unequal regional differentiation between the capitalist core and periphery. 
From Sweezy and Braudel came the emphasis on the ‘world-system’ as the 
unit of analysis, and relatedly the importance of trade and exchange.3 Finally, 
Wallerstein emphasised the historical specificity of the crisis of feudalism and 
the collapse of world empires as a precondition for the emergence of the capi-
talist world-system. This was because Wallerstein was additionally concerned 
with how to denaturalise capitalism, and so explore the possibility of its 
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eventual demise.4 At the heart of this project was then establishing the historical 
specificity of capitalism by:
reopen[ing] the question of how and when the capitalist world-economy was 
created in the first place; why the transition took place in feudal Europe and not 
elsewhere; why it took place when it did and not earlier or later [and]; why earlier 
attempts of transition failed.5
The specificity of the capitalist world-system is explained through a negative 
comparison with the social form that preceded it, world empires. The latter were 
integrated systems of political rule which controlled and exploited differenti-
ated communities on a regional and sometimes inter-regional basis. According 
to Wallerstein, world empires restricted economic development because large 
state bureaucracies would absorb surpluses appropriated from agrarian produc-
tion, hindering or precluding the accumulation of capital and (re)investment 
in production.6 The collapse of world empires was a precondition for the emer-
gence of capitalism, for it released profit-seeking commercial activities from the 
fetters of overarching imperial states. Now unrestrained, production would be 
‘constantly expanded as long as further production is profitable’, and capital-
ists would ‘constantly innovate new ways of producing things that expand their 
profit margin’.7 Consequently, trade tended towards constant expansion and 
subsumption – ‘an expansion of the geographical size of the world in question’8 
– which created a capitalist world economy by progressively ‘incorporating’ 
greater proportions of economic activity into its own ‘logic’. This subsumption 
of ‘non-capitalist zones’ into the capitalist world-system took place ‘through 
colonization, conquest, or economic and political domination’.9
 At the heart of this expansion was an ever-increasing regional specialisation 
and a world division of labour.10 From this perspective, Wallerstein distinguished 
the emergence of the world-system via overseas expansion from the freeing of 
labour, deriving the latter from the former.11 That is, the world-system is capitalist 
not because it involves the systematic exploitation of formally free wage-labour 
throughout its regions, but rather because it is characterised by different soci-
eties’ integration into a transnational network of market exchanges and trade.12 
Wallerstein effectively denies the necessity of the wage-labour side of the capital 
relation for his definition of capitalism itself, writing for example that:
The point is that the ‘relations of production’ that define a system are the ‘relations 
of production’ of the whole system, and the system at this point in time is the 
European world-economy. Free labor is indeed a defining feature of capitalism, 
but not free labor throughout the productive enterprises. Free labor is the form of 
labor control used for skilled work in core countries whereas coerced labor is used 
for less skilled work in peripheral areas. The combination thereof is the essence of 
capitalism.13
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It is only with the capitalist world-system that we find different localities 
integrated into a single but differentiated world-system – a unified division 
of labour distinguished along the hierarchical axes of core, semi-periphery 
and periphery.14 This unequal relationship is the sine qua non of capitalism 
for Wallerstein, in which differences between core (Western) and peripheral 
(non-Western) states determine the transfer of surplus from the latter to the 
former. This allowed for the observation that just as the core was experiencing 
an extensive freeing of labour, it was also siphoning off, via unequal exchange, 
huge amounts of surplus from unfree, coerced labour in the periphery, leaving 
the periphery in a permanent condition of developmental ‘backwardness’.
 Hence, part of the value of WST is to situate capitalist exploitation in this 
broader – international – grid of power and economic relations, beyond the 
singular act of an individual wage-labourer being exploited within the unit of 
production.15 As such, the importance of international hierarchy, exploitation, 
and more broadly unequal power relations, is revealed. And by distinguishing 
this world-system from preceding world empires, Wallerstein’s approach 
usefully emphasises the historical specificity and transience of such a hierar-
chical, exploitative system. These two elements – historical specificity and global 
hierarchies – can most certainly be considered the potential primary strengths of 
WST. However, on both counts WST ultimately fails to deliver. As we shall see, 
its identification of historical specificity is ill defined, to the point of missing it, 
and core–periphery relations are circumscribed by a problematic Eurocentrism 
that elides ‘peripheral agency’. We now turn to these criticisms in further detail.
The Problem of Eurocentrism
One of the benefits of Wallerstein’s emphasis on the world-system as the appro-
priate unit of analysis is that it has necessitated the study of societies outside 
of Europe. WST is prolific in this regard, with applications as diverse as the 
Ottoman Empire16 and Turkey,17 Africa,18 South Asia,19 East Asia20 and Latin 
America.21 But, for all of Wallerstein’s emphasis on the world-system as the unit 
of analysis, we find within his version of WST a pervasive internalism which 
underpins some unfortunate – if not intentional22 – Eurocentric assumptions.
 First and foremost, the operative concepts in WST such as ‘division of labour’ 
and ‘specialization’ are derived from an internalist classical social theory par 
excellence, Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations.23 These are then extrapolated 
in an unmediated fashion onto the international scale without considering how 
it might refashion such concepts. Falling prey to the ‘fallacy of the domestic 
analogy’,24 WST leaves the distinct determinations arising from the coexistence 
and interaction of a multiplicity of differentiated societies (‘the international’) 
untheorised as their own unique domain of social interactions.25 Instead, these 
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intersocietal determinations are functionally subsumed under the overriding 
operative logic of a singularly conceived world-system.26
 This inside-out method is replicated in WST’s study of history. Despite 
the high degree of emphasis on exogenous, global factors, WST cannot get 
away from an ontologically singular Eurocentric ‘logic of immanence’.27 
Consequently, Wallerstein reproduces the typically Eurocentric view that the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism took place uniquely and autonomously 
within the clearly demarcated spatial confines of Europe.28 Although Asian 
empires displayed signs of potential development towards capitalism,29 it was 
the crisis of feudalism in Europe between 1300 and 1450 ‘whose resolution was 
the historic emergence of a capitalist world-economy located in that particular 
geographical arena’.30
 World history subsequently became about how this European creation 
spread outwards and ‘eventually expanded to cover the entire globe, eliminating 
in the process all remaining redistributive world-economies and reciprocal 
mini-systems’.31 In short, social transformations from the 16th century onwards 
are understood in the Eurocentric terms of linear developmentalism, in which 
European social forms are transmitted to ‘the East’. In this approach, we find a 
typically Eurocentric distinction between an atavistic and despotic East and a 
capitalist West, now recast as periphery and core respectively. In this schema, 
‘the West’ is once again presented ‘as the pioneering creator of modernity’, and 
‘the East’ as ‘a regressive and unexceptional entity that is incapable of capitalist 
self-generation’;32 an undifferentiated, passive transmitter of surplus to the core. 
This leads to a double ‘elision of Eastern agency’.33 ‘Eastern’ elites are seen to 
voluntarily follow ‘Western dictates in order to better secure their own material 
reproduction within the capitalist world-system’.34 Meanwhile, non-Western 
forms of resistance are either overlooked or seen to unintentionally and 
passively reproduce the capitalist world-system.35
 This latter issue is especially striking given Marx’s theorisation of the distinct 
processes of subsumption through which capitalism could expand. For Marx, 
subsumption involved the possession, subordination and subsequent transfor-
mation of the labour process into a form compatible with capital’s tendency 
to self-valorisation. The two chief moments of this process – formal and real 
subsumption – refer specifically to instances of confrontation with extant 
labour processes. Formal subsumption denotes capital taking hold of pre- 
existing forms of production, leaving them intact, and extracting surplus from 
the labour process as it is given. Real subsumption, in contrast, refers to instances 
where pre-existing labour processes are either transformed, or destroyed and 
created anew in the image of capital.36
 In both cases, the character of subsumption and the relation between labour 
and capital are determined in and through class conflicts, through which direct 
producers attempt to resist, restrict, or perversely enable ‘the form and extent of 
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ruling-class access to surplus labour’.37 That is, the ‘world division of labour’ – 
the differentiated and multiple forms in which production is oriented to capital 
– is not simply a function of capital, wherein different forms of exploitation 
emerge due to the technical requirements of profit-maximisation. It is, rather, 
the result of the multiple and variegated outcomes of the struggles of capital with 
whatever methods of production it encounters. The failure of WST to confront 
the multiple nonlinear histories through which capitalism has been configured 
and reconfigured in the course of such struggles consequently involves writing 
the history of the ‘periphery’ out of the history of the ‘core’.
 This points to a more substantive issue in Wallerstein’s analysis: the strict 
binary distinction between non-capitalist and capitalist modes of production 
excludes the possibility of their coexistence and hence combination.38 This 
is a debilitating problem, since it leaves any theorisation of the transition to 
capitalism largely indeterminate. As Eric Mielants suggests:
The concept of an ‘age of transition’ can be interpreted as requiring the operation 
of at least two coexisting modes of production, and the eventual domination of 
one over the other. If we want to analyse the rise of one mode of production and 
the demise of another, at some point we have to acknowledge them as working 
together. If not, one is left with the argument that feudalism simply disappeared 
within Europe during the 16th century.39
Similarly, for C. P. Terlouw:
During this long transitional phase, feudalism was slowly transformed into, and 
superseded by capitalism. This can only mean that during at least two centuries 
feudalism and capitalism coexisted in one world-system. So what Wallerstein 
explicitly denies (the coexistence of two modes of production in one world-
system) he implicitly assumes for the period between 1450 and 1650. If one 
accepts that during a very long period, several modes of production coexisted in 
one single system, it is a small, and completely logical step to admit that at any 
moment in the history of the world-system several modes production could exist 
simultaneously.40
This inability to theorise the coexistence and interaction of multiple modes of 
production is at the heart of Wallerstein’s Eurocentrism. Since social relations 
that existed prior to capitalist incorporation are rendered irrelevant to our under-
standing of developments ‘post-incorporation’, we are left with a picture of the 
world-system devoid of differentiation in terms of either agency or outcomes. In 
Ernesto Laclau’s words, Wallerstein’s world-system is a ‘vacant and homogenous 
totality’ that is both historically and theoretically ‘created by eliminating differ-
ences rather than articulating them’.41 By denying the coexistence of multiple, 
differentiated modes of production, WST negates societal difference and 
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multiplicity, and the interactions that stem from them. The very mechanism 
through which the history of the ‘non-West’ could be brought into the history 
of ‘the West’ is theoretically and historically occluded from the outset.
The Problem of Historical Specificity
The binary opposition of world empires and world-system forms the basis of 
Wallerstein’s historicisation of capitalism, his account of the transition between 
the two, and ultimately his Eurocentrism. In a sympathetic critique, Mielants 
suggests that this strict opposition overlooks many key factors of capitalist 
development that were already well in place in the pre-capitalist era of world 
empires. He argues that it is possible to identify periods of commercial ‘transi-
tion’, ‘acceleration’ or ‘revolution’ in the long durational period between 1100 
and 1500.42 This period witnessed not only substantial changes in the agrarian 
structure of society, but also developments in urban production and trade that 
were crucial to the later consolidation and domination of capitalism.43
 For example, 12th-century Florence44 was dominated by commercial 
and financial interests that developed a sophisticated weaving and spinning 
industry, while Flanders developed a robust textile export industry based on 
‘a far reaching division of labour, employing both semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers in large numbers’.45 Moreover, the mining industry in 12th-century 
Tuscany was led by private partnerships using wage-labour and capitalist 
property rights.46 Land reclamation – the use of ‘land as a commodity that one 
could acquire, improve and profit from’ – constituted an important aspect of 
14th-century capital formation in both the Low Countries and Northern Italy.47 
Such was the depth of these developments in land, textiles and mining that 
Mielants describes Flanders and Northern Italy as ‘a genuinely capitalist mode 
of production’ based on wage-labour.48 What is more, Jairus Banaji has shown 
how these developments toward capitalism in the Mediterranean were in fact 
‘preceded by (and built on) an earlier tradition of capitalist activity’, including 
partnerships and advance payments, that had developed in the Arab world over 
the 9th and 14th centuries.49
 These prototypical developments in capitalism were not exclusively local. 
Mielants claims that the capitalist subsumption of non-capitalist regions through 
‘through colonization, conquest, or economic and political domination’ can also 
be observed in the Italian city states’ 14th and 15th century activities in the Medi-
terranean and Black Sea. He also suggests that the Iberian Reconquista50 used 
practices that were identical to the more ‘global’ form of Atlantic colonialism, 
albeit on a much smaller scale.51 Similarly, in the 15th century, the Portuguese 
monarchy, according to Banaji, was a ‘“driving force of a capitalist revolution” 
of far-flung trading establishments [feitorias, factories] buttressed by military 
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fortresses’. Imperial Portugal became the ‘“pioneers of the modern colonial 
system”, harnessing the Crusader tradition of a marginalised aristocracy within 
the peculiar fusion of Crown and commercial capitalism’.52 It is also possible to 
detect instances of world ‘divisions of labour’ that existed prior to the emergence 
of the world capitalist system. Noting unequal divisions between the Italian city 
states and the Baltic, Mielants argues that nascent core–periphery relations were 
present in Medieval Europe, with the Baltic supplying raw materials in exchange 
for finished goods from the Italian states. The emergence of Eastern Europe as 
‘the granary of Western Europe’ was itself rooted in a longer evolution that 
started with the Italian city states in the 13th and 14th centuries (for a further 
discussion of antediluvian instances of capital see Chapter 7).53 
 Taking all of these ‘antediluvian’ examples of capital together, Mielants asks, 
‘when discussing the emergence of capitalism, why not use such world-systems 
terminology before the 16th century?’54 Mielants’ argument poses an interesting 
problem for WST: how far is it possible to combine a longue durée analysis of 
capitalism with one that clearly demarcates the specificity and hence transience 
of capitalism? Many authors working in the WST tradition circumvent this issue 
altogether by simply doing away with any notion of historical specificity.
 Fernand Braudel’s use of concepts such as ‘capitalism’ and ‘core–periphery’ 
prior to the 16th century is well known.55 Kasja Ekholm and Jonathan Friedman 
argue that systems characterised by capital accumulation and centre–periphery 
structures based on such accumulation have existed from ancient systems 
onwards.56 Similarly, Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills suggest that some 
kind of world-system has been ever-present in the history of human societies, 
and openly dismiss the possibility of any sharp modal breaks. They argue that 
‘the same world-system in which we live stretches back at least 5,000 years’, in 
which ‘capital accumulation has played a … central role’.57 Historical develop-
ment is subsequently theorised in terms of shifts between different institutional 
forms through which accumulation takes place, and in terms of hegemons 
that dominate an otherwise qualitatively similar world-system.58 Since such 
changes are only formal, historical change is articulated as the ‘cumulation of 
accumulation’.59
 One of the benefits of such a move has been to make WST more amenable 
to non-Eurocentric modes of history writing. Indeed, a variety of authors 
have developed in-depth historical analyses of flourishing world economies 
throughout Eurasia and Africa, based on sophisticated commercial links, divi-
sions of labour and core–periphery relations.60 Janet Abu-Lughod therefore 
argues that ‘it would be wrong to view the “Rise of the West” as … an event 
whose outcome was attributable exclusively to the internal characteristics of 
European society’.61 Similarly, for Mielants, ‘the emergence of capitalism can 
hardly be explained by focusing exclusively on certain transformations within 
Europe’.62
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 Nonetheless, in these accounts, Eurocentrism is overcome at the expense of 
historical and theoretical specificity. By assuming the transhistorical presence 
of capitalism and not explaining its historically specific origins, this strand of 
WST fails to develop any kind of historical theorisation of the transition itself. 
Capitalism, according to this view, has always existed, and has if anything been 
extended gradually over time. In such a view, an explanation for why ‘the West’ 
was able to eventually subordinate and peripheralise ‘the Rest’, at a particular 
(if long durational) historical period, is left undeveloped. Although Mielants 
describes this as an ‘extreme’63 version of WST, his line of reasoning shows 
that this transhistorical turn appears to be inscribed in the conceptual appa-
ratus and theoretical assumptions of WST. For once Wallerstein’s conceptual 
claims are taken to their logical – or rather historical – conclusion it is possible 
to see ‘commercialisation’, ‘divisions of labour’, ‘incorporation’, and ‘core and 
periphery’ throughout all of human history.
 This is precisely the charge of Robert Brenner’s searching critique of Waller-
stein. According to Brenner, Wallerstein’s primary mistake is not historical, 
but rather theoretical. By placing an overemphasis on the profit motive and 
the expansion of trade, Wallerstein provides a ‘neo-Smithian’ model of capi-
talism.64 In the pursuit of profit, regions are separated in a world division of 
labour by specialisation, in which the forms of exploitation tend to correspond 
to the technical requirements of the world economy.65 This functional division 
of the globe into different regions or ‘zones’ in turn assures the ‘flow of surplus’ 
from periphery to core, which enables ‘the capitalist system to come into exis-
tence’.66 In short, for Wallerstein, ‘the growth of the world division of labour 
is the development of capitalism’,67 wherein qualitative transformations in the 
class structure of societies are seen as the result of the quantitative expansion 
of exchange. The basis of capitalism, the class system of free wage-labour, is 
understood simply as a ‘techno-economic adaptation’ undertaken by indi-
vidual capitalists in order to ‘maximize surplus and compete on the market’. 
Yet this model assumes precisely what needs to be explained: the ‘conditions 
required for the prevalence of these tendencies’68 – that is, the origins of capi-
talism as a mode of production.69 The crux of the issue for Brenner is that by 
omitting any analysis of class struggle, Wallerstein’s theorisation of capitalism is 
indeterminate.
 While the intensification of urban growth, trade and markets throughout 
Europe in the early modern era could act as ‘preconditions’ for the eventual 
development of capitalism, such developments, taken on their own, were 
incapable of engendering the transition to capitalism, as cities and markets 
were not by ‘nature or even tendentially capitalist’. For Brenner, the compul-
sion to maximise surpluses, reinvest in production, and develop labour-saving 
innovations is given in the relation of competition between capitalists and 
the nature of exploitation through increasing relative surplus. Yet both these 
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conditions crucially depend on the separation of direct producers from the 
means of production – the freeing of labour – and the subsequent employment 
of wage-labour as the primary form of exploitation.70 These conditions them-
selves presuppose a historical process through which labour, otherwise bonded 
by serfdom, becomes free – that is, a historical process of class struggle between 
lords and serfs (see the next section of the chapter).
 In contrast, Wallerstein simply ‘takes it for granted’ that the subjective 
rationale for profit maximisation will lead to innovation, a world division of 
labour, and thus capitalism. In doing so, he does not consider the objective, 
historically specific conditions which give rise to, and necessitate, such capi-
talistic behaviour.71 This theoretical indeterminacy in turn leads to a lack of 
historical specificity. Since ‘flowerings of commercial relations cum divisions 
of labour have been a more or less regular feature of human history for thou-
sands of years’, Wallerstein is unable to explain ‘why the rise of trade/division 
of labour should have set off the transition to capitalism in the case of Europe’.72
 Therefore, the sort of ‘historical continuity’ in the analysis of capitalism 
that Mielants, Abu-Lughod, Frank and Gills call for is in fact an unfortunate 
byproduct of Wallerstein’s theorisation of historical development.73 Once 
Wallerstein’s neo-Smithian assumptions are laid bare, it appears that the sharp 
historical divide between world empires and world economies effectively 
dissolves into a transhistorical model of quantitative economic development.74 
With it, the very notion of a mode of production becomes indeterminate, and 
the historical specificity and transience of capitalism disappears. 
 Whether Brenner’s alternative theoretical analysis of the transition to capi-
talism marks an advance over Wallerstein’s is examined below. A significant 
point worth recalling, however, is the very important contribution that Waller-
stein’s concept of the ‘world-system’ – a contribution all too often overlooked 
or forgotten after the ‘non-debates’ of the late 1970s75 – made in rescaling 
the primary ontological unit of analysis from the nation-state to the world- 
systemic perspective. This opened a potential – if largely unfulfilled – means of 
integrating the causal impact of intersocietal relations into our conceptions of 
development.
The Spatiotemporal Limits of Political Marxism
The Brenner Thesis: Explanation and Critique
In what has become one of the most influential theorisations of capitalism’s 
emergence, Robert Brenner mobilised Marx’s emphasis on changing relations 
of production (for Brenner, reconceptualised as ‘social property relations’76) in 
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order to historicise the origins of capitalism in terms of class struggles specific to 
feudalism.77 These struggles were determined by relations based on the appro-
priation of surplus from the peasantry by lords through extra-economic means: 
lords would habitually ‘squeeze’ agricultural productivity by imposing fines, 
extending work hours and extracting higher proportions of surpluses. In the 
15th century, this sparked class conflicts in the English countryside, where serfs 
rebelled against their worsening conditions and won formal enfranchisement. 
The liberation of serfs from ties and obligations to the lord’s demesne in turn 
initiated a rise in tenant farming and led to increased market dependence, as 
peasants were turned away from their land and forced into wage-labour as an 
alternative means of subsistence. Although peasant expulsions were met with 
significant resistance, the strength and unity of the English state ensured victory 
for the landed ruling class.78 This concentrated land in the private possession 
of landlords, who leased it to free peasants, unintentionally giving rise to ‘the 
classical landlord–capitalist tenant–wage labour structure’.79
 By contrast, in France, the freeing of the peasants and their ability to retain 
the land was bound up with the development of a centralised monarchical 
state that came to take on a ‘class-like’ character as an independent extractor of 
surpluses through the taxing of land. The French absolutist state consequently 
had an interest in securing and protecting peasant landowning as a source of 
revenue against the re-encroachments of the lordly classes. The ability of the 
peasants to hold on to the land in turn prevented the systematic emergence of 
wage-labour in France, hampering the transition to capitalism.80
 For Brenner, the differential outcomes of the class struggles in England and 
France are explained by the divergent evolution of the English and French 
states. Curiously, in explaining these divergent state trajectories Brenner explic-
itly evokes ‘international’ factors: the Normandy invasions for England, and the 
political-military pressures of the English state on the French. The ‘precocious 
English feudal centralization … owed its strength in large part to the level of 
feudal “political” organization already achieved by the Normans in Normandy 
before the Conquest, which was probably unparalleled elsewhere in Europe’.81 
As Brenner notes:
the English feudal class self-government appears to have been ‘ahead’ of the French 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, not only because its starting point was 
different, but because it was built upon advances in this sphere already achieved 
on the Continent, especially in Normandy. In turn, when French centralization 
accelerated somewhat later it was influenced by English development, and was 
indeed, in part, a response to direct English politico-military pressure. Thus the 
development of the mechanisms of feudal accumulation tended to be not only 
‘uneven’ but also ‘combined’, in the sense that later developers could build on 
previous advances made elsewhere in feudal class organizations.82
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Although evoking the concept of ‘uneven and combined development’ here, 
Brenner’s analysis proceeds within the confines of a comparative historical 
analysis whereby ‘the international’ remains an ad-hoc addendum to an essen-
tially ‘internalist’ analysis of the changing balance of class forces and state 
formation. Nowhere does ‘the international’ enter into Brenner’s theoretical 
presuppositions centred, as they are, around his concept of ‘social property rela-
tions’. Yet, as Neil Davidson argues, ‘[b]y focusing almost exclusively on what 
[Political Marxists] call social property relations, they “have no terms” to explain 
events that lie outside these relationships’.83 This is particularly problematic for 
Brenner and his followers, who explicitly reject any conception of the origins of 
capitalism as immanently developing from the contradictions of feudal society.84 
Rather, feudalism is conceived as a ‘self-enclosed, self-perpetuating system that 
cannot be undermined by its own internal contradictions’.85
 Hence, in spite of an extensive and informative historical explanation, Bren-
ner’s conception of the origins of capitalism based on shifting social property 
relations is conceptually too narrow and too simple; Brenner ultimately tries to 
explain too much with too little. In Brenner’s schema, Marx’s master concept, 
the ‘mode of production’ – conceived as the composite totality of relations 
encapsulating the economic, legal, ideological, cultural and political spheres 
– is reduced to the much thinner ‘social properly relations’ concept, which is 
itself reduced to a form of exploitation. Brenner’s error is to take the singular 
relation of exploitation between lord and peasant as the most fundamental and 
axiomatic component of the mode of production, which in turn constitutes 
the foundational ontology and analytical building block upon which ensuing 
theoretical and historical investigation is constructed. Yet, as Ricardo Duchesne 
argues, this stretches the concept of the ‘relations of production’ too far, as it 
seeks to incorporate under the logic of ‘class struggle’ all military, political and 
economic factors, while reducing military, political and legal relations – concep-
tualised as ‘political accumulation’ by Brenner – to functions of this singular 
relation.86
 The result of this ontological singularity is a dual tunnelling – both temporal 
and spatial – of our empirical field of enquiry. Temporally, the history of capi-
talism’s origins is reduced to the historical manifestation of one conceptual 
moment – the freeing of labour – and in turn explained by it. Spatially, the 
genesis of capitalism is confined to a single geographical region – the English 
countryside – immune from wider intersocietal developments. Such tunnelling 
cannot explain why the extensive presence of formally free wage-labour prior 
to the 16th century (both inside and outside England) did not give rise to capi-
talism.87 Nor can it explain subsequent social developments; by obliterating the 
histories of colonialism, slavery and imperialism, Brenner ‘freezes’ capitalism’s 
history.88 
 This substantially narrows Marx’s more robust conception of the process of 
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‘primitive accumulation’ to which Brenner and his students give so much analytical 
weight in explaining capitalism’s origins. In a famous passage, Marx wrote:
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the expiration, enslavement and 
entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the begin-
nings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a 
preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which charac-
terize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the 
chief moments of primitive accumulation …. The different moments of primitive 
accumulation can be assigned in particular to Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, 
and England, in more or less chronological order. These moments are systemat-
ically combined together at the end of the seventeenth century in England; the 
combination embraces the colonies, the national debt, the modern tax system, and 
the system of protection.89
In Marx’s temporally and spatially more expansive view, capitalism’s genesis 
was not a national phenomenon, but rather an intersocietal one. It therefore 
makes sense to follow Perry Anderson in viewing the origins of capitalism 
‘as a value-added process gaining in complexity as it moved along a chain of 
interrelated sites’.90
 In contrast, Brenner spatially reduces capitalism’s origins to processes that 
occurred solely in the English countryside; towns and cities are omitted, Europe-
wide dynamics are analytically active only as comparative cases, and the world 
outside Europe does not figure at all. Similarly excluded are the numerous 
technological, cultural, institutional and social-relational discoveries and devel-
opments originating outside Europe that were appropriated by Europe in the 
course of its capitalist development.91 In short, Brenner neglects the determi-
nations and conditions that arose from the social interactions between societies, 
since ‘political community’, in his conception, is subordinated to ‘class’, while 
classes themselves are conceptualised within the spatial limits of the political 
community in question.92 This leads to the various moments of Eurocentrism 
outlined in the Introduction. Temporal tunnelling gives rise to the notion of 
historical priority; spatial tunnelling gives rise to a methodologically internalist 
analysis. For Brenner’s followers these problems are only compounded, as 
the possibility of the development of early capitalisms outside of the English 
countryside that Brenner allows for is rejected.93 The notion of the origins of 
‘capitalism in one country’94 is thus taken literally.
 This Eurocentrism of Political Marxist analyses is further reinforced by their 
conception of pre-capitalist societies as generally incapable of significant tech-
nological innovations by either the direct producers or exploiters. For in the 
absence of the market compulsions that are unique to capitalist property rela-
tions, Political Marxists claim that there was no equivalent systemic ‘imperative’ 
to increase labour productivity and generalise technical improvements across 
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different economic sectors.95 Under feudalism, the consequence of this systemic 
inability was that ‘real [economic] growth’ could only be achieved ‘by opening 
up new land for cultivation’.96 Moreover, the ‘cross-cultural’ diffusions of tech-
nologies and organisational forms which could facilitate modal transformations 
in recipient societies is explicitly rejected by Brenner since, as he writes, ‘new 
forces of production were readily assimilable by already existing social classes’.97
 In short, Political Marxists deny the development of the productive forces any 
causal role in explaining the transition from feudalism to capitalism, since doing 
otherwise would inevitably run the risk of ‘technological determinism’, emptying 
human agency in the process.98 To counter this common charge of ‘techno- 
determinism’, it is important to note that the concept of ‘productive forces’ not only 
took on different meanings relating to different historical contexts in Marx’s writings 
(at one point it was identified with early social communities),99 but, moreover, 
should not be conflated with mere ‘technologies’. Rather, the forces of production 
refer to both the means of production – including ‘nature itself, the capacity to labour, 
the skills brought to the process, the tools used, and the techniques with which 
these tools are set to work’ – and the labour process – ‘the way in which the different 
means of production are combined in the act of production itself ’.100
  As this definition indicates, the forces of production (or ‘productive powers’) 
cannot be subsumed under any ‘techno-determinist’ interpretation. They are 
simultaneously material and social: for example, the ways in which tools are 
used involve both accumulated collective knowledge and a particular socio- 
historical context in which they operate. To say that there is a tendency for the 
forces of production to develop over time is simply to say that humans have 
been motivated to change them, and have done so in ways that have increased 
the social productivity of labour. Human agency is thus crucial to the process.101
 What is more, the Political Marxist conception of pre-capitalist societies as 
relatively stagnant social formations, incapable of either endogenous or exoge-
nously driven technological advances, has been challenged by a wealth of more 
recent studies of economic growth in pre-capitalist epochs.102 Indeed, sustained 
technological and organisational innovations, and thus agrarian productivity, 
were important features of late Medieval and early modern ‘European’ societies 
(see Chapters 3 to 6). Denying productive forces any explanatory significance 
prior to capitalism also generates a pervasive Eurocentrism, since it situates 
their development exclusively in modern Europe, as the harbinger of capi-
talist property relations. This obscures from view the extensive development 
of productive forces in non-European contexts, such as with the early modern 
tributary empires of the Ottomans and Mughals (see Chapters 4 and 8) and 
the dynamic colonial plantation systems in the Americas over the 16th to 18th 
centuries. In so doing, it occludes from the outset the possibility that productive 
forces transmitted from these extra-European sources to Europe contributed to 
the formation of capitalism in Europe itself (see Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 8).
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 So the Political Marxist conception of pre-capitalist societies as essentially 
developmental dead-ends is an historical claim that is both Eurocentric and diffi-
cult to sustain empirically. This should force us to reconsider the significance of 
productive forces historically, and re-evaluate the possibility of reincorporating 
their study into our theoretical explanations of the transition to capitalism.
The Geopolitical in the Making of Capitalism
The ontological singularity of the Political Marxist approach gives rise to a 
series of historico-theoretical exclusions from their account of the origins of 
capitalism: namely, intersocietal interaction and the concomitant geopolitical 
relations of political-military competition and war-making. This might at first 
seem like a strange omission given Brenner’s emphasis on the role of ‘political 
accumulation’ and state-building, which he and his followers see as immanent 
to feudal property relations. That war was endemic to the feudal era is gener-
ally recognised. But rather than conceiving this as an eternal ‘will to power’ or 
a consequence of a transhistorical anarchic condition of the states system, as 
mainstream International Relations scholars and neo-Weberians do, Brenner’s 
approach firmly roots the tendency to war in the nature of the prevailing social 
property relations. ‘In view of the difficulty, in the presence of pre-capitalist 
property relations, of raising returns from investment in the means of produc-
tion (via increases in productive efficiency)’, Brenner writes, ‘lords found that if 
they wished to increase their income, they had little choice but to do so by redis-
tributing wealth and income away from their peasants or from other members 
of the exploiting class’.103 Dependent as they were on political forms of surplus 
appropriation, feudal lords would therefore seek to expand the political means 
– land and military – through which their reproduction would be guaranteed. 
Insofar as this expansion put them into competition with other lords seeking to 
do the same, intra-lordly conflicts – feuds and wars – were structural outcomes 
of feudal property relations. Hence, ‘the drive to political accumulation, to state-
building, is the precapitalist analogue to the drive to accumulate capital’.104
 Drawing on Brenner’s analysis of the drive to ‘political accumulation’ under 
feudal property relations, Benno Teschke and Hannes Lacher make a sharp 
theoretical distinction between the historical emergence of capitalism and 
an antecedent system of territorialised states.105 Accordingly, they argue, the 
‘interstate-ness of capitalism’ cannot be derived from the nature of the capital 
relation itself, but must be ‘regarded as a “historical legacy” of pre-capitalist 
development’.106 They thereby claim that capitalism retains a wholly contingent 
relation to the multistate system, in which both the contemporary system of 
sovereign states and uneven development are understood as ‘historical legacies’ 
of a distant feudal-absolutist past.107
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 This leads Political Marxists to discard formations such as the English East 
India Company as ‘essentially non-capitalist in its logic’. For Ellen Meiksins 
Wood this was because the English East India Company relied on ‘surpluses 
extracted directly from producers in the age-old manner of non-capitalist 
extra-economic exploitation in the form of tax and tribute’, making it ‘an 
unambiguously non-capitalist institution’ – a verdict Wood similarly shares 
regarding the Dutch East India Company (see Chapter 7).108 For various Political 
Marxists, then, geopolitical rivalries and territorialised (‘extra-economic’) forms 
of accumulation are part of the undying feudal-absolutist legacy bequeathed to 
capitalism – war is the nightmare from which capital has yet to awaken.
 From such a perspective, how can we begin to understand, let alone respond 
politically, to the many ‘war-assisted’ processes of capital accumulation, 
geopolitical coercion, competition, rivalry and the like littering the history of 
capitalism’s development? More specifically, could not the war-making activities 
among feudal lords or absolutist states make for capitalist states? In other words, 
might not an unintended consequence of ‘political accumulation’ be to generate or 
spur the development of capitalist production relations? This is what Political 
Marxists appear to reject.109
 For example, Erica Schoenberger has examined how markets developed out of 
the state-building tasks of territorial conquest and control during the Medieval 
period, while being tied to specific modes of war-making. In this connection, 
markets emerged out of, or were created to respond to, the myriad logistical 
problems faced by states in ‘the mobilization of resources and their manage-
ment across space and time’.110 Commodity markets in material resources, 
property and labour were all crucial to the movement of wealth and goods that 
was necessary for Medieval war-making. This is not to say that the development 
of markets in itself led to the emergence of capitalist social relations. However, 
it would suggest that the effects of war – territorial integration – provided a 
more amenable environment for the extensive development of markets, while 
certain modes of war could actually spur commercialisation and the intensive 
development of productive forces.
 The reliance of state managers on private entrepreneurs in the financing and 
making of war also involved the widening and deepening of market relations. 
The symbiotic relationship between advances in war-making activities and the 
rise of capitalism has been perhaps most systematically explored by William H. 
McNeil, who writes that ‘by the sixteenth century even the mightiest European 
command structures became dependent on an international money and credit 
market for organizing military and other major undertakings’. As a consequence, 
market relations continued to expand, gradually penetrating ever wider spheres 
of European society. Although it is important to avoid the pitfalls of McNeil’s 
subscription to the ‘commercialisation model’, it is clear that these changes were 
important to understanding ‘the emergence of the bourgeoisie as a ruling class’.111
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 But perhaps even more important for explaining the rise of capitalist rela-
tions were the shifts in the forms of production associated with the changing 
nature of warfare. Marx was aware of the revolutionising effects of military 
activities on the relations of production, noting that dependence on wage-labour 
first developed in armies rather than in the ‘interior of bourgeois society’.112 As 
with Marx’s conception of primitive accumulation, the role of state interven-
tion, violence and war was therefore conceived as ‘functionally promiscuous’, as 
Michael Mann put it in critiquing Marx’s putative economism.113 In particular, 
the expansion of naval capacities contributed to the development of capitalist 
relations, since land reclamation, felling trees, building harbours, dry-docks and 
ships all required a steady and large supply of wage-labourers.114
 As early as the first half of the 16th century, some 16,000 workers employed 
at the state-run Venetian Arsenal115 were ‘becoming disciplined to the demands 
of integrated wage labor’.116 Constructing standardised galleys using assembly 
line production methods, the Arsenale Nuovo (established in 1320) may rightly 
lay claim to being one of ‘Europe’s first modern industrial factories’, preceding 
the Industrial Revolution by four centuries.117 The Arsenal also employed 
sophisticated managerial and accounting discourses, and practices exemplary 
of modern forms of ‘management through accounting’. For these reasons, 
some historians have referred to the Venetian Arsenal as a ‘hybrid organisa-
tion’ which fused capitalist and pre-capitalist forms of labour organisation,118 a 
kind of micro-example of a combined development. Similarly, in Amsterdam, 
the extensive application of economies of scale made Dutch naval shipyards 
‘pioneers’ of distinctly ‘capitalist forms of production’. Using ‘free’ wage- 
labour, hierarchised and strictly managed labour processes, and the systematic 
employment of science to develop labour-saving technologies, shipyards played 
a ‘prominent role … in advancing capitalist methods of production’.119
 It was not simply the building of ships that employed and promoted forms of 
wage-labour, but also the organisation of the maritime workforce itself. Between 
1700 and 1750, the concentration of capital in merchant shipping required the 
amassing of large groups of formally ‘free’ waged-labourers, numbering anywhere 
from 25,000 to 40,000 at any one time. As Marcus Rediker writes, this excep-
tionally large and concentrated workforce ‘represented a capital–labor relation 
quite distinct from landlord-tenant, master–servant, or master–apprentice rela-
tionships’.120 War-making and the industries it spawned were therefore crucial 
factors in the long transition to capitalism.
The Political Marxist Conception of Capitalism
The narrow focus on the English countryside and the exclusion of interna-
tional determinations derives in part from Political Marxism’s near Platonic 
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conception of capitalism as a theoretical abstraction to which empirical reality 
must conform or remain external. If the concept of capitalism used by Waller-
stein and WST scholars is too broad, that of Political Marxists is too narrow. 
For Political Marxists, capitalism can be said to have emerged only when the 
direct producers and appropriators have lost nonmarket access to their means of 
subsistence and production, and become entirely dependent on the market for 
their self-reproduction.121 Market dependency and the concomitant separation 
of the ‘economic’ and ‘political’ are thereby taken as the sine qua non of capi-
talism. As Wood puts it, the ‘special character’ of the capitalist state rests on the 
fact that ‘the coercive power supporting capitalist exploitation is not wielded 
directly by the appropriator and is not based on the producer’s political or jurid-
ical subordination to an appropriating master’; rather, the ‘the two moments of 
capitalist exploitation – appropriation and coercion – are allocated separately 
to a “private” appropriating class and a specialized “public” coercive institution, 
the state’.122
 Political Marxists therefore draw a sharp distinction between (non- 
capitalist) extra-economic forms of surplus extraction and (capitalist) noncoer-
cive forms of surplus extraction mediated by the market. Any mode of surplus 
extraction that does not conform to the latter market-dependent form, and any 
social formation characterised by extra-economic forms of surplus extraction, 
is therefore conceived as non-capitalist. This not only leads to the exclusion of 
geopolitical forms of accumulation and capital formation, but also justifies the 
narrow focus on England (and then Europe) as the historically privileged site in 
which this separation of the political and economic first took place.
 Yet to reduce a mode of production to its immediate form of exploitation runs 
the risk of conceptualising capitalism as an ‘ideal-type’ abstraction, erasing ‘the 
many shades and connections between free and coerced labour that characterize 
actually existing capitalist social relations and labour regimes’.123 For example, 
Marx conceived of ‘extra-economic’ forms of exploitation in North American and 
Caribbean slavery as at least partially capitalist, because of their place in a wider 
set of international economic relations dominated by capitalism.124 The expan-
sion of slavery in the colonies and free wage-labour in the imperial metropole 
were two sides of the same coin (see also Chapters 5 and 7). While wage-la-
bour is certainly an integral feature of capitalism – in part defining it – to claim 
that capitalism can only exist where the majority of direct producers are ‘free’ 
is unnecessary, if not unhelpful. Rather, wage-labour should be conceived as a 
norm in capitalist societies, ‘beyond which there are many gradations of formal 
freedom’,125 and wherein ‘the “sale” of labour-power for wages is mediated and 
possibly disguised in more complex arrangements’.126 What the Political Marxist 
conception of capitalism thus erases are the various transitional or mediated 
forms of labour relations and regimes, involving different combinations of modes 
of production. Indeed, the idea of ‘combined development’ – as an amalgamation 
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of differentiated modes of production within a social formation – is absent from 
the Political Marxist discourse,127 which unduly abstracts from the messy and 
contradictory reality of ‘really existing’ capitalisms.
 Politically, there is much at stake in this. The externalisation of ‘extra- 
economic’ forms of exploitation and oppression from capitalism ultimately 
leads Political Marxists to exclude the histories of colonialism and slavery from 
the inner workings of the capitalist production mode. They argue instead that 
such practices were rooted in the feudal logic of geopolitical accumulation.128 
While we would not go as far as to claim that Political Marxists ignore colo-
nialism and slavery per se,129 they do nonetheless absolve capitalism of any 
responsibility for these histories. However, as will be shown throughout this 
book, these phenomena were very much integral to the formation of capitalism 
as the globally dominant mode of production (see especially Chapters 5, 7 and 
8). Equally, it is possible to point to the continuing prevalence of racial, gender 
and sexual hierarchies, often reproduced via nonmarket (as well as market) 
mechanisms, and ask how far these forms of oppression can be included in the 
Political Marxist critique of capitalism. The answer, it would seem, is that they 
cannot. In a critique of ‘diversity, “difference”, and pluralism’, Wood argues, for 
example, ‘that gender and racial equality are not in principle incompatible with 
capitalism … although class exploitation is constitutive of capitalism … gender 
or race inequality are not’.130
 These are difficult claims to sustain empirically. A variety of authors from 
traditions as diverse as Marxism,131 feminism132 and Subaltern Studies133 have 
convincingly demonstrated that the origins of capitalism were heavily circum-
scribed – and in fact often constituted – by such coercive, nonmarket forms of 
exploitation and oppression. Others have shown how inequalities based on 
gender134 and ‘race’135 continue to be inscribed in the very ‘logic’ of capital accu-
mulation. But constrained as they are by disavowing the ‘extra-economic’ side 
of capitalism’s history, it is somewhat inevitable that Political Marxists might 
consider their historical status secondary. Such claims strike an especially discor-
dant note when considered in light of recent debates on the Left about getting 
gender politics ‘right’ as well as the general disdain about postcolonial studies 
found in some quarters.136 Narrow conceptions of capitalism typical of Polit-
ical Marxism risk descending into a politics of myopia, in which the manifold, 
complex and ‘intersectional’ forms of oppression (re)produced by capitalism 
are obscured, disavowed and externalised, rather than exposed, criticised and 
dismantled.
 These points all derive from the central problem with Political Marxism: 
that conceptual abstractions and empirical realities do not correspond to each 
other, or are misrecognised. As Teschke put it (in a critique levelled at the 
theory of uneven and combined development, but actually much more appro-
priate to Political Marxism), ‘significant degrees of violence have to be done to 
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the richness of history to orchestrate a “fit” between theory and history. Ulti-
mately, however, theory and history drift apart, inhabiting two different forms 
of reality’.137 History is, of course, a messy, complex affair, full of accidents, 
contingencies and the untheorisable. A grand theory of everything is unlikely. 
Problems emerge, however, when the central objects of our theories (the origins 
of capitalism, the modern states system, intersocietal relations and so on) are 
considered pure contingencies in relation to the abstractions we seek to explain 
them with. Wood once criticised the Althusserians as viewing the relationship 
between the state and modes of production in actually existing social forma-
tions as having ‘little to do’ with capitalism’s structural logic, thereby appearing 
‘almost accidental’.138 Might not the same be said of Political Marxists’ concep-
tualisation of the relationship between ‘the international’ and capitalism? Or, 
for that matter, their theorisations of the origins of capitalism itself?
 Ultimately, despite its rigour and its many insights into the origins of capi-
talism, Political Marxism must be judged as sorely lacking. Its pristinely abstract 
and consequently Eurocentric theorisation of capitalism and its origins is, we 
argue, historically untenable as it excises such huge swathes of capitalism’s 
history (including colonialism, slavery and war) that it becomes historically 
(and theoretically) unrecognisable. This abstraction from violence – from these 
geopolitical conditions in the making of capitalism – results in a violence of 
abstraction. Consequently, non-European agents who were most affected and 
made abject by these processes are written out of the making of capitalism. It 
is this theoretical and historical exclusion of non-Europeans that postcolonial 
theorists have so resolutely sought to correct. We now turn to consider their 
position.
The Problematic of Sociohistorical Difference:  
Postcolonial Studies Engaging Capital
Correcting the Eurocentric bias of extant social theory is at the heart of what 
has been broadly termed postcolonialism. Yet at first glance, its inclusion 
might seem incongruous in a study of capitalism’s origins, since the specific 
focus of postcolonialism has been the examination of an already existing and 
presupposed capitalist modernity in non-European contexts.139 We shall come 
back to this issue, and find it problematic. But before we do, it is necessary 
to highlight the immense methodological and theoretical contributions post- 
colonialism offers for the study of the origins of capitalism. Two central elements of 
postcolonialism are especially worth highlighting in this regard.
 First, postcolonial scholars have sought to ‘provincialise’ Europe by decen-
tring the Eurocentric claim that Western social forms and accompanying 
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discourses are homogenously universal.140 By emphasising how European 
modernity has always been constituted against – and through the subordination 
of – a non-Western ‘Other’,141 these authors have stressed how colonial prac-
tices are deeply embedded in the structures of European power and identity.142 
Postcolonialism therefore places the particularity of alternative representations 
of modernity in non-Western cases at the heart of its research programme.143 
By ‘giving a voice to the Other’, postcolonialism shows how subaltern experi-
ences have disrupted Eurocentric visions of history, reasserting the significance 
of non-Western agency in world history.144
 Second, postcolonialism emphasises the heterogeneity of social develop-
ment and its irreducibility to exclusively European forms. Accordingly, history 
is neither universal nor homogenous, but marked by difference, hybridity and 
ambivalence – in short, multiplicity. As such, postcolonialism also seeks to 
dislodge the linearity of historical time, and rejects any possibility of stadial 
conceptions of development.145 These two pointers – a non-Eurocentric and 
multilinear history – are the primary strengths of the postcolonial approach. 
It is here that its promise for the study of the origins of capitalism lies. We 
examine each in turn, with a particular – but not exclusive – focus on Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe. In this way, we hope to avoid some of the 
pitfalls of attempting a general overview of a highly heterogeneous research 
programme. Nonetheless, we also consider Chakrabarty’s work to be, in the 
words of Vasant Kaiwar, ‘undoubtedly the most important work to emerge out 
of the postcolonial phase of Subaltern Studies’,146 and thus deserving of special 
attention.
The Eurocentrism of Historicism
Postcolonialism is, first and foremost, a specific reaction against attempts in 
Western thought to subsume all sociohistorical experiences under the universal 
rubric of capitalist modernity. These universalist accounts suffer, because they 
tend to misread, or worse, overlook difference. Chakrabarty calls this ‘histor-
icism’ – a way of writing history that both ‘both recognizes and neutralizes 
difference’, in which ‘differences among histories’ are ‘overcome by capital in the 
long run’.147 Historicism tends to portray capitalism ‘as a force that encounters 
historical difference’ externally, struggles with this difference, and eventually 
negates, or more precisely, subsumes it ‘into historically diverse vehicles for the 
spread of its own logic’.148
 Such an approach carries with it a specific kind of politicised prescription. 
By positing Europe ‘as the site of the first occurrence of capitalism, modernity, 
or Enlightenment’, non-Europeans were assigned a place ‘elsewhere’.149 Histor-
ical developments subsequently came to be judged almost exclusively against a 
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European norm, and those histories that did not fit or comply with that norm 
were dismissed as ‘incomplete’ or ‘aberrations’. Differences are thereby articu-
lated through – and abolished by – essentialised binaries such as ‘precapitalism’ 
and ‘capitalism’, ‘modern’ and ‘premodern’, ‘archaic’ and ‘contemporary’, ‘world 
empires’ and ‘world-system’, and so on.
 The very notion of incompleteness carries within it the sort of hierarchies that 
were present in colonialism (such as notions of ‘barbarism’, ‘uncivility’, ‘back-
wardness’, ‘inadequacy’ and the like). Consequently historicism posits ‘a measure 
of the cultural distance … that was assumed to exist between the West and the 
non-West’,150 and acts as a way of saying to non-Europeans, ‘not yet!’ in their 
calls for autonomy and recognition.151 This becomes most evident when exam-
ining the ‘peasant’ or ‘subaltern’. For example, Eric Hobsbawm’s characterisation 
of the (Indian) peasant in history as ‘pre-political’ and ‘archaic’ is rooted in an 
understanding of non-European development as ‘incomplete’.152 These agents 
are then seen as a survival or remnant of pre-capitalist relations. More recent 
iterations of this same strategy can be found, according to Chakrabarty, in notions 
of ‘uneven development’, which ascribes ‘at least an underlying structural unity 
(if not expressive totality) to historical process and time that makes it possible 
to identify certain elements in the present as “anachronistic” or “outmoded”’.153
 Historicism becomes especially problematic when we consider the centrality 
of the peasant in the making of modernity. Peasant agency – although distinctly 
nonbourgeois, nonsecular, and historically connected to practices that existed 
prior to colonialism – was still unequivocally both political and modern.154 As 
David Washbrook has argued, the very prevalence of a ‘backward’ or ‘tradi-
tional’ stratum of society (in contrast to the ‘modern’) was itself a construction 
of colonialism in South Asia.155 The act of subsuming the peasant under the 
rubric of the ‘premodern’, ‘pre-capitalist’ or ‘precapital’ therefore reflects 
nothing other than the violent attempt to fit subalterns ‘into the rationalist grid 
of elite consciousness’, in a way that makes them intelligible to colonialists and 
bourgeois nationalists.156 The upshot is that an otherwise politically significant 
peasantry becomes silenced, misrepresented or marginalised by history writing.
 For this reason, Partha Chatterjee seeks to recast the historical question of 
non-European modernity in different terms by explaining ‘the limits to the 
historical actualisation of Capital as a universal economic category’.157 One 
of the primary concerns of Chakrabarty is therefore to ‘Provincialize Europe’ 
by showing ‘how universalistic thought was always and already modified by 
particular histories’.158 Put differently, this approach seeks to demonstrate that 
concepts and categories that purport to be universal always contain within them 
traces of the not-universal.
 This is evident in two respects. First, Chakrabarty seeks to show how seem-
ingly ‘universal’ concepts of political modernity ‘encounter pre-existing concepts, 
categories, institutions and practices through which they get translated and 
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configured differently’.159 Second, he demonstrates how ostensibly universal 
categories are in fact themselves particular and provincial, in that they were 
the product of a specifically European experience.160 Similarly, Chatterjee high-
lights that the supposed universalism of European social forms in fact masks a 
particular historical experience, which only became universal due to the specific 
history of capitalism:
If there is one great moment that turns the provincial thought of Europe to 
universal philosophy, the parochial history of Europe to universal history, it is the 
moment of capital – capital that is global in its territorial reach and universal in 
its conceptual domain. It is the narrative of capital that can turn the violence of 
mercantile trade, war, genocide, conquest and colonialism into a story of universal 
progress, development, modernization, and freedom.161
It should be clear from the outset then, and in contrast to Vivek Chibber’s recent 
broadside against Subaltern Studies,162 that the likes of Chatterjee, Chakrabarty 
and Ranajit Guha do not deny capital’s universalising tendency. Indeed nowhere 
do each of the Subaltern Studies scholars castigated by Chibber deny that capital 
demonstrates a real tendency toward universalisation. Rather, their claim is an 
altogether different one: that capital’s universalising tendency is necessarily 
limited, always and everywhere partial – all points made by Chibber himself. For 
example, Chakrabarty highlights the ‘“resistance to capital”’ that Marx speaks of 
as ‘something internal to capital itself ’. Hence, ‘the self-reproduction of capital’, 
as Chakrabarty notes, going on to evoke another quote from Marx:
‘moves in contradictions which are constantly overcome but just as constantly posited’. 
Just because, he [Marx] adds, capital gets ideally beyond every limit posed to it 
by ‘national barriers and prejudices’, ‘it does not by any means follow that it has 
really overcome it’.163
Interestingly, this passage taken from Marx’s Grundrisse is also quoted in full 
by Guha, after which he writes that ‘Nothing could be more explicit and indeed 
more devastating than this critique of the universalist pretensions of capital’.164 
Moreover, Guha views this contradictory unity of universalising and counter- 
universalising tendencies as operating within both ‘the East’ and ‘West’ 
(specifically Europe). As Guha puts it, for Marx:
the discrepancy between the universalizing tendency of capital as an ideal and the 
frustration of that tendency in reality was, for him, a measure of the contradictions 
of Western bourgeois societies of his time and the differences which gave each of them 
its specificity.165
The ‘structural fault in the historic project of the bourgeoisie’ Guha highlights166 
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was then not between ‘the Indian bourgeoisie and its predecessors’ in Europe.167 
It was instead a broader spatiotemporal fault line traversing the entire world: 
one between the ‘early’ bourgeois revolutions in England and France, on the one 
hand, and the later bourgeois revolutions running east of the Elbe in Europe to 
those beyond Europe (as with India), on the other.
The Violence of Abstraction
The postcolonial project of provincialising Europe is then not about rejecting 
the universality of capitalist modernity out of hand, or in Chakrabarty’s terms, 
it is not a project of cultural relativism.168 These authors accept that capitalism 
has a universal reach, only too brutally demonstrated by the histories of colo-
nialism and imperialism. What they reject is using this universal conception of 
capital as the ‘sole’ or ‘sovereign’ author of historical processes, in a way that 
turns all other particular histories into differentiated expressions of European 
history.169 The aim is to ‘displace a hyperreal Europe from the center toward 
which all historical imagination currently gravitates’,170 by (re)writing these 
non-universal, particular and local histories ‘back in’. In doing so, these scholars 
seek to highlight the liminality of universal categories in capturing the broad 
range of sociohistorical processes operating in the ‘extra-European’ world 
while examining the myriad hybrid sociopolitical forms produced by capital’s 
differentiated but interactive universalisation.
 This aim of identifying parts of social life not subsumed by the universality 
of capital leads Chakrabarty to a highly stimulating reading of Marx’s category 
of ‘abstract labour’ in capturing the homogenising tendency of capital.171 
According to Marx, the practice or performance of abstraction becomes 
apparent in workplace discipline, wherein the ‘life’ or ‘living labour’ of the 
worker is abstracted from and subsumed by ‘dead labour’ – the machine. Such 
an abstraction enables the homogenisation and equalisation of various, partic-
ular or concrete instances of labour, thus establishing labour (labour-time) as 
the measure of wealth under capitalism. It is also through this abstraction that 
wealth itself is created. In order to extend relative surplus labour, labour-saving 
technologies are introduced, which reduce to a minimum the amount of living 
labour necessary for production. In this respect, the abstraction of labour also 
acts as the mechanism through which labour is ‘emancipated’.172 This tendency 
to simultaneously exploit and emancipate labour constitutes what Marx calls 
the ‘moving contradiction’ of capital.173
 For Chakrabarty, this is significant because inscribed in the very universality 
of abstract labour is its opposite – the element of ‘life’ or ‘living’ for the worker, 
and the attempt of workers to reappropriate their ‘life’ – which forms the basis of 
resistance to capital. Given in the very universality of abstract labour is a partic-
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ularity – the life of individual workers – that remains never quite conquered 
by capital. It is on the basis of this distinction that Chakrabarty introduces the 
concepts of ‘History 1’ and ‘History 2’. History 1 refers to that past presupposed 
by capital, ‘a past posited by capital itself as its precondition’ and ‘its invari-
able result’.174 Although Chakrabarty leaves this largely unspecified, it is clear 
from his preceding discussion that this refers to abstract labour. History 1s 
abstract from specific instances in order to ‘make all places [histories] exchange-
able [comparable] with one another’,175 designating what Alfred Sohn-Rethel 
called ‘real abstractions’.176 These are more than just ‘abstract descriptions’ or 
‘abstract delineations’ – that is, concepts – but concrete relations and processes 
that affect the functioning of capitalism as a mode of production. The very act 
of abstracting – as both Marx and Chakrabarty argue – from the individual 
concrete labour of each worker is the precondition for their exchangeability on 
the market, and hence the precondition for capitalism as such.
 By contrast, History 2 refers to those histories that are encountered by capital 
‘not as antecedents’ established by itself, nor ‘as forms of its own life-process’.177 
History 2s are not ‘outside’ of capital or History 1. Instead, they exist ‘in prox-
imate relationship to it’,178 while ‘interrupt[ing] and punctuat[ing] the run of 
capital’s own logic’,179 providing ‘affective narratives of human belonging where 
life forms, although porous to one another, do not seem exchangeable through 
a third term of equivalence such as abstract labour’.180
 Although Chakrabarty is clear in his definition, he is somewhat elusive when 
it comes to the exact content of History 2. Nonetheless, with his discussion of 
abstract labour in mind, he appears to be talking about those elements involved 
in the reproduction of labour-power that are not subsumed by abstract labour 
itself. Others, most notably feminist authors, have theorised this as the ‘repro-
ductive’ or ‘unwaged’ sphere.181 History 2 also draws affinities with biopolitics, 
those elements of politics and society found ‘in the person’s bodily habits, in 
unselfconscious collective practices, in his or her reflexes about what it means to 
relate to objects in the world as a human being and together with other human 
beings in his given environment’.182 
 History 2s may well include non-capitalist, pre-capitalist or local social rela-
tions and processes, but the concept is not exhausted by these, and can refer to 
universal and global categories, social relations and process. Indeed, following 
Marx, two of the examples Chakrabarty gives of History 2s are commodities 
and money – two universal categories central to the reproduction of capi-
talism.183 Therefore, Chibber’s criticism that Chakrabarty uses History 2 to refer 
to merely local (‘Eastern’) manifestations of abstract and universal (or ‘Western’) 
processes184 is wholly inaccurate. History 1 is not simply ‘an abstract definition’, 
the ‘universal’ or ‘the West’; nor is History 2, by contrast, seen as a concrete 
manifestation, local and/or Eastern, as Chibber reads it.185 Notably, Chakrabarty 
himself nowhere defines History 1 and History 2 as any of these.186
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 Most revealingly, the category through which Chakrabarty seeks to eluci-
date such ‘difference’, ‘modifications’ and ‘interruptions’ is Marx’s (universal) 
category of real labour, the category that alongside – and in tension with – 
abstract labour inheres in all commodities in the capitalist mode of production. 
It is clear, then, that when Chakrabarty is talking about History 2s – about real 
labour, about difference – he is doing so in a way that both depends upon and 
reveals a dialectical relation with History 1s, with abstract labour, and with 
universality as such. That is, ‘just as real labor cannot be thought of outside 
of the problematic of abstract labor, subaltern history cannot be thought of 
outside of the global narrative of capital’.187 Hence, it is important to reject from 
the outset Chibber’s denunciation that Chakrabarty is providing ‘a license for 
exoticisim’.188 In fact, Chakrabarty is unequivocal in his description of History 2; 
these are ‘histories that capital everywhere – even in the West – encounters as its 
antecedent, which do not belong to its life process’.189
 In this respect, History 2s are not simply differentiated functional moments 
in the development of capitalism, nor are they concrete – local – instantiations 
of an otherwise universal process. Rather, they designate ‘institutional forms, 
regimes of value and alternative temporalities that have their lineage in other 
histories and modes of being’.190 History 2s are spheres of social being that are 
inhabited and remade by capital, but also processes that remake capital itself. 
As Marcus Taylor argues, ‘while capital may indeed seek to rewrite social life 
to further the cause of “endless accumulation”, it does not do so – to twist a 
famous maxim – in conditions of its own choosing’.191
 Indeed, Chakrabarty’s critique of Marxism’s ‘blind spot’192 is focused on its 
inability (or unwillingness) to take History 2 ‘seriously’.193 The Marxist analysis 
of the capitalist mode of production tends to create – and methodologically 
situate itself within – ‘abstract space’, which erases ‘the local’ and ‘evacuates 
all lived sense of place’.194 Although History 1 may seek to negate, destroy or 
sublate History 2, there is no guarantee that ‘this could ever be complete’.195 
Therefore, the correct method, according to Chakrabarty, is to write history in 
a way that combines History 1s and History 2s, wherein the ‘universal history 
of capital and the politics of human belonging are allowed to interrupt each 
other’s narrative’; and wherein capitals’ ‘histories are History 1s constitutively 
but unevenly modified by more and less powerful History 2s’.196
 There is, then, much at stake in retaining some of the insights gleaned from 
Chakrabarty’s interpretation of Marx. For his emphasis on the tensions between 
History 1s and History 2s appears crucial to mitigating against the potentially 
ahistorical, essentialising and (economically) homogenous reading of capi-
tal(ism) found in so much of the traditional literatures on its origins. For this 
reason, Chakrabarty’s method strikes us as an altogether positive advance for 
scholars going about writing the history of capitalism. In Chapters 5 and 7 we 
attempt to construct a history of the making of capitalism in which the sorts 
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of history targeted by ‘History 2’ – those found in the ‘unwaged’ or ‘reproduc-
tive’ sphere – are understood as constitutive of ‘History 1’ – the formation of 
‘abstract labour’ and an industrial proletariat. Taking a multiple and differen-
tiated agency as a starting point, and subsequently exploring encounters and 
interactions within this multiplicity is, moreover, precisely the sort of method 
that we ourselves outline in the following chapter. It is therefore worth briefly 
noting some of the affinities between Chakrabarty’s approach (and post- 
colonialism more broadly) and the theory of uneven and combined 
development as articulated in this work.
The Lacuna of Postcolonial Theory
Positing a ‘not-yet’ to ‘backward’ peoples was a prevalent and distinctly ‘Histor-
icist’ sentiment in Russia precisely at the time Trotsky was developing the 
theory of uneven and combined development. Pointedly, Trotsky rejected the 
Menshevik idea of ‘waiting’ for a bourgeois stage before a proletarian revolution 
could occur, and insisted on the ‘now’. The Bolshevik Revolution and strategy of 
permanent revolution are direct outcomes of this, while uneven and combined 
development was its methodological and theoretical foundation. This is espe-
cially revealing given the centrality of the peasant – the supposedly nonmodern 
agent par excellence – in Russian social life generally, and the Bolshevik Revo-
lution specifically. In the History of the Russian Revolution, Trotsky’s explicitly 
characterises Russia’s revolutionary conditions in terms of the imbalance 
between town and country, and revolutionary agency in terms of the combina-
tion of a newly formed proletariat and pre-existing peasantry. We can trace this 
back even further to Marx, who himself saw the potential for a communist revo-
lution in Russia ahead of the capitalist heartlands due to the very prevalence 
and dominance of the peasant commune.197
 The reason both Marx and Trotsky identified forms of divergence and differ-
ences similar to those found in the postcolonial literature was because both were 
sensitive – with some important limitations198 – to the intersection of History 
1s and History 2s. As we shall see, it is through the idea of ‘combination’ that 
Trotsky’s theory provides a nonstadial, multilinear understanding of develop-
ment that explicitly denies essentialised and externally related dichotomies of 
pre-capitalist and capitalist. Similarly, we find in Marx an outright rejection of any 
‘supra-historical’ application of his categories in Capital. This was because ‘events 
strikingly analogous but taking place in different historic surroundings led to totally 
different results’. They could not, therefore, be explained ‘by the universal passport 
of a general historico-philosophical theory’.199 The explicit disavowal of histor-
icism in the writings of Trotsky and Marx should alert us to the possibility that 
postcolonialism and Marxism need not be seen as mutually exclusive endeavours.
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 With this in mind, we suggest that uneven and combined development 
provides a theoretical approach that may strengthen the broader aims of the 
postcolonial research programme. We make this suggestion because there 
remains a tension within postcolonialism that ultimately undermines its efforts 
in both fully subverting Eurocentrism and reasserting non-European agency 
into the history of capitalism. The tension is rooted in the parochial – dare we 
say ‘provincial’? – scope of its critique. That is, the subject rarely extends beyond 
the particular experience of modernity in specific localities, and particularly 
those experiences in the colonial modernities of the Global South. Chakrabarty 
notes that ‘Provincializing Europe is not a book about the region of the world we 
call “Europe”’,200 but is instead concerned with the generalisation of its forms 
and categories. Similarly, Chatterjee claims that ‘[t]he universality of Western 
modernity … is a product of its local conditions’, which is then subsequently 
‘transported to other place and times’.201 And although Guha’s classic Dominance 
Without Hegemony provides a sharp critique of the liberal historiographies of 
bourgeois rule, it never provides an alternative substantive historical sociology 
of the European experience.
 Consequently, each of these authors uncritically presupposes a discrete and 
hermetically sealed European history in which modernity was created before 
being subsequently expanded globally.202 As we have seen, and will see further, 
such an idealised view is an integral part of the myth of Europe as an excep-
tional, pristine and autonomous entity that happened to be especially well 
suited to the endogenous transition to, and subsequent spread of, capitalism.203 
Insofar as ‘the West is constituted as an imperial fetish, the imagined home of 
history’s victors’ and ‘the embodiment of their power’,204 many of the processes 
of developmental differentiation that created hierarchical imbalances between 
colonisers and colonised are occluded.205 The lack of any substantive engage-
ment with the question of how capitalism emerged and developed in Europe 
is therefore a – perhaps the – critical lacuna of postcolonial theory, continually 
frustrating its abilities to offer a satisfactory non-Eurocentric theory and history 
of the modern epoch.
 To modify Frederick Cooper’s call to arms: in order to truly ‘provincialise’ 
Europe we must dissect European history itself, and there is no more central 
myth to be dissected than that of narrating European history around the history 
of capitalism.206 As Kamran Matin argues, such a task ultimately requires ‘a 
general social theory, and not just a theory of modernity’, one ‘that goes beyond 
a mere phenomenology of capital’s expansion and comprehends capital itself as 
a product of the interactive multiplicity of the social’.207 In short, the foregoing 
analysis demands an ‘internationalist historiography’208 and theorisation of 
capitalism’s emergence and reproduction. This would, in turn, require that we 
‘distinguish between the inflated, utopian self-presentation of capital as abstract 
and homogenous and the contradictions internal to historical capitalism that 
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produce a global, differentiated, and hierarchical space-time’.209 These are some 
of the main tasks taken up in the pages that follow.
Conclusion
As examined in this chapter, existing theoretical approaches to the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism have suffered from two particularly debilitating and 
interconnected problems. The first concerns their general inability to substan-
tively theorise the coexistence and interaction of a multiplicity of societies as a 
distinct domain of ‘geo-social’ developmental pressures, behavioural patterns 
and causal dynamics (‘the problematic of the international’). The second relates 
to these extant approaches’ predominant, if not exclusive, focus on Europe as the 
‘prime mover’ of sociohistorical change and transformation (‘the problematic of 
sociohistorical difference’). The two problems are interrelated in that the method-
ological internalism or ‘domestic analogy’ fallacy that the first predicament gives 
rise to – implicitly or explicitly – lends itself to theoretical analyses that conceive 
the genesis and sources of capitalism as an exclusively European affair (historical 
priority), and/or extrapolate from the distinct developmental paths and modal-
ities of European societies and project them onto the ‘extra-European’ world 
in a unidirectional manner (linear developmentalism). The European experience 
of capitalist modernity is thereby elevated to a universal stage of development 
through which all societies must pass in one form or another (universal stagism). 
The false sense of universality that such forms of analysis have given rise to has 
been the bane of social theory’s existence since its inception.210
 Whether the approach in question conceptualises the primary ‘unit of 
analysis’ as operating at the domestic or world level – as exemplified by Political 
Marxism and WST, respectively – the dilemma remains the same. By working 
outwards from a conception of a specific social structure (be it slavery, feudalism, 
capitalism or whatever), the theorisation of ‘the international’ takes the form of 
a reimagining of domestic society writ large: an extrapolation from analytical 
categories derived from a society conceived in the ontologically singular form. 
This then erases what is arguably unique to any intersocietal system: a super- 
ordinating ‘anarchical’ structure irreducible to the historically variegated forms 
of societies constituting any given system.
 This is a particularly debilitating problem for Marxist theories of socio- 
historical change, as one of the hallmarks of such theories is a claim to a holistic 
conception of social relations and systems, in which ‘social totality’ is conceived 
as being composed of interactive and co-constitutive parts; that is, one that 
theoretically interiorises the interdependency of each element within it ‘so that 
the conditions of its existence are taken to be part of what it is’.211 If such a claim 
is to be taken seriously, then the theoretical standing of ‘the international’ for 
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a historical materialist approach to the origins of capitalism requires a direct 
engagement with the question of what ‘the international’ is, understood and 
theorised in its own substantive historical and sociological terms.
 One theoretical answer to this question, we argue, is offered by a reconstruc-
tion of the concept of uneven and combined development. In contrast to WST 
and Political Marxism, uneven and combined development offers a way of theo-
rising ‘the international’ without jettisoning a historically sensitive sociology. 
Not only might this provide a way of uniting the externalist and internalist 
accounts offered here, it would also be able to capture and articulate the manifold 
excess of (intersocietally produced) determinations overlooked by both WST 
and Political Marxism. In its appreciation for the intersocietal and geopolitical, 
uneven and combined development also provides a way of capturing the multi-
linearity of development that is so central to displacing Eurocentric accounts. 
As such, it shares many affinities with postcolonial approaches. In particular, 
uneven and combined development provides a particularly fertile framework 
through which the sort of interconnections between History 1s and History 
2s emphasised by Chakrabarty might be identified, explored and explained. 
However, beyond Chakrabarty, the advantage of uneven and combined devel-
opment lies precisely in its broader temporal scope. This uniquely positions 
it as a framework through which we might reconstitute the master categories 
of Eurocentrism – such as capitalism – on the very terrain they were purport-
edly generated – that of Europe. We explore further the potential of uneven 
and combined development – theoretically and historically – in the pages that 
follow.
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c h a p t e r  2
Rethinking the Origins of  
Capitalism: The Theory of Uneven 
and Combined Development
Sociological problems would certainly be simpler if social phenomena had always 
a finished character. There is nothing more dangerous, however, than to throw out 
of reality, for the sake of logical completeness, elements which today violate your 
scheme and tomorrow may wholly overturn it.
Leon Trotsky, 19361
Introduction
To better account for the biography of capitalism’s development, we need an 
approach that captures the geopolitically interconnected and sociologically 
co-constitutive nature of its emergence. The very absence of ‘the international’ 
in theorising sociohistorical development has been identified by various scholars 
as a fundamental lacuna of not only Marxist theory but, more radically still, the 
classical sociology tradition as a whole.2 According to this line of critique, both 
traditions work with the ontologically singular3 assumption that the growth and 
change of a society ‘should be explained with reference to its internal constitu-
tion’. While the interactions between societies may not be viewed as entirely 
‘inconsequential’, they are ‘in principle insignificant for sociology, since its 
effects on the essential process [are] seen as negligible’.4
 While numerous historical sociologists have forcefully recognised the 
problem of abstracting the development and reproduction of societies from their 
intersocietal contexts, arguably none of them have ever found a substantive 
theoretical solution to the problem.5 For despite their attention to pointing out 
the inadequacies of ‘societal-based theories’,6 they too have continually intro-
duced this international dimension of development as an externality to their 
analyses in ways that actually reinforce the theoretical disconnect between the 
‘geopolitical’ and the ‘social’. This problem cuts across the theoretical and meth-
odological divides, as attested by Martin Hall’s critical survey of the different 
theoretical contributions of historical sociological approaches to International 
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Relations (IR). ‘There is a danger’, Hall warns, that historical sociology ‘serves 
to strengthen the dichotomization of “the international” and “the domestic”. 
Although … international and domestic forces interact or combine to produce a 
certain outcome, analytically they are still distinct’.7
 It is this lacuna that requires the formulation of a unified theory of how 
societies interact, of how they change, and the relationship between these 
historically dynamic processes. Such a theory would have to capture how the 
historical reality of ‘the international’ is itself part and parcel of wider socio-
historical developmental processes. As argued below, the theory of uneven 
and combined development provides one such answer to this problematic, for 
it uniquely interpolates an international dimension of causality as an intrinsic 
aspect of sociohistorical development itself. This then allows for the organic 
– rather than contingent or external – integration of ‘geopolitical’ and ‘socio-
logical’ determinations into a single, unified theory of sociohistorical change, 
sublating ‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’ theories of modal transitions. In other 
words, ‘the international’ – ‘that dimension of social reality which arises 
specifically from the coexistence within it of more than one society’ – is theo-
retically internalised in a way that ‘formulates this dimension as an object of 
social theory – organically contained … within a conception of social develop-
ment itself ’.8 For this reason, the theory has enjoyed an unprecedented revival 
over the last two decades in the disciplines of IR, development studies and 
historical sociology,9 where a number of scholars have sought to tease out and 
further refine the theoretical implications of Trotsky’s concept in fashioning the 
possibility for an entirely ‘new understanding of human history’.10
 In what follows, we begin by offering a schematic exposition of the theory’s 
main concepts – unevenness and combination – from which the ‘whip of external 
necessity’, ‘privilege of historic backwardness’, ‘advantages’ and ‘penalties of 
priority’, ‘contradictions of sociological amalgamation’, and ‘substitutionism’ 
necessarily follow. In this section, we explain how the conditions of unevenness 
and combination produce these component mechanisms, before proceeding in 
the next section to consider the concept’s precise spatiotemporal generalisability: 
that is, whether it can be fruitfully employed beyond the capitalist epoch. 
The Theory of Uneven and Combined Development:  
Exposition and Critiques
Unevenness
Unevenness posits developmental variations both within and between societies, 
along with the attendant spatial differentiations between them. The starting 
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point for Trotsky was an empirical observation about the basic ontology of 
human development: that a multiplicity of societies varying in size, culture, 
political organisation, material and non-material productivity, is a transhis-
torical feature of human history – its ‘most general law’.11 From this empirical 
observation, Trotsky was able to infer both the quantitative (multiple societies) 
and qualitative (different societies) character of social development12 – what he 
termed uneven development. But rather than simply describing two static condi-
tions or dimensions of such development (multiplicity – difference), Trotsky 
instead sought to capture how their dialectical interaction (social multiplicity ➜ 
intersocietal interaction ➜ societal difference) formed the basic onto-relational 
texture of the historical process as a whole, wherein the shifting identity of any 
particular society accumulated and crystallised.13
 Emphasising the specificities of any given society’s development within this 
wider interactive intersocietal milieu, Trotsky showed how they were irreducible 
to any unilinear path of development. Hence, for Trotsky, ‘Russia stood not only 
geographically, but also socially and historically, between Europe and Asia’.14 As 
both cause and effect of this international differentiation, unevenness also denoted 
the peculiar, local sociological forms of internal differentiation in institutional, 
cultural and class relations.15 Differential tempos and forms of change over time 
were matched by variations in space. This was true not only of the uneven (interac-
tive) relations between societies, but also of the uneven relations within societies. 
The ‘force of uneven development’, Trotsky wrote, ‘operates not only in the rela-
tions of countries to each other, but also in the mutual relationships of the various 
processes within one and the same country’.16 For example, Trotsky noted the 
imbalances between town and countryside17 and state and society,18 along with the 
differential pace of social stratification and differentiation among the peasantry19 
in Russia, in contrast to other European forms.
 Traversing the multiple, intersecting spatial fields of social constitution and 
organisation, breaking with any discretely conceived notions of the national and 
international,20 Trotsky’s conception of unevenness prefigured later conceptions 
of social relations as networks or webs,21 without losing sight of their territo-
rialisation and statisation in the modern epoch.22 Crucially, such relations of 
unevenness created structural competitive conditions between societies them-
selves – ‘the whip of external necessity’, which in Trotsky’s case referred to the 
competitive pressures of the European absolutist-cum-capitalist states on the 
‘less-developed’ Russian social formation.23 As Russian development did not 
occur endogenously, but always under the influences, pressures and lessons 
of these more ‘advanced’ societies, this in turn permitted – indeed compelled 
– Russia to reap a certain ‘privilege of historic backwardness’, adopting and 
potentially innovating on the most cutting-edge technologies, institutions and 
materials practices ‘pioneered’ by the leading states of the international system. 
The assimilation and adaptation of such capitalist methods and organisational 
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forms to Russian society as ‘finished products[s]’ also meant that the Tsarist state 
did not need to repeat the developmental steps or ‘stages’ originally required 
to get there. As Trotsky put it, ‘[s]avages throw away their bows and arrows 
for rifles all at once, without travelling the road which lay between those two 
weapons in the past’.24
 Yet while Trotsky emphasised the transformational effects of the more 
‘advanced’ European societies on the more ‘backward’ Tsarist state, the ‘whip 
of external necessity’ should be conceived not as a unidirectional structural 
imperative, but as one that operates in a co-constitutive and multilateral 
fashion: meaning that the ‘less-developed’ societies also influence the ‘more’ 
developed ones in their mutually interactive processes of social and geopolit-
ical reproduction. This was dramatically exemplified by the Mongolian Empire’s 
transformative effects on ‘European’ development over the Long 13th Century 
(see Chapter 3).25 Hence, developmentally differentiated societies constantly 
impact upon one another’s geosocial development and reproduction, which in 
turn instigates various forms of combined development. From this perspective, 
social development is conceived as ineluctably multilinear, causally polycentric, 
and co-constitutive by virtue of its very interconnectedness.
 In the premodern world, unevenness was expressed and articulated across 
the various dimensions and planes of internal differentiation within the onto-
logical whole of world-societal development. The natural bases of unevenness 
thus lie in the ecologically given conditions that originally confronted the 
human species. Here we find one side of the ‘double relationship’ examined by 
Marx and Engels in The German Ideology.26
 In the first instance, humans must produce and reproduce the means of 
their material subsistence to survive,27 entering into an interactively transfor-
mational relationship with their natural and social surroundings, shaping and 
reconstituting these conditions in the process. In early history, the ecologically 
given conditions confronting the human species formed the starting point of 
their development. ‘The way in which men [sic] produce their means of subsis-
tence’, Marx and Engels wrote, ‘depends first of all on the nature of the means 
of subsistence they actually find in existence and have to reproduce’. Thus, 
‘[a]ll historical writing must set out from these natural bases and their modifica-
tion in the course of history through the action of men’.28 Commenting on this 
passage, Justin Rosenberg notes how this ‘natural world is not only the physical 
foundation of human life; it is also … the largest single source of uneven 
development’. As he goes on:
Climatic, topographic and ecological differentiation across geographical space 
offered an enormous variety of habitats to which human groups adapted as they 
spread outwards from their East African home …. Temporally too, the earth was 
(and is) a dynamic phenomenon, uneven across time. … Thus the process of 
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peopling the earth, largely accomplished by HGBs [hunter-gatherer bands], was 
necessarily uneven in both space and time. This unevenness was expressed in (and 
further compounded by) an ‘enormous variation’ in human socio-ecological adap-
tation. And that …was heavily consequential for the course of development both 
locally and globally.29
The starting point of human development was then constituted by this 
nature-generated uneven, spatial topography from which all specific ‘soci-
eties’ subsequently developed. What is more, the ecological variations across 
geographical space worked to promote further processes of internal differentia-
tion. In the case of Russia – or more precisely, the networks of social relations 
forming what is now called Russia – the ‘natural-historical conditions’ (above 
all, Russia’s ‘less than favourable geographical situation’ standing between 
Europe and Asia) were the initial causes for the ‘comparative primitiveness and 
slowness’ of its social development, stunting class formation processes and their 
relations with the state.30
 But human development, even in its earliest stages, was not simply uneven 
but also combined, as it continually contained a multiplicity of differentially 
developing communities that came to interact with one another in causally 
significant ways in their own collective reproduction. Take the example of 
HGBs during the Palaeolithic period. Inter-band relations were crucial to each 
band’s survival. HGBs could not survive ‘as isolated units’31 as they ‘depended 
for their biological reproduction on exogamous interaction with other bands, 
extending networks of consanguinity which provided the basis for periodic 
gatherings, shared language and security against environmental stress’.32 It was 
only through the uneven and interactive nature of social multiplicity entailed 
in such reproductive relations that political multiplicity – that is, proto-state 
formations – emerged in the first place.33 Hence, Marx and Engels’s ‘double 
relationship’ was, from the very start, circumscribed by social relations that were 
both uneven and combined. Reframed from such a perspective, this universal 
characteristic of human development (the double relationship) may be recon-
ceptualised as ontologically plural and interactive: that is, as a triple relationship 
spanning from: (1) nature to (2) the social to (3) the intersocietal.34
 As societies became more complex in their development, geographical factors 
would become progressively less fundamental in shaping the course of their 
co-evolution. ‘[H]uman development’, as Robert W. Cox put it, ‘loosens the 
determining influence of geography’.35 There were, in other words, emergent 
layers and axes of the unevenness of human development that would be artic-
ulated through a multiplicity of state forms, social relations, and ideological 
and cultural institutions. We examine the specificities of these forms in the 
chapters that follow – nomadic, tributary, feudal and so on. One of the central 
claims of How the West Came to Rule is that capitalism emerged from within and 
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through these antecedent processes of unevenness. From its inception, capital-
ism’s expansion thereby took a ‘combined’ character, fusing with the plurality of 
existing sociological forms through its internationally mediated emergence. In 
so doing, distinctly capitalist processes would come to progressively gain control 
over this extant unevenness, reconstituting its fundamental quality as it unified 
the various instances and forms of uneven development into a single, causally 
integrated, world-historical totality.36
Combination
Combination, conceived at the most abstract level, refers to the ways in which 
the internal relations of any given society are determined by their interactive 
relations with other developmentally differentiated societies, while the very 
interactivity of these relations produces amalgamated sociopolitical institutions, 
socio-economic systems, ideologies and material practices melding the native 
and foreign, the ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’, within any given social formation. 
Bringing out the relational character of these developmental differentiations 
in societies, Trotsky argued that ‘from the universal law of unevenness thus 
derives another law … the law of combined development’.37 As with unevenness, 
combination has a strong empirical referent: multiple societies do not simply 
exist hermetically side by side, but interactively coexist, which by necessity 
(and to varying degrees) determines their collective social and geopolitical 
development and reproduction.38
  Trotsky’s sociological explanations are consequently imbued with processes 
in which societies draw ‘together different stages of the journey’, combining the 
spatiotemporally variegated experiences of societies into unstable amalgams 
of the new and old.39 In Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution, we find 
numerous examples in which the more ‘backward’ Russia attempted to devel-
opmentally catch up with a more advanced Europe by making use of Europe’s 
existing developmental achievements. The ‘privilege’ of Russia’s backwardness 
entailed a ‘skipping over intermediate steps’ of development, ensuring attempts 
at catch-up did not follow the same paths of antecedent developments.40 Hence, 
‘historical backwardness does not imply a simple reproduction of the devel-
opment of advanced countries, England or France, with a delay of one, two, 
or three centuries’, Trotsky wrote, but ‘engenders an entirely new “combined” 
social formation in which the latest conquests of capitalist technique and 
structure root themselves into relations of feudal or pre-feudal barbarism, 
transforming and subjecting them and creating peculiar relations of classes’.41
 The outcome of this geopolitically interactive process was the creation of 
entirely new forms and modalities of development, producing ‘amalgam[s] of 
archaic with more contemporary forms’.42 Such combinations served to ‘smash 
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the limited boundaries of classification’, thus ‘revealing the real connections and 
consecutiveness of a living process’.43 In this respect, combination belies any 
stagist model of development, as the effects of the amalgamation of different 
modes of production within social formations are sociologically transformed 
into more than the sum of their parts. It would therefore be a mistake to conceive 
of any form of combined development as a kind of ideal-type with which others 
can be compared and contrasted. Rather, there is no uniform type of combined 
development, but only a multiplicity of differentiated forms and trajectories.
 Trotsky’s concept of combined development thus dispenses with all notions 
of ‘deviant’ or ‘aberrational’ forms of societies and their development. Here, 
however, it is important to note that while they are usually rooted in the 
interlacing and overcharged fusion of different modes of production (feudal, 
tributary, nomadic, capitalist and so on), the effects of combined development 
suffuse every aspect of society. It is much more than an economic phenomenon, 
but captures the totality of relations constitutive of a social order as a whole. 
As Neil Davidson puts it, ‘The archaic and modern, the settled and disruptive, 
overlap, fuse, and merge in all aspects of the social formations concerned … 
in entirely new and unstable ways’.44 By deploying the concept of combined 
development, Trotsky was able to uncover the contradictory and complex 
‘concentration of many determinations’45 which ultimately led to a trajectory 
of development in which proletarian revolution first took place in Russia – 
economically the most ‘backward’ and ideologically most reactionary state in 
Europe at the time.
 Part and parcel to these forms of sociological amalgamation are processes 
and methods of substitutionism. In the first instance, Trotsky employed the 
term ‘substitutionism’ to critique Lenin’s proposed reforms to party organisa-
tion in 1904: ‘the organisation of the party substitutes itself for the party as a 
whole; then the Central Committee substitutes itself for the organisation; and 
finally the “dictator” substitutes himself for the Central Committee’.46 Trotsky’s 
prescient remarks well captured the bureaucratic processes ultimately leading 
to the degeneration of the Bolshevik Revolution as it slowly devolved into the 
personal dictatorship of Josef Stalin.47 After 1905, however, Trotsky appears to 
have broadened the scope of the term (albeit implicitly) in coming to identify 
it with various forms of ‘replacement’ agents and institutions involved in 
spearheading capitalist processes of development in late-industrialising 
societies.
 Examining the meagre ways by which the Tsarist regime sought to solve 
Russia’s agrarian problem, for example, Trotsky wrote of how the ‘solution 
of the problems of one class by another is one of those combined methods 
natural to backward countries’.48 In other words, the attempts to solve the 
agrarian problem were not pursued by an indigenous capitalist class or even 
by the natural operation of the capitalist mode of production, for both these 
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conditions were lacking in half-feudal Russia. So the Tsarist regime had to 
‘substitute’ itself for the putative tasks of a capitalist class corresponding to 
earlier processes of capitalist modernization. Referring to this extended remit of 
the concept which sought to capture ‘a much wider and multifaceted phenom-
enon, intrinsic to combined development’ operating in ‘the political, intellectual, 
ideological, economic and bureaucratic spheres’, Kamran Matin writes of how:
substitution involves the mobilization of various replacements, native and 
foreign, in backward polities, for the agency, institutions, instruments, materials 
or methods of earlier processes of capitalist modernization in West European  
ountries, a process in which the ‘threatening western foe becomes a teacher’.
Hence, substitutionism ‘necessarily involves and generated amalgamated forms 
that are dynamically tension-prone’.49
 It is precisely these ‘dynamically tension-prone’ elements integral to any 
combined development that we conceive as ‘contradictions of sociological amal-
gamation’: the inorganic melding of native and foreign agencies, institutions, 
practices, ideologies and socio-economic systems, resulting in time-compressed, 
accelerated developmental transformations ‘assum[ing] the form of terrible 
convulsions and drastic changes of former conceptions’.50
 In the capitalist epoch, the overlapping and fusion of different temporalities 
– of different modes of productions – characteristic of such sociological amal-
gamations finds some affinities with Ernest Bloch’s concept of ‘nonsynchronism’ 
(Ungleichzeitigkeit): the ‘simultaneity of the non-simultaneous’ (Gleichzeitigkeit 
des Ungleichzeitigen). ‘The objectively nonsynchronous is that which is far from 
and alien to the present’, as Bloch writes. This may in turn involve some forms 
and degrees of agency in which capital employs:
that which is nonsynchronously contrary, if not indeed disparate, as a distrac-
tion from its own strictly present-day contradictions; it uses the antagonism of 
a still living past as a means of separation and struggle against the future that is  
dialectically giving birth to itself in the capitalist antagonism.51
While imbued with all kinds of problematic ‘historicist’ assumptions (in 
Chakrabarty’s sense of the term), the focus on these agential features of a 
combined development that Bloch discusses in terms of ‘nonsynchronism’ are 
significant. For whether the ‘whip of external necessity’ translates into a privi-
lege or disadvantage of backwardness – and relatedly, the degrees by which the 
political and ideological effects are progressive or reactionary – is dependent 
on the outcome of social conflicts both within the ruling class and between the 
ruling and subordinate classes. Thus, as Ben Selwyn highlights, it is of ‘great 
importance’ to examine ‘how contending social classes shape and respond to 
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development processes through struggles’, as the ‘outcomes of these struggles 
impact significantly upon process and outcomes of late development. And, 
because the outcomes of these struggles cannot be predicted in advance, neither 
can the process of uneven and combined development’.52 To this extent, the 
sociopolitical and economic effects of uneven and combined development are 
partly and necessarily indeterminate: we cannot say in advance exactly how the 
developmental pressures of intersocietal relations will impact on any given 
society without an analysis of the changing balance and struggle of class forces 
(in other words, human agency), among other factors. And that changing 
balance is itself shaped and partly determined by the wider intersocietal milieu.
 This point regarding the necessity of an agential analysis as a required 
component of any satisfactory employment of uneven and combined develop-
ment is an important one, as it directly challenges a common criticism of the 
theory as overly structuralist, and thus deterministic, with little or no room for 
political agency.53 While the role and direction of agency is always a partly inde-
terminate, political process, it is nevertheless not a ‘structure-less’ one: that is to 
say, it can be explained retrodictively by invoking structural properties. One of 
the great benefits of the theory of uneven and combined development is how it 
explains sociologically differentiated forms of agency, contradicting any prede-
termined unilinear readings of sociohistorical development: an explanation of 
why and how ‘[t]he tasks of one class are shouldered off upon another’.54 Hence, 
in challenging such charges of ‘structuralism’, Michael Burawoy draws attention 
to the intrinsically agential aspects of Trotsky’s theory, which captures the ‘accu-
mulation of micro-processes’ in explaining molecular forms of social change 
and transformation. In this sense, it is carrying ‘forward Marx’s project of estab-
lishing the micro-foundations of a macro-sociology, of understanding how 
individuals make history but not necessarily in ways of their own choosing’.55
 More generally, at the heart of such criticisms there seems to be a worry that 
casting uneven and combined development as a ‘general abstraction’ evacuates 
concrete human praxis, rendering it an ‘overly abstract and contentless register’56 
devoid of any substantive theoretical explanatory capacity. And, indeed, if left 
at the level of a ‘general abstraction’, this would surely pose a problem: decon-
textualised from any conception of historically distinct social structures, the 
precise scales, mechanisms and qualitative forms of unevenness and combina-
tion – to say nothing of the historically specific dynamics of political agency 
they give rise to – could hardly be illuminated. Yet, as detailed below, this is 
certainly not the intention of the theory, which proceeds through a series of 
descending levels of abstraction, further approximating, and reconstituting in 
thought, empirical reality along each step of the way.
 The emphasis placed in this work on the structural constraints and enabling 
properties of uneven and combined development, therefore, in no way seeks 
to erase the critical role of agents and human praxis in processes of large-scale 
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social transformation and change. Quite the contrary: as later chapters will 
demonstrate, our purpose is to re-excavate the ‘lost history’ of the multitude of 
agential processes that – whether intentionally, but more often than not unin-
tentionally – led to and conditioned the rise of distinctly capitalist production 
relations over the early modern period.
 In particular, we aim to explore the – at times – decisive role of non-Euro-
pean agency in directly engaging with and subverting Eurocentric conceptions 
of development. From the hugely significant agency of the Mongolians over the 
Long 13th Century (Chapter 3) to that of the Ottomans during the Long 16th 
Century (Chapter 4) to the multiplicity of societies making up Southeast Asia 
in the 17th century (Chapter 7) – through all these examples, among others, 
we seek to offer an analysis of the rise of capitalism that pays resolute attention 
to the plurality of ways in which the structural determinations emanating from 
both within and outside societies interactively developing alongside one another, 
came to be interpreted, shaped, and often reconstituted through concrete political 
agency and praxis. We aim to systematically disclose the socially ‘thick’ relations 
of interconnection and co-constitution between the ‘West’ and ‘the Rest’ in their 
joint, if uneven, making of the modern capitalist world.
 These points regarding the need for a non-Eurocentric, agent-sensitive 
approach to the study of capitalism’s origins are further borne out in considering 
how we might reconceptualise the role of the forces of production in the transi-
tion to capitalism from the perspective of uneven and combined development. 
For the diffusion of more ‘advanced’ scientific ideas, organisational forms and 
technologies from ‘East’ to ‘West’ was an important factor in European societies’ 
ability to reap a ‘privilege of backwardness’, constituting a key precondition for 
the eventual emergence of capitalist social relations within them (see Chapters 
3 and 4). Yet it is necessary to emphasise that such processes of diffusion did not 
take place in a linear or even cumulative manner. Innovations in certain locales 
are not replicated (to borrow Trotsky’s term) ‘slavishly’ in all contexts, but can 
be appropriated, adapted, reconfigured and repurposed by different people, 
classes and organisations , in variegated ways. This is not to argue that produc-
tive forces are neutral, but simply to emphasise that the specific outcomes of 
their development are not essential or preordained. They are determining, but 
not deterministic, ‘biased but ambivalent’.57 Productive forces that push forward 
certain developments or benefit certain groups in particular contexts can have 
very different consequences in other contexts, for other groups. The innovations 
of the Industrial Revolution that solidified ruling class power in Britain led to 
social revolution in Russia. What matters then is not the primacy of productive 
forces, but how their adoption and adaptation is plugged into and related to 
other aspects of a social assemblage.
 In this respect, the development of productive forces cannot be under-
stood as uniform or equalising, but multilinear and uneven. The emphasis 
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on multilinearity suggests we should avoid any ontologically singular concep-
tion of productive forces as pertaining to a single enterprise or a single society, 
hermetically sealed off from others. The variegated nature of productive forces 
(including labour processes, organisations of production, tools and technologies) 
should alert us to the possibility that this multiplicity can be ‘combined’ – they 
can be integrated with and interrelated to each other – across a wider inter- 
societal plane. This, we believe, better captures the spirit of what ‘productive forces’ 
denote: ‘the way in which the different means of production are combined in the 
act of production itself ’. In turn, it opens the possibility of theorising historical 
developments via the heuristic of uneven and combined productive forces.
 For example, we demonstrate in Chapters 3 and 4 how the tributary practice 
of ‘caging’ allowed for the absorption of the techniques, capacities and organ-
isational forms of various societies into an integrated system of ruling class 
reproduction. In Chapters 5 and 7, we further analyse how capitalism was built 
on the combination of a multiplicity of labour processes in various locales 
stretching from Barbados to Banda, and back to London and Amsterdam. In 
short, productive forces should be conceived as uneven and combined, wherein 
the intersocietal – rather than the nation-state – forms the proper unit of 
analysis.
 In these different ways, uneven and combined development offers a cogent 
means of theoretically explaining the differentiated social forms and historically 
distinct agencies emerging from a single, unified process of sociohistorical devel-
opment, as well the geosocial effects of their interactive differences. Moreover, 
it is important to note that while the dynamics of combined development were 
revealed to Trotsky most sharply and violently in later-developing societies, 
he nonetheless also viewed these phenomena as applicable to even the most 
economically ‘advanced’ capitalist state of his time, the United States. In an 
instance of what we might call a ‘perpetuated’ form of combined development, 
Trotsky wrote:
In America we have another kind of combined development. We have the most 
advanced industrial development together with the most backward – for all classes 
– ideology. The internal colonization … was the basis on which the retarded 
consciousness of the workers existed.58
On this basis, it was possible for Trotsky to advocate the strategy of ‘permanent 
revolution’ for the Black Nationalist movement for self-determination in the 
United States.59 Trotsky’s identification of these combined paths of development 
in some of the most advanced capitalist societies of his time (the United States 
and also Germany) is particularly significant given the tendency of contempo-
rary scholars to portray Trotsky’s theory as solely confined to explaining late 
capitalist developers (more on this below).60 
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Seeing Through a Prism Darkly? Uneven and Combined  
Development beyond the Eurocentric Gaze
The theory of uneven and combined development offers a potentially useful 
perspective in overcoming the many problems and pitfalls of the Eurocentric 
analyses characterising so many extant theoretical approaches to the origins 
of capitalism. As our employment of ‘unevenness’ and ‘combination’ suggests, 
we must go beyond any ‘historicist mode of thinking’, as Dipesh Chakrabarty 
terms it, that conceives of development as the ‘secular, empty, and homogenous 
time of history’.61 Hence, against Gurminder Bhambra’s criticism that uneven 
and combined development theoretically reproduces the strong stagism of 
Enlightenment thinking,62 it rather presupposes stagism in order to scramble, 
subvert and transcend it.63 The notion of ‘stages’ is deployed precisely to counter 
stagist thinking, as Trotsky continually emphasised in his diatribes against the 
Menshevik position that the socialist revolution in Tsarist Russia had to wait 
for the bourgeois stage to complete itself. More radically still, Trotsky’s polit-
ical strategy of ‘permanent revolution’ represented ‘a fundamental rejection of 
the notion of stages as such in the definition of a qualitatively new type of 
revolution’.64
 Underlying Bhambra’s critique, however, is a more fundamental point about 
the concept of ‘development’ itself. This might be reformulated in terms of the 
following question: Can any conceptualisation of human change and transfor-
mation from the perspective of development (uneven, combined or whatever) 
escape certain historicist assumptions? This point is brought out in Meera 
Sabaratnam’s searching critique of various historical sociological approaches to 
IR,65 including the theory of uneven and combined development as formulated 
by Justin Rosenberg.66 Although she claims that the theory makes a ‘critical 
contribution to wrestling the notion of “development” away from a methodolog-
ically nationalist’ foundation, it nonetheless remains an ‘unsatisfactory solution 
to the issues created by using the idea of “development” as a natural benchmark 
for understanding human societies and their relationships’.67 As the ‘central 
problematic of capitalist modernity’ and the ‘founding question of historical 
sociology as a project’, the concept of development comes packed with a number 
of normative assumptions about what is meaningful and (causally) significant 
in understanding human societies.68 The problematic of ‘development’ thus 
tends to conceptualise the polities of the Global South as ‘subordinate articula-
tion[s] of a normalised capitalist modernity that finds its full expression in the 
contemporary West’. This reproduces a ‘developmentalised framing of human 
history’ and ‘a politics of “developmentality” in the space of former empires’.69
 However, we consider Trotsky’s notion of ‘combined development’ useful 
precisely because it subverts many of the normative and historicist assumptions 
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that Sabaratnam argues are inherent to the category of development. Indeed, the 
concept of combination denotes that there has never existed any pure or ‘normal’ 
model of development; each and every society’s development has always been 
‘overdetermined’70 by its interactions with others, creating a plurality of varie-
gated sociological amalgamations. The very unevenness and combination of 
historical development thus resists any kind of ‘stylised and abstracted’ concep-
tions of European history – or any history, for that matter – that can be used as 
the privileged ‘benchmark’ to normatively judge or comparatively contrast with 
others.
 What is more, the course that European development took throughout 
the historical periods we examine below was continually conditioned by 
non-European structural determinations and agents. The multiple histories of 
non-European societies and the ‘causal’ processes emerging from them were, 
from the very outset, inscribed in the generative grammar of modern European 
development. In this sense, any notion of a ‘normalised capitalist modernity 
that finds its full expression in the contemporary West’ is a pure myth. Each 
and every instantiation of capitalist modernity – from England to Germany, to 
Japan, to Bolivia, to Senegal – was, so to speak, a ‘bastard birth’.71 Indeed, if 
we are to take Marx’s ‘absolute historicism’ (in Gramsci’s sense of the term)72 
seriously, ‘pure’ developmental forms do not exist. This destabilises norma-
tive claims about any singular developmental model – whether it be England’s 
economic development or France’s political development, to take just two 
oft-cited examples in comparative studies – as the benchmark or standard by 
which other developmental trajectories are to be judged.73
 This in turn has radical implications for how comparative historical socio-
logical analyses can be pursued fruitfully. It requires a methodological shift to 
something akin to Philip McMichael’s notion of ‘incorporated comparison’, 
in which specific instances of sociohistorical development are dialectically 
related to one another as constitutive moments of a broader world-historical 
process.74 The ‘whole’ thereby crystallises via a comparative analysis of its ‘parts’ 
as moments of a differentially developing, interactive ‘self-forming’ totality.75 
Hence, ‘variations in the actual process whereby the same historical develop-
ment manifests itself in different countries’, Antonio Gramsci wrote, ‘have to 
be related not only to the differing combinations of internal relations with the 
different countries, but also to the differing international relations’.76
 Following the above analysis, one might find a potential contradiction in our 
employment and juxtaposition of such concepts as ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’, 
‘modern’ and ‘archaic’, so central to Trotsky’s works. Such terms are indeed 
intrinsically problematic as conventionally used and understood in popular 
and scholarly discourses. According to Baruch Knei-Paz, Trotsky’s own use of 
the term ‘backwardness’ was not intended as a ‘moral judgement’, but instead 
sought to demarcate a ‘clear social and historical uniqueness’ which the terms 
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‘less developed’ or ‘under-developed’ do not convey.77 Of course, this is easier 
said than done.
 Irrespective of how Trotsky employed the terms, our own use of such cate-
gories as ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ is of a rather specific kind. They denote 
asymmetrical relations or imbalances of power ((geo)political, economic, ideolog-
ical), within and between societies, in the ways and forms by which ruling classes 
reproduce themselves. For example, a social formation such as the Habsburg or 
Ottoman Empire during the 16th century might be considered more ‘advanced’ 
than, say, the emerging capitalist societies of the United Provinces or England, 
since the modalities of ruling class reproduction in the former were relatively 
more powerful, strong and stable. This was not only because of the geopolitical 
and military power differentials between these two sets of feudal-tributary and 
nascent capitalist societies, but also possibly due to the ‘staying power’ of their 
dominant ideologies and political institutions. Our conception of these terms 
thus rests on the standards set by the dominant mode of production of the epoch.
 By analogy, the concept of ‘class’ also refers to power differentials (ruling 
and ruled, exploiter and exploited), expressed as a sociopolitical or economic 
– and not a normative or developmental – hierarchy. In the capitalist mode of 
production, for example, the capitalist class is not temporally or normatively 
more ‘advanced’ than the working class. But it is more ‘advanced’ in terms of its 
possession of power; if it were otherwise, the capitalist class would be incapable 
of oppressing and exploiting subaltern classes. Thus, we employ the categories 
of ‘advanced/backward’ in this sense (unless otherwise stated) to capture the 
various asymmetrical and uneven power relations.78 As such, our reconceptuali-
sation of the terms shares some affinities with Sabaratnam’s proposed alternative 
concepts ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ or ‘possessing/dispossessed’. Whichever categories one 
prefers, they all allow for, as Sabaratnam puts it, ‘a relational understanding of 
material conditions in the world without labelling them as deviant from the 
model of modernity’.79
 Where we see an advantage in the use of uneven and combined development, 
however, is in its potential to extend the historical scope of analysis beyond the 
capitalist mode of production (in which categories of rich-possessing/poor-dis-
possessed are markers of power hierarchies), to non-capitalist contexts, and 
the very making of capitalism itself. For while the categories of ‘advanced’ and 
‘backward’ only take on their full force under specifically capitalist conditions, 
their empirical referents (asymmetrical and uneven power relations) undoubt-
edly held in preceding epochs. This was illustrated in the widespread awe and 
fear that the more ‘advanced’ Ottoman Empire conjured in the minds of so many 
16th-century Europeans (see Chapter 4). Hence, in order to truly subvert the 
‘pristine’ and ‘pure’ self-image of European capitalism that Sabaratnam identi-
fies as so problematic, we need a conceptual framework that is not beholden to 
the capitalist epoch.
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 Such a historical extension of uneven and combined development would 
appear crucial to claiming its non-Eurocentric credentials. For, as John M. 
Hobson suggests, the concept of uneven and combined development, insofar as 
it is exclusively identified with capitalism, is no less guilty of conflating ‘the inter-
national’ with exclusively ‘intra-European relations’, falling prey to the typical 
Eurocentric assumptions of ‘Western priority and Eastern passivity’.80 Similarly, 
Bhambra suggests that for all of theory’s focus on societal difference, its very 
origins remains wedded to a Eurocentric conception of capitalism derived from 
the Enlightenment conception of stadial development.81 For Burak Tansel, so 
long as uneven and combined development is considered specific to capitalist 
modernity, and this capitalist modernity is attributed to European origins, then 
the theory appears no different to the diffusionist claims of modernisation 
theory and WST.82 In short, without problematising the origins of capitalism in 
Europe, the non-West remains excluded as an empirically significant yet theo-
retically secondary entity.83 For uneven and combined development to simply 
invoke intersocietal processes is therefore not enough. It must also be capable 
of establishing an alternative conception of the making of capitalism, one that 
includes the historical (and theoretical) significance of non-European soci-
eties as active agents in the process. We turn to this question of the historical 
generalisability of uneven and combined development next.
Trotsky beyond Trotsky? Uneven and Combined 
Development before Capitalism
Thus far we have proceeded in using uneven and combined development as 
(unproblematically) operating across time and space. However, in doing so, 
we must be careful not to fall into the kind of ‘tempocentric ahistoricism’ so 
common to mainstream IR theories, such as realism, in which a reified nation-
statist ontology of contemporary world politics is projected back in time as 
the suprahistorical essence of ‘the international’ in general.84 There is indeed 
a similar danger in using uneven and combined development as a ‘trans- 
historical’ general abstraction85 that projects back in time what may in fact be the 
historically specific characteristics of the capitalist mode of production.
 This has been a criticism explicitly raised by various scholars, who have 
argued that Trotsky only used the concept in this more temporally delimited 
sense (that is, within capitalism).86 More importantly, they claim that to extend 
uneven and combined development beyond capitalism would end up providing 
mere descriptive claims rather than explanatory ones.87 As Sam Ashman puts it 
critiquing Rosenberg’s work in particular:
To state that societies exist in the plural is mere description that neither helps 
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explain the dynamic (or ‘actual modalities’) of combination between these  
societies … nor offers any explanation of unevenness or of the differences between 
societies. This is precisely because general (transhistoric) abstractions do not have 
explanatory power (Marx 1973 [1953]). To the extent that something akin to 
U&CD [uneven and combined development] can be discerned in pre-capitalist 
modes of production, we can only illuminate such a phenomenon with a theory of 
the particular mode of production in question.88
To help us address the important issues raised by Ashman, we pick through 
three different ways uneven and combined development can be used. First, it can 
be seen as an ontology of human development – that is, as a general, abstract 
set of determinants highlighting a general condition confronted by all societies 
irrespective of historical context. Second, it can act as a methodology or set of 
epistemological coordinates, derived from the preceding basic ontological claim, 
that informs what historical material may be deemed (‘causally’) significant, and 
how that material relates to each other. However, these general ontological and 
epistemological assumptions taken on their own do not constitute a theory as 
such – at least not in the specifically Marxist sense. That is, theory is only possible 
at the more historically specific level at which the ontological and epistemological 
coordinates of study are connected to more determinate, concrete categories.
 For example, Marx did not provide a general theory of production or a theory 
of modes of production in general, but rather a theory of the capitalist mode of 
production. In this respect, we do not consider theory and history to be distinct; 
they are mutually intertwined and reinforcing. In this theoretical respect, third, 
uneven and combined development also refers to and theorises concrete histor-
ical processes, be they epochal or conjunctural. In other words, we may speak 
of a theory (or theories) of uneven and combined development in this more 
historically delimited sense: that is, in terms corresponding to specific epochs 
or conjunctures characterised by different modes of production that animate 
the broader dynamics of such historical temporalities. Moreover, it would also 
comprise the surplus of determinations deriving from the interactively gener-
ated (that is, intersocietally produced) combinations of modes of production 
and social formations. We consider it viable and indeed useful to deploy uneven 
and combined development in these related, but distinct, ways and encourage 
readers to keep in mind these distinctions and the different contexts in which 
they are used.
More Questions than Answers: Method, Abstraction 
and Historicity in Marx’s Thought
As Frederic Jameson once exclaimed, ‘Always historicize!’ is ‘the one absolute 
and we can even say “transhistorical” imperative of all dialectical thought’.89 
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Does Jameson’s injunction necessarily translate into a denial of the use of ‘tran-
shistoricals’ in Marx’s own methodology? We believe not, as a number of studies 
have well demonstrated that transhistorical abstractions did in fact play quite 
an important role in Marx’s work.90 As Robert Wess notes in a discussion of 
Marx’s method outlined in the Grundrisse, Marx ‘insists, at the very outset, that 
to avoid the bourgeois misconception of capitalism as “natural”, one must para-
doxically begin on the transhistorical level, with production in general…[as] the 
transhistorical renders visible the concrete historicity of capitalism’.91 Explaining his 
method of abstraction, which begins with the ‘general, abstract determinants 
which obtain in more or less all forms of societies’, Marx wrote that:
although the simpler category may have existed historically before the more 
concrete, it can achieve its full (intensive and extensive) development precisely 
in a combined form of society, while the more concrete category was more fully 
developed in a less developed form of society.92
In keeping with this method of abstraction, Marx worked with a number of trans- 
historical categories: ‘use-value’, ‘concrete labour’ and ‘production in general’. 
Marx’s use of these transhistorical categories was, however, strikingly different 
from their employment within much contemporary mainstream political 
economy and IR. In realist theories of IR, for example, a theoretical abstrac-
tion such as ‘anarchy’ takes the form of the primary explanans of the argument, 
from which all other relevant concepts (such as the ‘balance of power’, ‘national 
interest’ and ‘security dilemma’) are deduced. From this perspective, the 
abstraction forms the theory itself.
 In contrast, for Marx, a general abstraction functions as an inbuilt assump-
tion: the existence of a concrete general condition whose historically specific 
form has to be accounted for by still further explanans. General abstractions 
are, in other words, question-begging. They serve the purpose of isolating 
particular objects of study, which in turn raise analytical questions that can 
only be answered through their connection to other abstracted moments and 
concretised through their historical contextualisation and analysis.
 Marx’s explanations took place not by the reduction of social reality into a 
simplified and elegant abstraction, but by the expansion and complexification of 
the object under study. Hence, again in contrast to the ‘bourgeois’ method which 
seeks to identify a unitary essence in the object(s) of study (the abstraction), for 
Marx an abstraction cannot be judged heuristically useful by what elements of 
concrete reality it successfully excludes, but by what elements of concrete reality 
are opened up for further exploration. In short, rather than positing abstrac-
tions (such as anarchy) as the explanans of theory, general abstractions need 
to be conceived as explananda: things that require further explanation. Used 
in this way, general abstractions are best understood as ‘a guiding thread, an 
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orientation for empirical and historical research, not a theoretical substitute 
for it’.93
 As such, Marx’s abstractions do not provide, on their own, the concepts 
required for theory.94 Nor do they act as axioms from which secondary and 
tertiary concepts are derived, where concretisation takes place in a unilinear 
fashion from the abstract to concrete. Instead, they provide the basic ontological 
presuppositions needed for more determinant, historically specific categories to 
be brought to light.
 In Capital Volume I, for example, the commodity is understood as a bearer 
of both the general, transhistorical need to produce ‘use-values’ and the histori-
cally specific conditions under which such production occurs – the production of 
‘exchange-values’. Similarly, ‘labour’ is at once conceptualised as ‘concrete labour’ 
(the general feature of all human labour) and ‘abstract labour’ (the historically 
specific condition under which concrete labour takes place in capitalism). Marx 
thus claims that the general abstraction of ‘concrete labour’ ‘expresses an immea-
surably ancient relation valid in all forms of society, [which] nevertheless achieves 
practical truth as an abstraction only as a category of the most modern society’.95
 Here again we see how Marx employs ‘transhistorical’ abstractions to bring 
out the very historicity of their more concrete and specific forms in different 
epochs. Marx was not seeking to build a transhistorical theory of labour or 
use-value, for example, but instead sought to introduce these concepts as ques-
tion-begging presuppositions in his construction of a historically specific theory 
of the capitalist mode of production. As such, the contents of categories are not 
rigidly fixed, but ‘developed in their historical or logical process of formation’.96
 The method required to do this involves viewing the object of study through 
different historically specific contextual prisms, different analytical vantage points 
or ‘windows’. The view from any singular vantage point will tend to be ‘flat and 
lack perspective’. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the concrete from a multi-
plicity of different abstractions; that is, to deploy multiple vantage points in order 
to disclose the complexity of social relations and determinations in any given 
historical context. By moving across different vantage points in this way, those 
elements formerly hidden by any one-sided abstraction will come into view, thus 
reconstituting the object of study by adding ‘greater depth and perspective’.97
 In short, Marx ‘explained’ by carving open analytical and theoretical spaces 
that would necessitate the introduction of – and relation to – additional explan-
atory determinations, derived from alternative vantage points. Hence, across 
Capital as a whole, Marx repeatedly changed register and (re)analysed social 
relations through different conceptual prisms, moving from the singular capi-
talist enterprise,98 to circulation,99 to many capitals.100 In Capital, each analytical 
shift of this kind served to ‘destroy the simplicity’ of anterior vantage points 
and ‘complicate their phenomenology’ by bringing them into interrelation with 
other abstracted moments.101
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 Through the disclosure of the relations between these expanding sets of abstracted 
moments, the multiplicity of concrete conditions and determinations pertaining to 
the capitalist mode was unearthed and reconstituted in thought. In like fashion, 
we argue that uneven and combined development can be utilised in a similar 
(though not identical) way in filling out a distinctively historical materialist theory 
of ‘the international’. Used in this way, uneven and combined development is not a 
theory in itself. It is, rather, a methodological fix – or more precisely, a ‘progressive 
problem-shift’ – within the broader research programme of historical materi-
alism.102 The why, how and in what forms development is uneven and combined in 
different historical periods can only be explicated by more concrete categories and 
determinations accompanying a mode of production-centred analysis.
 As our exposition demonstrates, the ontology of uneven and combined 
development postulates that historical processes are always the outcome of a 
multiplicity of spatially diverse nonlinear causal chains that combine in any given 
conjuncture. What this compels historians and sociologists to do methodologi-
cally is to analyse history from a multiplicity of different spatiotemporal vantage 
points – or overlapping spatiotemporal ‘vectors’ of uneven and combined devel-
opment103 – in order to uncover these causal chains. In this schema, an emphasis 
on the origins of capitalism in Europe, or the English countryside à la Brenner, 
would constitute one of many spatiotemporal vectors of uneven and combined 
development – one that must be complemented and combined with other deter-
minations analysed from alternative vantage points.104 It would be one that is, 
in turn, related to a number of extra-European determinations bound up in the 
histories of colonialism, slavery and the Asian merchant trades, to name but 
a few of the processes examined in the following pages. In short, uneven and 
combined development stresses, indeed necessitates, a genuinely ‘internation-
alist historiography’105 of the origins of capitalism. We now explicate how these 
ontological and methodological pointers would be generative of a theory – or 
more precisely theories – of uneven and combined development.
Modes of Production Versus Uneven and 
Combined Development? A False Antithesis
Ashman’s injunction to contextualise any historically determinant form of 
uneven and combined development through a ‘theory of the particular mode of 
production in question and its relations and dynamics’ is exactly how we seek 
to employ the concept in the pages that follow.106 Indeed, as Rosenberg explic-
itly states regarding the use of uneven and combined development as a ‘general 
abstraction’, the concept ‘cannot furnish the particularities of any given mode 
of production, which … are necessary for the general abstraction to be “cashed 
in”’.107 We are in complete agreement with this type of approach.108
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 While uneven and combined development can indeed be conceived as a 
transhistorical phenomenon – or more precisely, a transmodal one – it must 
remain sensitive to the massive qualitative differences between its various 
iterations in any given mode of production. We have come to prefer the term 
‘transmodal’, as the ‘transhistorical’ can be – and has been – interpreted as 
conceiving of uneven and combined development as a kind of ‘suprasocial’, 
ahistorical phenomenon that replaces, rather than complements, a mode of 
production-centred theory of development.109 To say uneven and combined 
development functions in a transmodal sense therefore highlights the ways in 
which it only operates in and through historically distinct modes of production, 
which provide the explanations for the specific dynamics, scales and quali-
tative forms of unevenness and combination. The incorporation of uneven 
and combined development as a ‘general abstraction’ into such a mode of 
production-based framework in turn offers a sensitivity to and theoretical inter-
nalisation of those intersocietal dimensions of causality which so often fall out 
of mode of production-based analyses or remain external to their theoretical 
premises. This method of analysis consequently demands the reconstruction 
of historical materialism’s basic theoretical premises in a way that incorporates 
these interactive, differentiated and multilinear – that is, intersocietal – aspects 
of human development as a whole.110
 In this book, we examine the historically distinct dynamics, scales and forms 
of uneven and combined development in no less than five modes of production: 
the nomadic, tributary, feudal, slave-based and capitalist. As we demonstrate, 
each of these modes generated very different forms of unevenness and combi-
nation, belying any kind of suprahistorical theorisation. Moreover, the various 
interactions between these modally differentiated societies produced a multi-
plicity of variegated sociological amalgamations, representing entirely new 
modalities of development whose ‘laws of motion’ were more than the sum of 
their parts, defying any neat modal classificatory schemas. Such sociological 
combinations were not either/or but both and more.
 Following this perspective, uneven and combined development’s distinct 
causal determinations, articulated and expressed through intersocietal rela-
tions, are in every instance historically specific to and variable across any given 
mode of production. In other words, a theory of any given mode of production 
must be incorporated into an understanding of the particular form of uneven-
ness and combination, as the specific articulations, scales and dynamics of such 
a phenomenon will, without it, remain entirely inexplicable. At the same time, 
what the ‘general abstraction’ of uneven and combined development provides is 
a methodological sensitivity to those intersocietal dimensions of development 
that are either entirely ignored or only externally related to the emergence and 
reproductive dynamics of any given mode of production. The specific theo-
risations we offer – nomadic, tributary, feudal, slave, and capitalist – will be 
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provided in the substantive historical engagements that follow, not least because 
the theoretical articulation of uneven and combined development can only take 
place, we argue, in and through historical study.
Conclusion: Towards an ‘Internationalist  
Historiography’ of Capitalism
As shown in Chapter 1, the debate on the transition to capitalism has been 
marked by the dual intersecting problems of abstracting capitalism’s devel-
opment from the intersocietal conditions in which it is inherently embedded 
(the coexistence and interaction of a multiplicity of differentiated societies) and 
the concomitant focus on Europe as the prime mover of sociohistorical change 
and transformation. This led to the universalisation of Europe as the ‘originary 
and privileged space of modernity’.111 Directly engaging these two problems in 
the proper study of capitalism’s emergence, this chapter has offered the theory 
of uneven and combined development in furnishing a more ‘internationalist’, 
non-Eurocentric framework.
 We have argued that uneven and combined development is best understood 
in three related yet distinct ways. First, it operates as an ontology that funda-
mentally reconstitutes a materialist conception of history by incorporating 
non-identity and multiplicity – unevenness – into its premises. From this first 
feature arises the second – a methodology which emphasises the need to study 
historical sociology from a multiplicity of spatiotemporally diverse vectors of 
uneven and combined development. We argued that these first two features 
do not, on their own, constitute theory. The latter can only be generated by 
linking more abstract categories to more concrete, determinant, historically 
specific ones. That is, it is only at the level of any given mode of production that 
we can speak of theory. But we have also argued that uneven and combined 
development goes beyond mode of production analysis by capturing the surplus 
of determinations created by the interaction of different modes of produc-
tion or social formations. Finally, we argued that due to the inseparability of 
theory and history, uneven and combined development also refers to concrete 
historical processes.
 From these ontological and methodological pointers we now seek to ‘cash 
in’ our hitherto abstract discussion on the terrain of history. The next chapter 
proceeds with our historical investigation into the ‘extra-European’, inter- 
societal origins of capitalism over the longue durée. It begins with an analysis of 
the transformative impact of the Mongol Empire’s expansion and the resulting 
westward spread of the Black Death on the rise of capitalism in Northwestern 
Europe over the Long 13th Century.
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c h a p t e r  3
The Long Thirteenth Century: 
Structural Crisis,  
Conjunctural Catastrophe
History is always written from the sedentary point of view and in the name of a 
unitary State apparatus, at least a possible one, even when the topic is nomads. 
What is lacking is a Nomadology, the opposite of a history.
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 19801
Introduction
The study of nomadic societies has typically been framed by a dichotomy 
between the state and nonstate, and a complementary stadial or evolutionist 
model of development. Positing a unidirectional historical movement from 
nomadic to sedentary societies, from tribal communities to modern states, this 
model has informed a broader historicist prioritisation of state over nonstate 
agents. In this evolutionist model, nomadic societies have functioned as the 
equivalent to ‘primitive communities’ in classical social theory – a comparative 
ideal-type against which modern forms of state and society can be defined.2 
Similarly, models of the ‘segmentary tribe’ that were developed as part of a 
wider ideology of 19th-century colonialism have often been superimposed 
onto the study of Eurasian nomads.3 In the colonial period, the dominant 
image of the nomad was that of a ‘simple people, fierce and free’, living an 
‘exotic’ life of ‘barbaric lawlessness’.4 In later historiography, nomadic empires 
were presented as ‘arrested’5 and ‘static’6 social forms that acted as ‘brakes’7 on 
development, and were therefore susceptible to ‘degeneration’.8 These images 
have subsequently been juxtaposed against the dynamism, civilisation, ratio-
nality, and social stratification that supposedly characterises the modern 
state.
 With these rigid distinctions between ‘civilised’ and ‘barbaric’, the study 
of nomadism has shared (and continues to share) significant similarities 
with other forms of Orientalism and Eurocentrism. As such, it is worth 
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remembering that the ideological construction of the ‘primitive nomad’ tallied 
with a history of violent subordination, annihilation and sedentarisation of 
nomadic communities. Through modern state formation and colonialism, 
nomads were subdued and subsumed into the codified and territorialised 
ambit of the modern state – a process that continues to this day.9 For 
example, the supposed ‘failure’ of Native American nomads to enclose and 
replenish their land led many Europeans to conclude that their colonisation of 
the New World was legitimate (see Chapter 5).10 Subsequently, the remnants 
of nomadic life in North America were systematically eradicated through 
state-led sedetarisation in the 19th century.11 Similarly, the modernisation 
of the Ottoman state in the 19th century was accompanied by a policy of 
forced settlement of nomads, along with a legitimating ideology of ‘Ottoman 
Orientalism’ which painted nomads under its jurisdiction as ‘savages’ who 
required ‘civilising’.12 In the same period, the Russian Empire forced its 
nomadic population to settle as part of its attempts to modernise the creaking 
Tsarist state. This too was complemented by an ideological construction of 
the nomad as ‘uncivilised’.13
 The legacy of this subjection has reverberated through the social sciences, 
which have subsequently been relatively dismissive of the role played by 
nomadic people in the shaping of modern states and societies, both histori-
cally and contemporaneously.14 As Iver Neuman and Einar Wigen argue, the 
very assumption of nomadic ‘backwardness’ precluded the possibility of more 
‘advanced’ sedentary states being positively influenced by nomads. Conse-
quently ‘even the most sophisticated contributions to the literature on state 
building do not touch base with the Eurasian steppe’.15 In short, the historiog-
raphy of nomads is marked by a persistent and, we argue, problematic erasure of 
nomads from the history of capitalist modernity.
 This chapter aims to demonstrate that this exclusion is no longer sustain-
able, and that an appreciation of the influence of the nomadic Mongol Empire 
is central to any analysis of how the modern capitalist world came into being. In 
this respect, we follow the lead of a number of scholars who have highlighted 
the pervasive influence on world history of nomadic communities operating on 
the Eurasian steppe, from the formation of Asian empires to the commercial 
prefiguration of the modern world system.16 We acknowledge and take up some 
of these arguments, but with two important modifications. 
 First, accounts that have emphasised the influence of nomadic empires 
in the making of Asian history17 have not extended their geographical scope 
to address how this history impacted the origins of capitalism in Europe. 
Second, those authors who do focus on their influences on Europe18 have 
typically concentrated on quantitative increases in trade and transfers of 
knowledge and artefacts that took place in the Medieval period.19 However, 
what they have yet to capture is how such commerce-induced transfers 
anievas maintext.indd   65 18/05/2015   12:18:47
how the west came to rule
66
impacted on the qualitative transformation from feudal to capitalist social 
relations. In contrast to both tendencies, we argue that the expansion of the 
Mongolian Empire was a crucial ‘vector’ of uneven and combined develop-
ment which contributed to the making of capitalist modernity over the longue 
durée.
 Considering the task at hand, it is worth noting two ways in which we 
consider uneven and combined development especially useful in redeeming 
the agency of the Mongolian Empire. First, uneven and combined develop-
ment calls for a radically anti-stadial model of development and a nonlinear 
conception of history. This provides an important corrective to evolutionist 
assumptions that underpin the study of nomadic societies, for any ideal-typical 
understanding of nomadism would in every instance have to be reconcep-
tualised in a way that incorporates the sorts of ‘combination’ that arise from 
intersocietal relations. To paraphrase Peter Jackson, there are no ‘pure’ nomadic 
polities, but only ‘hybrids’.20 The subversion of the evolutionist approach also 
undermines the assumption that, on the historicist hierarchy of sedentary versus 
nomadic societies or state versus nonstate, nomadic communities lack historical 
agency.
 So second, the idea of uneven and combined development does away with 
intersocietal relations conceived in realist terms as externally related but occa-
sionally colliding states, and instead allows us to grasp more itinerant and 
nonstate forms of territoriality as an active part of international relations, state 
formations and world history more broadly. An awareness of this itinerant terri-
toriality is precisely why uneven and combined development can offer a way of 
theorising the significance of nomadism in general, and the Mongolian Empire 
in particular, for world history. In doing so, uneven and combined development 
also provides theoretically and empirically generative ways of reintroducing the 
importance of nomadism into historical narratives of the origins of capitalism.
 We take up this task in the sections that follow. In the first section, we 
examine the impact of the Mongolian Empire on the socio-economic and polit-
ical development of Europe, demonstrating how it facilitated cross-cultural 
flows of commerce, trade, technologies, ideas and more, while also spurring 
significant technological innovations. The second section goes on to examine 
the unintended destructive yet regenerative consequences of the Mongol 
Empire’s ‘unification of the world by disease’ – an often overlooked and under-
theorised form of intersocietal interaction. The spread of the Black Death to 
Europe engendered significant institutional and socio-economic developments 
and a transformation of the balance of class forces, which directly led to the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism in the English countryside. The conclu-
sion then teases out the historical analysis’s broader implications for the study 
of world history and historical sociology more generally.
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Pax Mongolica as a Vector of Uneven 
and Combined Development
It is worth recalling that in the late Medieval and early modern epochs, Europe 
was in no sense destined to rise to the position of global prominence it currently 
holds. Up until at least the mid-13th century, the social formations making up 
‘Europe’ were in fact the least developed region of a ‘world system’ of increasing 
economic integration and cultural contacts between ‘East’ and ‘West’.21 Arising 
late on the periphery of this world system, European development had the most 
to gain from the new intersocietal links being forged, particularly through the 
diffusion of new technologies and ‘resource portfolios’ spreading from East to 
West.22
 The principles of mathematics, navigational inventions, arts of war and 
significant military technologies all originated in the more scientifically and 
militarily advanced Asian societies, only to then eventually pass to the more 
‘backward’ European societies.23 This then enabled European (proto)states to 
acquire the means to revolutionise their own societies in much more intensive 
concentrations of time than had the original purveyors. Such ‘late-developing’ 
societies did not need to start from scratch, but could instead acquire and refine 
the most advanced technologies and organisational forms pioneered by earlier 
developers. In these ways, the societies that came to form Europe benefited 
from a certain ‘privilege of historic backwardness’,24 a key precondition for the 
eventual emergence of capitalism in them.
 Crucial to this process of worldwide interconnection was the ‘globalising’ 
dynamic of the robustly expansionist Mongol Empire, which over the course of 
the Long 13th Century (1210–1350) unified much of the Eurasian landmass, 
putting ‘the termini of Europe and China in direct contact with one another for 
the first time in a thousand years’.25 The emergence of the Mongol Empire and 
its effects on other societies’ development were of world-historical significance, 
as this section demonstrates. We must first, however, examine the dynamics of 
the nomadic mode of production in explaining the precise forms, scales and 
articulations of uneven and combined development during this epoch.
The Nomadic Mode of Production and 
Uneven and Combined Development
The sources of the expansionist tendencies of the Mongolian steppe clans can 
be found in their distinctive form of production: nomadic pastoralism. Unlike 
sedentary agricultural societies, the means of production for nomads were herds 
rather than soil.26 Since herds were themselves dependent on land not occupied 
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by nomads, any systematic development of productive forces was limited, as was 
the quantity of surplus produced. In order to generate new surpluses, nomads 
had to therefore integrate – by conquest or consent – more and more productive 
units from which they could extract tribute.27
 Consequently, the nomadic mode of production had a tripartite mech-
anism for the reproduction of social life. First, there was the necessity of 
locating grazing land for animals in the herd. Constrained by the ‘spotty and 
archipelagic’28 distribution of cultivable land in the steppe, migrations tended 
to be semi-annual between high pastures in the summer and lower steppes in 
the winter, imbuing nomadism with a continuous and far-reaching mobility. 
This mobility, and the social structure it entailed, endowed nomadic life with 
militaristic traits: war and conquest developed from being necessities in the 
(re)productive process to forming a part of the polity and identity of the communi-
ty’s members.29 Second, there was the necessity of raiding sedentary communities 
for grains, manufactures and luxury goods.30 Here the mobility, discipline and 
hardiness of the nomadic mounted archer proved an irresistible military force 
which contributed to innovations both technical and strategic.31 Third, in their 
interactions with sedentary societies, nomads also made use of their mobility 
to develop extensive trade relations with widely disparate sedentary communi-
ties. This in turn facilitated the communication and transfer of technologies and 
information over long distances, as further examined below.32 Nomadic empire 
building was consequently invariably conducted along caravan routes that facil-
itated the appropriation of surpluses through the mechanisms of trade and 
tribute.33 Economic ‘openness’ in the conquered lands was therefore crucial to the 
reproduction of nomadic empires. These lands acted as logistical mechanisms for 
the supply of food, strategic resources, luxury goods, tributes and taxes.34
 Such a mode of production tended towards a proto-state or ‘headless’35 state 
form which could manage these three elements – coordinating migrations 
around new pastures, leading conquering missions, and mediating between 
a multiplicity of nomadic and sedentary societies. The mobility of migrations 
also meant that the nomadic relationship to land was not one of ownership, 
and the limited nature of extensive pastoral farming meant that the accumu-
lation of surpluses was restricted by climactic unreliability.36 Thus, nomadism 
was adverse to the centralisation of power and resources – an essential basis 
for any private ownership of land and form of sovereign authority – and was 
instead marked by horizontal and disaggregated social relationships between 
society members.37 This was complemented by an ideology of inclusiveness and 
quasi-equality, where social relations between members of the community were 
articulated in terms of companionship and comradeship.38
 In particular, this horizontality and flexibility of nomadic groups facilitated 
collective collaboration in raiding better protected sedentary communities. 
Because intratribal or supratribal organisations were so heavily predicated on 
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warfare,39 unification tended to occur through the appointment of a supreme 
chief, or khan, who would represent the ‘higher unity’ of these horizontal struc-
tures.40 Hence, political authority tended to be concentrated according to the 
personal qualities of the most skilled warrior in the position of chief, who was 
best suited to leading the ‘joint ventures’ of migration and raiding.41
 With intersocietal interactions between uneven polities at the heart of social 
reproduction, the nomadic mode of production begot combined development. 
This was most clearly expressed in the transformation of both nomadic and seden-
tary societies through their interactions. Because nomadism required the material 
products of sedentary societies, many sedentary cultures became a ‘source’ and 
‘model’ for ‘comparison, borrowing, imitation, or rejection’.42 Moreover, combi-
nation worked reciprocally: nomadic technologies, cultures and traditions were 
also imitated by sedentary societies.43 The qualities of mobility and war-readiness 
made nomads especially attuned to extorting surpluses from sedentary societies 
through raids, and under certain conditions conquest.44 This external nomadic 
‘whip’ necessitated a response from sedentary societies toward more ordered 
politics and better equipped military organisations, something that was only 
possible with greater accumulation and centralisation of resources. As a result, 
sedentary societies required the creation of surpluses, and their appropriation, 
and so social stratification and the concentration of political powers were needed 
in personified arbitrary authorities or states. In these ways, sedentary societies 
tended to unwittingly replicate political features of nomadic societies.45
 At the same time, interactions with sedentary states led to the consoli-
dation of larger and stronger administrative and military institutions among 
nomads, in order to better conduct wars and raids, or to control trade routes. 
Such expansions precipitated the emergence of centralised standing armies and 
the Supreme Khan’s personal bodyguards, often to unprecedented scales.46 Such 
a growth of centralised military functions was maintained primarily through 
the semi-institutionalisation of the raid, through tribute and eventually by the 
direct taxation of sedentary subjects.47 And as the importance of tribute and 
taxation to the modalities of ruling class reproduction grew, nomadic empires 
tended to incorporate bureaucrats from conquered sedentary territories in order 
to administer these functions of surplus extraction.48 Finally, nomadic ideology 
was rearticulated in order to legitimise this shift in social relations ‘from 
horizontal to vertical and from semi-egalitarian to hierarchical’.49 
 In short, the uneven relations between nomadic and sedentary societies 
tended towards the complexification of nomadic political structures as a result 
of the confrontation and consequent amalgamation,50 synthesis51 or ‘caging’52 
of these multiple and varied social forms.53 And it was through such processes 
of combined development that nomadism could tend towards semi-tributary 
modes of production – either through processes of nomadic empire building 
(Mongol, Ottoman), or through the nomadic pressures on sedentary states to 
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consolidate, as exemplified by the Mughal, Chinese, Byzantine and Muscovite 
empires. When we see nomadism as developing combined social formations, 
it is therefore possible to move away from an essentialised understanding of 
nomadism as ‘static’, ‘simple’ or ‘primitive’ to an understanding that recognises 
the often unprecedented levels of sophistication in the organisation of state and 
society achieved by polities such as the Mongolian Empire, along with their 
impact on other more ‘advanced’ sedentary societies.
 Moreover, these combined characteristics help to clarify the central contra-
diction in the nomadic mode of production between tendencies towards a 
hierarchical, stratified sedentarisation, on the one hand, against the horizontal 
flexibility of nomadism, on the other. Because this contradiction was so deeply 
imbued with intersocietal determinations, it tended to be expressed first and 
foremost geopolitically.54 The ebb and flow of nomadisation and sedetarisation, 
created by intranomadic and nomad–sedentary internecine conflicts over access 
to land or spoils of raids, meant that communities were constantly uprooted 
and moved to more secure areas for grazing and/or agriculture.55 
 Waves of nomadic empire building therefore tended to create chain reac-
tions of displacement, migration and resettlement that transmitted the peoples 
and traditions of nomadism throughout Inner Asia to its hinterlands. Such was 
the reach of Inner Asian nomadic empires that their legacy could be found 
to the north in the Muscovy Empire, to the south in the Mughal Empire, to 
the West in the Saffavid and Seljuk Empires, and to the East in the Yuan and 
Manchu Dynasties.56 In short, the contradictions at the heart of nomadic form 
of uneven and combined development meant that nomadic empire building 
could be simultaneously generative and destructive. The varied developmental 
experiences implied in this contradiction are explored below.
The World-Historical Significance of the Mongol Empire
The impact of the Mongol conquests on the subsequent trajectory of world 
history was profound. Once relatively isolated entities, the different sedentary 
and nomadic societies making up the whole of the Eurasian landmass were 
now ‘interactive components of a unified system’57 of geopolitical relations. 
What we then find in the world of the 13th and 14th centuries is a plurality 
of differentiated societies, based on different modes of production (tributary in 
Asia, nomadic in the steppes, feudal in Europe), constituting a single interac-
tive geopolitical whole. Within this ontological whole, each society’s conditions 
of existence necessarily impinged on and entered into its logics of reproduc-
tion, creating an ‘interdependence … of the structures of social, material and 
cultural life’.58 Nomadic expansionism thus represented an early form or vector 
of uneven and combined development.
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 The effects of the Mongol raids and conquests on ‘West’ and ‘East’ were, 
however, gravely different. The pressure of nomadic expansionism was one of 
the main reasons for the differentiated development of Eastern and Western 
Europe, as the former’s internal evolution was continually impeded by succes-
sive nomadic invasions. ‘The pattern and frequency of these invasions’, Perry 
Anderson writes, ‘made them one of the basic coordinates of the forma-
tion of Eastern Europe’.59 The invasions hindered both the development 
of the productive forces and the states system in Eastern Europe, marking it 
off from Western Europe as its own distinct geopolitical and socio-economic 
unit.60 
 For China too, the Mongol invasions profoundly arrested economic devel-
opment. E. L. Jones claims that the human destruction wrought by the Mongol 
conquest of Sung China ‘was so large that it must have obliterated economic life 
over wide areas’.61 Similarly, according to Alan Smith, ‘after the overthrow of 
the Sung dynasty by the invading Mongols in 1276, China never regained the 
dynamism of its past’.62 For this reason, Eric Mielants cites the Mongol conquest 
as an ‘important variable’ in explaining why China, despite its high levels of 
economic growth, was unable to make the transition to capitalism.63 As Europe 
would come to expand economically as a result of the transcontinental trading 
system established by the Pax Mongolica, many of the pre-Mongolian commer-
cial networks and trading states of Central Asia were negatively affected, if not 
entirely destroyed, by the Golden Horde.64 While the hitherto more powerful 
states that made up China, the Middle East and Russian territories were 
persistently ‘burdened’ by the ‘Tartar yoke’, Western Europe benefited.65 This 
was a key reason for the divergent, variegated paths of socio-economic develop-
ment in different regions.66 It can be said, then, that the uneven and combined 
development of the Pax Mongolica exacerbated the developmental unevenness 
between ‘East’ and ‘West’, as well as within Europe itself.
 Although by 1350 the Mongol Empire had disintegrated into a number of 
rivalling khanates, the continuing nomadic threat to China’s inner Asian land 
frontier persisted. The strategic dilemma posed by the nomads is often cited as 
a key reason for the Ming dynasty’s retreat from the sea, represented by their 
famous decision not to follow up Admiral Zheng He’s naval expeditions in the 
Indian Ocean. The inward turn of the Ming Empire, though often exaggerated, 
nonetheless did signal the abandonment of seaborne expansion, and as an 
indirect result, the eventual weakening of the Empire vis-à-vis its soon to be 
Western competitors.67 The very withdrawal of powerful Chinese fleets from 
commercially and strategically important nodes of the Indian Ocean littoral 
meant that the Portuguese and Dutch had a considerably freer rein during 
their later, 16th-century penetration into the region, assisting their success in 
capturing ‘vital emporia and crucial strategic locations’ throughout the Ocean. 
‘In this sense, “Chinese abdication was Europe’s gain”’.68 Had it not been for 
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China’s central strategic problem, the nomadic threat, we could speculate that it 
might well have reached the Americas first.69
 By contrast, for Western Europe, the effects of the Mongol invasions and the 
formation of the Pax Mongolica were primarily beneficial for economic develop-
ment.70 In addition to lowering commercial protection and the transaction costs 
of overland trade, in many cases the Mongols actively guaranteed the safety 
of merchants travelling in the regions they controlled, while offering lucrative 
commercial and territorial privileges to European states on the basis of treaties 
or concessions. An example of these concessions is the agreement negotiated 
by the Venetian ambassadors Giovanni Quirino and Pietro Giustiniano with 
Khan Ozbeg for the founding of a comptoir in Tana, which included a ‘territorial 
concession, favourable taxation, protection for the merchants, and provisions in 
case of legal disputes’.71 
 The Mongol Empire also facilitated the diffusion of such key military tech-
nologies as navigational techniques and gunpowder72 from East Asia to Europe 
– all of which were crucial to Europe’s subsequent rise to global prominence. As 
new military technologies were critical tools of conquest and administration, the 
Mongols would acquire such technologies in one society and then deploy them 
in another to better enable imperial expansion and control, resulting in their 
continual spread.73 ‘Without the Mongol peace, it is hard to imagine any of the 
rest of Western history working out quite as it did’, Felipe Fernandez-Armesto 
writes, ‘for these were the roads that carried Chinese ideas and transmitted tech-
nology westward and opened up European minds to the vastness of the world’.74
 While the Mongol threat to China represented a whip of external necessity 
structuring and redirecting Chinese development, the structural geopolitical 
space created by the Pax Mongolica and its effects on Western European soci-
eties was something more akin to what we might term a ‘gift of external 
opportunity’. But crucially, these ‘gifts’ were determined by the agency of the 
Mongolians themselves, ‘by what the Mongols liked, needed and were inter-
ested in’. Consequently, the sorts of cross-cultural exchange that took place in 
the Pax Mongolica were functions of – and adaptations to – the requirements 
of Mongolian imperial reproduction.75 Hence, as further examined below, 
Mongolian agency played a significant role in the creation of some of the crucial 
preconditions that launched Europe onto the path of capitalist development 
and, much later, global supremacy.
Trade, Commerce, and Socio-Economic 
Development under the Pax Mongolica
The Mongol rulers formed a symbiotic relationship with merchants from all over 
Eurasia as the booty from their conquests became increasingly insufficient to 
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finance the Empire’s administration. To supplement their finances, the Mongols 
sought to derive profit from trade across their domains. They were, Ronald 
Findlay tells us, the ‘natural supporters of “free trade” as the Mongols mate-
rially benefitted from the free flow of goods and factors across their domains 
since this increased the wealth they could extract for themselves’.76 Merchants 
thereby became the ‘foundation of the state’.77 In search of a steady stream of 
income, the Mongol rulers therefore actually sought to promote trade, making 
them a key agent in the rise of the virtual ‘world market’ of the 13th and 14th 
centuries. ‘No effort was spared to encourage all kinds of commercial activity’, 
Virgil Ciocîltan writes, as:
they allowed unhindered access for foreigners in the lands which they governed, 
guaranteed safety for travellers, and ensured the proper conditions for transport of 
goods, which of course also included setting custom duties at an attractive level. 
Any measure which would increase trade was considered good.78
The Mongols were ‘exceptional’ in their willingness and capacity to provide the 
infrastructural foundations for intersocietal trade even when the formal backing 
of European states was lacking or absent.79
 The establishment of the Pax Mongolica was then a major boon for overland 
trade connecting East to West, which notably benefited Northwestern Europe. 
It created a transcontinental trading system in which commerce, trade, technol-
ogies and ideas travelled along the Silk Road like never before.80 This has led 
Figure 3.2 Master of Busico, Kublai Khan giving support to the Venetians, 1412
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Kublai_giving_support_to_the_Venetians.jpg 
(accessed 27 October 2014).
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some scholars to go so far as to attribute the origins of ‘globalisation’ to the 
unification of the Eurasian land mass accomplished by the Mongols.81 Having 
connected the disparate regions of Eurasia under a single authority for ‘the first 
and indeed only time in history’,82 the Mongols contributed to the emergence 
of a nascent ‘world economy’ by facilitating ‘land transit with less risk and lower 
protective rent’. Merchants and goods were now able to travel more safely over 
‘these vast distances’, thereby establishing a trade route which briefly ‘broke the 
monopoly of the more southerly routes’.83 
 This was particularly beneficial for the ‘proto-capitalist’ merchants of the 
Italian city-states Venice and Genoa, for whom Mongolian protection in Central 
Asia was central to their preponderance and growth in the Black Sea region.84 
The activities of Italian merchants crucially depended on the Mongols’ will-
ingness and capacity to create and maintain favourable trading conditions.85 
While a number of historians have emphasised the importance of the Treaty of 
Nymphaeus (1261) in establishing Genoa’s commercial monopoly east of the 
Bosporus, less noted is the fact it was the Mongols that allowed its merchants to 
‘set up shop’ in the Crimea in the first place.86
 What is more, the decreased transaction and protection costs across the 
overland trade routes resulted in an ‘unprecedented expansion of the market 
for Western European cities’, in turn promoting growing and complexified 
divisions of labour in most European urban industries.87 In particular, the 
expanded international demand for cloth stimulated the textile industry in the 
Low Countries,88 which proved critical to the ‘urban-agrarian’ symbiosis that 
characterised the rise of capitalist social relations in parts of the Late Medieval 
Netherlands (see Chapter 6).89 The widened market for wool in Flemish towns 
would in turn encourage English landowners in the Stuart period to convert 
to commercial agriculture.90 For these reasons, Mielants concludes, it would be 
‘Eurocentric to claim that “medieval development” in Europe was nothing but 
“auto-development”’.91
 In all these ways, the Mongol Empire provided the propitious geopolitical 
conditions for the extensive development of market relations, trade, urban 
growth, and perhaps most importantly an increasingly complex division of 
labour in Western Europe – the latter constituting an integral aspect of the 
development of the productive forces. To be clear, this did not automatically 
entail the advent of capitalist relations of production, but it did provide the 
preconditions for their subsequent emergence.92 For growing urban centres 
provided not only the gravitational pull on peasants seeking to escape serfdom, 
but also a growing demand for agricultural products, which were increasingly 
produced for the market. As Terence Byres explains, ‘The sizeable market for 
agricultural products was the outcome of considerable urban development, 
and the consequent existence of considerable urban demand, and the emer-
gence of an enormous network of smaller markets and craft centres’.93 The 
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development of complex commercial networks of interconnected city sites was, 
then, an important aspect of the story of capitalism’s emergence – one signifi-
cantly enhanced by the intensification and securing of long-distance trade 
relations under the Pax Mongolica.
 Although trade between ‘West’ and ‘East’ would significantly decrease with 
the disintegration of the Mongol Empire, European interest in trade with the Far 
East never died. Memories of the commerce carried on by European merchants, 
and especially Marco Polo’s stories, maintained knowledge of the Far East, and 
the desire for renewed access to it. Moreover, by unifying hitherto isolated ‘civil-
isations’ as interactive components of a single geopolitical system, the Mongol 
conquests significantly altered the conceptual and ideological horizons of the 
Europeans as they came to view the world as a unified whole. This widened 
conception of the world would eventually prove a further motivation for 
long-distance voyages among Europeans in the age of expansion, instigating 
Genoan-Portuguese ventures around the Cape of Good Hope, as well as the 
accidental discovery of the Americas.94 Consequently, as S. A. M. Adshead puts 
it, ‘[i]f Europe came to dominate the world, it was possibly because Europe 
first perceived there was a world to dominate. There is a straight line from 
Marco Polo to Christopher Columbus, the eastward-looking Venetian to the 
westward-looking Genoese’.95
 Finally, we must note the important benefits afforded to Europe in the wake 
of the Mongol Empire’s collapse. For after Pax Mongolica had established the 
trade links and intersocietal exchanges facilitating the first ‘world system’, its 
fall provided critical advantages for Europe’s subsequent rise to global domi-
nation. First, it was precisely the disintegration of the Mongol Empire that 
provided the propitious geopolitical space through which the societies of Europe 
could make strident developmental gains. This was because the increase in 
protection and transportation costs on the overland route, and the concomitant 
shift to maritime trade in the Indian Ocean littoral, precipitated a political crisis 
in numerous Inner Asian states.96 In this sense, as Janet Abu-Lughoud notes, it 
was the ‘Fall of the East’ that set the conditions for the later ‘Rise of the West’, 
as the ‘devolution of this pre-existing system’ established by the Pax Mongolica 
‘facilitated Europe’s easy conquest’.97 
 In yet another instance of the ‘gift of external opportunity’, Europe conquered 
or subsumed commercial routes and networks that had been previously devel-
oped by the Pax Mongolica over the Long 13th Century. The Europeans ‘did not 
need to invent the system, since the basic groundwork was in place by the thir-
teenth century when Europe was still only a recent and peripheral participant’.98 
But, moreover, the commercial shift to the Indian Ocean intersected with 
Europe’s own entry into these maritime routes, forming a crucial economic and 
strategic platform from which particular European powers (especially Britain) 
would later launch their drive to global domination (see Chapter 8). The rise 
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and fall of the Pax Mongolica were thus crucial moments in kick-starting the 
developmental trajectory that eventually led to the rise of capitalism in Europe, 
while providing the critical intersocietal conditions from which Europe would 
begin its ascent to global supremacy.
Apocalypse Then: The Black Death and the Crisis of Feudalism
The Black Death is often cited as a major conjunctural factor in explaining both 
the terminal crisis of the feudal mode of production in Europe and the crucial 
shifts in the balance of class forces leading to the eventual rise of capitalist social 
relations.99 Some scholars have gone so far as to cite the Black Death as the 
main reason for the development of capitalism in Western Europe.100 Whatever 
emphasis is placed on the precise significance of the Black Death, it is gener-
ally agreed among historians that the already existing crisis within the feudal 
mode of production was supercharged by the ‘pandemic shock caused by the 
Black Death’, heralding ‘a watershed in the transition to capitalism’.101 By stim-
ulating state formation processes throughout Western Europe while spurring on 
urbanisation and commercialisation, the late Medieval crisis ‘may have marked 
the most decisive step in the continent’s long trajectory to capitalism and world 
hegemony’.102 Yet rarely, if ever, does this contingent factor enter into the theo-
risation of the process of systemic dissolution and reconstruction itself. And, we 
might ask, why should it? How could any historical sociology theorise such a 
phenomenon?
 The reason is that in both origin and effect the Black Death was a social 
phenomenon, or more precisely an intersocietal one. It is ‘indicative’, Neil 
Davidson writes, ‘of a rather oversocialized notion of human existence if our 
struggle with … non-human aspects of nature is treated as an exogenous factor’. 
Davidson goes on to give the example of the Black Death which, he correctly 
notes, plays a critical role in Robert Brenner’s explication of the changing 
balance of class forces at the end of the 14th century. Against conceptions of the 
Black Death as a pure contingency, however, Davidson notes how ‘the extent 
of its [the Black Death’s] impact was a function of the weakened resistance to 
disease of a population who were already suffering from reduced caloric intake 
as a result of the feudal economic crisis’.103
 Indeed, by the middle of the 14th century, feudalism in Europe was losing 
steam. Population had stopped rising, food costs were higher and famines 
became more frequent, as was exemplified by the Great Famine of 1315–17. 
Feudal Europe’s long period of expansion had apparently come to an end, 
which explains why the impact of the Black Death was so severe;104 the plague’s 
effects were conditioned by this socio-economic environment. What is more, 
it was only through the Mongolian unification of the Eurasian landmass, and 
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the increasing intersocietal interactions that this facilitated, that allowed the 
plague to spread to Europe in the first place.105 What Le Roy Ladurie called ‘the 
unification of the globe by disease’106 should therefore be seen as an unintended 
consequence of the uneven and combined development of the Mongolian 
Empire.
Figure 3.3 Albrecht Dürer, Die Offenbarung des Johannes: 4. Die vier apokalyp-
tischen [The Revelation of St. John: 4. The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse], 1497–98
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Durer_Revelation_Four_Riders.jpg 
(accessed 27 October 2014).
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 The transformative effects of the Black Death on Europe were both causative 
and indicative of a wider social crisis in feudalism. For many contemporaries, 
the Black Death appeared as an apocalyptic event, heralding the ‘End Times’ 
that would sweep away all vestiges of the extant structures of society. The ideas 
of catastrophe and salvation generated by the eschatology of the time were thus 
indicative of a ‘historical context in which one mode of production and life was 
being supplanted by another’.107
 Such themes are stunningly captured in Albrecht Dürer’s 1498 The Four 
Horsemen of the Apocalypse, in which the four harbingers of reckoning furi-
ously rout all before them. Straddling the horses of ‘pestilence’, ‘war’, ‘famine’, 
and ‘death’, each signified the chokepoints of feudalism: the bubonic plague, 
internecine military competition, the vicissitudes of agrarian production, and 
demographic fluctuations. Meanwhile, a diabolical monster drags members of 
the ruling class into hell, representing and demonising the widespread rebel-
lions that would attack the institutions of serfdom, empire and papacy from 
below. The extensive reproduction of Dürer’s Apocalypse with Pictures (there 
were 750 editions and commentaries from 1498 to 1650)108 suggests that his 
vision resonated through the 16th century among the ruling and ruled classes 
alike, capturing the disorders of a mode of production nearing its final end.
 The Black Death was ‘an event of great historical importance’, for it not only 
expedited the breakdown of feudalism, but also impelled ‘economic, techno-
logical, social and administrative modernization’.109 We examine these in turn 
through: first, an analysis of the breakdown of feudal class structures; second, 
an examination of the increasing socio-economic stratification of the peasantry; 
and third, a focus on the significant developments to the productive forces.
Class Struggle and the Changing Balance 
of Class Forces in Europe
One of the single most important effects of the demographic collapse resulting 
from the plague was how it temporarily functioned to tip the balance of class 
forces in favour of the peasantry throughout much of Western Europe, but most 
notably in the English countryside.110 In particular, the high demand for land 
that had hitherto upheld the manorial lords’ positions was severely undermined 
by the population decline resulting from the plague. Where lords could previ-
ously use the threat of expulsion to discipline peasants, now abundant land 
allowed the peasantry opportunities to flee and cultivate new lands.111 One 
immediate consequence of the Black Death was rent strikes – the ‘refusal to 
pay’ – among peasants, reinforced by the threat of flight from manorial lands to 
unoccupied territories or cities.112 
 As the peasantry became less docile, the potency of extra-economic means 
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of surplus extraction – coercive, legal, religious and so on – was curbed.113 As 
a consequence, many direct producers across the West European countryside 
either experienced an upturn in their living conditions, or were altogether 
emancipated by the dissolution of serfdom.114 Wages doubled and trebled 
across Western Europe, and work obligations for peasants were considerably 
reduced. With the greater availability of work and increasing wages, landless 
peasants also experienced a notable upturn in their conditions.115 Wage differ-
entials between men and women were also greatly reduced following the Black 
Death.116 For a brief period, the peasantry held historically ‘unprecedented 
power’ in what proved ‘a golden age of the European proletariat’.117
 The unprecedented demographic downturn resulting from the plague in turn 
exacerbated a declining rate of seigniorial revenues, generalising and deepening 
the systemic crisis of feudalism that had begun in the early 15th century.118 For 
in ‘a system where the social reproduction of the ruling class hinged upon a 
growing population in order to sustain seigneurial revenues’, Jason Moore writes, 
‘the Black Death quickly transformed the agrarian depression of the early four-
teenth century into a terminal crisis of the feudal system’.119 In these respects, 
the Black Death was ‘not simply one episode among the many dramatic conflicts 
that punctuate[d] the history of feudalism’, Guy Bois notes, but represented the 
‘watershed’ event signalling the beginning of the end: an organic crisis besetting 
the totality of power structures making up feudal production as a whole.120
 Further avenues for feudal survival came to be predominantly oriented 
around three main axes of ruling class reproductive strategies: first, a forcible 
redistribution of already occupied lands represented by war-assisted processes 
of (geo)political accumulation (that is, intra-lordly conflict); second, a redirec-
tion of expansionist strategies away from land accumulation on the continent to 
the capturing of commercially lucrative overseas markets and trade routes; and/
or third, a clamping down and intensification of the rate of exploitation of the 
direct producers (known as the ‘seigniorial reaction’). Such ruling class strategies 
aimed at recuperating lost surpluses could be found throughout Europe. In the 
face of labour shortages caused by the plague and the consequent upturn in 
wages, the ruling class sought to reimpose strictures on the peasants that had 
until then been gradually diminishing, by attempting to strengthen serfdom, 
and hold down wages in both town and country.121 This was exemplified by the 
Statues of Labourers decreed in England in 1349–51, immediately following 
the Black Death, and the French Ordonnance of 1351, which partly followed 
provisions laid out in the English statues, along with similar decrees controlling 
labour wages by the Cortes of Castile in 1351, the German princes in Bavaria in 
1352 and the Portuguese monarchy some two decades later in 1375.122
 Attempts to reinforce servile conditions and pass the costs of the feudal 
crisis onto the labouring class were met by fierce and often violent resistance. 
Peasant revolts broke out across most European countries, along with workers’ 
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uprisings in the more urbanised Low Countries.123 In 1358, northern France 
was set aflame by the Grande Jacquerie, one of the largest peasants’ revolts 
recorded in Western European history since the Bacaudae of the 3rd century. 
France erupted again in 1379 and 1382 in what Prosper Boissonnade described 
as a ‘whirlwind of revolution’.124 The more developed urban regions in Flanders 
and Northern Italy also experienced autonomous communal revolts, while 
in 1378 a more radical peasant revolt in Florence led to the brief dictatorship 
of the Ciompi wool combers, made up primarily of wage-labourers. Then in 
England, the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 sought nothing less than the total 
abolition of serfdom and the existing legal system.125 Political and economic 
struggles prompted by the Black Death continued into the 15th century, often 
escalating into civil wars. In Catalonia, peasants demanded land, the freedom of 
movement, an end to enclosures, and the abolition of rents, in a series of strug-
gles that culminated in the Remensa Wars of 1462–86.126 The peasant revolts 
in Germany, beginning in 1476, inaugurated and prefigured a long series of 
rebellions that reached its apogee with the great Peasant Wars of 1522–25.127
Peasant Differentiation in the Age of the Black Death
By transforming the agrarian depression of the 14th century into the terminal 
crisis of feudalism, the Black Death ushered in a new era of profound social 
dislocations and economic change. In this context, many peasants increasingly 
turned to the market in order to escape the machinations of serfdom. This is 
a particularly significant point given the tendency among Political Marxists to 
stress that market dependency must be imposed upon economic agents; under 
no circumstances, they argue, would peasants willingly choose to be capitalists 
or subject themselves to the systematic imperatives of the market. While this 
position has the great merit of denaturalising the emergence of capitalism, the 
historical evidence does nonetheless indicate that, under certain circumstances, 
peasants sought to use the market to escape from serfdom. Over time this often 
had the unintended consequence of making them market-dependent.128
 In the immediate aftermath of the Black Death, many English peasant 
producers were able to use their improved conditions to accumulate land,129 
produce surpluses130 and participate in the market as a means to secure their 
material reproduction.131 The ongoing process of peasant differentiation was 
greatly accelerated by the impact of the plague on England’s feudal agrarian 
economy. This was above all the result of the demographic shifts resulting from 
the plague’s diffusion from the Mongol Empire to Europe. ‘There can be little 
doubt as to the importance of the Black Death’, Michael J. Bennett notes, ‘to 
both the progressive amelioration and differentiation of peasant fortunes’.132 
For in numerous regions of England, high mortality rates left unbreachable gaps 
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in the ranks of the peasantry. The consequent shortage of labour was bound in 
the long run to work to the advantage of most sections of the peasant class, and 
the large number of vacant holdings inevitably enabled the more enterprising 
survivors to add to their tenancies on a scale hitherto unimaginable.
 Similarly, as Jane Whittles writes specifically in regards to the situation in the 
county of Norfolk, England:
Manorial lords had retained their hold on the economy in the century before the 
Black Death because of the high demand for land. Once this factor was removed 
by population decline, the diversified economy undermined the manorial lords’ 
position. Land was still an important element in the economy, but it was not the 
only element, and it was now not difficult to acquire .... Peasants, or rather wealthy 
peasants, had capitalized on the fifteenth-century situation, building up their land 
holdings, and orientating themselves increasingly towards market production.133
Such statements generally confirm the picture painted by Rodney Hilton of 
the dramatic changes to Europe’s agrarian economy in the wake of the Black 
Death. The plague’s effects in transforming the ‘land : labour ratio’ in Europe 
had, according to Hilton, two major long-term consequences for the European 
peasantry: first, it increased the availability of suitable land to farm; and second, 
it diminished the rent burden on property holdings.134 In the century following 
the Black Death, rent revenue fell at rates ranging between 40 per cent in the 
Tuscan contado and 70 per cent, as witnessed in Normandy and some regions in 
Flanders. Moreover, rents paid per crop shares dropped from a half to a seventh 
or an eighth, while at the same time real wages rose. In England, wages doubled 
over the same period, placing a much greater strain on the seigneurial economy 
than the peasant economy, which remained largely dependent on family labour.
The diminishing of the rent burden was in turn ‘partly due to peasant pressure, 
and partly (especially in war-devastated areas) to the anxiety of landowners to 
attract tenants to keep land in cultivation’. Increases in money wages for peasant 
labourers were ‘no doubt the immediate consequence of their scarcity (though 
the demand must also have fallen) but could not have been sustained at the 
high level without a considerable increase in the productivity of labour’. Such 
increases in labour productivity were, in turn, the ‘consequence of the abandon-
ment of marginal soils, the increased availability of pasture and the increased 
number of animals’. The effects this had on increasing the process of internal 
differentiation and stratification within the peasant class were hugely signif-
icant, as the ‘number of smallholders was considerably reduced’, the ‘middle 
stratum’ appreciably strengthened, and the richer peasantry also ‘improved their 
position’, though not as ‘consistently as did the middle peasants’.135
 The reduction in the proportion of smallholders was perhaps the most 
important development in the changing landscape of the feudal agrarian 
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economy. As ‘the families of smallholders were more likely to die out than those 
of the better-off peasants’ and since the latter held larger holdings and had 
generally smaller families, ‘the heads of richer households could endow their 
sons without depressing them into the smallholding class’.136 This decline in 
the number of smallholdings was most markedly demonstrated in the English 
case.
 The Cistercian Abbey of Stoneleigh in the Forest of Arden saw the proportion 
of tenants holding under 8 acres (across all its land that was leased by the peas-
antry) drop from 61 per cent in 1280 to 46 per cent in 1392. In a less extreme but 
more representative case, in five Midland counties in 1280 the average propor-
tion of smallholders was 46 per cent, but by the late 14th and 15th centuries 
the percentage had dropped in a number of Midlands manors to somewhere 
between 11 and 28 per cent. It is difficult to overstate the significance of these 
reductions in the proportion of smallholding peasants for the functioning of the 
agrarian economy as a whole, since the smallholders predominantly made up 
the ‘hired labour reserve for the lords’ demesnes and the rich peasant holdings’. 
Moreover, these were the very labourers ‘who pushed up wages and were gener-
ally regarded as an insolent and demanding group’ among the feudal ruling 
classes; that is, they were those at the forefront of the class struggle against the 
lords. Further, because of the commutation of labour rents resulting from inten-
sifying peasant struggles and changing lordly practices over the years, ‘lords had 
to rely largely on the labour of these independent workers for the cultivation 
of the demesnes, as had the richer peasants for their holdings’.137 Thus, Hilton 
argues:
[i]t is likely that the cost of labour was largely responsible for the abandonment 
of demesne cultivation and it is possible that, at any rate before the latter part of 
the fifteenth century, high labour costs restricted the expansion of the economy of 
the large holding.138
The particular significance of these plague-induced processes in England during 
the period between 1350 and 1450 is not that we find merely a ‘relative abundance 
of land’, since this abundance could already be found in the early Medieval epoch, 
which had witnessed ‘the strengthening of the power of the landed aristocracy 
and of considerable pressure for rent, service and jurisdictional profit’. Instead, 
we find in the years between 1350 and 1450 that the ‘relative land abundance was 
combined …with a relaxation of seigneurial domination and a notable lightening of 
the economic burden on the peasant economy’. Hence, English peasant society, 
‘in spite of still existing within (in broad terms) a feudal framework’, Hilton 
concludes, began to develop ‘according to laws of motion internal to itself ’.139
 The importance of Hilton’s account, as Byres tells us, is his identification and 
tracing of ‘some of the processes of class formation critical to [the emergence of ] 
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a later agrarian capitalism’. For while the middle peasantry prospered during 
this period, ‘a class of “quasi-capitalists”’ was also being formed in the graziers. 
At the same time, the rich peasantry, though still constrained, were beginning 
to acquire the means of production (that is, land) ‘that would be a critical part 
of their transformation into capitalist farmers in the sixteenth century’. By this 
time, ‘it was not only the nature of the leases upon which they held the land’ 
that was significant but ‘their ability to acquire larger holdings’. And, crucially, 
by the end of this period, there emerged the possibility ‘that the constraint asso-
ciated with high labour costs was coming to an end, and that a true potential 
rural proletariat existed’.140
 Each of these developments contributed to a long drawn-out process of class 
differentiation within the peasantry. On the one side, there emerged a class of 
wealthy peasants, possessing capital and larger plots of land,141 who were conse-
quently imbued with ‘the desire, the means and the capacity to accumulate and 
expand, if the opportunity presented itself ’.142 It was these wealthier peasant 
tenants who would also come to contribute to the engrossment of land and 
the formation of capitalist farms,143 which were not, contrary to what Brenner 
claims, solely the preserve of the lordly class.144
 On the other side of this process of peasant differentiation was the emergence of 
a stratum of peasant wage-labourers compelled to work the land as tenant farmers. 
As Colin Mooers, a sympathetic critic of Brenner, writes, ‘The ability of the English 
lords to carry through an assault on the peasant rights in the seventeenth century 
can only be explained by the prior weakening of the peasant community as a result 
of economic differentiation’. The breakthrough of the yeomanry that emerged 
through the process of ‘petty capitalist accumulation’, Mooers notes, ‘was a crucial 
intervening stage in the later development of large-scale capitalist farming. How 
else is it possible to explain the unique triadic pattern of English agrarian capi-
talism?’ For the tenant peasants who would later work as wage-labourers on the 
large-scale capitalist farms of the 18th century ‘had to have come from some-
where’.145 In short, the long drawn-out process of socio-economic stratification 
among the peasantry was an integral aspect of the story of how capitalist relations 
of production first emerged in Europe, and in particular in the English countryside. 
And it is this story that really took off and matured in the age of the Black Death.
 The crucial upshot of all these interrelated developments for understanding 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism is well summarised by Byres, who 
discusses the transformations in the English agrarian economy in relation 
to the sharpening of class conflicts as the 1350–1450 era progressed and the 
‘“well-to-do peasant farmers” were able to take on the new leases’. Without 
the presence of this stratum of wealthier peasants that had emerged from the 
preceding period of peasant differentiation under feudalism, the possibility of 
taking extended leases would not have existed, or at the very least would have 
taken much longer to develop. Those richer peasants wishing to further expand 
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their holdings would have then needed to take on additional hired labour (both 
seasonal and permanent). As a consequence, ‘their relationship with such labour 
would change, and the likelihood of conflict would increase’.146
 Whether or not we agree with Byres that this process of peasant differentia-
tion was the ‘primum mobile’ behind the transition, the point should nonetheless 
be clear: the Black Death’s effects on the feudal agrarian economy and its class 
configurations, particularly in England, spread wide and deep in hastening the 
myriad developments heralding the demise of the old – the feudal system – 
and the awakening of the new capitalist dawn. The Mongol vector of uneven 
and combined development through which the plague was first transmitted to 
Europe thereby acted to further exacerbate processes of internal unevenness 
(peasant differentiation) and class conflict, substantially weakening extant 
feudal power relations while simultaneously hastening the development of new 
(capitalist) productive relations and social forces. We now turn to examine one 
final significant factor in the transition to capitalism resulting from the Black 
Death: that is, its effects on the development of the productive forces.
Development of the Productive Forces
Given the massive loss of working-aged people147 resulting from the plague, 
land became more abundant vis-à-vis labour. This pushed the prices of agri-
cultural products down relative to manufactures, particularly those with high 
labour ratios. Both land rents and interest rates also declined relative to wages. 
Consequently, the income of the feudal landowning classes began to decline 
as labour and peasant incomes rose. Out of necessity, agriculture and manu-
factures began to develop along more capital-intensive lines, spurring new 
improvements in the productive forces.148 Likewise, the dramatic collapse of the 
working-age population also functioned to free resources, such as land, and put 
them to use in new and – more often than not – more productive applications. 
Freed lands could now be employed in ways other than cultivating grain, while 
mills that had traditionally been used to grind grain could now be adapted to 
full cloth, saw wood, operate bellows and so on.149
 In these ways, the redeployment of material resources could act to release 
and develop new productive forces. For as wages rose sharply relative to rents 
and the price of capital,150 producers and landowners across the continent 
began to systematically replace labour with land and capital.151 David Herlihy 
has examined how this systematisation of factor substitution – the substitution 
of cheap land and capital for increasingly expensive labour – led to various 
processes which directly or indirectly stimulated labour productivity and the 
development of the productive forces more generally. 
 For example, in the agricultural sector, the purchasing of oxen to assist 
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peasants in ploughing became more common, as did the use of fertiliser. Both 
material inputs enabled peasants to work more efficiently, which increased the 
overall productivity of labour. Likewise, in the urban sector, factor substitu-
tion allowed for the purchase of improved tools or machinery, again assisting 
the overall productivity of urban labour. These processes not only involved 
replacing labour with existing tools and machines, they also led to quite wide-
spread instances of technological innovation. This period saw the development 
of entirely new tools and machines, as high labour costs systematically incen-
tivised the use of labour-saving inventions. ‘Chiefly for this reason’, Herlihy 
notes, ‘the late Middle Ages was a period of impressive technological achieve-
ment’,152 as ‘a number of more capital-intensive industries emerged’.153 This is 
exemplified in the maritime revolution and dramatic innovations in the use of 
firearms.154
 Consequently, the epidemic-driven crisis of the 14th century led to the 
emergence of a number of novel rural and urban textile industries in Holland, 
England, Southern Germany and some sections of Italy.155 Yet during this period 
of general economic contraction, most ‘national’ markets were far too limited to 
sustain such industries. ‘Hence this industry had to look for markets abroad’, 
which ‘it did not fail to do in England and Holland from the second half of the 
fourteenth century on’.156 The Baltic countries were to make up the bulk of this 
export expansionism. And as the Portuguese and Spanish embarked upon their 
overseas expansion, the English, and particularly the Dutch, became crucial 
intermediaries in the commercial exchanges between the Baltic states and the 
Iberian peninsula. ‘Thus, the countries of north-western Europe, and especially 
Holland and England, had from the fifteenth century onwards great chances 
of development through their trading connexions, both with the Baltic coun-
tries and Spain and Portugal’.157 Taken together, the 14th-century crisis, driven 
in part by the demographic devastation accompanying the epidemics, resulted 
in new industrial activities and trading opportunities for the Northwestern 
European states. As such, the age of the Black Death witnessed the structural 
reconstruction of intra-European economic relations, as ‘industries in the Low 
Countries and England began to outstrip Mediterranean producers in woollen 
textiles’.158
 In line with such changes in Northwestern Europe, the Black Death also 
significantly stimulated processes of urbanisation, a key indicator of rising 
productivity and economic development in the pre-modern epoch.159 In the 
aftermath of the plague, urbanisation was particularly rapid in the Netherlands 
during the 15th and 16th centuries and in England during the 16th century. 
What is more, the longer-term effects of the Black Death marked the very begin-
ning of a structural shift in Northwestern Europe spanning nearly six centuries, 
from a labour force primarily based in agriculture to one increasingly based in 
services and industry.160
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 There were also important changes in the agricultural economy. With the 
mass exodus of peasants from the land, the competition between lords and 
tenant struggles resulted in much lower rents, fewer obligations and longer 
leases. As population growth did not fully recover from the plague for several 
generations in Western Europe, such arrangements subsequently led to the 
dissolution of the manorial economy, as money rent payments came to eventu-
ally replace labour services by the 16th century. A major upshot of all this was 
that such extensive institutional changes to the agricultural economy paved the 
way for its increasing commercialisation, specifically in Northwestern Europe. 
Consequently, peasant producers in the region became more and more capable 
of responding to new opportunities such as producing for markets and raising 
productivity. Again, all these developments occurred in the Northwest of Europe 
rather than the South.161
 These processes also had a distinctly political aspect to them, for the short-
ages in labour magnified the bargaining powers of both the wealthier peasant 
classes and the urban elites, who stood to gain from weaker feudal rights 
and levies. In attempting to counter such tendencies, aspiring political rulers 
sought to increase the jurisdictional integration of their territories. This in 
turn led to the creation of more competitive markets, with the added effect 
of further stimulating commercialisation, thereby ‘setting the stage for the 
long sixteenth-century boom’.162 We can then partially conclude with Stephen 
Epstein that the Black Death significantly ‘contributed to the feudal economy’s 
transition from a low-level “equilibrium trap” to a higher growth path by sharply 
intensifying pressures that had been building up over centuries’.163
 While Epstein continually refers to the Black Death as an untheorisable 
‘exogenous event’, widening this perspective to the level of the intersocietal, 
and its concomitant dynamics of uneven and combined development, offers a 
theoretical optic through which the plague’s causes and consequences can be 
internalised into a broader conception of sociohistorical development. Hence, 
the Black Death and its socio-economic and political consequences marked a key 
moment in the epochal transformations of the Late Medieval era. It did so not 
only by spurring developments that eventually led to capitalist breakthroughs 
in Northwestern Europe in the early modern epoch (specifically, in Holland and 
England), but also by creating the socio-economic conditions under which these 
rising capitalist societies came to developmentally catch up with and overtake 
the hitherto leading economies of Southern Europe.164
Conclusion
In this chapter we have argued that the multilinear perspective offered by 
uneven and combined development provides a way of subverting and indeed 
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dismantling the evolutionist approaches that have long relegated nomadic 
communities to the margins of history. By asserting uneven and combined 
development’s sensitivity to itinerant forms of territoriality, we have provided a 
theoretical framework through which nonstate agency can be captured and rein-
serted into world historical narratives. In these ways, we hope to have offered 
a way of redeeming the historical agency of the Mongolian Empire in the 
making of capitalism. On the one hand, we have shown that the unification of 
the Eurasian landmass under its imperial authority provided propitious condi-
tions for commercial growth in Europe. The Pax Mongolica thus prefigured the 
commercial relations that would later become a dominant feature of the modern 
capitalist world system. On the other hand, we have also shown that the impact 
of Mongolian expansion reached beyond the commercial relations that are 
typically emphasised by World-Systems theories and world historians alike, as 
the integration of different regions in and through the Mongol Empire had the 
unintended consequence of ‘unifying the globe by disease’. As we argued, the 
subsequent spread of the Black Death had catastrophic consequences for the 
feudal mode of production in Europe.
 In these two ways – the creative integration of commercial networks, and the 
destructive effects of the Black Death – the Mongolian Empire proved decisive 
to the emergence of capitalism. Specifically, the long-term agrarian revolts 
precipitated by the Black Death spurred variegated forms of revolution and 
counter-revolution around seigniorial rule, reordering feudal social relations 
in ways that the feudal system would eventually prove unable to recover from. 
Whether the seigniorial reaction was successful depended on the balance of 
class forces and antecedent processes of internal differentiation. As Findlay and 
O’Rourke note:
In each region the impact effect of the plague was to raise wages, lower land rents, 
and hence increase the demand on the part of landowners for serfdom.… Trade 
and population recovery favoured urban interests in the west and rural interests 
in the east.165
The central reason for these different outcomes lay in the varied relations 
between land and labour in Eastern and Western Europe. Although the demo-
graphic collapse in Eastern Europe was actually less in absolute terms than that 
in Western Europe, the strain was greater given the already endemic shortages 
of labour characterising the region. ‘Given the vast underpopulated spaces of 
Eastern Europe’, Anderson remarks, ‘peasant flight was an acute danger to 
lords everywhere, while land remained potentially very abundant …. The land/
labour ratio thus in itself solicited the noble class towards forcible restriction of 
peasant mobility and the constitution of larger manorial estates’.166
 According to Robert Brenner, the key factors in explaining the different effects 
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of the demographic collapse lay in the dynamics of the class struggle including: 
first, the differential levels of peasant organisation, class consciousness and 
internal solidarity in each society; and second, the differential levels of ruling 
class unity and their relationship to the state.167 In other words, the key vari-
ables explaining the variegated effects of the Black Death were the unevenness 
in the social forms of internal differentiation – particularly between the peasant 
and lordly classes in agrarian production, on the one hand, and between the 
lords and the state, on the other. It seems then that ‘unevenness’ and ‘combina-
tion’ played a central role in the ending of serfdom in Western Europe, paving 
the way for the subsequent emergence of capitalist production relations.
 Crucially, for Brenner, these variables explain the divergent developmental 
paths taken by England (towards agrarian capitalism) and France (toward the 
strengthening of feudalism) in the aftermath of the Black Death. In France, the 
monarchical state developed a ‘class-like’ character, emerging as a competitor 
to the lords for the peasants’ surplus. This meant that when peasant revolts 
occurred, the state would habitually support them against landlords, by 
protecting their freehold and fixing dues. The consolidation of peasant freedom 
precluded market forces of compulsion emerging in agrarian relations, leaving 
France a fundamentally feudal state. In contrast, England developed significant 
unity among the landed class vis-à-vis each other and with the state, so that 
when the peasant revolts took place, the state acted on behalf of landed inter-
ests. This allowed English landlords to maintain landholdings by ‘engrossing, 
consolidating and enclosing’ peasant freeholds, leading to the development 
of market forces in production and the emergence of symbiotic relations with 
tenant capitalists; in short, presaging the sustained economic development of 
agrarian capitalism.168
 Remarkably, Brenner cites a distinctly international determination – the 
Norman conquests of the 11th century – as the central causal factor behind 
England’s uniquely intralordly cohesion.169 Similarly, as Anderson notes, ‘[t]he 
early administrative centralization of Norman feudalism, dictated by both the 
original military conquest and the modest size of the country had generated … 
an unusually small and regionally unified noble class’.170 The appearance of the 
Normans in this manner is however problematic, for nowhere does Brenner’s 
treatment of this external determination enter into his theorisation of the devel-
opment of agrarian capitalism. Instead it appears as an ad-hoc international 
addendum.171
 Without theorising ‘the international’, Brenner finds no trouble tracing 
English nobility–state relations in the 16th century to an 11th-century cause. 
Spatial tunnelling in theory leads to temporal tunnelling of history, where 
historical conjunctures are explained by phenomena half a millennia apart. 
This leaves numerous questions over how far this picture of intralordly unity 
going back to the 11th century stands up when tested against the evidence of 
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the intervening years. What, for example, explains the fits of English intralordly 
struggle during the Hundred Years’ War and the War of the Roses?
 The next chapter seeks to address this deficiency by looking at how England’s 
internal ruling class unity was in fact predicated on its relative seclusion from 
the geopolitical tumult that gripped Europe in the aftermath of the Black Death. 
Although this insulation from geopolitical factors could seemingly lend itself 
to kind of the internalist method practised by Brenner, on closer inspection we 
shall find that England’s isolation had distinctly international roots, bound up 
in the geopolitical conflicts taking place on the continent. In particular, this 
shifts the scope of our international explanation of the origins of capitalism to 
yet another non-European actor, the Ottoman Empire. We examine the impact 
of the Ottomans on the making of capitalism in the next chapter.
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c h a p t e r  4
The Ottoman–Habsburg Rivalry 
over the Long Sixteenth Century
Modern History begins under stress of the Ottoman Conquest.
Lord Acton, 18991
Introduction
European 16th-century history occupies a peculiar place in historical socio- 
logical narratives. Compared with the preceding Medieval age, it was a period of 
striking social alteration and development. Both in its encounter with unchar-
tered territories and in its own self-definition, this was very much Europe’s ‘Age 
of Discovery’. And yet the 16th century occupies only a marginal place in the 
‘Age of Revolution’2 that followed, in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. Such 
a duality is represented in the period’s very characterisation as ‘early modern’. 
The term ‘modern’ anticipates the developments of the next 300 years, whereas 
the prefix ‘early’ suggests an epochal budding that has not quite blossomed, 
or the embryonic shaping of a society that is yet to come. Just as the culture of 
the Renaissance was defined by a Janus-faced view of the past and future, its 
geopolitics was characterised by new inventions in diplomacy and warfare that 
were nonetheless bound by the social relations of the old. And while filling the 
womb of a bloated aristocracy, trade, commerce and production displayed the 
first signs of tearing open this archaic order with the deep breath of primitive 
accumulation that preceded capitalism’s screeching birth.
 In examining this early modern period, this chapter takes as its starting 
point the clue of the Turkic rug in Holbein’s Ambassadors, in order to trace the 
historical significance of the Ottoman Empire in the making of capitalism. If 
we recall, this rug alerts us to the fact that in the context of the New World 
discoveries, primitive accumulation, religious revolt and Habsburg ascendency, 
the Ottoman Empire was a persistent and prominent presence, lying behind 
and in many ways underpinning these manifold European developments.3 In 
this period, the Ottomans constituted the most prevalent non-Christian ‘Other’ 
that confronted Europe,4 ‘persistently capturing the headlines and profoundly 
transforming the geopolitics of (and beyond) the Mediterranean world’.5 In the 
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words of Daniel Goffman, ‘this was an Ottoman Europe almost as much as it 
was a Venetian or Habsburg one’.6 Yet despite the latent centrality implied by 
Holbein’s painting, dominant theorisations of early modern Europe have been 
constructed with the Ottomans in absentia. Whether in the sphere of politics, 
economy, culture or ideology, the emergence of capitalist modernity is generally 
understood as a sui generis development specific to Europe. In short, the history 
of capitalism’s origins is an unmistakably Eurocentric history (see Chapter 1).
 There are two moments to the Eurocentric approach that will be the subject 
of scrutiny and criticism in this chapter. The first is historical priority. Based on 
the assumption that any given trajectory of development is the product of a 
society’s own immanent dynamics, Eurocentrism ‘posits the endogenous and 
autonomous emergence of modernity in Europe’.7 Thus we find in cultural 
history that the flowering of the Renaissance was a solely intra-European 
phenomenon.8 Analyses of the rise of absolutism and modern state systems are 
similarly conducted exclusively on the terrain of Europe, with non-European 
cases appearing (if at all) comparatively.9 Dominant accounts of the origins of 
capitalism as either an economic form10 or a social system11 place its origins 
squarely in Western Europe, while the world outside Europe is relegated to an 
exploited and passive periphery.12 As such, a prevailing problem of Eurocentric 
analyses in the extant historiography of the period is rooted not only in defi-
cient theorisations of the Ottoman Empire, but in an equally problematic and 
one-sided view of European modernity.
 A consequence of the epistemological separation (or epistemological exteri-
ority) of ‘Eastern’ from ‘Western’ societies, Eurocentrism articulates and situates 
the developmental (and in some cases normative) distinction between tradition 
and modernity through a spatial separation of ‘West’ and ‘East’. As such, the 
study of the origins of capitalism has been an exclusionary process in which the 
agency of the Ottomans has been erased or overlooked. This is not to say that in 
studies of the 16th century the Ottoman Empire have been heedlessly avoided.13 
But where its imperial apogee has been studied, it has been largely considered 
a ‘social formation apart … largely a stranger to European culture, as an Islamic 
intrusion on Christendom’, or as a comparative case study, against which the 
specificity and distinctiveness of Western modernity has been defined.14
 The epistemological distinction between the Ottomans and Europe depends 
on an ontologically singular narrative of the emergence of modernity within the 
spatially delimited and hermetically sealed boundaries of Europe. Here the 
second moment of Eurocentrism becomes evident: an internalist methodology. 
Conceptions of the ‘East’ have subsequently focused on its essential(ist) charac-
teristics – typically Islam, Oriental despotism, or the Asiatic mode of production. 
Simultaneously, the distinctiveness of the ‘West’ is presented in terms of its 
own endogenous and autonomous history. This ontological claim gives rise to 
the assumption that any given trajectory of development is the product of a 
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society’s own immanent dynamics, and hence sociological theorisations can only 
be derived solely from within the domestic confines of a single society. 
 Recent scholarship in the fields of World History and postcolonial studies 
has attempted to ‘ReOrient’15 historiography in order to both destabilise and 
potentially escape the Eurocentric trap. However, despite providing extensive 
additional empirical frameworks that have decentred the historical priority of 
Europe, these works have also largely overlooked the role of the Ottomans in the 
construction of capitalist modernity, while eschewing any concomitant theorisa-
tion of capitalism’s origins in light of their empirical findings. Even Ottomanists 
working within the anti-Eurocentric research programme have tended to stand 
outside of debates concerning the origins of capitalism.16 Hence, the gnawing 
separation between ‘East’ and ‘West’, Europe and the Ottomans, tends to be 
replicated even in anti-Eurocentric accounts.
 To return to and extend our critique of postcolonialism in Chapter 1, a truly 
non-Eurocentric interpretation of history must pose an alternative theoretical 
framework to these traditional conceptions in which to conduct historical and 
sociological study. That such an alternative has not yet been forthcoming has 
left the study of modernity at a peculiar impasse that we might term Euro-
centric realism – the claim that owing to the historical record, there simply is 
no alternative to Eurocentric accounts of the origins of capitalism. Indeed, 
for those who subscribe to this realism, Eurocentrism is straightforwardly 
unproblematic.17
 In this chapter, we ‘return to Holbein’ via uneven and combined development 
to recapture the significance of the Ottomans in the geopolitics of the Long 16th 
Century. In particular, we seek to bring out the causal impact of the Ottoman 
Empire on the primary historical themes in The Ambassadors – the political frag-
mentation of feudal Europe in resistance to Habsburg attempts at empire building, 
the structural shift away from the geopolitical and commercial centrality of the 
Mediterranean towards the Atlantic, and the primitive accumulation of capital. 
We argue that these developments – each crucial to the emergence of capitalism 
– were causally inseparable from Ottoman geopolitical pressures on Europe. 
In developing this argument, we seek to challenge and criticise Eurocentrism 
through the theory of uneven and combined development, and in the process 
further demonstrate its non-Eurocentric credentials. We argue that uneven and 
combined development can make a positive and illuminating contribution to 
these debates because it speaks directly to each of the two moments of Euro- 
centrism identified above. By positing the multilinear character of development 
as its ‘most general law’, uneven development provides a necessary corrective 
to the ontological singularity and attendant unilinear conception of history that 
underpins assumptions of historical priority. By positing the inherently inter- 
active character of this multiplicity, combined development in turn challenges the 
methodological internalism of Eurocentric approaches (see Chapter 2).
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 In this chapter, we further develop the argument that the question ‘why 
Europe?’ can only be properly addressed by situating its peculiar development 
within the context of the international relations of the Long 16th Century. 
Consequently, a theorisation of the dimension typically elided by Eurocentric 
analysis – ‘the international’ – is required for us to break out of the Eurocentric 
spatiotemporal limits of the hegemonic perspectives provided by the likes of 
World-System Theorists and Political Marxists. As argued in Chapter 2, uneven 
and combined development provides precisely such a theorisation, by positing 
that historical processes are always the outcome of a multiplicity of spatially 
diverse nonlinear causal chains that combine in any given conjuncture.
 In what follows, we show that geopolitical relations between the Ottoman 
Empire and European states over the Long 16th Century provided one of these 
vectors of uneven and combined development that fed into the emergence of 
capitalism. In the first section, we explicate the social relations that under-
pinned a relation of unevenness between the tributary Ottoman Empire and the 
feudal European states. This Euro–Ottoman relation of unevenness gave rise 
to numerous political, military, economic and territorial advantages held by 
the Ottoman Empire over Europe. These forms of unevenness entailed both 
an Ottoman ‘whip of external necessity’ and a European ‘privilege of historic 
backwardness’ which we argue were crucial preconditions for the eventual 
emergence of capitalism in Europe. In the second section, we demonstrate 
how these moments of Euro–Ottoman interactivity entailed various instances 
of combined development, in which European ‘backwardness’ compelled the 
adaptation to and adoption of the developmental advantages possessed by the 
Ottomans. In particular, we argue that Ottoman attempts at empire building 
curtailed the imperial threat of the Habsburgs, giving Northwestern European 
states the structural geopolitical space in which modern state-building practices 
and the formation of capitalism could take place. In so doing, the Ottomans 
unwittingly facilitated the primitive accumulation of capital and brought about 
a structural shift to Atlantic trade and Northwestern European dominance, 
leading to processes of developmental ‘catch up’ and overtake in Europe that 
would give rise to capitalism.
Unevenness: A Clash of Social Reproduction
Ottoman–European Relations
Ottoman relations with the outside world have primarily been understood by 
scholars through an idealised and uncritical notion of diplomatic precepts rooted 
in Sharia law.18 Here, the supposed self-regarded superiority of the Ottomans 
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constituted the basis of a unilateral policy on international affairs, and a reli-
gious commitment to permanent war with Europe. This mystified conception 
of Euro–Ottoman relations – articulated as a continuation of the eternal clash 
between Christianity and Islam – was captured in the literature, philosophy and 
art of early modern Europe. In the work of artist Leonardo Dati, Sultan Mehmet 
II was portrayed as a minion of the devil,19 while Martin Luther argued that the 
Ottomans were a punishment from God for the degeneration of Christianity.20
 Yet alongside this widespread belligerence there were also significant levels 
of European appreciation for Ottoman achievements. For example, reflecting 
the resistance to the Habsburg alliance, German pamphleteers downplayed 
the need to intervene militarily against the Ottomans, with some pointing to 
the Turks’ efficiency as a model for German reform.21 Similarly, the legal code 
established by Süleyman II was studied by a legal mission sent from England by 
Henry VIII.22 The efficient and merit-based character of the Ottoman adminis-
trative system was also widely appreciated by European diplomats and visitors 
to the region. ‘[A]mong the Turks, dignities, offices, and administrative posts 
are the rewards of ability and merit’, the ambassador to the Ottoman Empire 
in Constantinople for the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I (1556–64), 
Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, wrote. ‘This is why the Turks succeed in all that 
they attempt and are a dominating race and daily extend the bound of their 
rule’. This was in stark contrast to the European ‘method’, de Busbecq went on, 
where ‘there is no room for merit, but everything depends on birth; consid-
erations of which alone open the way to high official position’.23 Likewise, 
in their examinations of European state forms, Machiavelli, Bodin, Bacon 
and Montaigne all heralded Ottoman military discipline and administrative 
efficiency.24 To quote Busbecq again:
I tremble when I think of what the future must bring when I compare the Turkish 
system with our own …. On their side are the resources of a mighty empire, 
strength unimpaired, experience and practice in fighting, a veteran soldiery, 
habituation to victory, endurance of toil, unity, order, discipline, frugality, watch-
fulness. On our side is public poverty, private luxury, impaird strength, broken 
spirit, lack of endurance and training; the soldiers are insubordinate, the officers 
avaricious; there is contempt for discipline; licence, recklessness, drunkenness, 
and debauchery are rife; and, worst of all, the enemy is accustomed to victory, and 
we to defeat.25
This mixture of fear, awe, belligerence and admiration reflected a material 
relation of unevenness in which the Ottomans held numerous advantages over 
their European allies and foes.26 Perry Anderson goes as far as to suggest that 
under Süleyman I’s reign the Ottomans were ‘the most powerful Empire in the 
world. Overshadowing his nearest European rival, Suleiman enjoyed a revenue 
twice that of Charles V’.27 This relation of unevenness was neatly captured 
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by Aeneas Sylvius (the future Pope Pius II) who, after the fall of Constanti-
nople, reflected on the existential threat the Ottomans posed to a disunited 
Christendom:
[Christendom] is a body without a head, a republic without laws or magistrates 
… every state has a separate prince, and every prince has a separate interest …. 
Who will make the English love the French? Who will unite the Genoese and 
the Aragonese? Who will reconcile the Germans with the Hungarians and Bohe-
mians? ... If you lead a small army against the Turks you will easily be overcome; 
if a large one, it will soon fall into confusion.28
Almost a century later in 1554, Cardinal Pole – an envoy sent by Pope Julius 
III to negotiate an accord between the French and English – berated Francis I, 
Henry II and Emperor Charles V for their ‘dissensions and wars’, which were 
supposedly to blame for the Ottoman conquest of Belgrade and Rhodes.29 
While Europe struggled with divisions, the Ottomans faced them as a unified, 
resourceful and disciplined force,30 one that was able to expand consistently into 
Europe and beyond. The phenomenon of Christian renegades ‘turning Turk’ 
and converting to the ‘Ottoman way’ appeared to be a pertinent danger, espe-
cially since, in certain regions of conquest, the Ottomans had been welcomed 
as ‘liberators’ owing to their less onerous taxation systems and respect for local 
customs.31 ‘[H]ow it comes to pass’, a contemporary R. Carr lamented, ‘that so 
many of our men should continually revolt, and abjuring all Christian rites, 
become affectors of that impious Mahumetane sect, whilst on the other part 
we finde none or very few of those repaying unto us’.32 Such was the awesome 
ideological and material force that the Ottoman Empire brought to bear upon 
the less developed feudal Europeans. But what were the sources of this uneven 
set of relations between the Ottomans and Europeans?
The Tributary and Feudal Modes of 
Production: Unevenness Combined
The unevenness between the Ottomans and Europe was underpinned by the 
divergence in forms of social (re)production associated with the tributary and 
feudal modes of production. This was expressed in three ways. The first was 
in the relations that pertained among social classes based on predominantly 
agrarian production: between exploiter and exploited (and therefore also in 
the forms and character of surplus appropriation by the ruling class in these 
societies); second, in the contradictory relations between different sections of 
the ruling class (and hence political relations as such); third, in relationship 
between merchants and states to which these forms of social reproduction gave 
rise. In order to better understand these forms of unevenness, we must first 
anievas maintext.indd   96 18/05/2015   12:18:49
97
the ottoman–habsburg rivalry
explicate the modal differences between the Ottoman tributary and European 
feudal modes.
 A number of scholars have explicitly denied that there ever existed a histori-
cally specific ‘tributary mode of production’, instead viewing tributary formations 
as a distinct subvariant of feudalism. This ‘universal feudalism’ thesis has been 
most coherently and systematically developed by Halil Berktay and John 
Haldon.33 Their central methodological claim is that a distinction should be drawn 
between a ‘mode of production’ as an abstract ideal-type and a ‘social forma-
tion’ as a concrete ‘really existing’ society.34 This allows them to develop Marx’s 
argument that the mode of production – ‘the same economic basis’ – can, ‘due to 
innumerable different empirical circumstances’, exhibit ‘infinite variations and 
gradations in appearance’ at the level of a social formation.35 For both authors, 
the economic basis of feudalism therefore resided in the form of exploitation,36 
and more specifically in the juxtaposition of a ruling aristocracy exploiting a class 
of peasant direct producers through extra-economic means.37 Consequently, for 
Haldon, ‘both sides of the couplet tax/rent are, in fact, expressions of the politico- 
juridical forms that surplus appropriation takes, not distinctions between different 
modes’.38 For Berktay, ‘political decentralisation … is a superstructural feature. 
Thus no clear cut economic differences of a primary nature can be pinpointed 
between Western feudalism and Ottoman society – both were based on peasant 
production’.39 Accordingly, the precise natures of these extra-economic means – 
whether tax or rent – constitute superstructural variations of the same mode of 
surplus appropriation. Such variations are therefore only ascertainable through 
the more historically specific analytical level of the social formation.
 However, Haldon’s and Berktay’s insistence on the distinction between modes 
of production and social formations (and equivalently, between economic bases 
and political superstructures) generates an array of disconcerting separations 
between history and theory. By defining a mode of production in terms of an 
economic basis distinct from a political superstructure, and then conceptually 
conflating this economic basis with a form of exploitation, they exclude the very 
social relations that make such exploitation an historical possibility, as conjunc-
tural and contingent specificities that lie outside of the ‘mode of production’ 
conceived as an ideal-type theoretical construct. Hence, Haldon argues that:
the actual conditions in which coercion occurs, and which makes possible its 
continuation, are fundamental to the ways in which the claims to the appropri-
ation of wealth are enforced and validated. But these can take a multiplicity of 
different forms and, while they are fundamental to the process of the reproduction 
of the social relations of production in a specific historical context, they are still not 
a part of the economic relations of appropriation.40
This tendency to keep history at an arm’s length from theory is a striking 
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position for a historical materialist to take, for it omits any theorisation of 
three crucial conditions under which any form of surplus appropriation takes 
place. First, there is a tension between Berktay and Haldon’s claim that extra- 
economic exploitation was a defining characteristic of the feudal mode of surplus 
appropriation, and their dismissal of the specificity of these extra-economic 
means – that is, whether they are tax or rent – as entirely political or super-
structural. Both Derek Sayer and Perry Anderson have convincingly argued that 
the very ‘fusion’ of political and economic functions of coercion and consent that 
underpin surplus extraction in a pre-capitalist context makes any such separation 
of economic basis from political superstructure inherently problematic.41
 Second, in Haldon’s and Berktay’s accounts, the concept of mode of produc-
tion becomes detached from history, wherein the specificity of a social formation 
is rendered independent from the dynamics or ‘laws of motion’ of any given 
mode of production. Haldon quite explicitly states that ‘a mode of production 
is not a concrete social reality’, that it does ‘not exist in any real form’ and does 
‘not develop’.42 Hence, analysis into the processes of state formation and class 
conflict becomes entirely a question engaged with at the level of the ‘social 
formation’, leaving us with a static ‘ideal-type’ conception of a production 
mode.43
 Taking these two exclusions together, Haldon and Berktay’s explanation for 
the ‘variations and gradations’ in a mode of production comes to rest entirely 
on historical chance and accidents. So, third, historical variation – unevenness, 
multiplicity – appears only as a contingent fact of social reality which sits outside 
the explanatory purview of a mode of production-centred analysis. Theoreti-
cally, this involves a conflation of universality with homogeneity, whereby 
sociological differences are obscured rather than articulated. In turn, the very 
dimension of socio-spatial multiplicity – ‘the international’ – also becomes 
obscured or overlooked. We are instead left with a pervasive commitment to 
an ontological singular conception of society. Indeed, Berktay argues that ‘it is 
permissible to investigate the Ottoman Empire in the 15th–16th centuries as 
an autonomous pre-capitalist social formation, without referring it to any significant 
external economic dynamics’.44 As demonstrated below, such a methodologically 
internalist perspective is not only unsustainable empirically, but also does 
violence to any theoretical understanding of the developmental dynamics of the 
Ottoman Empire.
   In what follows, we seek to reframe the Ottoman mode of production debate 
by confronting this question of ‘the international’ overlooked by Berktay and 
Haldon. In doing so, we argue that a ‘mode of production’ should be seen not as 
a simple economic relation, or merely a form of exploitation, but as a composite 
totality of social relations that encapsulate certain conditions of production – be 
they political, cultural or intersocietal – and the ‘laws of motion’ that arise out 
of those conditions (see further Chapter 7).
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 From such a perspective, the Ottoman Empire can be fruitfully conceptual-
ised as a tributary mode of production, distinct from – rather than a subvariant 
of – feudalism. Following Jairus Banaji, we may define the tributary mode as 
constituted along two class-relational axes: first, the vertical opposition of a 
ruling, tax-collecting class in a contradictory relationship with a class of peasants 
exploited for the appropriation of productive surpluses; and second, the hori-
zontal differentiation between a ‘landed nobility’ and ‘patrimonial authority’ 
within the tax-collecting class, in which the state controlled the nobility as well 
as the means of production.45 Hence, the relations of production of the trib-
utary mode ‘involved both the control of peasant-labour by the state … and 
the drive to forge a unified imperial service based on the subordination of the 
ruling class to the will of the ruler’.46
 The emphases on these social relations help to identify some of the essen-
tial elements of the Ottoman form of the tributary mode. The first – ruling 
class–peasant – division was articulated through the appropriation of peasant 
production surpluses through taxation. The most common tax was the öşür 
tithe, which took one-tenth of agricultural produce, followed by the cizye head 
tax for non-Muslims. In addition, the orfi ‘sovereign prerogative’ could be 
levied on decree, and included the adat customary and avârız household taxes. 
While it was initially levied to meet extraordinary expenses – in particular for 
war-making – this became a regular tax on villages and towns.47 
 The preponderance of taxation as a mechanism for surplus appropriation 
was distinct from the European lord–peasant rent nexus of exploitation because 
taxation was regulated by regional and central agents of the Ottoman state.48 
This meant that peasants had greater access to their surplus than in Europe 
because of the preservation of subsistence plots, as well as state-fixed limitations 
on taxation by intermediaries at local (beys) and regional (beylerbeys) levels.49 
Peasants also had inalienable rights to land,50 were better protected from market 
fluctuations,51 had the option – albeit limited – to legal recourse should their 
conditions worsen,52 and were legally considered free.53 Without overlooking 
the fact that peasants were subject to highly exploitative conditions and abuses 
of power, such differences suggest that Ottoman subjects’ experiences diverged 
from those of their European counterparts.54
 The second division – between a landed nobility and patrimonial authority – 
was distinct from intra-ruling class relations in Europe because almost all land 
was formally owned by the Sultan, while military fiefs – tımars – were predom-
inantly nonhereditary, changeable and regularly rotated among individuals in 
the ruling class.55 This created a contradictory distribution of political power 
and surplus, forming a centre–periphery sociopolitical structure.56 Located 
primarily in Constantinople, the Ottoman centre consisted of the sultan, his 
household and the imperial council, comprising the army judge (kadi-asker), 
Grand Vizier, treasurers and slave elites (the devşirme or kapıkullar).57 The latter, 
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despite their slave status, occupied the highest administrative and military posi-
tions in the Empire, comprising a large and unified bureaucratic administration 
and the Janissary (yeniceri) military.58 Together they provided the state with well-
trained standing troops and administrative officers capable of overseeing the 
complexity of the Ottoman tax system.59 Because the kapıkullar were recruited 
through levies (kul) on children from conquered territories and then transferred 
to and assimilated into the Ottoman centre, they were entirely dependent on 
(and therefore loyal to) the Sultan.60 By the 14th century these centralised insti-
tutions acted as a crucial counterbalance to provincial power, and by the time 
of Mehmed II’s conquest of Constantinople in 1453, they came to predominate 
over other sections of the Empire.
 Although the state established control over provincial notables and land, 
central authority was relatively dispersed. The Ottoman state was able to 
regulate both production and exploitation by devolving power to its agents 
in the rural provinces through the tımar system.61 A tımar was the predomi-
nant form of land division,62 an allocation of land from which the holder could 
extract revenue. Tımars provided the basic income for the sipahi cavalrymen and 
imperial officers (sancak beys) in return for their performing state services. Tımar 
holders were also responsible for the collection of land taxes and the periodic 
redistribution of peasant holdings, as well as the maintenance of civil order.63 
Some larger tımars were assigned to more powerful and entrenched sections of 
the Ottoman ruling class, such as the devşirme and those close to the house of 
the Sultan.64 In these cases, the holding was often passed onto the tımar holder’s 
son, establishing a degree of hereditary ownership in some sections of the ruling 
class.65 For example, in the early period of Ottoman expansion, a number of 
the old Turkish clan elite – ghazis – were able to retain ancestral lands as timar 
grants, enabling them to maintain an economically dominant position. As such, 
the tımar system was partly designed to placate through compensation the ghazi 
leaders and local notables of newly conquered lands by admitting them into the 
ruling askeri class.66
 Nonetheless, tımar holders were fundamentally dependent on and 
constrained by the Ottoman central state functions for their social reproduc-
tion. Tımar holdings were assigned by the Sultan, and possession was granted 
through the acquisition of a Sultanic diploma.67 Scrupulously maintained tax 
registers kept a strict record of the size of tımars and their contents, in turn 
setting the level of taxes that could be levied by the tımar holder from the 
peasantry.68 Moreover, the rotation of tımar allocations were used to remove 
potentially discontented ghazis from their local environment.69 By resettling 
ghazis in Ottoman-controlled Europe, the administration could prevent the 
growth of provincial centres of power while filling the Empire’s frontiers with a 
powerful military force.70 Through these mechanisms the Ottomans were able 
to institutionalise the social reproduction of tımar holders into a relationship 
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of dependence to the Sultan.71 Consequently, the tımar, despite providing a 
basis of provincial power, was a function of a form of social stratification that 
was crucial to the reproduction of the tributary state. In this sense, the tımar 
embodied the distinction in tributary ruling class relations between the patri-
monial authority of the sultan and his household, and the local nobility, in 
which the former controlled the latter.
 The devices of ruling class reproduction under the tributary mode proved 
remarkably efficient and stable, so much so that theorists have often mistaken 
its very dynamism in ruling class reproduction for a static and unchanging 
social form.72 Due to the nature of Ottoman power sharing and the alienability 
of notable land, there was limited potential for unified class interests acting 
outside the purview – or counter to the interests – of the Ottoman state.73 
Instead, discontented sections of the ruling class sought to articulate disaffection 
within the confines of the extant political system,74 while the state was able to 
maintain the internal integrity of the Empire by co-opting local elites,75 or coer-
cively centralising power.76 Furthermore, the relatively lenient form of surplus 
extraction levied on Ottoman peasants, as well as tolerance for local religions 
and identities, meant that rebellion in the countryside was a less marked feature 
of the Ottoman tributary mode than it was of European feudalism.77 Hence, 
there was little impulse or necessity for reform of the tributary system from 
above, or revolutionary pressure from below.78 Consequently, through their 
contradictory relations to production, the state, provincial ruling classes and 
the peasants, as well as more marginal groups such as merchants and religious 
foundations, were overwhelmingly geared towards the reproduction and expan-
sion of the state and its functions. This was the defining feature of the tributary 
mode and its ‘laws of motion’.
 The primary contradiction of the tributary mode therefore lay in the struc-
ture of the ruling class itself, which could potentially come into conflict over 
the distribution of surplus between its central and provincial sections. The 
prevention of this conflict, and hence the continued reproduction of the tribu-
tary mode, was possible so long as the Ottoman ruling class could maintain its 
material well-being and ideological unity.79 Haldon suggests that such unity was 
achievable only through a policy of military and economic expansion.80 Provin-
cial notables and would-be members of the Ottoman ruling class could best be 
guaranteed expanded access to surplus only through the accumulation of more 
land that would in turn be redistributed to them in the form of tımars.81 Simi-
larly, the burgeoning central state required greater access to taxes, tributes and 
a population from which to recruit slave elites. Both objectives were possible 
only through continual territorial accumulation. These specific historical 
configurations of the tributary mode of production were therefore inextri-
cably bound up with not simply an internal temporal dynamic of a society – its 
‘laws of motion’ – but also its interactive relations with other societies. Put 
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differently, the laws of motion of the tributary mode had an inherently uneven 
and combined component to them, and this uneven and combined feature 
explains sociological differences between tributary societies.
 As detailed above, tributary laws of motion consisted in the reproduction 
of the imperial state through the appropriation of surpluses derived from the 
centre’s control of the ruling class and means of production. The social reproduc-
tion of the tributary state thus took place not only through ‘internal’ relations 
of surplus appropriation, but also through the ‘external’ means of geopolitical 
accumulation. By conquering land, the tributary state was able to extend and 
widen its control of the means of production – land – enabling it to extract 
greater tribute from its population. In the Ottoman case, this involved not only 
the appropriation of productive surpluses but also the power of workers (in 
particular, slaves) for the expansion of state functions. Territorial conquest also 
enabled the Ottoman state to control the ruling class through the triple means 
of consent, coercion and competition.
 First, subservient members of the ruling class could be co-opted by being 
offered access to more land, building relations of dependence and consent 
between centre and province in the process. Second, discontented or rebel-
lious sections could be relocated to the frontiers of expansion and away from 
the imperial centre. In some cases, by incorporating pre-existing notables 
in conquered territories, troublesome members of the ruling class could be 
expropriated and replaced. For although Ottoman expansion was predicated 
on conquest, ‘outsiders’ would also willingly seek to become part of the ruling 
class, with the knowledge that subordination to the state would confer privi-
lege and security: that is, it would guarantee social reproduction. So third, such 
incorporation could foster competition between different sections of the ruling 
class with differential relations of dependence on – and autonomy from – the 
imperial system.
 Imperial geopolitical accumulation was therefore crucial to maintaining state 
power over sections of the ruling class. This made tributary societies particu-
larly sensitive to external conditions – either through conquest, assimilation, 
diplomacy, secession or conflict – as a fundamental component of their social 
reproduction. That is, geopolitical accumulation was not just an externalisation 
of internal contradictions, arising from logics of reproduction ‘within’ soci-
eties.82 Nor was it – in contrast to Marx’s ‘Asiatic’ model – simply a process in 
which the tributary form was unidirectionally superimposed onto pre-existing 
communities.83 It was rather a mechanism through which relations with other 
societies would feed back upon and reconfigure the internal class composition 
and laws of motion of the tributary mode itself.
 In reference to nomadic empires, but equally applicable to the tribu-
tary mode, Kees van der Pijl calls this relational form of social reproduction 
‘caging’.84 On the one hand, conquered territories would assimilate tributary 
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social relations into their own pre-existing forms.85 On the other hand, the 
tributary state would habitually absorb the local customs, laws, forms of social 
organisation, and individuals of conquered territories.86 Such ‘caging’ through 
geopolitical accumulation was a central part of tributary laws of motion and a 
concrete practice of combined development, in which the developmental expe-
riences of differentiated societies were syncretically merged in an ‘amalgamated 
state’ form.87 As van der Pijl puts it:
the principles of sovereignty and bureaucratised authority of empire, heralding the 
territorial state, here mix with the notion of shared space reminiscent of tribal 
foreign relations. Different ways of life are pressed together, and the density and 
intensity of social interaction works to accelerate development.88
Consequently, the reproduction of tributary rule was fundamentally dependent 
on agrarian production in support of geopolitical accumulation and vice versa 
– what Burak Tansel aptly calls the Ottoman ‘military-agricultural complex’.89 
Provincially, this involved the maintenance of sipahi cavalry troops who repro-
duced themselves and their retainers by appropriating peasant surpluses on their 
tımar land allocations. In return, they provided arms, horses, food and other 
supplies for themselves and their retainers in military campaigns.90 Through the 
institution of devŞirme, the Ottoman centre was able to fill its ranks with the 
most able boys in the Empire, training them into a well drilled military force, 
the Janissaries. This section of the military was supported by the extensive accu-
mulation of agrarian surpluses, redistributed to them through the treasury in 
the form of wages. Janissary pay constituted the single largest item of treasury 
expenditure, costing 44 per cent of the treasury’s budget in 1527.91
 Through these mechanisms of social reproduction, the Ottomans were able 
to raise seasoned, disciplined and steadfast armies on an unprecedented scale. 
The kapIkullar army – which included the Janissaries, as well as a cavalry and 
artillery – comprised the best trained and most loyal section of the Ottoman 
army, numbering an estimated 30,000 by the reign of Suleiman I.92 In the prov-
inces, the tımar system could raise up to 80,000 men between the sipahis and 
their retainers. These were supplemented by auxiliary troops and akıncıs drawn 
from peasant and nomadic populations within the Empire.93 For example, rela-
tions of tribute with the Tatar Khan of Crimea could supply up to an estimated 
100,000 additional akıncıs to the Ottoman army.94 Similarly, North African 
corsairs under Ottoman vassalage provided a large and skilled naval force in 
the Mediterranean.95 Taken together, in the 16th century the Sultan could 
potentially deploy over 200,000 men without putting the Ottoman treasury or 
peasantry under any exceptional strain.96
 The Ottomans’ ability to raise vast and loyal armies for military campaigns 
was matched by the development of ‘centralized modes for resource extraction 
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and allocation for use in war’ that provided the administrative basis of military 
support.97 The state’s regulation of production though records of land tenure 
enabled them to encourage grain production that would feed this vast army, 
as well as raise oxen and buffalo in Rumelia and horses from the Danube for 
transporting supplies.98 Routinised levying of military provisions in the form of 
avârız taxes was an established procedure by the 16th century.99 Armies were 
supplied with basic foodstuffs from the state treasury or locally from state-owned 
lands, rather than resorting to forced contributions from peasant populations.100 
Integrating agrarian production with war-making in this way left agrarian 
and civilian life relatively undisturbed by war-making, imbuing the military- 
agricultural complex with a continuous stability unmatched in feudal Europe.101 
In the fields of transport, logistics and food supply, the unity of the tributary 
mode made the Ottomans ‘trend-setters and models of perfection whom the 
others strove to emulate’.102
Ottoman ‘Penalties of Progressiveness’ – 
European ‘Privileges of Backwardness’
The unity and stability of the Ottoman Empire examined above contrasted 
significantly with European forms of social reproduction. These too were 
predominantly based on agrarian production, where peasants had direct access 
to the means of production and subsistence. And like the Ottoman Empire, this 
condition meant that an aristocratic ruling class required political, ideological 
and military means in order to exploit the peasantry and extract a surplus for the 
purpose of lordly consumption. However, unlike in the Ottoman Empire, these 
means were not controlled by – or concentrated in – a centralised and unified 
state, but were dispersed across the nobility.103 As a consequence, peasants 
were more susceptible to coercive squeezes on their productivity, while having 
no recourse to outside legal protection from their lords. This regularly led to 
declining living conditions and, in turn, rural rebellions.104 At the same time, 
the dispersion of coercive capabilities meant that political authority in Europe 
was unusually fragmented, parcellised and therefore also highly competitive, 
with heightened intralordly struggles taking place over territories both within 
and outside of feudal ‘states’.105 In short, both war and rebellion was more 
pronounced within Europe than in Ottoman territories.
 Because of the fragmented and parcellised character of political power, 
Europeans who wanted to make war required extraordinary financing outside 
the day-to-day mechanisms of ruling class reproduction. In order to raise 
armies, European rulers borrowed from international banking houses106 or 
asked wealthy and powerful sections of society for contributions, in terms of 
either military support or taxes.107 This was often conducted via ‘local estates 
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and assemblies or city-leagues in which the merchant-entrepreneurial class 
wielded significant – even military – power’.108 Hence, a byproduct of European 
feudal war-making was an attendant rise in the political autonomy, power and 
influence of merchants, with increasing degrees of representation in the deci-
sion-making structures of states;109 for ‘behind every successful dynasty stood 
an array of opulent banking families’.110
 By contrast, the Ottoman Empire had little requirement for monetary 
financing outside of the customary levies already imposed on agrarian produc-
tion.111 Consequently, there was scarce potential for autonomous merchant 
activity outside of the functional requirements of the tributary state. The 
relations between merchants and the Ottoman ruling class were balanced consid-
erably in favour of the latter, who exercised significant control over merchant 
activities through the guild system.112 Moreover, conflicts or tensions between 
merchants and guilds tended to curtail merchant autonomy and power,113 while 
merchant access to state apparatuses and decision making was limited.114 The 
accumulation of wealth was discouraged and restricted by controlling coin circu-
lation, production and prices, and anti-luxury laws were deployed to confiscate 
merchant fortunes.115 Inter-regional trade was heavily regulated, and provisions 
for towns came almost exclusively from their own hinterlands, narrowing the 
geographical remit of production and distribution to local regions.116 Caravan 
endpoints geographically coincided with seats of government authority, 
ensuring close supervision of prices and commodities traded. Taxes on trade 
also enabled state extraction of surpluses from mercantile activities.117
 The subordination of merchants to the tributary state was also evident 
geopolitically. For a ruling class fundamentally dependent on agriculture and 
tribute for their reproduction, the capturing and control of trade routes was 
considered essential to tributary power in order to bring those outside of its 
imperial purview within its tributary regime.118 So while the state could at 
times show signs of ‘economic intentionality’,119 merchants were not considered 
important enough for state protection or support. Rather, agriculture remained 
the priority. Following the capture of the Mamluk Empire in 1517, for example, 
the Ottomans were placed in a position of direct competition with the Portu-
guese over access to the spice trade in the Indian Ocean, and gold and slaves 
in Africa.120 But instead, imperial policy reverted to territorial expansion into 
the agriculturally more fertile and populous territories of Southeast Europe. 
That the Ottomans did not pursue the Indian course was primarily due to the 
reproductive requirements of a ruling class based primarily on agrarian produc-
tion,121 reflecting the swelling claims made by provincial notables on access to 
booty, land, and power as such.122
 By contrast, European powers were explicitly focused on bringing commer-
cially valuable territories under direct conquest and political control for 
specifically (though not exclusively) economic purposes. The reason was the 
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relative ‘backwardness’ of European structures of ruling class reproduction, 
which were dependent on the wealth drawn from merchants and financiers 
to either fund (geo)political accumulation (in the case of Habsburg Spain and 
Austria) or for the direct reproduction of the ruling class itself (in the case of 
city-states such as Genoa and Venice). Consequently, the state was sensitive to – 
or at the behest of – merchant interests, and state resources, especially military, 
were deployed in order to obtain commercial advantages.123 Such was the extent 
of merchant power that no European ruler could have withdrawn or demanded 
the return of ships in the Indian Ocean as the Ottomans had done.124
 These uneven internal relations – between ruling and ruled class in agrarian 
production, on the one hand, and between state and merchant, on the other 
– formed the basis of an international relation of Euro-Ottoman unevenness: 
the relative backwardness of the European ruling classes, and the comparative 
weakness in its form of social reproduction when opposed to the Ottoman 
Empire. These European ‘privileges of backwardness’ encouraged and compelled 
its people – both ruling and ruled classes – to develop and adopt new ways of 
securing their social reproduction, which we elucidate in the next section. At 
the same time, the relative strength of the Ottoman social form entailed ‘penal-
ties of progressiveness’: the stability of their structures of social reproduction 
provided the Ottoman ruling class with various mechanisms through which 
their power could be sustained, even in the face of social upheaval.125
 This relation of unevenness goes some way to explaining why the so-called 
‘miracle’ of capitalism would occur in Europe, and why it would not be repeated 
in Ottoman territories. That this divergence was a product of Ottoman ‘progres-
siveness’ and European ‘backwardness’ suggests that Eurocentric assumptions 
of historical priority need to be reconsidered. Moreover, these two elements – 
Ottoman strength, and European ‘privilege of backwardness’ – were ultimately 
interrelated and co-constitutive phenomena. As a consequence of its compara-
tive strength, the geopolitical pressure of the Ottomans (the ‘whip of external 
necessity’) constantly affected and redirected European development, in turn 
compelling changes in its forms of social reproduction. This meant that while 
the Ottomans were faced as a significant existential threat, they were also 
an opportunity for the most ‘backward’ part of Europe – the Northwest – to 
outflank the more advanced Habsburg Empire and Italian city-states.
Combination: Pax Ottomana and European Trade
Coupled with the unevenness in forms of social reproduction, the Euro–
Ottoman relation entailed a curious form of combined development. The 
development of European culture over the course of the Renaissance cannot be 
separated from such interrelations. In certain cases, such as that of Constanzo 
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da Ferrara, European artists spent time in the Ottoman court and worked under 
the Sultan’s commission.126 Ottoman imagery was widely featured by Italian 
Renaissance painters seeking to elicit support for crusades by representing the 
Ottomans as the embodiment of the Islamic threat.127 Humanist literature would 
similarly deploy the Ottomans as a comparative allegorical vehicle through 
which medieval forms of European statecraft could be analysed and criticised.128 
In both Shakespeare’s Othello and Thomas More’s Dialogue, Ottoman military 
supremacy revealed the underlying divisions in Christendom.129
 These comparisons with the Ottoman Empire therefore reflected a period of 
European self-examination and criticism in the context of Christendom’s break-
down as a unifying principle.130 It was in the context of the Ottoman threat 
that propagandists, politicians and thinkers began talking about Europe as a 
normative as well as geographical concept. The aforementioned Aeneas Sylvius 
invented the very adjective ‘European’ following the fall of Constantinople to 
the Ottomans.131 Habsburg and Polish publicists began appealing to secular 
‘European values’ in order to defend Hungarian territories from Ottoman 
incursions.132
 In terms of diplomacy, culture and religion, the Ottoman presence was insep-
arable from the breakdown of the old and the emergence of increasingly modern 
ways of thinking. Considering the extensive ideological effect of Euro–Ottoman 
relations, we might wonder why the historiography of capitalism’s origins has 
been constructed with the Ottomans absent. For the remainder of this chapter, 
we explore this as an additional and underappreciated trajectory of combined 
development between the Ottomans and Europe in the 16th century and argue 
that this constituted a fundamental and necessary (but not sufficient) condition 
for the emergence of capitalism in Western Europe.
The Ottoman ‘Whip of External Necessity’
Prior to the definitive establishment of the Ottoman Empire in the 14th century, 
Europe existed in an interdependent commercial relationship with the rest of the 
world in which it was relatively peripheral to global trade.133 European traders of 
this period greatly benefited from pre-existing networks, relations and cultures 
of exchange,134 as well as the exposure to extensive sources of technology and 
knowledge (see also Chapter 3).135 Because of this condition of ‘backward-
ness’, the recovery of European feudalism, the flourishing of commerce and 
the cultural Renaissance that accompanied it were directly connected to the re- 
establishment of peaceful lines of communication and trade between ‘East’ and 
‘West’ that followed the expansion and consolidation of the Ottoman Empire.136
 Through the institutional support of the Ottoman state, the Pax Ottomana 
lowered commercial protection and transaction costs, established relatively 
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uniform trading practices and hastened the alacrity of trade. On land and sea, 
Ottoman rule was crucial to safeguarding traders from banditry or piracy, while 
building roads and canal routes that would facilitate inter-regional trade.137 The 
emergence of the Pax Ottomana also brought together highways of commerce 
linking Russia and Central Asia with Europe via the Black Sea, and the Levant 
and North Africa to the Indian Ocean where the bulk of Euro-Asian trade was 
conducted.138 Geographically and economically, ‘the Ottoman Empire was the 
hinge that connected the rapidly growing economies of Europe with those of 
the East’.139
 The safe passages into the Indian Ocean and along the Silk Route were crucial 
to the transmission of commodities that gave rise to the European demand for 
Eastern goods, which aided the further development of commerce in Europe.140 
The ‘engines of the economic boom of the late fifteenth century [such] as Venice, 
Marseilles, and Ragusa depended on the Ottoman Empire’ for both luxury and 
bulk goods,141 and in the course of the 16th century less established states 
such as France, England and the Low Countries became increasingly reliant 
on Ottoman raw materials.142 The spice trade that would become a cornerstone 
of colonial capitalism was primarily conducted between the Indian Ocean and 
the Middle East, with European markets only receiving surpluses left over from 
Middle Eastern consumption; by the late 1500s, 80 per cent of the pepper trade 
was being conducted through the Levant.143 Supplies of Iranian silk were trans-
mitted to the West via Aleppo, significant amounts of wheat came from Crimea 
Figure 4.1 Eurasian trade routes during the Pax Ottmana
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and Greece, rice from Egypt, cattle from Hungary, Wallachia and Moldova, and 
timber, wool, mohair, cotton and hides from the Balkans and Anatolia.144
 Trade and communication between the Ottomans and Europe also assisted 
the transmission of social and technological knowledge, leading to a spurt of 
developments in European manufacturing, particularly those sectors imitating 
‘Eastern’ products.145 The boost in French economic activity following a trade 
agreement with the Ottomans led to the ‘proto-industrialisation’ of towns 
such as Marseilles.146 The competition in silk markets between the Levant and 
Venice inspired the creation of the hydraulic mill in Bologna which would later 
be adapted to construct Lombe’s Mill in Derby in the early 18th century147 
– arguably the world’s first fully mechanised factory.148 Because Ottoman 
merchants themselves were active agents in bolstering trade within the Empire 
and beyond, their own credit system and methods of accumulation such as the 
simsar monopoly association and mudaraba advance system149 became woven 
into the fabric of European commercial relations, prefiguring the ‘complete 
control of a commodity from production to sale’150 that would become the 
hallmark of ‘company capitalism’.
 However, despite the commercially regenerative effects of Pax Ottomana, for 
Europe the Ottoman incursions seemed like a semi-apocalyptic event. With a 
standing army the size of which no alliance of European rulers could match, 
the Ottomans constituted a formidable military danger that threatened the very 
existence of Christendom. This Euro–Ottoman confrontation was rooted in a 
relation of unevenness: the Ottoman tributary system allowed for the raising of 
armies on a stable and unified basis, while the feudal system in Europe required 
extraordinary financing for armies, which weakened intra-ruling class unity 
and rural stability. The very efficacy of the Ottoman military meant that from 
the mid-15th century and ‘[u]p to 1596 there was no question of international 
politics which did not somehow involve the Ottomans’.151 
 This involvement was permanent and regularly hostile. In 1453, the 
Ottomans conquered Constantinople, subsequently using it as a base to conduct 
further excursions into Greece, Bosnia and Albania. Europe’s Eastern preoccu-
pation was soon justified, as Ottoman armies surged onward to Budapest and 
Vienna in the 1520s, putting them in direct conflict with the Habsburgs. The 
ensuing wars between these two ‘superpowers’ were conducted primarily on 
the southeastern terrain of Europe, with an especially long drawn-out war over 
Hungary and Mediterranean possessions. Having conquered Egypt and Syria 
in 1517, and thus obtaining access to this crucial hinge in the Eurasian trade 
routes, the Ottomans became, perhaps briefly, the most impressive seaborne 
power in the Mediterranean.152 Access to this crucial artery of seaborne trade, 
teeming with Ottoman-sponsored corsairs, became conditional on the outcomes 
of the Ottoman–Habsburg rivalry.
anievas maintext.indd   109 18/05/2015   12:18:50





































































































































































































































































































































































anievas maintext.indd   110 18/05/2015   12:18:51
111
the ottoman–habsburg rivalry
The Breakdown of Christendom
Such was the concern over ‘the Infidel’ that ‘the papacy put more of its resources 
into fighting the Ottomans than it did into combatting Protestantism’.153 The 
very purpose of a united Christendom was repeatedly emphasised in func-
tional terms to launch a new wave of crusades against the Ottoman Empire. 
After Francis I was captured by the Hapsburgs in the Italian Wars (1521–26), 
his release was negotiated on the condition that wars with the Ottomans would 
become his ‘principal intention’.154 Similarly, the Peace of Cambrai (1529) called 
on its signatories to stop the Turkish invasions, as did the Peace of Crepy (1544), 
which required Francis I to provide soldiers to fight in Hungary against the 
Ottomans.155 Legitimacy for that other bulwark of Christendom, the Habsburg 
Empire, was similarly constructed in the Ottoman mirror. By 1519, concern 
for the ‘Terrible Turk’ loomed so large that the election of Charles V as the 
Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire was in part based on his ability to unite 
Christendom in wars against the Ottomans.156 The pre-eminence of Charles’s 
son, Philip II, was also legitimised through appeals to his ability to repel the 
Ottoman threat.157 In such respects, it could be argued that Ottoman belliger-
ence, despite tearing into Christian lands, served as a common enemy around 
which the disparate factions of Christendom could unite.
 Calls for harmony, however, generally fell on deaf ears. One exception was 
the Holy League formed in 1571, which brought together the Papal States, 
Spain, Venice, Genoa, Tuscany, Savoy, Parma, Urbino and Malta. Deploying 
290 ships carrying 44,000 sailors and oarsmen, 28,000 soldiers and 1,800 guns, 
the Holy League established ‘the largest naval force mounted by Christendom, 
and the largest ever deployed against Islam’.158 Confronting an Ottoman naval 
force of a similar size, the ensuing victory for the Holy League at the Battle of 
Lepanto in 1571 came to be regarded as one of the greatest victories for the 
forces of Christendom. Subsequently mythologised, it long remained a central 
plank in the ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative, distinguishing the ‘liberated West’ 
from a ‘despotic East’.159 In this respect, the battle was central to the formation 
of a European identity that was distinctly ‘non-Ottoman’.
 But revealingly, Lepanto had little actual impact on the sort of crusading 
missions that the Holy League was created for. For starters, such was the 
strength of the Ottomans that they suffered no further territorial losses and had 
the resources to immediately replace the armies lost in 1571. In fact, when the 
Ottomans conquered Tunis in 1574, they did so with a naval force larger than 
the one that fought at Lepanto: ‘The Ottomans thus reminded Christendom 
that they could still bring war to Europe’s heartlands’.160 At the same time, the 
Holy League betrayed the divisions within Christendom by disbanding in 1573. 
Here again, the Ottomans played a determining role. Venice, seeking to defend 
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its commercial interests in the Mediterranean, approached the Ottomans for a 
peaceful resolution to ongoing conflicts in the region. In doing so, the Venetians 
effectively abandoned the continuing Habsburg military campaign in North 
Africa.161
 In short, the very notion of the crusade as a unifying ideology, with its impli-
cation of an offensive on the Infidel, proved impracticable and unsustainable. 
The reality was, as we have seen, the opposite; the 16th century was one of 
near-permanent victory for the Ottomans and defeat for Christendom. With 
the unifying principle of the crusade in tatters, the legitimacy of Christendom, 
already divided, came more and more into question.
 Here again, the Ottomans were active participants. Aside from direct 
instances of military pressure, the Ottomans also deployed alliances and connec-
tions with dissident groups in Europe as a means of undermining Habsburg and 
Papal hegemony.162 Francis I, king of Valois France, recognised the significance 
of the Ottoman Empire as a ‘power-balancer’, candidly admitting:
I keenly desire the Turk powerful and ready for war, not for himself, because he 
is an infidel and we are Christians, but to undermine the emperor’s power to 
force heavy expenses upon him and to reassure all other governments against so 
powerful an enemy.163
But the ‘unholy alliance’ between the French and Ottomans went beyond mere 
power balancing, and instead constituted – for both sides – a useful strategic 
union against the Habsburgs and Papal alliances.
Figure 4.3 Battle of Lepanto, 7 October 1571, depicted by an unknown artist
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Battle_of_Lepanto_1571.jpg (accessed 
22 November 2014).
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 After Charles V attacked Provence in 1536, Francis I was able to call upon 
Barbarossa, a corsair commander under Ottoman suzerainty, to attack the 
Genoese.164 The following year, an Ottoman attack on Corfu in 1537 called on 
the assistance of 13 French galleys. Even more remarkably, in 1543, Barbaros-
sa’s fleet participated in a French invasion of Nice (then under the duchy of 
Savoy), eventually occupying the town. Unable to provision their troops in 
Nice, the Ottomans were given permission by Francis I to station troops in 
nearby Toulon for eight months. Francis cleared the town of its French popu-
lation, effectively turning it into an Ottoman colony including a slave market 
and Mosque.165 Even after Francis’s reign, Ottoman-French strategic relations 
continued to thrive. Henry II signed a treaty with Süleyman I, leading to the 
1551 siege of Tripoli by Ottoman ships. Triggering the Italian War of 1551–59, 
the French and Ottomans conducted joint operations against Charles V, with the 
Ottomans committing up to 100 galleys. The Franco-Ottoman alliance captured 
Reggio in 1552 and invaded Corsica in 1553.166 A decade later, the Capitula-
tion agreement given to the French in 1569 was deployed as an attempt by the 
Ottomans to ‘divide its European neighbours on the eve of its assault upon 
Cyprus’.167
 The Ottoman-French alliance grabbed the headlines, but the Ottomans also 
established more clandestine links with dissident groups in Christendom. For 
example, Sultan Süleyman I contacted the Schmalkaldic League of German 
Protestant princes, urging them to cooperate with France against the Habsburgs, 
and offering them amnesty should Ottoman armies conquer Europe.168 
Moreover, the military pressure of the Ottoman Empire proved a crucial 
contributing factor in the origins and expansion of the Reformation. Lutheran 
revolts swept through Germany during a period in which the Habsburgs were 
especially dependent on German military support and financial aid in wars 
against the Ottomans.169 This proved to be forthcoming only on the condition 
that Charles V agreed to religious reforms. In this context, Lutherans sought to 
carve out greater religious freedoms whenever conflict between the Ottomans 
and Habsburgs surfaced, using the Ottoman threat as a bargaining chip in 
negotiations with Charles V.170
 The ensuing spread of the Reformation often occurred in territories that bore 
the mark of the Ottomans, most notably in Hungary. The Ottomans encouraged 
religious heterodoxy in Hungarian lands as a check on Roman Catholic (and by 
extension Habsburg) claims to power and authority in the region.171 Under the 
rule of John Sigismund Zápolya – elected king of Hungary twice (1540–51 and 
1556–71), very much due to Ottoman protection – Hungary became ‘a haven for 
Reformed Protestants’172 which recognised or at the very least tolerated Latin-
rite Christians, Calvinists, Lutherans, Unitarians and Orthodox Christians. The 
Ottomans went so far as to provide direct military assistance to the Hungarian 
Protestant revolt against Habsburg-Catholic rule (1604), and awarded its 
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leader Stephen Bocskay an ahitname (treaty) which confirmed him Prince of 
Transylvania and King of Hungary.173
 The ‘Calvino-turcismus’ would reach as far as the French Calvinist party, who 
called for the use of an Ottoman alliance against Spain in the second half of 
the 16th century.174 The Ottomans also developed links with the Moriscoes, 
committing on occasion infantries of 200–400 men to assist in rebellions 
against the Spanish.175 By 1580, Sultan Murad III had established connections 
with Queen Elizabeth I, leading to a 1580 commercial treaty and a capitulation 
in 1583. By the 1590s, Anglo-Ottoman relations were considered a key strategic 
alliance against the shared enemy of Habsburg Spain, although the hoped-for 
assistance by Barbary corsairs in the English naval wars against Spain never 
materialised.176
 With slightly greater success the Ottomans also established links with Prot-
estants in the Low Countries177 in order to internally destabilise Habsburg 
Spain. William of Orange sent ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire in 1566 to 
assist with the Dutch Revolt, stating, ‘the Turks are very threatening, which will 
mean, we believe, that the king will not come to the Netherlands this year’.178 
Later, in the 1570s, Dutch rebels were known to use the slogan ‘Liever Turks 
dan Paaps’ (‘Rather Turkish than Papist’).179 However, the conflict between the 
Ottomans and Christendom was not restricted to the geographical confines of 
Europe. The Ottomans built alliances with Islamic sultanates in South Asia and 
East Africa – such as Calicut, Ajuran and Adal – as part of a concerted effort to 
undermine Portuguese attempts to infiltrate these regions.180
 Various authors have noted that it was the accumulation of such ‘cross- 
pressures generated by the heterogeneity and scale’181 of the Habsburg domain 
that hindered attempts at the establishment of a unified imperial hegemony in 
Europe.182 And in numerous ways it was the Ottoman threat that so persistently 
redirected both Habsburg and Papal resources away from the internal divisions 
that were stretching the Empire in the northwest, contributing in turn to the 
perpetuation of ‘multiple polities within the cultural unity of Christian Europe’ 
that ‘time and again frustrated universal imperial ambitions’.183 Both Charles 
V’s and Philip II’s prioritisation of the Ottoman front came at an extremely 
high cost. The former could not maintain either religious or Austro-Castilian 
unity, and the latter oversaw the eventual breakaway of the Dutch Provinces 
that would mark the beginning of the end for the Spanish Habsburg epoch. It 
was only after the Ottoman threat was dispelled from the Mediterranean that 
Philip II could concentrate Spanish efforts on consolidating rule in the Neth-
erlands and invading England in the late 16th century, by which time it was 
arguably all too late.184
 It could be said, then, that the uneven and combined development of rela-
tions between the Ottomans and Europe created further vectors of unevenness 
throughout Europe. Consequently, ‘combination’ was itself felt unevenly, with 






































































































































































































































































































































its specific causal effects varying across different European states. The more 
‘advanced’ European states constituted the primary focus of Ottoman military 
operations, while alliances with more ‘backward’ European states were utilised 
to balance against the Habsburgs. As such, while the Habsburgs, Genoese, 
Venetians, Spanish and Portuguese were antagonistically engaged with the 
Ottomans, Northwestern European states such as France, the Low Countries 
and particularly England were afforded the geopolitical space to conduct modern 
state-building practices. This ‘privilege of backwardness’ became manifest along 
two causal vectors of combination: first, by bringing about a structural shift 
away from the dominance of the Mediterranean to the Atlantic; and, second, by 
isolating England from Habsburg geopolitical pressures. These will be discussed 
in turn.
The Ottoman Blockade and the Emergence of the Atlantic
In accordance with Ottoman geopolitical interests, the commercial effects of the 
Pax Ottomana were felt unevenly across Europe. Following Ottoman conquests 
of the Black Sea, Red Sea and much of the Mediterranean, European traders 
were only allowed conditional admittance to these areas.185 Once the Ottomans 
had obtained these territories, commercial activity became subject to state regu-
lations and supervision thus limiting the export of key commodities such as 
timber, horses, grain and alum.186 At the same time, the Ottoman–Habsburg 
military conflict exacerbated Mediterranean volatility, ‘cutting the arteries of 
Venetian seaborne trade’.187 The Spanish and Portuguese fared little better, 
failing to push into a Mediterranean rife with Ottoman-sponsored corsair 
attacks on merchant ships.188 Therefore, besides facilitating trade, the Pax 
Ottomana broke the commercial monopoly previously held by leading traders 
(primarily Venetian and Genoese) in the Mediterranean and Black Sea,189 while 
exposing such trade to competition from Northwestern European traders, as 
well as Ragusan, Armenian and Jewish merchants under Ottoman suzerainty.190
 By blocking the most dominant European powers from their customary 
conduits to Asian markets, the Ottomans directly compelled them to pursue 
alternative routes. Having lost its Black Sea monopoly, Genoa sought to 
circumvent the Ottoman passage to Indian and Far Eastern markets,191 while 
turning to private business and financial operations in Western Europe 
and the Atlantic.192 With the Ottoman-dominated Mediterranean i acces-
sible to Genoese capital, the Atlantic became a considerably more promising 
avenue for commercial activity.193 In both Spain and Portugal, the relationship 
between Genoese merchant-financiers and New World colonialists grew as 
Genoa’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean declined. The Atlantic ventures 
that this alliance gave rise to were ultimately made possible through the 
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investments of Genoese capital that had been forced out of the Mediterranean 
by the Ottomans.
 In the course of the Ottoman blockade, capitulations also came to play a 
major role, mediating between European commercial and Ottoman geopolit-
ical interests through alliance building and blockading rivals. The Genoese, 
Habsburgs, Spanish and Portuguese were all excluded, while the French (1536), 
English (1583) and Dutch (1612) benefited from capitulations. Political in scope 
for the Ottomans, capitulations proved an economic boon for the merchants of 
Northwestern Europe. These states that had been otherwise peripheral to the 
Mediterranean (and thus Eurasian) commerce were now able to trade under 
significantly more advantageous terms than their competitors. Plugged into 
the security afforded by the Ottoman state along its trade routes, Northwestern 
European connections with Asian commodity markets were significantly 
expedited.
 With the conquests of the eastern Mediterranean and its subsequent blockade, 
the Ottomans reconfigured the entire European balance of power, bringing with 
it a ‘structural shift’194 from the commercial dominance of Adriatic city-states 
such as Genoa and Venice to the Northwestern European states positioned on 
the Atlantic coast. As Michael Mann notes, ‘[t]he trade of the central Mediterra-
nean powers declined at the same time as their military commitments grew. The 
Atlantic powers seized their opportunity, and the West became dominant’.195
 The competition over markets that arose from this shift gave a major impulse 
to the development of ‘company capitalism’ and anticipated the increasing 
unity of merchant and state interests that became a hallmark of English and 
Dutch politics in the 17th and 18th centuries.196 These developments would 
lead to efforts to build permanent circuits of capital through the advance 
system, in turn escalating merchant intervention and control over international 
production.197 An additional unforeseen consequence of the incessant compe-
tition among the city-states ‘for access to Eastern markets and the threat of the 
expanding Ottoman Empire’ was that it would eventually lead the Europeans to 
the discovery of the Americas.198 For ‘[w]ith the Eastern frontiers blocked by the 
powerful Ottoman Empire after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 the brighter 
horizon was in the West, into and eventually across the Atlantic’.199 The line 
connecting the 1492 Discoveries with Europe’s subsequent ‘global destiny’ ran 
through Constantinople in 1453.
The Ottoman Buffer and English Primitive Accumulation
The states best placed to take advantage of this structural shift were those where 
the Ottoman geopolitical buffer was most keenly felt. As we have seen, the 
protagonists most intensely involved in the continental conflicts of the 15th 
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and 16th centuries were concerned with the Ottoman presence in the Mediter-
ranean and Southeast Europe. The Habsburg–Ottoman rivalry thereby formed 
a geopolitical centre of gravity that often redirected imperial concerns away 
from England and the Low Countries. The Dutch made use of the divisions in 
Christendom to make a long-desired break away from Habsburg domination.200 
The English were perpetually buffered from European geopolitical pressures 
precisely at a time when the continent was experiencing a demographic and 
commercial revival. And typical of Ottoman manoeuvres, both states were 
offered diplomatic agreements – capitulations201 – that weaved political alliances 
with commercial privileges in Ottoman territories. This was a major contrib-
uting factor to the integration of Levant and Atlantic trade in the 17th century 
and the ensuing rise of these Atlantic commercial powers. The Dutch became 
dependent on the Ottomans for supplies of the raw materials for which they 
had the heaviest demand – silk, cotton, mohair and wool – and equally depen-
dent on the Ottoman market for their principal exports, textiles and precious 
metals.202 England became similarly attached to both the import of wool and 
silk from, and export of manufactured cloths to, the Ottoman Empire.203 In both 
cases, the attempts of merchants and financiers to monopolise and control such 
trade led to the establishment of strong trading companies.204
 At the same time, raw materials from Ottoman territories acted as a stimulus 
for the development of European manufacturing, in particular textiles.205 As 
the Levant trade fed Northwestern Europe with staple commodities produced 
through extensive land use, the need for self-sufficient production at home was 
removed. And by ‘freeing’ agricultural land from extensive production, land 
around European towns and ports became geared toward more capital-intensive 
and labour-intensive forms of use, such as (proto)industrial manufacturing.206 
The concomitant increase in land value – especially among those plugged into 
inter-regional and international trade networks – increased the profitability and 
hence frequency of short-term land lets, sales of land and land transfers. This 
contributed to 16th-century population increases, pressures on land, rises in 
rents and short-term tenures, depression in rural wages and growing demand 
for staples.207 In short, the upsurge in Euro–Ottoman trade contributed to 
the preconditions of rural revolt and the primitive accumulation of capital in 
Northwestern Europe.
 Aside from these new commercial privileges, the effects of the Ottoman 
geopolitical buffer were especially pronounced in English intra-lord class rela-
tions and the peculiar development of the English state. A variety of authors 
have stressed the significance of England’s lack of involvement in the conti-
nental geopolitical conflicts from 1450 onwards as a fundamental factor in 
its ‘precocious’ development of capitalism.208 Theda Skocpol suggests that 
‘England could remain somewhat aloof from the continental military system’ 
which made it ‘uniquely responsive to commercial-capitalist interests’.209 For 
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Fernand Braudel, this isolation abetted a highly beneficial protectionism, 
helping England ‘remain independent and to fend off interference from foreign 
capitalists … more successfully than any other European country’.210 For Derek 
Sayer, England’s privilege of isolation meant it was not ‘squandering productive 
resources on Continental empire building, nor obliged, to the same degree or 
in the same ways as Continental powers, to defend itself against others’ expan-
sionist predilections’211 during the period when agrarian capitalism was set to 
take hold.
 One of the more peculiar features of Tudor ‘absolutism’ flowed directly from 
this isolation – a regression in the military resources held by the state and aris-
tocracy. For example, in the 1470s, the Spanish and English military numbered 
20,000 and 25,000 men respectively. By the 1550s, Spain’s military forces had 
risen to 150,000 while England’s manpower had fallen by 5,000 to 20,000.212 
Disarmament among the English aristocracy was even more pronounced: ‘in 
1500, every English peer bore arms; by Elizabeth’s time … only half the aristoc-
racy had any fighting experience’.213 This demilitarisation meant that England 
effectively ‘skipped over’ the development of the strong, tax-appropriating 
bureaucratic state structures characteristic of French and Spanish absolutism 
from the 16th century onwards.214
 This exceptional historical trajectory proved especially conducive to capi-
talist development in 16th-century England. First, demilitarisation among the 
nobility meant limited access to the means of coercion required to raise feudal 
rates of exploitation. This inability to ‘squeeze’215 peasant surpluses meant that 
the option of dispossessing peasants and exploiting them through market mech-
anisms became an increasingly preferable means for ruling class reproduction.216 
Second, the English state did not possess the coercive or administrative strength 
to protect the peasantry from attempts by the nobility to ‘engross, consolidate 
and enclose’ land.217 This contrasted with the French state, which competed 
with the nobility over agrarian surpluses by habitually protecting the peasantry 
from attempts at dispossession.218 Third, geopolitical isolation meant that the 
English ruling class was unusually homogenous,219 with a relative absence of 
social stratification across the state, the pre-existing landed aristocracy and an 
emergent commercial class. Under conditions of demilitarisation, the English 
landowning class became disassociated from ‘patented peerage’.220 Influence 
and office became a more important source of power for the ‘untitled gentry’ 
who would come to dominate English political and economic life.221 As such, 
the English landowning class was ‘unusually civilian in background, commercial 
in occupation and commoner in rank’.222 The lack of social stratification in turn 
engendered an intersection between the landed classes, would-be capitalists 
and state officers that became a central plank of the landlord–capitalist tenant–
wage-labourer triad.
 These three factors help to explain one of the fundamental propositions of 
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Robert Brenner’s argument on the origins of capitalism: that it was in England 
alone that agrarian revolts were met with a unified and successful attempt by 
the state and landed class to remove the peasantry from their land through 
enclosures.223 As peasants were dispossessed, they turned to an alternative 
means to secure their means of subsistence and social reproduction: selling their 
labour to landlords and capitalist tenants in return for a wage.224 The persistent 
success of the state–nobility alliance in dispossessing the peasantry of the 
means of production led to the emergence of a ‘free’ class of wage-labourers. 
The social property relations through which surplus were appropriated was thus 
transformed, from the extra-economic means of feudalism to the ‘economic’ or 
‘market’ mechanisms of agrarian capitalism.
 Considering that English isolation was such a crucial condition for the 
processes outlined in the ‘Brenner thesis’, a fuller exposition of capitalism’s 
origins requires that this geopolitical isolation be satisfactorily accounted for. 
We argue that this condition of geopolitical isolation, rather than signalling an 
absence of international determinations, is inexplicable if it is separated from the 
broader processes of uneven and combined development within which it took 
place. As the preceding analysis has shown, this isolation should be understood 
as the outcome of a distinctly intersocietal condition arising from the European 
continent’s preoccupation with the Ottoman Empire. The peculiar social form 
to which this isolation gave rise proved especially conducive to the symbiotic 
unity of state and landed class interests that underpinned the exceptional 
growth of agrarian capitalism in England. When considered in this specifically 
international context, English development in the 16th century can be best 
understood as a particular outcome of ‘combined development’: the develop-
mental outcomes of an intersocietal condition rooted in the uneven relation of 
England to the Euro-Ottoman geopolitical milieu. Ottoman geopolitical pres-
sures must therefore be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
emergence of agrarian capitalism in England.
Conclusion: The Ottoman Empire as a Vector 
of Uneven and Combined Development
It must be re-emphasised that none of these developments were sufficient 
conditions for the emergence of capitalism; there were numerous other causal 
chains – vectors of uneven and combined development – both European and 
extra-European that must be incorporated into a full understanding of capital-
ism’s origins. It is nonetheless difficult to establish a proper appreciation of the 
key developments in 16th-century history and the (Northwestern) European 
trajectory towards capitalism without looking at the Euro–Ottoman relation as 
a fundamental determinant.
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 The duality of Euro–Ottoman relations – both belligerent and collaborative 
– was a crucial driver in the development of capitalism. By establishing a node 
of international trade, the Ottomans contributed to the internationalisation of 
merchant activity and a cultural revival in Europe. More significantly, through 
their military conflict with the Habsburgs the Ottomans abetted the Reforma-
tion and the break-up of Habsburg geopolitical hegemony. The breakdown 
of Christendom as the unifying principle of the feudal age must therefore be 
understood as a product of the multiplicity of geopolitical interactions with the 
Ottoman Empire that converged over the course of the 16th century.
 We have, moreover, argued that the very breakdown of Christendom, and the 
Habsburg concern for the Ottomans in particular, gave Northwestern Europe 
the geopolitical space to conduct modern state-building practices. The isola-
tion of England was a direct product of a continent occupied with the Ottoman 
threat in Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean. This ‘buffer’ – and the isola-
tion it permitted – gave rise to the peculiar fusion of interests among the landed 
nobility, capitalist tenants and the state in England, which proved crucial to 
the success of the English ruling class in enclosing land. We can therefore see 
how Ottoman geopolitical pressure on Europe inadvertently contributed to the 
process of primitive accumulation in the English countryside.
 We have also seen how, through their geopolitical policies, the Ottomans 
actively and directly brought about a structural shift away from Mediterranean 
trade and the concomitant ascendancy of Italian city-states, toward the Atlantic 
powers that would eventually come to dominate the world through colonialism. 
In this respect, many of the developments that emerged out of Euro–Ottoman 
interactions prefigured the integration of every corner of the globe into a unified 
world system. Before Europe could ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ and ‘create a 
world in its own image’,225 the Ottoman Empire had to first shatter the citadel 
of Christendom. Paradoxically, once it had done so, a ‘New World’ began to 
supplant the Ottomans as the primary preoccupation of Europeans. This novel 
geopolitical concern – the Atlantic and the Americas – is the subject of the next 
chapter.
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c h a p t e r  5
The Atlantic Sources of European 
Capitalism, Territorial  
Sovereignty and the Modern Self
… the veiled slavery of the wage-labourers in Europe needed the unqualified 
slavery of the New World as its pedestal.
 Karl Marx, 18671




The New World ‘discoveries’ of 1492 were a decisive moment in the formation 
of modern European societies, constituting a fundamental vector of uneven and 
combined development through which the modern world order was born. For 
the discoveries and the socio-economic and geopolitical relations they produced 
would come to profoundly affect the differential developmental trajectories not 
only between the European and Western hemispheres, but also within Europe 
itself, laying the foundations for Northwestern Europe’s subsequent global 
ascendancy. The discoveries would arrest Spain’s socio-economic development 
and accelerate its geopolitical decline as a great power, while simultaneously 
affording numerous benefits to Europe’s two latecomers, Holland and England. 
They also provided the structural geopolitical space in which the latter could 
rapidly develop in a capitalist direction. Moreover, it was through the colonial 
encounter on the American continent and its attendant colonial rivalries that 
the institutional and legal structures of modern territorial sovereignty were first 
formed.
 In the spheres of European ideology and culture, the discoveries were no less 
consequential, as the Americas would come to constitute the principal crucible 
through which modern European political thinking and identity relations 
were forged. The web of commercial and financial relationships engendered 
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by the Atlantic slave trade would also subsequently prove a critical factor in 
Britain’s capitalist industrialisation, further assisting its rise to global supremacy. 
It was these myriad patterns of developmental differentiation that, as Robbie 
Shilliam claims, ‘constitute[s] the deepest structural unevenness upon and through 
which the modern world order developed’.3 The importance of this point for 
understanding the origins of capitalism, its differentiated developmental 
trajectories and the subsequent ‘rise of the West’, cannot be overstated. For 
if it is recognised ‘that non-capitalist social forms and political organizations 
are not simply sublated under the movement of capitalism’, but are instead 
‘co-constitutive of the movement itself, then … we cannot adequately explain 
modern world development through a narrative that starts with the rise of 
capitalism, nation and class within England or Europe’.4
 Recognising the decisive importance of the transformative interactions 
between Europe and the Americas further problematises the rigid epistemo-
logical separation between ‘West’ and ‘East’ or Global North and South, while 
going beyond the assumption of ontological singularity that frames traditional 
theoretical explanations of the ‘rise of the West’. Only by drawing attention to 
the interaction of a multiplicity of unevenly developing polities can we begin to 
theoretically explain their subsequent developmental trajectories in ways that 
eschew both Eurocentric notions of an internally generated ‘European miracle’ 
and the linear developmentalism supposedly marking each and every society’s 
transition to capitalist modernity.
 This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, we provide an 
overview of how the Spanish jurists of the 16th century sought to reconcile the 
increasing gap between Christendom as an all-encompassing universal ideology 
and the encounter with non-Christian peoples in the Americas. We show that 
the jurists’ response invited a reconceptualisation of universality based on an 
ontological distinction between Europeans and ‘Indians’. This in turn provided 
the basis for the ideological emergence of Eurocentrism, and the development 
of the modern legal principle of sovereignty. In turn, we argue that each inno-
vation was bound up in, and provided legitimation for, broader processes of 
subjugation, exploitation and plunder accompanying the colonial encounter.
 In the next section, we demonstrate how the Americas came to affect the 
differential developmental trajectories between the European and Western 
hemispheres and within Europe. Specifically, we examine how the plunder of 
precious metals from the Americas exacerbated the contradictions of feudalism 
and facilitated the commercial expansion of Northwestern European states into 
Asian markets. In the third section, we go beyond this Smithian appreciation 
of commerce and trade by highlighting the wider processes of primitive accu-
mulation outlined by Marx. Here, we argue that the limits of 17th-century 
English agrarian capitalism were only overcome because its ruling class was able 
to exploit the widened sphere of economic activity offered by the Atlantic. In 
anievas maintext.indd   122 18/05/2015   12:18:52
123
the atlantic sources  of european capitalism
particular, in the fourth section of the chapter, we show how the combination 
of English capital, American ‘virgin’ land and the labour of enslaved Africans 
created, in the plantation system, a key input for the reproduction of wage- 
labour and capital in England, and later the Industrial Revolution.
Imagining Europe in the Atlantic Mirror: Rethinking 
the Territorialised Sovereign, Self and Other
The discovery of the New World was in many respects ‘astonishing’.5 The scope 
of humanity was now framed by a universality that was not merely imagined,6 
but based on an unprecedented geographical combination of all the world’s 
inhabited continents. The colonial encounter that took place in the Americas 
was marked by an exceptionally ‘intense’ and ‘radical’7 recognition of differ-
ences between its protagonists, in which the sharp divergences of sociological 
unevenness were to be revealed. It is no exaggeration to say that the challenges 
presented by the disorienting experiences of the colonial encounter were one 
of the most formative and constitutive of modern European developments, 
destroying and creating in equal measure.
 On both sides of the Atlantic, ‘the old’ was being systematically and violently 
dismantled, subsequently clearing the path for the emergence of ‘the new’, the 
modern, capitalist mode of production. While colonialists were conducting the 
‘greatest genocide in human history’8 in the Americas, ideologues in Europe 
were busying themselves with tearing down an authority – Christendom – 
that was proving incapable of articulating New World experiences. It was out 
of the resultant debris that the twin conceptions of the European Self and the 
non-European Other would emerge, paving the way for an ideological appa-
ratus – Eurocentrism, racism, patriarchy – that would serve to both legitimise 
the horrors of colonialism and spur the development of capitalism.
Tearing Down the Ideological Walls of Christendom: 
From Sacred to Secular Universalism in the Construction 
of the European Self and Non-European Other
The colonial encounter posed two significant challenges to the universalist 
claims of Christendom. First, the presence of different European states with 
competing claims to colonial preponderance meant that both expansion into 
and rule over New World territories were ‘contested and open to rival inter-
pretations’.9 Second, the confrontation with American populations called 
into question why the application of universal, natural laws diverged so 
sharply between the Europeans and Amerindians. There was a pervasive and 
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intractable contradiction between notions of Christian universality and the 
absence of any Christianity in the Americas. In this context, ‘claims to universal 
authority upon the old foundations of Christendom were, when looked at in 
this global perspective, as Hugo Grotius bluntly said in 1625, daft (stultum)’.10 
Reconciling the facticity of unevenness in the context of the increasingly global 
scope of European activity required a rejection of imperial and papal concep-
tions of legality based on universal divine law. Through this rejection, a new 
conception of universality was constructed which would prove central to the 
justification of colonial expansion.
 The self-reflection this involved was made possible through a comparison 
between the Spanish and the populations of the Americas, and the attempt 
to reconcile the two under a universal framework applicable to both. The 
Spanish jurist Francisco de Vitoria – a forerunner in modern international 
law11 – based his legal thought on a characterisation of Amerindians which 
emphasised their supposedly ‘natural’ commonalities with Christians. Both 
peoples, Vitoria argued, were capable of ‘reason’. Like the Spanish, Amerin-
dians displayed ‘orderly arranged’ polities in which rules pertaining to ‘marriage 
and magistrates, overlords, laws and workshops, and a system of exchange’ were 
observable.12 A shared possession of ‘reason’ consequently formed the basis of 
equivalence between Europeans and non-Europeans, binding both under the 
same – universal – legal framework.13 Vitoria therefore began reconstructing 
papal universalism on the secular basis of natural laws and the principle of jus 
gentium (law of nations) which, rather than being dictated by the papacy or 
emperor, would be administered by sovereigns.14
 By treating the Spanish and Amerindians as ‘equal’ participants in the 
colonial system, Vitoria’s approach provided a system of law which legitimised 
the Spanish presence in the New World in terms of commerce and expansion.15 
However, the specificities of Vitoria’s argument reveal a considerably more 
insidious underbelly, as his innovations in jurisprudence not only legitimised 
the unfettered penetration of the Spanish into the Americas but, moreover, 
provided a legal basis on which the coercion of local populations could be justi-
fied.16 For despite the idealised conformity between Amerindians and universal 
principles of natural law, Spanish colonialists were all too aware that the colonial 
relationship between the two was marked by nonconformity and difference – an 
opposition among the local population to the Spanish ‘way of life’. As Beate 
Jahn argues, this eventually forced Spanish jurists to ‘grapple with an ontolog-
ical rather than just a political or legal question: what was the nature of these 
Amerindians; were they human beings at all?’17
 In the mid-16th century debates among Spanish jurists, a popular idea took 
hold that although Amerindians were indeed human, they were hamstrung 
by a developmental ‘backwardness’ – a ‘primitivism’ – caused by their own 
cultural peculiarities. Vitoria’s sociology of local populations in the Americas 
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thus served to identify those universal (read Spanish) qualities that the 
‘Indian’ lacked. Hence, the absence of certain qualitative characteristics became 
constitutive of their very being as ‘Others’.18
 Both Vitoria and the influential theologian Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda were 
instrumental in identifying markers of ‘barbarian’, ‘evil’ and ‘savage’ characteris-
tics among Amerindians.19 While sodomy and cannibalism were indicative of a 
heathen, diabolical, even bestial character (‘little different from brute animals’ as 
Vitoria put it),20 the physical nudity of the Amerindians exposed, in the minds 
of the Spanish, a more pervasive spiritual and cultural nudity, ‘an absence of 
customs, rites, religion’.21 Amerindians were also considered economically 
naïve, excessively generous and possessing no conception of private property, 
while appearing unable to properly extract precious metals or cultivate land. 
The difference in systems of production, property and exchange observed by the 
likes of Columbus and Cortes served as markers of an absence of social system 
altogether, from which a view of the Amerindians as ‘backward’ was extrapo-
lated.22 The upshot of such ‘observations’ was that the Amerindians were by 
nature and divine sanction destined to be slaves.23 As Sepúlveda put it:
those who are dim-witted and mentally lazy … are by nature slaves. It is just and 
useful this way. We even see it sanctioned in divine law itself, for it is written in 
the Book of Proverbs: ‘He who is stupid will serve the wise man’. And so it is 
with the barbarous and inhuman people [the Indians] who have no civil life and 
peaceful customs.24
Both Vitoria and Sepúlveda saw in the Amerindian character a series of defects, 
each a product of years of socialisation in ‘evil’ customs and practices, which 
prevented the Amerindians’ salvation.25 A long process of counter-education 
and supervision by the Spanish designed to ‘undo’ such ‘barbarity’ subsequently 
became a necessity, no less a duty.26 Moreover, because such ‘barbarity’ was so 
deeply ingrained, force, coercion, discipline and punishment became necessary 
to compel local populations to abandon their beliefs and customs.27 If ‘they 
refuse our rule’, as Sepúlveda wrote, ‘they may be compelled by force of arms 
to accept it’.28
 The brutality of Spanish colonialism led another Spanish thinker, Bartolomé 
de Las Casas, to produce a ‘counter-history’29 of the Amerindians.30 He empha-
sised their ‘gentle and peace-loving’31 characteristics, upon which he articulated 
a principle of Christian equality and ‘the natural laws and rules and rights of 
men’.32 Las Casas contrasted this image with that of the Spanish conquistadors 
as ‘devils’,33 thus criticising Spanish practices in the Americas. However, despite 
his more ‘benevolent’ starting point, Las Casas also saw Amerindian culture 
as something to be negated and replaced by Spanish practices, albeit ‘peace-
fully’.34 In justifying this position, Las Casas argued that since Amerindians 
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were ‘docile’ and ‘less resistant’, they were particularly primed for conversion to 
Christianity.35 
 Here, Las Casas invoked a paternalistic conception of Amerindian devel-
opmental immaturity – these people were ‘borne late’ and were hence ‘rustic’ 
in character. The ‘cultural vacuum’36 that characterised Amerindians would 
therefore have to be filled through tutelage from the more advanced Spanish.37 
Hence, in both belligerent and benevolent sides of the debate, the conclu-
sion was the same: both Spanish and Amerindians were subject to the same 
universal, natural laws, but because of a deeply ingrained cultural ‘backward-
ness’, Amerindians were incapable of adhering to such laws. Since Amerindians 
were incapable of governing themselves, the Spanish were required to govern 
on their behalf. Spanish rule and tutelage was therefore necessary in order for 
Amerindians to conform to the ‘universal’ principles of natural law and ‘achieve 
salvation’.38
 Associating ‘universality’ with ‘the adoption or the imposition of the univer-
sally applicable practices of the Spanish’39 meant that colonisation and the 
aggressive transformation of the ‘New World’ were subsequently presented as 
moral and legal obligations. Should indigenous communities deny colonialists 
the ‘right of communication’40 through which the indigenous people would be 
transformed, the colonialists would be entitled to conduct a ‘just war’ against 
them.41 With this move, war became justified ‘under the cover of an interna-
tional law of reciprocity’42 and took centre stage in the ideology of colonialism. 
It became the ‘means by which Indians and their territory [were] converted into 
Spaniards and Spanish territory, the agency by which the Indians thus [achieved] 
their full human potential’.43 In short, the destruction of indigenous communi-
ties, customs and modes of production became reframed as the ‘humanitarian 
obligation of the Spaniards’.44 These ideas advanced by the ideologues of the 
Spanish Empire prefigure – if in incomplete form – the basic components of 
Eurocentrism to which we now turn.
Legitimising Colonialism: The Historical 
Sociological Foundations of Eurocentrism
As was demonstrated above, the making of both the European Self and Atlantic 
Other were fundamentally interactive processes based on extant and changing 
forms of sociological unevenness. Likewise, the ideology of Eurocentrism cannot 
be historicised within the cultural or geographical borders of Europe alone, 
but only as an essentially intersocietal development.45 For it is in the colonial 
encounter that we find the emergent tendencies to read cultural differences 
between societies not simply as differences, but as absences: the Amerindians 
lacked those features the Spanish possessed. Absence in turn served as a marker 
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of ‘backwardness’ in the Amerindian Other, and enabled the hierarchical demar-
cation of the European Self as ‘advanced’ and ‘superior’. Through this practice 
of demarcation, Europeans were able to imagine themselves as a culturally 
homogenous entity – civilised, advanced, distinct and separate from the ‘savage’ 
world outside. In this way the basic premises of Eurocentrism were prototypi-
cally established. A methodological internalism (in which European development 
is conceptualised as endogenous and self-propelling) and assumptions of 
historical priority (which ‘posits the endogenous and autonomous emergence of 
modernity in Europe’46), first began to take shape in the Atlantic encounter.
 Setting up this hierarchy established a ‘standard of civilization’, and with it, 
the moral obligation for the ‘the civilized to take control of the uncivilized’.47 
As such, the practice of comparison established difference as something to be 
negated and overcome – an absence to be filled with the content of Spanish 
practices. ‘Indians’ had to be civilised, their peculiarities annihilated. Sepúlveda 
chillingly captured the affinities between ‘civilising’ activities and societal 
annihilation when he argued that ‘the loss of a single soul dead without 
baptism exceeds in gravity the death of countless victims, even were they 
innocent’.48 Sepúlveda’s imperative – a ‘moral’ and ‘humanitarian’ one, no less 
– implied ‘a projection of the subject speaking about the universe, an identi-
fication of my values with the values’,49 the projection of Spanish practices as 
universal.
 This projection and the possibility of civilisation through annihilation would 
in turn invoke the third marker of Eurocentrism – linear developmentalism 
based on a homogenous conception of time, or what Dipesh Chakrabarty calls 
‘historicism’.50 By setting up sociocultural distinctions in terms of linear history, 
non-Europeans were seen to present an image of Europe’s past, and in turn 
Europe posited itself as the image of non-Europeans’ future. Amerindians, on 
this view, ‘served as a paradigm for an original state [of nature] before property 
became individuated and secure: “In the beginning all the world was America” 
as John Locke put it’.51 Or, as Adam Ferguson would later write:
It is in their [the American savages] present condition, that we are to behold, as in 
a mirror, the features of our own progenitors; and from thence we are to draw our 
conclusions with respect to the influence of situations, in which, we have reason to 
believe, our fathers were placed.52
Such conceptions of linear developmentalism (re)constructed sociological 
relations of unevenness (that is, difference) through temporal conceptions of 
distance or separation.53 They also functioned as a framework to legitimise 
the annihilation of substantive sociological differences between the Spanish 
and Amerindians by naturalising the ‘culturally peculiar path of Western 
development based on private property and state-formation’.54
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 By the time of the Enlightenment, conceptions of linear developmentalism 
would find their fullest expression in Eurocentric stadial thinking.55 With an 
emphasis on clearly distinguishable stages of development (what the French 
Physiocrats and Scottish Enlightenment thinkers conceived in terms of succes-
sive ‘modes of subsistence’)56 on the continuum of unilinear time, stagism would 
establish one of the key intellectual foundations for the emergence of ‘scien-
tific’ conceptions of racism.57 In keeping with these unilinear stagist models, the 
employment of scientific and technological criteria in proving the superiority 
(and thus domination) of Europeans over non-European peoples would become 
the norm over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries. As material dispar-
ities between a rising capitalist core and non-capitalist periphery developed, 
broader philosophical, societal, religious and cultural distinctions were super-
seded by those ‘based on things’.58 This was one instance of a more generalised 
technological fetishism emerging from the rapid, but uneven, development of 
the productive forces under capitalism in its world-wide expansion. The level 
of technological development was perceived as determining the moral worth 
of a particular ‘race’ and/or society.59 In these ways, modern racism organically 
arose with the systematisation of unevenness constitutive of the capitalist mode of 
production and its interactions with other societies.60
 The dispossession of the Amerindians, along with the many later European 
‘humanitarian’ interventions abroad, thereby became justified on the basis of 
a stadial conception of development through which non-European societies 
were deemed materially (and thus normatively) ‘backward’ in comparison with 
the ‘West’. Hence, as with the formation of the United States, ‘Native Ameri-
cans, like other less-powerful groups who possessed territory coveted by White 
Americans, were declared racially inferior and incapable of productive use of 
the land’.61 Those communities or ‘races’ that did not ‘adequately’ develop the 
productive forces were judged unfit to exist, or in need of instructive rule from 
the morally and culturally superior ‘Western’ societies. Tellingly, the so-called 
‘father’ of modern liberalism, John Locke, evoked similar justifications for the 
dispossession of the Amerindians in the English-held Atlantic colonies. For 
Locke, the dispossession of the Amerindians was both necessary and legiti-
mate since the ‘Indians had no right, or very tenuous right, to the land, because 
they had not “mixed their labour” with it sufficiently’.62 As E. P. Thompson 
notes, since Locke saw Amerindians as ‘poor “for want of improving” the land 
by labour’, and since such ‘labour (and improvement) constituted the right to 
property, this made it the more easy for the Europeans to dispossess the Indians 
of their hunting grounds’.63 In these ways, Europe’s colonisation of the Americas 
and the ideological apparatuses it spawned marked the embryonic origins of 
the ‘global colour line’64 that would subsequently evolve with capitalism’s 
development into a world system of imperialist domination.
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Culture Wars in the Americas
However, political and legal questions were not the primary challenge posed 
by subjugating the Amerindians. Instead, it was the more existential questions 
regarding the ontology of the Other – with, of course, determinant (geo)polit-
ical and legal effects – that proved most problematic, destroying and creating 
in roughly equal measure. This was a problem that touched on all aspects of 
Native American being, including fundamentally their ‘cultures’. The various 
challenges that this presented to the European colonialists are the subject of 
this section.
 To better understand the ontological separation of Europe as a discrete 
sociocultural entity, we must trace a specific challenge found in the colonial 
confrontation against which these ideologies were created: the resistance of 
indigenous communities in the Americas. As Silvia Federici argues, the debates 
among Spanish jurists that took place in the mid-16th century over the onto-
logical status of Amerindians (and therefore also ‘Europeans’) ‘would have been 
unthinkable without an ideological campaign representing the latter as animals 
and demons’.65 Travel literature was embellished with bestial, diabolical and 
nonhuman imagery (cyclops, troglodytes, pygmies, people with tails, giants) as a 
way of sharpening the differences of local populations from Europeans.66 In this 
period, cannibalism, polygamy, devil worship, sodomy and bestiality became 
European obsessions, since they ‘seemed a perversion of the law of nature’.67 
The ontological separation of Europeans from Amerindians at the heart of the 
ideological innovations of sovereignty (more on this below), European identity 
and Eurocentrism was therefore based on a prior attempt to demonise the local 
populations of the Americas.
 The spur for this demonisation was the conditions of crisis that emerged 
within the pre-1550 structure of the colonial plunder economy.68 Up until then, 
appropriation was based on the encomienda – a legal framework which enabled 
colonialists to siphon off surpluses via tribute systems that were already in 
place among the local ruling class (albeit at higher rates of exploitation). The 
encomienda was a unique – indeed, perhaps historically singular – hybrid mode 
of organising and controlling the production process which combined features 
of feudal, tributary, Amerindian, slave and (in a later period) capitalist forms 
of exploitation, labour and property relations.69 In the first instance, the feudal 
institutions that the Spaniards brought with them were superimposed and 
grafted onto existing indigenous social relations of production, leading to a 
combination of feudal and Amerindian modes of production.70 Indeed, signifi-
cant features of indigenous social structures ‘remained substantially intact for at 
least the first several decades of Spanish rule and persisted in modified form for 
the duration of the colonial period’.71
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 Production in the lands of the Aztec Empire of later Mexico, for example, 
was characterised by the tributary mode, in which the direct producers retained 
access to the means of production and formal vestiges of kin-based, ‘communal’ 
social relations persisted, while indigenous elites extracted surpluses from 
these producers through ‘extra-economic’ means. The Spanish Crown saw no 
reason to fundamentally disturb these indigenous relations of production, as 
they served the monarchy’s aim ‘to prevent the unruly conquers of Mexico from 
enhancing their own power by gaining direct control over land and other key 
resources’. Nor could the Crown ‘completely ignore the wishes of those who 
had risked their lives in a military campaign that had so spectacularly extended 
Spanish sovereignty’.72
 So while the Spaniard monarchy initially intended to import their own 
feudal institutions to the American colonies, they ended up making use of 
extant indigenous productive relations, social institutions and power structures, 
while limiting the autonomy of the Spanish colonial ‘warrior-merchants’. A new 
overseas feudal nobility could not be tolerated by the growing royal absolutism 
of the Spanish state because, ‘left to themselves’, Spanish merchants would have 
given ‘verbal homage but little else to the Crown’.73 Indeed, as Eric Wolf notes, 
it had been the ‘initial intention of the Crown to deny the incoming conquerors 
any direct control of land and of Indian hands to work it’. This was because it 
wanted to ‘inhibit the development of an independent class of tributary over-
lords in the Indies, and thus insisted at first on granting the services of native 
Americans only on its own terms’.74
 The compromise forged out of these competing interests between Crown 
and conquistadors was the encomienda. To prevent the development of any 
independent class of feudal aristocrats or ‘tributary overlords’ in the colonies, 
the Crown issued temporary grants of trusteeship: the encomienda. This was a 
form of señorío (or manor) comprised of towns, villages and other populated 
areas held in the royal domain that the Crown granted to deserving persons 
or corporations for a specified period of time.75 The recipient of an encomienda 
was allowed to extract a stipulated amount of tribute – whether in the form of 
goods, money or personal services – from the Amerindian labouring inhabi-
tants who, after 1542, were proclaimed legally ‘free’.76 In return, encomienderos 
were required to protect, ‘civilise’ and Christianise those Amerindians working 
their lands. Crucially, however, the Crown’s granting of an encomienda did not 
‘bestow on the encomiendero (trustee) rights over Indian land or unlimited rights 
to Indian services’, as these ‘rights the Crown reserved to itself ’.77 In other 
words, the commendation of an encomienda did not convey a property title to its 
temporary trustee.78
 In these ways, the Spanish monarchy sought to separate encomienderos as 
much as possible from both claims to the land and, through the interposition 
of royal officials, their subject Amerindian workers – a goal further achieved 
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through the abolition of Amerindian slavery in 1542.79 To these ends, the 
monarchy also permitted – and in many ways sought to cultivate – the existence 
of an indigenous noble class of elites (the caciques), who continued to exercise 
considerable power at the local level. Caciques concurrently borrowed from 
established customs, and exploited their ‘new sanctioned positions as interme-
diaries in colonial government’ by organising production, extracting tributes 
and transferring surpluses to the encomiendero.80 In some colonial regions, such 
as Rio de la Plata, conquering Spaniards formed marriage alliances with the 
existing Guarani elite while making use of ‘Guarani modes of labour control 
in the mini-state organization of the region’. When the encomienda was finally 
introduced there in 1556, the ‘system simply accepted the existing arrangements 
using an encomiendero class of mixed Spanish-Guarani origin’.81 While indig-
enous peasants formally retained direct control over the land they tilled, the 
encomienda system combined existing practices of surplus-appropriation with 
the introduction of new forms of coerced labour and semi-servile productive 
relations.
 In separating encomienderos from direct control and ownership over their 
allotted land and labourers, the Spanish Crown established what some scholars 
have described as a ‘post-feudal’ mode of production,82 which not only retained 
some of the pre-colonial Amerindian tributary structures but created entirely new 
quasi-tributary relations of production (see also Chapters 4 and 8). However, 
with the rapid decimation of the indigenous populations through war, disease, 
illness, over-exploitation, and peasant flight and resistance, the Spanish monarchy 
turned to replacing their dwindling labour supplies with the importation of slave 
labourers from West Africa.83 The result was a dizzying array of different labour 
regimes, relations of exploitation, property relations, and productive organi-
sational forms all operating along increasingly racialised lines: African slaves, 
Amerindian serfs, quasi-tributary Spanish overlords, indigenous noble elites, 
and mestizos and white masters who owned lands and mines. Such peculiar 
combinations of non-capitalist productive relations were further distinguished 
by their (later) market-driven imperatives as they increasingly became oriented 
towards and integrated into international trading markets and circuits of capital, 
while nonetheless remaining governed by pre-capitalist ‘laws of motion’.84
 The persistently crisis-prone nature of the encomienda system, with its 
continual exhaustion of labour-power and resulting labour shortages, proved 
particularly problematic for the reproduction of Spanish colonial rule. Within 
the limits of this extant system of surplus extraction, the Spanish found they 
were unable to meet an array of economic requirements – not least, the growing 
indebtedness of both the Spanish Crown and individual colonisers.85 The 
Spanish monarchy thus sought to obtain greater control over land and people. 
People were considered especially crucial, since the obrajes (manufactures for 
the international market) and the silver and gold mines which stuffed the 
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Spanish Crown’s coffers with American precious metal required steady supplies 
of labour.
 Establishing control over production and strengthening the grip of colonial 
rule was primarily enacted by ‘declaring war’ on Amerindian cultures.86 This 
included mass executions, tortures and displacement of the existing population 
under the charges of diabolism, which were enforced through the destruction of 
indigenous worship practices. Temples and idols of old deities were destroyed.87 
Previous rites and rituals including songs, dances, painting, sculpture, astrology, 
and writing were banned. Any Amerindians found continuing such practices 
were hunted, imprisoned, tortured and killed by colonial authorities under 
charges of devil worship.88 
 These strategies served not only to attack indigenous cultures in the name of 
Christianity and colonial tutelage, but also to remove people from land, subju-
gate them, destroy their autonomy and tear apart their communal relations. 
It was, in short, a ‘strategy of enclosure … of land, bodies or social relations’89 
resulting in greater subordination and exploitation of the local population by the 
Spanish colonists. Quotas of labour were increased, and regulation of surplus 
extraction was taken from local chiefs and placed under the watch of Crown 
representatives.90 New labour regulations were supplemented by a resettlement 
programme (reducciones) intended to move rural populations into villages where 
they could be better controlled.91 Women were most negatively affected by these 
changes, as they were denied access to land and water rights that had previously 
been communal. New regulations banned them from freedom of movement 
independent of men, and demanded that women either become wives or be 
classified as maids, thus redefining them as the property of men, while denying 
mechanisms through which they could assert their autonomy.92
 Such ravages to the local population’s existing mode of life meant Spanish 
attempts at subjugation were met with resistance. Indigenous anticolonial 
movements rejected the sort of communication and collaboration demanded 
by the Spanish, seeking instead to reassert their own local cultures.93 In some 
areas, such as the Sierra Zapoteca, rebellions were led by caciques who revived 
the culture of ‘old gods’ in order to encourage the youth to take up arms in 
a violent struggle for their liberation.94 People of the Taki-Onqoy movement 
claimed bodily possession of Huachi gods as a way of cleansing themselves 
of Christian conversions, and prophesised a millenarian upheaval that would 
destroy the Spanish in a wave of pestilence and floods.95 They rejected Spanish 
customs – clothing, religion, tributes and labour services – and sought to resur-
rect local gods. The eschatological emphasis on the sources of communal rights 
such as land and water suggests that the Taki-Onquy expressed much more 
than other-worldly aspirations. The resonance of the Taki-Onqoy message 
throughout Amerindian communities, and the waves of direct and passive 
resistance, threatened Spanish control over their rural and urban possessions.96
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 In other cases, migrations escaping the widespread human desolation 
produced by colonialism drew on precolonial millenarian discourses as their 
source of legitimation. Many groups resisted by taking flight to the hills, where 
colonial rule was more difficult to impose, in order to continue the practice of 
precolonial traditions.97 The Tupi-Guarani in Amazonia, for example, described 
their journey as a migration to a ‘Land without Evil’.98 In many cases, resistance 
was articulated not by already exiting elites among the local population, but 
by carais or caraibas: spiritual leaders who operated on the margins of existing 
social structures. In a context where local elites often exploited pre-existing hier-
archies to conspire with colonialists against their populations, many resistance 
movements therefore also challenged existing local elites and hierarchies.99
 In this respect, women often became the chief protagonists of resistance 
against Spanish rule, having been disproportionately affected by colonisation. 
Female resistance was articulated culturally by refusing to submit to colonial 
rules governing marriage and the baptism of children. In instances of collective 
flight, women sought to reorganise communities along the lines of precolonial 
customs, taking on the mantle of spiritual leadership – previously the preserve 
of men. Pan-Andean movements based on the revival of indigenous culture 
were often led by women.100 Because women constituted both representatives 
of the old cultures, and the backbone of resistance to colonial rule, the Spanish 
again turned to a culturally motivated form of subjugation based on accusa-
tions of diabolism. Charges of witchcraft were used to subjugate women and 
redefine their position in society, establishing a new system of patriarchy that 
undergirded colonial rule and exploitation.101
 It becomes apparent that the push and pull of colonial subjugation – and 
indigenous resistance to it – was articulated primarily through cultural differ-
ence. In the first instance, it provided the moral and legal basis through which 
colonialism could be justified: the Spanish were rational, moral, universal, 
advanced and thus sovereign; the Amerindians were irrational, backward, and so 
exempted from sovereign agency. For these reasons, Amerindians were obliged 
to adopt universal – that is, Spanish – ways of life. But, moreover, the definition 
of Amerindians in ‘state of nature’ terms was driven by the compulsion among 
the Spanish ruling class to exert greater control over indigenous communities, 
especially since Amerindian attempts to reassert their own culture constituted a 
fundamental attack on the reproduction of Spanish colonialism. Cultural differ-
ence became a threat, something to be violently negated by colonial rule. Where 
colonialists could not make indigenous communities conform to the ‘universal’ 
standards set by the Spanish, they were defined as diabolical or irrational. Colo-
nialists were thus able to exclude ‘women and men in the colonies from the 
social contract implicit in the wage and “free labour”’ economy,102 and in the 
process naturalise the exploitation of colonial labour based on ‘unfree’ methods.
 The exclusion of indigenous populations from this ‘social contract’ – an 
anievas maintext.indd   133 18/05/2015   12:18:53
how the west came to rule
134
exclusion that went right to the heart of colonial rule – helps us understand the 
compulsion felt among Spanish jurists to make a cultural distinction between 
themselves and the Amerindians based on the ‘state of nature’. The culture 
wars waged in the Americas were therefore constitutive of altogether new and 
unique relations of patriarchy, class, and later white supremacy, that would 
be formative of capitalist social relations in both the ‘periphery’ and ‘core’. 
In this context, the associated ‘state of nature’ discourse was not an empirical 
observation, or an innocent thought experiment. It was rather a colonial(ist) 
construct born out of the culture wars waged – and ultimately won – by Spanish 
colonialists against the Amerindians in the name of colonial exploitation.
 A line of continuity can thus be drawn from the comparative work of Spanish 
colonialists, through Enlightenment and imperial conceptions of stadial devel-
opment, to current practices of imperialism. In each, cultural, political and 
economic differences in so-called ‘backward’ countries have been presented as 
‘absences’, with a particular emphasis on lacking or ‘failed’ structures of polit-
ical and economic governance. The concomitant exclusion of indigenous people 
from the ‘social contract’ and the perceived inability of ‘backward’ countries 
to govern has in turn been central to legitimising external rule over them – a 
practice that continues to this day.103 In its more belligerent manifestations, 
the perceived absence of proper governance structures has served to validate 
military interventions under the rubric of ‘just wars’.
 Hence, the capacity for and battle over sociopolitical organisation and 
self-government – that is, statehood and sovereignty – constitutes a key compo-
nent of the ‘standard of civilization’.104 The ideological, institutional and legal 
structures of territorialised state sovereignty that would come to be seen as a 
hallmark of capitalist modernity in Europe were in fact forged in the (racialised 
and gendered) crucible of the colonial Atlantic.105 Only after these institutional 
and ideological innovations came to prove their efficacy as a particular form of 
(bio)political rule and control did such organisational ‘advances’ then radiate 
back to the European imperial metropole.106 We now turn to examine the 
theoretical debates and historical processes involved in this often overlooked 
colonial dimension in the making of the territorialised sovereign states system 
in Europe.
The Colonial Origins of the Modern Territorialised States Systems
Debates surrounding modern state formation and the origins of territorial sover-
eignty have been overwhelmingly characterised by endogenous (internalist) 
and exogenous (externalist) logics of explanation primarily – if not exclusively 
– operating in the European theatre. On one side, Weberian and Hintzian- 
influenced approaches to the origins of modern states have emphasised the 
anievas maintext.indd   134 18/05/2015   12:18:53
135
the atlantic sources  of european capitalism
effects of war-making and geopolitical rivalries in increasing state institutional 
and material capacities. In this model, geopolitical and military competition 
among the great powers in Europe is seen as the prime catalyst and driver 
in the making of modern, territorially bounded states.107 Focusing on intra- 
European developments, the constitutive role of the colonial encounter and 
empire building is accorded, if recognised at all, a secondary place in the explan-
atory schema. Consequently, the agency of the Amerindians is given little to no 
attention.
 On the other side, (neo-)Marxist approaches have focused on transforma-
tions in the social relations of production (or social property relations) within 
societies as the ‘prime mover’ in the origins and development of the modern 
territorialised states system in Europe.108 While some of these perspectives take 
the endogenous development of capitalism in England as their point of depar-
ture, they nonetheless recognise the subsequent role of geopolitical competition 
in spreading the modern nation-state form, as continental European states 
sought to confront the systemic pressures posed by the modernising challenge 
emanating from Britain.109 The primary focus is again centred on intra-European 
dynamics as the primary site of capitalism’s inception and the modern sovereign 
states system. While broadening this perspective to include the economically 
functional role of the ‘periphery’ to the rise of capitalism in the imperial ‘core’, 
World-Systems Theory pays little, if any, attention to the mutually transforma-
tive nature of the colonial encounter in producing (and reproducing) the modern 
state form.110 Hence, even where intersocietal determinations are invoked by 
(neo-)Marxist approaches in explaining processes of social change, they fall 
short of offering a genuinely ‘international’ non-Eurocentric perspective.111
 The overwhelming attention to solely European or Western agents is similarly 
reproduced in constructivist accounts of the rise of the modern states system.112 
What all these accounts miss is the fundamentally co-constitutive nature of the 
colonial encounter in the making of the modern territorial state. Indeed, the 
transformative effects of Europe’s interactions with non-European societies were 
evident in the earliest forms of European colonisation.
 Returning to the writings of the Spanish jurist Vitoria is again instructive. 
In his work, we see a pervasive attentiveness to ‘the international’, taking in 
European geopolitics, but also those of the Americas and Asia. In Vitoria’s 
writings we see how the colonial encounter was not only generative of Eurocen-
trism as an ideology of colonial legitimation, but also instrumental in mobilising 
the assumptions of Eurocentrism to develop what would become modern 
conceptions of territorial sovereignty. Emphasising the absence of proper gover-
nance structures among the indigenous populations of the Americas, Vitoria 
writes, for example, that:
they have no proper laws nor magistrates, and are not even capable of controlling 
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their family affairs … they lack many other conveniences, yea necessaries, of 
human life …. It might, therefore, be maintained that in their own interests the 
sovereigns of Spain might undertake the administration of their country, providing 
them with prefects and governors for their own towns, and might even give them 
new lords.113
He then goes on to further substantiate the permissibility of Spanish rule, by 
articulating the absence of Amerindian governance structures in terms of their 
historical ‘backwardness’:
for if they are all wanting in intelligence, there is no doubt that this would not 
only be permissible, but also a highly proper, course to take; nay, our sovereigns 
would be bound to take it, just as if the natives were infants. The same principle 
seems to apply here to them as to people of defective intelligence; and indeed 
they are no whit or little better than such so far as self-government is concerned, 
or even the wild beasts, for their food is not more pleasant and hardly better than 
that of beasts. Therefore their governance should in the same way be entrusted to 
people of intelligence.114
For Vitoria, the ‘justness’ of war could not be founded on a subjective belief 
that those conducting war were inherently just, since this opened the possibility 
that ‘even Turks and Saracens might wage just wars against Christians, for they 
think they are thus rendering God service’.115 Vitoria’s paradoxically subjective 
solution to the problem was to demonstrate that Saracens, due to the absence 
of any conformity to natural law, were incapable of waging a just war. In this 
way, Vitoria was able to exclude Saracens – and by extension Amerindians – 
from admittance to the legal rights of sovereignty. Finally, Vitoria incorporates 
into his legal framework a way of distinguishing who is and who is not sover-
eign, to justify rule over the Amerindians and the exclusivity of this rule to the 
Spanish: 
if there was to be an indiscriminate inrush of Christians from other parts to the 
part in question, they might easily hinder one another and develop quarrels, to 
the banishment of tranquillity and the disturbance of the concerns of the faith and 
of the conversion of the natives.116
Taken together, Vitoria’s statements demonstrate that the perceived absence of 
recognisable sovereign authority in the Americas not only legitimised ‘just wars’, 
but also necessitated original ways of dividing, claiming and asserting power 
over newly conquered territories against other European competitors.117 ‘Almost 
any seventeenth- or eighteenth-century map of America’, Samuel Edgerton 
notes, ‘reveals the absolute faith Europeans of all religious persuasions had 
in the authority of the cartographic grid’. For as colonial powers ‘laid claim to 
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lands solely on the basis of abstract latitudes and longitudes … [t]roops were 
sent to fight and die for boundaries that had no visible landmarks, only abstract 
mathematical existence’.118
 Indeed, Francis I of France voiced a celebrated protest to these types of 
argument, claiming that ‘[t]he sun shines for me as for others. I should very 
much like to see the clause in Adam’s will that excludes me from a share of the 
world’. The king of Denmark in turn refused to accept the Pope’s ruling for the 
East Indies. Sir William Cecil, the famous Elizabethan statesman, also denied 
the Pope’s right ‘to give and take kingdoms to whomsoever he pleased’. In 1580, 
the English government thus countered with the principle of effective occupation 
as the determinant of sovereignty.119
 In these ways, newly formulated notions of linear time came to be comple-
mented by novel conceptions of linear geographical space and a concomitant 
modern form of territorialised state sovereignty. ‘The ostensibly empty spaces of 
the Americas could be comprehended, negotiated over, and competed for only 
by using an abstract conception of space built on mathematical cartography’, 
as Jordan Branch writes. ‘The novel requirements of making extra-European 
political claims demanded new authoritative practices by colonial powers, 
practices that were made manifest immediately in linear territorial divisions 
between spatial expanses’.120 Such novel articulations of linearly demarcated 
forms of territorial sovereignty in the Americas also had major repercussions 
for their development in Europe. For the principles of cartography, based on 
abstract space and linear territorial divisions, were first generated in the colonial 
encounter in the Americas and then subsequently transported back to Europe.121
 The originality of colonial conceptions of linear territoriality can be found 
most clearly in the treaties of the period. In the Old World, treaties concluding 
wars typically emphasised nonlinear or noncontiguous territoriality, and the 
spoils of conquests were divided according to places rather than territories. 
This was evident as late as the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which despite its 
purportedly modern credentials, still listed every noncontiguous ‘place, jurisdic-
tion, and right to be granted to one party by the other’.122 In contrast, treaties 
pertaining to the New World used cartographic or geographic language in order 
to delineate territorial claims based on linear demarcations and supposedly 
‘natural’ frontiers. Territories could be claimed in this way precisely because the 
known political authorities – that is, the Amerindians – were not recognised, 
were denied their right to sovereignty and were therefore excluded from any 
such treaties.123
 The first examples of linearly defined claims to political authority can be 
found in the 1493 Papal Bulls and the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas between 
Spain and Portugal. These treaties apportioned to Spain all newly discovered 
territories west of a line drawn in the Atlantic Ocean, with Portugal receiving 
those territories to the east (see Figure 5.1). The significance of such treaties was 
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‘not in the details of the lines’, Branch notes, ‘but instead in the very idea of 
using a linear division to assign political authority: “For the first time in history 
an abstract geometric system had been used to define a vast – global – area of 
control”.’124
 These linear territorial divisions apportioning political authority to European 
powers over specific locales in the Americas were only partly directed at local 
‘sovereigns’. Rather, their novel utility lay in dealing with existing and future 
European rivals. For while such claims to sovereignty initially served to posit 
non-European spaces as terra nullius, thereby opening them to European acqui-
sition, the primary aim was in regulating the relative claims of competing 
European powers.125 Thus, ‘such treaties were not concluded with the local 
“sovereigns” in mind at all, but functioned rather as a means of demonstrating 
a relationship of authority or control to other European powers’.126
 The origins of the modern form of territorialised sovereignty were therefore 
an outcome of an aleatory encounter with societies that Europeans considered 
‘empty’ – stuck in a ‘state of nature’ and not under or capable of any sovereign 
authority – and the competing claims to occupy such ‘empty’ spaces by various 
colonial powers. Rather than being derived from some internal impulse, they 
represented a response to the particular challenges of jurisdiction in these terri-
tories produced by historically specific intersocietal interactions. Such state 
practices and modalities of territoriality then radiated back to the imperial core 
in Europe, forming a crucial step in the formation of the modern territorially 
defined state, but only ‘after the usefulness and legitimacy of linearly bounded 
authority claims were made clear by centuries of colonial practice’.127 Such 
legal and political innovations must therefore be understood as various forms 
of combined development – constructions specifically based on ‘attempts to 
resolve the unique legal problems arising from the discovery of the Indians’.128
 The significance of our spatially decentred, non-Eurocentric conception of 
the origins of sovereign state territoriality for understanding the rise of capi-
talism in Europe and its later ascendency to global domination is threefold. 
First, it gives the lie to the dominant myth that the European states system was 
a product of geopolitical and socio-economic processes internal to Europe, while 
further problematising those accounts that conceive of the European state- 
formation process as an exclusively elite-driven affair. Rather, it was the very 
struggle to dominate and subjugate the indigenous populations of the Americas 
that laid the ideological and material foundations for novel conceptions of 
linearly demarcated, territorialised spaces of sovereignty. These conceptions 
further functioned to defend territory against the claims of other rival colonial 
powers. The territorialising process of state formation was then fundamentally 
Janus-faced: it gazed inward or vertically at the domination of newly claimed 
‘empty spaces’ and subject populations, while also looking outward or laterally 
toward fending off other competing imperial states.
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 Second, the development and consolidation of territorialised state sover-
eignty and capitalist social relations in Europe was an intimately intertwined 
and co-constitutive process, as the following sections and chapters demonstrate. 
Hence, in contrast to influential neo-Weberian and Marxist accounts,129 the 
formation of the European system of territorialised sovereign states did not 
precede the rise of capitalism. Instead, the early modern epoch witnessed the 
co-evolution and transformation of capitalism and the states system in Europe 
that was ‘overdetermined’ by interactions with the extra-European world. 
Capitalism did not only emerge as a consequence of developments internal 
to England or Europe during the Long 16th Century. It did not later suddenly 
‘burst on the international [read: European – AA/KN] scene in the nineteenth 
century’130 and subsequently radiate outwards in a unidirectional process of 
European-driven change. Similarly, the territorially bounded states system did 
not first emerge in Europe during the absolutist era, and it was not exclusively 
the consequence of the military and geopolitical rivalries operating on the 
European continent. The upshot of all this is that capitalism and the modern 
territorialised system of sovereign states retain not only a theoretically internal 
relationship as conceived from the perspective of uneven and combined devel-
opment, but a historically organic one as well. And as we have been at pains to 
emphasise, this was a relationship that was fundamentally rooted in and consti-
tuted by historical processes emanating from outside Europe.
 Third, the development of territorially bounded state sovereignty was crucial 
to the subsequent bundle of processes that eventually led to Europe’s ascen-
dency to global domination. The modern territorial state, particularly in its later 
post-absolutist incarnation, proved a militarily and fiscally efficient vehicle of 
class rule at home and imperial dominance abroad. The two were in fact inex-
tricably bound together, as the development and consolidation of capitalism 
at home was fundamentally secured and buttressed by imperial expansion 
abroad (see the next section and Chapters 7 and 8). Moreover, the territoriali-
sation of state and military power was a powerful (geo)political vehicle for the 
‘endless’ accumulation of capital which, over a relatively short period of time, 
outpaced non-capitalist rivals (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). In other words, the 
co-development and co-evolution of the territorialised state and capitalism was 
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the subsequent ‘rise of the West’. 
Their co-constitutive and reinforcing developmental tendencies formed a kind 
of cumulatively building virtuous circle,131 setting Europe – or more precisely, 
Northwestern Europe – on the path to global supremacy.
 To be clear, this is not to argue that such institutional and socio-economic 
innovations directly translated into victories on the battlefield or even in war, as 
the long history of ‘Western’ defeats in colonial ‘small wars’ has demonstrated 
all too well. War is perhaps the ultimate realm of radical contingency. Like a 
boxing match, no one can know with certainty who will emerge victorious, 
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however imbalanced the power relations.132 Nonetheless, the kinds of radical 
power imbalances that emerged in Europe with the co-formation of territo-
rialised states and capitalist social relations did give these states significant 
advantages in imposing ‘their’ will – either directly by coercive-intensive forms 
and/or structurally via the abstract mechanisms of the world market – over 
other states and societies (see Chapters 7 and 8).
1492 in the History of Uneven and Combined Development
As the preceding section has shown, the Atlantic vector of uneven and combined 
development proved a formative moment in the unmaking of European Chris-
tendom, reconstituting ‘universalism’ on secularised conceptions of linear time 
and space. Relatedly, the Atlantic was also key to the development of novel 
ideological articulations of a European ‘Self ’ and non-European ‘Other’ in the 
legitimation of European claims to govern in the colonies. Such articulations 
were central to the formation of new forms of racialised and gendered rule over 
the indigenous peoples of the American continents. At the same time, ‘the old’ 
was destroyed and ‘the new’ forged, in bringing the Americas under Europe’s 
heel in a history of unprecedented violence and brutality.
   The next section further analyses this history of domination and exploitation 
by demonstrating the impact the ‘discoveries’ had on the making and hastening 
of capitalism. It begins by examining this impact in the sphere of circulation 
before moving on to an analysis of the effects of the colonies on the sphere of 
production. The section therefore aims to dialectically sublate these Smithian 
and Marxian moments of analysis into a higher synthesis via ‘the international’ 
– an approach sketched out, but not substantively developed, by Marx in his 
famous quote:
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the expiration, enslavement and 
entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the begin-
nings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a 
preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which charac-
terize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are 
the chief moments of primitive accumulation. Hard on their heels follows the 
commercial war of the European nations which has the world as its battlefield. It 
begins with the revolt of the Netherlands from Spain, assumes giant dimensions in 
England’s Anti-Jacobin War, and is still going on in the opium wars against China. 
The different moments of primitive accumulation can be assigned in particular 
to Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England, in more or less chronological 
order. These moments are systematically combined together at the end of the 
seventeenth century in England; the combination embraces the colonies, the 
national debt, the modern tax system, and the system of protection.133
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Here we see, in rough form, the significance of the colonies and ‘the interna-
tional’ in the making of capitalism as a world system interconnecting the myriad 
differentiated societies constituting it. To these issues we now turn.
The Smithian Moment: American Treasures 
and So-Called Primitive Accumulation
There is a long tradition of Marxist thinking emphasising the profound impact 
the 1492 ‘discoveries’ had on the development and consolidation of capitalism 
as a world system.134 Yet today, the hegemonic Brennerite approach to the 
origins of capitalism emphasising the internal, agrarian sources of its genesis 
explicitly sidelines the contribution of the ‘periphery’. Noting some Marxists’ 
emphasis on the importance of the wealth amassed from the New World, Ellen 
Meiksins Wood writes that ‘we cannot go very far in explaining the rise of capi-
talism by invoking the contribution of imperialism to “primitive accumulation” 
or, indeed, by attributing to it any decisive role in the origin of capitalism’.135 
As reasons, she cites the relatively late start of British colonisation and Spain’s 
failure to develop in a capitalist direction.
 The immediate effects of the New World colonies on the Spanish Habsburg 
Empire were indeed to further entrench the feudal monarchy while arresting 
economic development in the region.136 Yet there were also significant knock-on 
effects that worked to hasten the rise of Dutch capitalism. While colonial 
surpluses were able to (partly) finance the Habsburg military expeditions across 
Europe,137 ‘the influx of bullion from the New World also produced a parasitism 
that increasingly sapped and halted domestic manufacturers’.138 This led to a 
virtual deindustrialisation of the Castilian economy as the home market collapsed, 
with American silver raising production costs and an ascendant Dutch manu-
facturing sector penetrating the Castilian textile market.139 This meant Philip 
II’s imperial projects could only be sustained through ‘reckless borrowing’.140 
Despite – or perhaps because of – the vast imports of New World silver, fiscal-mil-
itary pressures bankrupted the Spanish monarchy eight times by the end of the 
17th century.141 And as Genoese bankers held Spain’s public debt, they came to 
‘reorient their “surplus capital” from the American trade towards the bond market, 
thereby opening the door for Dutch capital. The rise of the United Provinces and 
the decline of Spain were therefore intimately connected’.142 What is more, the 
inflow of silver may have accelerated the decline of Spanish military power by 
encouraging attempts to conduct what proved to be an unsustainable two-front 
war against the Ottomans in the Mediterranean and the Dutch to the north. For 
as William McNeil notes, ‘it was the swelling flow of New World silver after the 
1550s that made Philip [II] think he could conduct war both in the Mediterranean 
against the Turks and in the north against the Dutch’.143
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   From the perspective of the longue durée, these ‘penalties of priority’ beset-
ting Spain’s development in the early modern age go some way in explaining 
the country’s relative ‘backwardness’ in the later modern epoch.144 Here again 
we see how the socio-economic and strategic benefits afforded to earlier devel-
opers would at a later point in their development turn into strategic liabilities, 
as less-developed societies came to reap the ‘privileges of backwardness’. In 
particular, the plundering of the Americas functioned as a means of ‘primi-
tive accumulation’ on a Europe-wide basis which overwhelmingly benefited 
two latecomers, Holland and England, at the expense of the more (feudally) 
advanced colonising powers, Spain and Portugal.
 Indeed, throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, Spain and Portugal acted 
as conduits for the transfer of much of the American bullion into the coffers of 
financiers in Antwerp, Amsterdam, London, Paris and Genoa. New World silver 
thereby further aided the structural geopolitical space opened to Northwestern 
Europe (again, notably the Dutch and English), and its capitalist development 
(see Chapters 3 and 4). Thus, the overall material benefits to Europe from the 
overseas discoveries, P. K. O’Brien writes, ‘accrued disproportionately to two 
latecomers and free riders – the Netherlands and Britain’.145 Further, as Roland 
Findlay notes, ‘the two East India Companies used the American treasure to 
balance their imports of Indonesian pepper, clove and nutmeg, Indian cotton 
textiles and Chinese silk and porcelain for profitable re-export to consumers 
in Europe’.146 This was a particularly important development aiding the multi-
lateral trade flows that would come to interconnect Western Europe with the 
highly lucrative East Asian trades through the enforced plundering of the 
Americas (see Figure 5.2).
 Why the Dutch, rather than English, became the first leading force in the 
subsequent development of the world market during the Long 16th Century 
is also explained by the country’s close ties to the Spanish-American trading 
system. This afforded Holland greater access to Spanish wealth than England, 
and this wealth was subsequently redeployed to drive its own commercial and 
financial operations.147 It is perhaps no coincidence that almost half of the gold 
and silver acquired by Spain ended up in Holland,148 Marx’s ‘model capitalist 
nation of the seventeenth century’, and the first state to experience a bourgeois 
revolution (see Chapter 6).149 Indeed, for a time the Netherlands acted as a 
‘distribution center from which American silver passed to Germany, Northern 
Europe, and the British Isles’, which ‘was crucial to European economic 
activity’.150 And even after the Netherlands’ break with the Habsburg monarchy, 
the Spanish still allowed Amsterdam considerable access to American silver.151 
Thus the Netherlands’ economic ascendancy was built, at least in part, on 
American bullion.152
 The immense quantities of bullion from Spanish America were also crucial 
in kick-starting the Netherlands’ Europe–Asia trade.153 This point was noted in 
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the often quoted description of Dutch trade in 1619 by then VOC director Jan 
Pieterszoon Coen:
Piece goods from Gujarat we can barter for pepper and gold on the coast of 
Sumatra; rials [silver currency] and cottons from the coast [of Coromandel] for 
pepper in Bantam; sandalwood, pepper and rials we can barter for Chinese goods 
and Chinese gold; we can extract silver from Japan with Chinese goods; piece 
goods from the Coromandel coast in exchange for spices, other goods and gold 
from China; piece goods from Surat for spices; other goods and rials from Arabia 
for spices and various other trifles – one thing leads to another. And all of it can 
be done without any money from the Netherlands and with ships alone. We have 
the most important spices already. What is missing then? Nothing else but ships 
and a little water to prime the pump. (By this I mean sufficient means [money] so 
that the rich Asian trade may be established.) Hence, gentlemen and good admin-
istrators, there is nothing to prevent the Company from acquiring the richest trade 
in the world.154
In the first instance, the bullion confiscated in the Americas lubricated the 
circuits of capital accumulation in Europe as a whole, providing the liquid 
specie for Europe’s vibrant trade with ‘the East’. By 1650, the estimated flow of 
precious metals from the Americas reaching Europe amounted to at least 180 
tons of gold and 17,000 tons of silver. Between 1561 and 1580, about 85 per 
cent of the entire world’s production of silver came from the Americas. This 
provided the capital for European merchants’ profitable trade with Asia and 
East Africa in textiles and spices.155 It also assisted European states in obtaining 
raw materials and primary products from areas (particularly China and India) 
which would otherwise have had little incentive to trade with the Europeans 
on such a scale.156 Indeed, it was the enormous demand for silver coming from 
China that allowed the mines in t he New World to operate so profitably.157
 There was, then, a clear connection between American treasure and the 
expansion of the extremely lucrative East India trade. Holland, England, 
Portugal and France were only able to finance their trade with Asia because 
of the vast streams of precious metals coming from Mexico and Peru.158 This 
enabled the relatively ‘backward’ European merchants to tap into Asian markets 
and eventually monopolise them, creating conditions under which ‘the West’ 
would displace, subordinate and subsequently dominate ‘the East’ in their own 
trading arena (see Chapter 7).159 The re-export of Asian colonial goods in turn 
contributed to developing markets in Europe, the Americas and Africa. Hence, 
a world market directed in the interests of the European ruling classes was ulti-
mately funded by plundered ‘New World’ precious metals.160 One recent study 
has gone so far as to conclude that ‘the differential growth of Western Europe’ 
over the 16th to early 19th centuries ‘is almost entirely accounted for by the 
growth of nations with access to the Atlantic Ocean’, including, notably, those 
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‘nations most directly involved in trade and colonialism in the New World and 
Asia’.161
 In fine, the socio-economic effects of the Atlantic vector of uneven and 
combined development on European geopolitics spread vast and wide. Locking 
Spanish development in place, the American colonies monetarily facilitated 
Madrid’s engagement in a classic bout of imperial overstretch, precipitating 
the monarchy’s decline as a great power. In turn, the fiscal adjustments of the 
Spanish state created the geopolitical and economic space for Europe’s two 
latecomers, England and Holland, to reap the ‘privileges of backwardness’ 
assisting their ‘rise’ to global supremacy. The only way to explain the varie-
gated developmental trajectories of the Spanish vis-à-vis the Dutch and later 
English is by recognising the various means through which the New World 
specie and plundered resources from the Americas fed into and gave a much 
needed boost to emergent processes of capitalist development in the Nether-
lands and England, while locking in an already existing feudalism in Spain. The 
uneven and combined development of the Western and European hemispheres 
therefore conditioned and reconstituted patterns of differentiated develop-
ment within Europe itself, enabling the incipient rise of Northwestern Europe 
as the ‘organic heartland’ of capitalist development. This intersocietal, ‘extra- 
European’ context through which European capitalism developed was its critical 
precondition.
Sublating the Smithian Moment: From Smith 
to Marx via ‘the International’
As is well known, Adam Smith recognised the significance of American silver 
in ‘West–East’ trade relations, noting how East Asia was a major market for 
the silver being pumped out of the American mines. This was a ‘market which, 
from the time of the discovery of those mines, has been continually taking off 
a greater and greater quantity of silver’. The precious metals flowing out of the 
Americas were a commodity that was ‘extremely advantageous to carry from 
Europe to India’ as there was scarcely any other commodity which brought a 
‘better price there’, and it was in fact ‘even more advantageous to carry silver to 
China’.162 The silver extracted from the American continent would provide the 
basis for commercial relations between the ‘two extremities’ of the Old World, 
and the means by which ‘those distant parts of the world are connected with one 
another’. Smith also noted how the European commodity trade to the East Indies, 
along with the gold and silver purchased for those commodities, necessarily 
created increases in European productivity. As such, Europe went from being a 
regionally limited economic system of manufacturers and carriers to being one 
covering ‘almost all the different nations of Asia, Africa, and America’.163
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 For Smith, it was the widening of markets brought about by the acquisition 
of American wealth that would bring about divisions of labour and technolog-
ical developments. In this respect, the Atlantic also acted as a ‘vent-for-surplus’, 
in which the international trade it instigated absorbed commodities ‘for which 
there was no domestic demand’.164 Such Smithian arguments have been widely 
invoked by political economists seeking to (re)insert the Atlantic into our 
understanding of European capitalist development. For Eric Williams, the 
international division of labour across the Atlantic triangular trade helped to 
generate profits by effectively buying cheap and selling dear between its three 
nodes. The Northwestern European states provided manufactures, which were 
shipped to Africa in exchange for slaves. Slaves were then shipped to American 
plantations, which subsequently provided raw materials that were sold back in 
Northwestern Europe (see the next section). Subsequently, the accumulated 
wealth generated from these activities was reinvested into the ‘core’, financing 
the technological developments that resulted in the Industrial Revolution.165
 Max Weber also recognised the great significance of the Atlantic discoveries 
in hastening the development of capitalism in Europe, writing:
The acquisition of colonies by the European states led to a gigantic acquisition of 
wealth in Europe for all of them. The means of this accumulation was the monop-
olizing of colonial products, and also of the markets of the colonies, that is the 
right to take goods into them, and, finally, the profits of transportation between 
mother land and colony.166
Even Marx, for all his criticism of Smith and other bourgeois economists, was 
keen to emphasise the ‘acquisition of wealth’ as a crucial moment in the process 
of primitive accumulation. As he put it:
There can be no doubt … that the great revolutions that took place in trade in 
the sixteenth and seventeen centuries, along with the geographical discoveries of 
that epoch, and which rapidly advanced the development of commercial capital, 
were a major moment in promoting the transition from the feudal to capitalist mode 
of production. The sudden expansion of the world-market, the multiplication of 
commodities in circulation, the competition among the European nations for the 
seizure of Asiatic products and American treasures, the colonial system, all made a 
fundamental contribution towards shattering the feudal barriers to production.167
Elsewhere, Marx also wrote of how:
[t]he colonial system ripened trade and navigation as in a hothouse …. [colonial 
companies] were powerful levers for the concentration of capital. The colonies 
provided a market for the budding manufactures, and a vast increase in accumu-
lation which was guaranteed by the mother country’s monopoly of the market. 
The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement and 
anievas maintext.indd   147 18/05/2015   12:18:54
how the west came to rule
148
murder flowed back to the mother-country and were turned into capital there. 
Holland, which first brought the colonial system to its full development, already 
stood at the zenith of its commercial greatness in 1648.168
However, it is important to remember that although Marx incorporated this 
‘Smithian moment’ into his understanding of the origins of capitalism, his 
own explication of primitive accumulation was based on considerably wider 
processes. Hence, immediately after noting ‘the discovery of gold and silver in 
America’, Marx goes on to argue that the:
expiration, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population 
of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the 
conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are 
all things which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production.169
What Marx points to is an intersocietal process in which the labour of different 
societies was subordinated to and subsumed by the requirements of capital. 
However, beyond a few brief passages, he offers little substance to the historical 
significance of the processes of subordination on this international scale. This 
has led an array of Marxists and non-Marxists alike to bracket the international 
scope of his analysis and limit Marxian notions of primitive accumulation to 
exclusively domestic processes.170 In what follows, we argue that this inter-
nalist perspective limits our understanding of the history of capitalism, and 
its continued reproduction, and that it is therefore necessary to redeem – and 
indeed expand upon – Marx’s original emphasis on ‘the international’ in order 
to overcome these limits.
Primitive Accumulation Proper: From 
‘Simple’ to ‘Expanded’ Reproduction
In Chapter 1, we saw how Ellen Wood, following Brenner, argued that prim-
itive accumulation was an entirely domestic process, taking place through the 
dispossession of the peasantry in the English countryside and the creation of an 
internal market which could satisfy and reproduce market dependence.171 On 
the one hand, the reproduction of now dispossessed direct producers became 
based on obtaining a wage through which their means of subsistence could be 
purchased, establishing their market dependence as such. On the other hand, 
capitalist production in agriculture made the market a viable medium through 
which the means of subsistence could be secured. Technological improvements 
led to increases in productivity and the expansion of outputs per unit, lowering 
prices on goods that would have otherwise been affordable only to the wealthy 
or would require nonmarket access (through subsistence farming, for example).
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 Wood thus succeeds in tracing the historical origins of what Marx would 
come to term ‘simple reproduction’ (although Wood does not explicitly make 
this claim). As Marx put it:
[Capital’s reproduction] takes good care to prevent the workers, those instru-
ments of production who are possessed of consciousness, from running away, 
by constantly removing their product from one pole [labour] to the other, to the 
opposite pole of capital. Individual consumption provides, on the one hand, the 
means for the workers’ maintenance and reproduction: on the other hand, by the 
constant annihilation of the means of subsistence, it provides for their continued 
re-appearance on the labour market.172
Marx’s argument here perhaps explains Wood’s own emphasis on dispossession 
and the creation of an internal market,173 for these appear to constitute the basic 
preconditions for the ‘simple reproduction’ of the capital–wage-labour relation. 
However, Wood’s explanation remains wedded to a decidedly one-sided view of 
the capital–wage-labour relation. For not only is there a basic necessity for the 
means of subsistence to be produced, there is also a necessity for those products 
to be consumed. That is, the market can function as a medium for reproduction 
only insofar as the proletariat have the sufficient means to purchase the goods 
required for their reproduction. Capitalist crises occur, Marx argued, because 
that very means – (access to) a wage – is constantly undermined by capitalist 
accumulation, and more specifically by ‘expanded reproduction’.174
 Marx’s argument about ‘expanded reproduction’ demonstrates that capital, 
because of inter-capitalist competition, must always return to the market and 
reinvest its surpluses into expanding its productive capacities. By introducing 
labour-saving techniques into production, individual capitals can reduce costs 
and reap super-profits, or reduce prices to obtain a greater market share. As inno-
vations reduce costs, more and more products are transformed into consumer 
goods, thus spurring the expansion of markets and lines of production beyond 
already existing market capacity. While this creates the sort of ‘internal market’ 
envisaged by Wood, it also causes prices to fall more slowly than costs, creating 
conditions for high profitability; ‘capital then rushes to line, pulling labour with 
it’.175 However, as more and more capital is mobilised in expanding production, 
the market becomes saturated, and innovations cause productive capacity to 
rise beyond what the market is capable of absorbing. Hence, prices fall quicker 
than costs, and overall profitability tumbles. As a consequence, vast swathes of 
both capital and the working population are shed by productive lines seeking to 
drive down costs, and re-establish the conditions of profitability and continued 
accumulation.
 This is exactly what happened to agrarian production in England over the 
course of the 17th century. The enclosures, and later the agricultural revolution, 
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introduced various labour-economising techniques such as the reclamation and 
engrossment of land, the reduction of fallow, and four-field crop rotation.176 
This allowed for the expansion of food production to an unprecedented level, 
driving down costs and creating a domestic market for labourers to secure their 
means of subsistence.177 But once this expanded capacity reached the limits 
of what could be profitably absorbed by the domestic market, both labour 
and capital were systematically shed from agrarian production and pushed 
into urban areas.178 The rapid urbanisation of England and the expansion of 
London into the largest city in Europe were the consequence of an emergent 
‘surplus’ population created by the limits of agrarian capitalism. In England, the 
emergence of this vast surplus population constituted a fundamental problem 
for the continued reproduction of capitalism. The 17th century was rife not 
only with the emergence of rural social movements such as the Diggers and 
Levellers that would challenge the status quo,179 but also with various ruling 
class lamentations over what to do with the ‘multitudes’ or ‘swarmes’ of 
‘vagrants’ and ‘idlers’180 that had been shed by agrarian production in the course 
of the enclosures, and later the agricultural revolution.
 And yet the capitalist dynamic of ‘expanded reproduction’ indicates that this 
surplus population shed by agrarian capitalism will eventually be reabsorbed 
into new productive lines elsewhere. Wood makes a similar argument, showing 
that the dispossession of the peasantry and their absorption into waged labour 
in urban areas further contributed to the expansion of the domestic market. 
What Wood does not account for convincingly is precisely how and where this 
surplus population was absorbed:
the English city, London in particular, was disproportionately enlarged by the poor 
dispossessed by agrarian capitalism. In any case, what made the English market 
for basic goods distinctive was not simply the demographic distribution between 
town and country but also the growing proportion of the population, whether 
urban or rural, that was dispossessed and reliant on wages for survival, together 
with the more direct relation of production to consumption of this kind.181
However, the reliance on a wage does not guarantee access to it; in fact, one 
of the primary results of expanded reproduction is the increasing superfluity 
of labour, and a growing surplus population with no direct access to a wage. 
So a proper understanding of why English capitalism was able to survive the 
agrarian limits suffered by prior protocapitalist social formations would neces-
sitate some historical account of what made England exceptionally attuned to 
absorbing populations rendered superfluous by this prior round of capitalist 
transformation. Wood’s omission of any such account is undoubtedly not 
intentional, but it is a crucial one. For it was specifically those sectors attached 
to the Atlantic that eventually provided the outlet for capitalists to absorb 
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the surplus population created by the expulsion of peasants from agrarian 
production.
 First, a large mass of proletarians were integrated into forms of work that 
presupposed colonies – shipbuilding, harbour building, and later sugar refin-
eries and textile production. For example, huge quantities of labour were 
required to clear forests and transport timber, which would subsequently be 
used to build the ships that formed the backbone of English colonial expan-
sion.182 Similarly, colonial enterprises were the precondition for the extensive 
construction of ports for long-distance trade. Pre-existing towns and cities such 
as Bristol and London expanded significantly in the 17th century, while entirely 
new conurbations – Liverpool most notably, but also Glasgow and Derry – later 
sprang up as nodes in the growing network of international shipping spurred 
on by the Atlantic trading system.183 The construction of ports and harbours 
was based on the labour-intensive activities of reclaiming marshy coastal 
lands, felling and transporting timber and rubble, and constructing seawalls, 
breakwaters, piers, quays and jetties. As Adam Ferguson noted in 1767:
The pestilent marsh is drained with great labour, and the sea is fenced off with 
mighty barriers …. Harbours are opened, and crowded with shipping, where 
vessels of burden, if they are not constructed with a view to the situation, have 
not water to float. Elegant and magnificent edifices are raised on foundations of 
slime.184
Second, where the internal market could not absorb them, the dispossessed 
were exported en masse to the colonies as settlers or indentured servants. In 
particular, those considered indebted, poor, dispossessed, criminal, vagrant or 
rebellious were targeted – what propagandists of the time described as the ‘rank 
multitude’, those ‘who cannot live at home’. Richard Hakluyt, a propagandist 
for English colonialism, noted the concurrence of the emergent surplus popu-
lation with England’s ‘late entry into the European scramble for New World 
colonies .... England, unlike Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, or France, had a 
huge and desperate population that could be redeployed overseas’.185 In 1606, 
Francis Bacon advised James I that in exporting such ‘surplus’ populations, 
England would gain ‘a double commodity, in the avoidance of people here, 
and in making use of them there’.186 Similarly, in 1609 the Virginia Company 
argued that its colonisation project would serve ‘to ease the city and suburbs of 
a swarme of unnecessary inmates, as a contynual cause of death and famine, 
and the very originall cause of all the plagues that happen in this kingdome’.187 
These claims were reflected in state legislation. The Beggars Act in 1597 and 
1598 authorised the transportation of vagrants and criminals to work in penal 
servitude in the colonies.188 By 1652, another legislative act was passed that 
enabled magistrates to ship vagrants and beggars to the colonies. Over the 
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course of the 17th century, some 200,000 people were moved to the Americas, 
thus ‘removing out of the city’ the ‘matter of sedition’.189
 The absorption of the surplus population, and the expanded reproduction of 
capital as such, was therefore dependent – as its precondition – on the exploita-
tion of a widened sphere of activity beyond the boundaries of the domestic 
market. That is, if it were not for the specifically international conditions created 
by Europe’s expansion into the Atlantic, it is likely that capitalism would have 
been choked off by the limits of English agrarian capitalism. In this respect, we 
might be able to construct an ‘inside-out’ argument that attributes the growth 
of English (and later British) colonialism to the ways in which it overcame the 
limits of domestic capitalist production. But it is also possible to go beyond this 
orthodoxy, and demonstrate how intersocietal determinations arising from the 
Atlantic fed back into and decisively reordered the configuration of a capitalism 
based on agrarian production, and prefigured the industrial capitalism that drove 
Britain to global dominance. In particular, the combination of the sociologically 
uneven sources of English capital, African (slave) labour and American land – 
concentrated in the institution of plantation slavery – would provide both the 
international conditions and the spur to British domestic development. We now 
explicate these international determinations in turn: first, by tracing the combina-
tion of American land with African slave labour; and second, by examining how 
plantation slavery fed back into and determined the course of British development.
The Uneven and Combined Development of Plantation Slavery
Lions have no historians, and therefore lion hunts are thrilling and satisfactory 
human reading. Negroes had no bards, and therefore it has been widely told how 
American philanthropy freed the slave.
W. B. du Bois, 1920190
The reason why 17th-century colonialists were so enamoured by the promise of 
the Americas was that unlike Europe, the land appeared ‘virgin’. It was consid-
ered empty, vacant, and as such presented an exceptional opportunity for a 
ruling class seeking to dump a surplus population that was not needed at home. 
Despite the purity implied by the notion of ‘virgin lands’, the sparseness of the 
continent was in part a product of European colonialism itself. Specifically, 
the mass slaughter of indigenous communities through murder, overwork or 
disease had left a pre-conquest continent of 90 million inhabitants with only 
10 million people by 1650.191 Among those who survived, many existing terri-
tories were abandoned, as communities fled to the highlands to escape the reach 
of colonial authority (see above).
 Therefore, in contrast to England, where a vast surplus population was 
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causing the ruling class widespread consternation, the New World posed very 
different challenges. In England, a unified ruling class concentrated in the 
state was able to legislate for and coercively impose private property rights 
and anti-vagrancy laws. The iron discipline of the English state was one of the 
fundamental levers through which the dispossessed class of peasants could be 
terrorised into a new work discipline based on the capitalist mode. Such insti-
tutions and practices had little efficacy in the Americas, where ‘property rights 
[existed] legally, but because of the extent of land, they [were] valueless’.192 In 
the context of ‘unoccupied’ lands and the weakness of the wholesale absence 
of any recognised authority, the idea of production based on the combination 
of private property and ‘free labour’ proved initially unworkable.193 In partic-
ular, colonialists found worker resistance to be a persistent dilemma that proved 
difficult to solve because of the sociological characteristics of the Americas.
The Sociological Unevenness of the Atlantic
First, the sociological unevenness between colonial and Native American 
communities provided an impulse for rebellion. Many among those who 
had been sent to work on the colonies saw in native communities alternative 
modes of production and ways of life that offered a better guarantee of food 
and freedom. When confronted with strict and onerous work regimes in the 
colonies, in which subsistence was barely guaranteed, migrant workers found 
flight and defection to indigenous communities to be a way to resist and reassert 
the communality and autonomy that they had been dispossessed of in England. 
Thus, ‘a steady stream of English settlers’ fled colonial settlements and became 
‘Anglo-Powhatans’, joining a Native American confederation ‘of small-scale 
societies without ownership of land, without classes, without a state’.194 In other 
cases, the sheer abundance of land offered the opportunity to escape and create 
altogether new settlements, although this often meant the active dispossession 
of indigenous populations.195 Other servants and slaves fleeing from colonial 
authorities would form more itinerant communities in the shape of bands of 
pirates and buccaneers.196
 Second, the combination of people from sociologically different backgrounds 
served as the basis for resistance. Colonial transport and work presented new 
collaborative opportunities for the ‘rank multitude’, wherein dispossessed Irish 
peasants, veterans of the English Revolution, enslaved indigenous Ameri-
cans and African slaves could collectively rebel against authorities. Strategies 
of resistance included refusal to work, sabotage of production, flight from the 
colonies and outright revolt. In fact, such was the collaboration among Irish 
and Africans in resistance movements that the ‘“Black Irish” were considered an 
ethnic group in Montserrat and Jamaica’.197
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 In short, the problem of the idle, vagrant, rebellious worker reasserted itself 
in the colonies, where the persistent resistance and flight of workers made 
the new American communities periodically unsustainable. The combination 
of a resistant European workforce, the decimation of the indigenous popula-
tion, large tracts of vacant land, and the concomitant absence of effective state 
coercion meant the colonial economy soon suffered from a crisis in the supply 
of labour. The peculiarity of this colonial arrangement in the New World meant 
that the possibility of capitalist development based on a ‘free’ and waged work-
force was effectively closed off.198 In fact, many initial experiments in colonial 
plantations failed because of the prohibitive costs of accruing ‘free’ labour.199 
However, once the colonisation of the Americas had been instigated – and with 
it a section of the ruling class invested in developing the colonial economy – 
a new dynamic took hold. The making of Atlantic colonies became less about 
dumping surplus populations, and more about obtaining a viable supply of 
workers that was otherwise not forthcoming from England.200
 By the 18th century, with the onset of industrialisation, population control 
thereby became a central concern of English economists. Whereas in the first 
period of colonisation, the ruling class were trying to rid themselves of the 
‘rank multitude’, in the age of the factory, surplus populations became central 
to profitability. It was in this context that the likes of Malachy Postlethwayt, a 
mercantilist and propagandist for the Royal African Company, argued that ‘the 
provision of black labor for the colonies had distinct advantages over that of 
white labor. Specifically, the use of African slaves on the plantation would not 
depopulate Britain’.201 The turn to slavery was therefore a historically specific 
response to the challenges noted above that confronted the ruling class – in both 
Europe and America – in the 17th/18th centuries. But why African slavery? 
Robin Blackburn suggests that African slaves were ‘better suited, stronger, more 
resilient’ than either European or Native American workers.202 On the ‘supply’ 
side, World-Systems approaches have often reinforced an essentially conserva-
tive view of African societies as passive, and the slaves extracted from them as 
docile and submissive.203 For Walter Rodney, because Africa was at a ‘lower level’ 
of economic development than Europe, it was forced into a colonial relation in 
which African rulers gave up slaves in exchange for manufactured goods.204
 However, such approaches mistakenly project the ‘modern’ colonial relation 
retrospectively back to a time in which the power balance between Europe 
and Africa was much less clear cut. In doing so, Africa’s ‘backwardness’ (and 
Europe’s ‘privilege’) is presupposed but not explained, thus reifying an other-
wise historically constructed (and contested) social relation. Although the 
eventual long-term effects of the relations between European and African soci-
eties would prove constitutive of a colonial relation and white supremacy, the 
colonial relation itself was not the starting point. Such explanations, whether 
benign or not, therefore tend to reinforce the naturalisation of black slavery, by 
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reproducing the idea that Africans were naturally prone to colonial subjugation 
and exceptionally suited to plantation work.
 Consequently, it must be remembered that in the 16th century when Euro-
peans first began to develop the transatlantic slave trade, West African states 
held numerous geopolitical and economic advantages over Europeans. Much 
has been made of the superior military might of Europeans, but this again tends 
to read a later era of colonial domination back into a historical period in which 
domination was not the norm. Although European states would eventually 
subjugate the continent from the 18th century onwards, prior to that period 
African states proved very effective in repelling European territorial encroach-
ments.205 Moreover, in terms of trade, Europe offered very little to Africa that it 
did not already produce or obtain from elsewhere.206
 The clearest indication of European weakness in relation to African states was 
their abortive attempts to establish plantations in West Africa. Such attempts 
failed because the Europeans were unable to subjugate and transform the 
communal subsistence bases of agrarian production into a privatised market-
based system.207 This was largely because, unlike in the Americas, Europeans 
were unable to conduct extensive territorial conquests and raiding missions on 
the African continent until well into the 18th century. Despite holding naval 
advantages at sea, Europeans were unable to transfer this superiority onto the 
African mainland, where indigenous naval techniques proved considerably 
better suited to manoeuvring in, and hence protecting, riverways.208 A curious 
stand-off characterised the geopolitical relations between Atlantic African and 
European states in the 16th and 17th centuries, where the Europeans were 
unable to fully conquer Africans on the mainland, and the Africans failed to 
expel the Europeans from the coast
 More in common with the Indian Ocean littoral (see Chapter 7), the expe-
riences of European colonialists on the Atlantic African coast were governed 
by commercial activities conducted on the terms set by the African ruling 
classes. European merchants had to fulfil a number of local obligations to gain 
market entry, dealing with an array of actors including kings, state intermedi-
aries, merchants, brokers, notables and producers. Their obligations included 
obtaining licences, or providing gifts, taxes, rent and charges. Moreover, rulers of 
African states often compelled Europeans to trade below fixed prices, withdraw 
from trade, and opened and closed markets at will.209 In some cases they actively 
coerced the Europeans into submission, by seizing European ships that engaged 
in unsanctioned trade.210 These advantages held by Atlantic African states over 
Europeans meant that the ‘human capacity’ of slavery had to be bought, and 
then employed elsewhere – in the Americas – where land was easier to obtain 
and the ‘local population easy to coerce’.211
 When seen in this context, the slave trade should not be conceived as an 
external shock, designed or compelled by Europeans, but instead as a pre-existing 
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part of ruling class strategies for reproduction in certain African societies. The spec-
ificity of the slave trade was rooted in the very unevenness that existed between 
European and (Atlantic) African modes of production. To be clear, slavery was 
widespread not because Atlantic Africa was more ‘backward’ than feudal Europe, 
but rather because the character of ruling class reproduction differed. While in 
Europe land ownership constituted the basis of private property and ruling class 
wealth and power as such, in Atlantic Africa quasi-communal ownership of land 
predominated. Therefore, ruling class reproduction was guaranteed by mecha-
nisms based on the ownership and accumulation of people rather than land: head 
taxes, military dues and labour services, of which slavery was the most common. 
Indeed, slaves constituted the primary form of private property in West African 
law. Hence, European contemporaries observed that local rulers and notables 
were predominantly wealthy in slaves rather than land, cash or goods.212
 One consequence of Atlantic African slaving was that slaves occupied a social 
position and standard of life that was little different from European peasants or 
workers.213 In fact, and similar to the Ottoman state structure (see Chapter 4), 
slaves could often take up positions that were functionally part of the ruling class. 
In the case of Songhay, Kongo and Ndongo, slaves were crucial to the centrali-
sation of the ruler’s authority, acting as ‘administrators, soldiers, and even royal 
advisors, enjoying a great freedom of movement and elite life-styles’.214
 In short, ruling class power could be reproduced and increased by accumu-
lating slaves. Hence the centrality of slaves to the reproduction of the Atlantic 
African ruling class contained, as its precondition, an intersocietal compo-
nent. Due to the predominance of quasi-communal forms of land, there was 
a lack of compulsion for – and outright resistance towards – the acquisition 
of large tracts of territory through geopolitical accumulation. Instead, West 
African geopolitics was governed by what might be termed biopolitical accumu-
lation:215 wars aimed at acquiring slaves were ‘the exact equivalent of Eurasian 
wars aimed at acquiring land’.216 The accumulation of humans as a rule of 
reproduction in Atlantic African societies was thus central to the conflicts and 
raids enacted between the Kongo and Ndongo, the imperial expansion of the 
Songhay, and the reproduction of the Senegambian states.217 Taken together, 
the various factors that placed slave and slaving at the heart of ruling class 
reproduction made the Atlantic African ruling classes exceptionally capable 
of providing and sustaining a steady supply of slave labour to European 
colonialists.
 Nonetheless, once Europeans entered the slave trade, and especially once 
slavery became a crucial component of ruling class reproduction in the Americas, 
the (geo)political composition of Atlantic Africa was radically transformed. In 
certain areas, such as the Gold Coast, the processes of state formation that took 
place in the 16th and 17th centuries were made possible by the encounter of 
Atlantic African societies with each other, and with Europeans. Such interac-
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tions generated increasing migration, settlement and centralisation in a region 
where nomadic and village communities were the norm. Following the intro-
duction of maize, the increased caloric capacity helped spur rapid population 
growth throughout regions plugged into the Atlantic trade. The Atlantic coast 
thus shifted from a ‘periphery’ of the ‘Sudanese center’ into ‘a center in its own 
right: a magnet that drew people and trade from all sides to its burgeoning 
“central places”’.218
 But the importance of biopolitical accumulation as a rule of reproduction, 
and the relatively advanced position of Atlantic African societies in other trades, 
meant that the import of military commodities took precedence. Europeans, 
who were producing firearms on an unprecedented scale, were exceptionally 
well placed and only too willing to take advantage. The extensive influx of 
European weapons into Atlantic Africa substantially reconfigured the geopol-
itics of the region, and in particular the dynamic of biopolitical accumulation, 
changing the nature and scope of warfare. Prior to the arrival of European guns, 
the politically fragmented character of Atlantic Africa was relatively balanced, 
whereby ‘no single state was militarily stronger than its neighbors’. Warfare was 
instead primarily defensive, short lived and limited to ‘small-scale’ operations, 
‘embracing tens rather than hundreds of square miles’.219
 From the mid-17th century, with African states now plugged into dense 
networks of commercial-cum-military relations with Europeans, this dynamic 
fundamentally changed. Wars became more extensive, giving rise to a series 
of expansionist state formations along the Atlantic African littoral, with states 
such as the Denkyira, Akwamu and Asante springing up, expanding, and 
widening the geographical scope of slave acquisition.220 At the same time, states 
outside the slave trade were deprived of access to weaponry and increasingly 
‘found themselves on the losing side of an arms race. Their dilemma: without 
firearms defence was precarious. To get muskets, there must be something to 
export. The only item in great demand was slaves’.221 As the capacities of states 
for obtaining slaves increased, societies previously outside of the transatlantic 
slave trade were pulled irrevocably into it, either as sources of slaves, or as slave 
traders themselves.222 Overall, the slave trade came to serve a dual purpose. It 
was the medium through which the firearms crucial to war-making could be 
imported, and it was also the medium through which states could shed the 
surplus slaves accrued from their now enhanced war-making capabilities.
 The Europeans’ insatiable thirst for slave labour in the Americas, on the one 
side, and the subsequent reordering of African geopolitics, on the other, help 
explain why, from the mid-17th century onwards, there was a radical increase 
in the transatlantic slave trade. In the first half-century of the transatlantic slave 
trade, 700,000 Africans boarded boats destined for the Americas.223 The export 
of slaves from West Africa as a whole doubled; in some cases, as in Angola, 
it tripled.224 Slaving in and around Allada – which would eventually take the 
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title of the ‘Slave Coast’ – grew from no exports in 1500 to over 19,000 slaves 
per year by 1700. Parts of the Gold Coast, such as Lower Guinea, experienced 
a similar expansion, switching from a net importer of slaves to a net exporter 
in the 17th century. The expansion proved exponential, especially once the 
English entered the trade.225 In 1670, an average of 888 slaves were exported 
from the Gold Coast each year. By 1720, the average had risen to 4,708 per 
annum.226
 By the mid-18th century this had resulted in the increasing militarisation 
of West African states, geopolitically destabilising the region as a whole. The 
expansion of slaving for export, combined with the ravages of conflict, produced 
a concomitant demographic exhaustion of West Africa and its tributaries. In a 
region where people were considered the primary source of wealth, population 
decline had a negative impact on agrarian productivity, which in turn increased 
exposure to famine and disease.227 Plundered of its source of power, wealth and 
international ‘comparative advantage’ – human labour – Africa was left prone 
to an emergent relation of subjugation and dependence vis-à-vis Europe, which 
would come to characterise the later ravages of colonialism on the continent.
Sociological Combination in the Plantation System
The plantation brought these disparate, unevenly generated forces of 
production together: English capital, American land and African slavery. This 
combination was historically unprecedented and distinct from prior forms of 
either slave labour or plantation production – a productive unit geared specif-
ically towards capitalistic production. Plantations thus functioned as sites 
of significant capitalistic experimentations in agro-industrial combinations 
of productive forces,228 and are best characterised as ‘transitional forms’ of 
social relations combining complex amalgams of capitalist and non-capitalist 
relations, production techniques and practices – ‘dependent and hybrid socio-
economic enterprises’.229 They were distinct from the form of agrarian and later 
industrial production based on wage-labour that predominated in England, 
and also different from European serfdom and the modes of slavery in Africa. 
From top to bottom, these were societies where the ‘archaic’ and ‘modern’, the 
most ‘backward’ and ‘advanced’, were juxtaposed, overlapped, and fused in 
multiple and contradictory ways. The myriad constitutive contrasts making up 
this colonial mode of combined development are well illuminated by Robin 
Blackburn:
The social relations of colonial slavery borrowed from an ancient stock of legal 
formulas, used contemporary techniques of violence, developed manufacture 
and maritime transport on a grand scale, and anticipated modern modes of co- 
ordination and consumption. Slavery in the New World was above all a hybrid 
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mixing ancient and modern, European business and African husbandry, American 
and Eastern plants and processes, elements of traditional patrimonialism 
with up-to-date bookkeeping and individual ownership …. These borrowings 
necessarily involved innovation and adaptation, as new social institutions and 
practices, as well as new crops and techniques of cultivation, were arranged in 
new ensembles.230
These bundles of sociopolitical, economic and ideocultural processes and 
relations are perhaps best captured under the conceptual rubric of créolisation 
– a distinct and novel articulation of an uneven and combined development in 
the historically specific conditions of the New World. The term is particularly 
helpful in understanding the conditions of hybridity and combination forged 
through the New World experience, as the concept of créolisation is ‘organically 
linked to Atlantic slavery’. Though it was ‘initially designed to denote African 
slaves brought up in a master’s house’, the term was subsequently generalised 
‘to refer to anything that, first introduced into the New World from elsewhere, 
managed to reproduce itself in its new setting’.231 From the African coastal depots 
to the reprovisioning points in the Atlantic islands to the American ports to the 
plantations, colonial marketplaces and backlands – from all these ‘new spaces’ 
came ‘new languages, new musics, new religions and new laws’, giving ‘birth 
to the creole, to mixtures of European, African and Amerindian elements’.232 
Such processes of créolisation on the plantation economy and the concomitant 
hybrid social relations, identities and ‘new syntaxes of racial hierarchy’233 that 
were fashioned in the colonial crucible would come to cohere and develop in ways 
that escaped all extant European developmental models and forms. Such was the 
‘melting pot’ of the Americas, founded on the some of the most vicious forms of 
exploitation, oppression and racism the modern world has known.
 Insofar as European, Amerindian and African workers shared relatively 
equivalent experiences of the disciplinary work regime in the Americas, new 
potentialities for collective collaboration and resistance emerged. In addition 
to the forms of escape and resistance outlined above, the late 17th century 
saw uprisings against the ruling class in centres of the nascent plantation 
system, as exemplified by the Chesapeake rebellions in 1676.234 The sorts of 
solidarity fashioned in the early colonial system would eventually be disman-
tled through the differentiation and stratification of certain groups within the 
workforce. Less onerous labour functions and greater privileges were assigned 
to white European workers, while African slaves were redefined as a legally 
abject section of the workforce.235 Subsequently, ruling class fears of revolt were 
directed less at ‘multiracial rebellions’, and more at exclusively slave revolts. 
‘Negro insurrections’ became an object of fear among colonialists, reflected in 
two acts legislating against such revolts in 1680 and 1682. According to Peter 
Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, the transition to a racially hierarchised mode 
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of production ‘was completed with “An Act Concerning Servants and Slaves” 
(1705), which guaranteed the rights of servants and defined slaves as a form of 
property that would constitute the basis of production in Virginia’.236
 With the defeat of these rebellions in the late 17th century came the recom-
position of the plantation proletariat by the formation of class divisions between 
white and black workers through the ideology of scientific racism.237 As the 
cartographer and physician William Petty put it in ‘The Scale of Creatures’ 
(1676), ‘There seem to be several species even of human beings’ in the colonies 
and ‘the Europeans do not only differ from the aforementioned Africans in 
colour … but also … in natural manners and in the internal qualities of their 
minds’.238 Here we find in Petty’s works, which followed those of Francis Bacon, 
the development of ‘a new discourse, an ideological racism different in tone and 
methods from the racial prejudice of the overseer with a whip or the bully on 
the deck’.239 Such spurious biological arguments for ‘white supremacy’ were later 
redefined by the two titans of modern English philosophy, John Locke and David 
Hume, along with various English biologists. Similarly, the Church of England 
clergyman and missionary Morgan Godwyn explained the ‘inherent inferiority’ 
of black slaves – and black people as such – by their refusal to work, writing, 
‘Surely Sloth and Avarice have been no unhandy Instruments and Assistants to 
midwife it into the World, and to Foster and Nurse it up’.240 Of course, as noted, 
such refusals to work were quite often part of slave strategies to resist colonial 
rule, rather than symptomatic of putative essential(ist) racial attributes.
 The construction of racism as a class relation, and as an ideology legitimating 
divide and rule, was therefore central to the formation and reproduction of 
the colonial economy in the Americas.241 But its effects would prove consider-
ably more wide-ranging, eventually constituting the broader development and 
reproduction of capitalism as a totality of socio-economic, political, legal and 
ideocultural relations. For at the core of the sociological amalgamations within 
the colonial plantations was the interlacing and systemic fusion of different 
relations of production. Slaves themselves were not directly subject to capitalist 
rules of reproduction and were often dependent on the ‘natural economy’ for 
subsistence. Rather than the market dependence of the wage-labourer, ‘slaves 
grew much of their own food and built shelter for themselves’. In fact, this 
allowed plantations a degree of self-sufficiency outside of the vagaries of the 
market, enabling them to better ‘survive times of war, revolution or commer-
cial depression’.242 Due to this element of self-sufficiency, slavers themselves 
could temporarily withdraw from the market in ways that merchants and 
industrialists could not.
 Nonetheless, plantations also mobilised modern techniques in crop special-
isation, cultivation, book-keeping, packaging and shipping, signalling various 
developments in the productive forces. Such developments in the labour process 
made slavers considerably more responsive to market pressures than most 
anievas maintext.indd   160 18/05/2015   12:18:54
161
the atlantic sources  of european capitalism
non-capitalist rulers or merchants.243 Being plugged into networks of interna-
tional capital for both the supply of labour and the realisation of commodities 
produced also meant that slavers (and by extension slaves) could regularly turn 
to the market for food and manufactured goods traded in plantation products. 
Consequently, specialised production in the plantation could operate on a 
permanent basis. To draw a contrast with 17th-century Indian cotton, where 
producers would often turn to subsistence production in times of famine 
leading to substantial decreases in cotton output, plantations were receptive and 
responsive to the market as a basis for reproduction and were thus not subject to 
the same limitations.244
 Perhaps most importantly, market competition compelled plantations to 
operate according to distinctly capitalist rules of reproduction.245 The mainte-
nance of the plantation was subject to costs and ‘market stimuli’ that constantly 
demanded renewed and expanding commodity production, where profit maxi-
misation was the cardinal aim.246 As assets of fixed capital, slaves were ‘put to 
work’ in the name of profit, or else sold off to someone who would do so.247 
Consequently, at least ‘nine tenths of American slaves were put to commodity 
production’,248 in which modern techniques of discipline and violence were 
deployed to concentrate and mechanise work, as well as accelerate its intensity. 
Such features meant that the condition of slaves was considerably closer to that 
of the proletarians of England than that of the self-subsisting peasants of feudal 
Europe.249 Moreover, planters often made large investments in slave labour that 
could ‘enhance the productivity of future laborers’, as exemplified by South 
Carolina’s tidal rice plantations.250 Elsewhere slavers introduced labour-saving 
technologies, as in the case of the ginning machine, which in 1794 mechanised 
cotton cleaning.251 
 The intensification of cultivation – its increasing commercialisation, mecha-
nisation and industrialisation – brought with it an intensification of exploitation 
for the slaves who worked the plantations. Notably, slaves working on plan-
tations that were plugged into international networks of trade – for example, 
cotton – were considerably more exploited than those in other sectors.252 
In short, the plantations showed all those features we would expect from a 
capitalist enterprise.253
 What is more, as slave plantations were so thoroughly integrated into the 
world market, the evidence reveals a sharp convergence of average rates of 
profits and standardised methods of procedure, as we would expect from enter-
prises operating on a fully capitalist market.254 These ‘transitional forms of 
social relations’ and ‘the trading links connecting them to Europe would form 
part of a network through which capitalist laws of motion could become opera-
tive on a global scale, once the existing states system was overthrown’.255 Hence, 
against Charles Post’s claim that ‘plantation slavery, even when subordinated 
to a capitalist world-market, cannot be understood as a capitalist form of social 
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labour’,256 the plantations operated according to capitalist laws of motion, even 
if the slaves themselves were not subject to capitalist rules of reproduction. 
This was a ‘combined’ social formation, imbued with entirely novel and distinct 
(amalgamated) social relations and processes of a complexity and richness that 
falls out of any neat modal classification as either capitalist or non-capitalist.
 Such was the curiosity of the plantation as a combined capitalist enterprise that 
operations conducted in the American ‘periphery’ were often far in advance, in 
terms of production techniques and forms of labour organisation, of those found 
in the imperial metropole. These were ‘the most intensely commercialised farms 
in the world’,257 something particularly true of the Brazilian sugar plantations of 
the Portuguese Empire, where:
[t]he merchants who owned the plantations were involved in the process of produc-
tion, from cultivation to processing to ultimate transportation to market, to an 
extent that they were very rarely in the metropolitan centre. And the same process 
would often happen in reverse with planters becoming merchants in their turn. 
Plantations, although often smaller than the average area owned by landowners in 
Europe, occupied labour forces up to ten times as large. These were more akin to 
later factories than to the actual manufacturing as it existed in most of Europe at 
the time in the form of the largely unsupervised putting-out process.258
The plantation combined extensive land use with a labour force that was 
self-subsisting in reproduction but proletarianised in production, operating 
within an international market for the realisation of goods produced. Hence, 
we can indeed speak of the slave plantations in the Americas and West Indies 
as entirely novel ‘combined’ social formations, amalgamating different modes 
of production (Atlantic African slavery and European merchant capitalism) into 
new forms and modalities of development entirely distinct from those found 
previously in Europe, the Americas or Africa. These were, in other words, sui 
generis modes of combined development. And failure to grant explanatory 
‘agency’ to these combined modalities of development born and nurtured in the 
Atlantic furnace is to externalise the intertwined histories of slavery, patriarchy, 
racism, colonial subjugation and exploitation so fundamental to the making of 
capitalist modernity.
New World Slavery and the Rise of Industrial Capitalism
The implications of the plantations for the development of English capitalism, 
and the capitalist mode of production more generally, are wide-ranging and 
striking. If we recall, the limits of England’s domestic agrarian capitalism had 
created a surplus population and a concomitant fall in the overall rate of profit. 
Whether intentional or not, plantation slavery provided an avenue through 
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which an array of countervailing tendencies could: first, put a halt to any 
fall in the rate of profit; and second, facilitate the ‘expanded reproduction’ of 
capitalism through the Industrial Revolution.
 For Marx, there were six countervailing tendencies which could prevent the 
rate of profit from falling: 1) a more intense exploitation of labour; 2) reduc-
tion of wages below their value; 3) cheapening the elements of constant capital; 
4) absorbing surplus populations by developing new lines of production; 
5) foreign trade; and 6) increases in share capital.259 As William Darity notes, ‘in 
the colonial setting, especially with slave labour in place, all of these counter- 
effects except the sixth can be operative’.260 The significance of the plantation 
was not missed by Marx, who observed:
As far as capital invested in the colonies, etc. is concerned, however, the reason why 
this can yield higher rates of profit is that the profit rate is generally higher there on 
account of the lower degree of development, and so too is the exploitation of labour, 
through the use of slaves and coolies, etc. Now there is no reason why the higher rates 
of profit that capital invested in certain branches yields in this way, and brings 
home to its country of origin, should not enter into the equalization of the general 
rate of profit and hence raise this in due proportion, unless monopolies stand in 
the way.261
It is difficult to overstate the importance of this quote, as it demonstrates that, 
at least empirically, Marx understood sociological unevenness, intersocietal 
interactions and hybrid systems of production (combined developments) as 
constitutive of capitalism’s laws of motion.262
 In what follows, we trace the significance of the plantation to two key factors 
of capitalist accumulation – two ‘spheres’ in which the expanded reproduction 
of the Industrial Revolution was manifest. First, we look at the sphere of circu-
lation, and the contributions the plantations made to the rate of profit and to 
foreign trade. Second, we look at how the plantation reordered the composi-
tion of labour and capital in Britain, with a particular focus on the reproduction 
of wage-labour and the real subsumption of labour under capital during the 
Industrial Revolution.
Contributions to the Sphere of Circulation
The peculiar combination of extensive land, capital and slave labour in the 
plantation entailed both a low organic composition of capital (countervailing 
tendency 4) and the means through which increases in absolute and relative 
surplus labour (countervailing tendency 1) were made possible. The very 
modal ‘hybridity’ of the slave plantations ‘made it a powerful engine of prim-
itive accumulation … cheapening the supply of the means of production or 
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reproduction to the metropolitan regions’ (more on the latter below). Hence, 
the rate of surplus extraction and rate of profit on the plantation were 
exceptionally high.263
 In the Jamaican sugar plantations, for example, the rate of return was 
10 per cent or more higher than the prevailing rate of interest in England.264 
On Barbara Solow’s estimates, the year 1770 saw slave profits forming 0.5 per 
cent of Britain’s national income, nearly 8 per cent of total investment and 
39 per cent of commercial and industrial investments, constituting ‘enormous’ 
ratios.265 As Solow puts it, ‘[s]lavery made more profits for investment, a larger 
national income for the Empire, and a pattern of trade which strengthened the 
comparative advantage of the home country in industrial commodities’.266 In 
the late 18th century, income from colonial properties in the Americas was 
equal to approximately 50 per cent of British gross investment.267 Since much 
of this would have been reinvested in British industries, it provided a signifi-
cant input into British industrialisation.268 An indication of the impact of such 
developments was the sharp decline in British interest rates. In the early 1690s, 
the rate of interest in Britain was 12 per cent, declining thereafter to 8 per cent 
after the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694, and then to 3 per cent 
in 1752. Rates on British public debt displayed a steady decline, falling from a 
high of 14 per cent in 1690 to 6 per cent and 7 per cent between 1707 and 1714. 
Rates subsequently remained low, at around 5 per cent up to the 1730s, falling 
to 3 per cent by 1750.269
 These rates indicate that the plantation economy was central to the expan-
sion of foreign trade (countervailing tendency 5). The import of ‘luxury items’ 
from the New World (tobacco, sugar, coffee and so on) provided goods in global 
demand, enabling the colonial powers to engage in a lucrative re-export trade 
with the rest of Europe.270 Access to cheap sources of cotton lowered the cost of 
production in the all-important textile industry, raising the competitiveness of 
British exports. In particular, the transatlantic trades boosted the manufacture 
of cottons checks271 for export either in the form of Indian-piece imitations in 
West Africa or as ‘clothing material for the African slaves in the New World’.272
 According to one estimate, British exports accounted for approximately 
56 per cent of all industrial production between 1700 and 1760, and over 
46 per cent between 1760 and 1800. North America, Latin America and the 
Caribbean were far and away the major markets for these overseas sales.273 
Moreover, it is estimated that this Atlantic trade constituted as much as 55 per 
cent of Great Britain’s ‘gross fixed capital formation investment’.274 By 1772, 
the Americas consumed 37 per cent of English exports, making them a critical 
market for the imperial metropole while allowing the West Indies to concen-
trate exclusively on sugar.275 If we include all the colonies, the proportion of 
British manufacturing exports rose from 14 per cent in 1700 to 55 per cent in 
1773 to 71 per cent in 1855.276 For the 1750–1800 period alone, British trade 
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with the colonies accounted for approximately 15 per cent of national income 
– a ‘colossal figure’.277 Hence, it seems clear that during the critical early stages 
of Britain’s industrialisation, the colonial export markets played a particularly 
crucial role making up for the demand often lacking in the highly protected 
home market – Smith’s ‘vent for surplus’.
 Certainly in the 17th century, cotton textiles were central to the widening 
of Britain’s export markets, saving British industry as a whole from a crisis of 
stagnation. Initial domestic demand was stimulated by the East India Company 
trade in Indian textiles. In 1613, the Company’s first sales amounted to 5,000 
pieces. By 1625 this had increased to 221,500 pieces. In 1681 sales peaked at 
3,445,000 pieces.278 The negative effects Indian imports had on domestic woollen 
manufacturing in turn led to ‘noisy agitation’ among English producers, who 
petitioned for protective legislation. Such constraints subsequently stimulated 
the production of home-made calicoes – using Indian methods – which were 
then sold as East Indian products in the domestic market.279 Again woollen and 
silk producers moved against this market by pressuring Parliament to pass legis-
lation banning the domestic consumption of calicoes. The unintended effect 
was to provide a boost to cotton manufacturing.280 ‘As the expansion reached 
the limits of the protected pre-existing domestic market’, Joseph Inikori writes, 
‘stagnation set in’. Not surprisingly, the means to resolve this crisis of stagnation 
was ‘through the exploitation of export opportunities in the transatlantic slave 
trade from Africa and in the slave-based economy of the Atlantic system’.281
 Indeed, the larger market offered by the Atlantic increased the number of 
firms engaged in textile production. Consequently, Solow and Engerman argue 
that these foreign outlets ‘provided Britain with new markets as old ones were 
drying up’ and that ‘increased demand for British manufacturing exports played 
an important role in the expansion of the British industrial sector’.282 Hence, the 
20 years from 1782 to 1802 have a marked originality, owing to their very high 
growth rate in exports, in which transatlantic commodities and markets played 
a leading role.283 The role of the Atlantic colonies for the British economy was 
particularly important during periods of intense international economic compe-
tition. In the period after 1650, for example, the North American colonies had 
a positive net impact on English demand, ‘thereby opening up an exclusive 
market for English industrial output precisely when intra-European trade was 
depressed and competition intensifying’.284
 In sum, the American colonies and slave plantations generated both the 
markets and needed surpluses that assisted, through reinvestment, in jump-
starting the engine of industrial accumulation. In Britain, the growth of an 
array of sectors – sugar refining, rum production, metallurgical products such 
as guns, chains and iron bars, wool and cotton textiles – benefited from capital 
investments derived from the transatlantic trade. Moreover, the profits from 
such sectors were often realised in this same trade, as all of these goods were 
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transported to Africa, the Americas or both. The development of port cities such 
as Bristol and Liverpool, and centres of manufacture such as Manchester, was a 
direct product of slavery.
 To take an anecdotal but revealing example, the business activities of the 
Hibbert family embodied the transatlantic sociological combination of planta-
tion slavery and capitalism. The Hibberts owned ‘a 3,000-acre sugar plantation 
in Jamaica and sugar commission enterprise in London as well as a cotton cloth 
manufactory in Manchester’.285 The investments derived from dealings such as 
these were, moreover, constitutive of British finance. The bulk of exchange bills 
and company bonds circulating in England ‘originated directly and indirectly 
from the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the trade centred on slave produced 
American products’.286 Many banks and insurance firms grew and reproduced 
themselves on the basis of ownership and/or investment in plantations, and 
their related trades. Most notably, Barclays and Lloyds developed from slave 
trade profits, and subsequently became sources of credit for British industry.287
Contributions to the Sphere of Production
Nonetheless, the significance of the plantation extended far beyond surpluses 
realised in export markets. Specifically, in the sphere of production, the planta-
tion had a twofold impact on the development of industry in Britain. First, the 
production of consumer goods such as sugar, coffee and tobacco on the plantations 
proved crucial to reducing the costs of labour-power (countervailing tendency 
number 1) in Britain. In contrast to Europe, where labour and land costs were 
comparatively prohibitive,288 the cheaper use of slave labour in the ecologically 
‘boundless’ American colonies facilitated increases in productivity. The result was 
reduced prices on these so-called ‘luxury items’, enabling access to and consump-
tion of them on a mass scale. The effect on British workers was significant, since 
sugar provided ‘virtually free calories’289 that had previously been unobtainable 
with their wage via the market. The plantation was thus instrumental in widening 
the scope of market dependence, and reducing the proportion of the working day 
required for British workers to reproduce themselves. Hitherto luxurious items 
such as sugar, coffee and tobacco both metaphorically and literally fuelled the 
British Industrial Revolution, allowing labourers in the factories to work more 
productively over longer periods of time.290
 However, it would be a mistake to read this as a triumph for British workers 
in cahoots with European capitalists at the expense of those toiling on the plan-
tations. For the expanded consumption of the working class brought with it 
the possibility of reconstituting the labour process in Britain by expanding the 
‘unpaid part of the waged working-day’ as well.291 While increases in calorific 
intake meant workers could remain productive for longer, the cheaper cost of 
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the workers’ reproduction meant a concomitant reduction in the value of their 
labour-power. Either by reducing wages or by increasing productivity, capi-
talists could thus siphon off a larger proportion of workers’ labour as profits, 
without affecting the latter’s reproduction. This increase in the rate of exploita-
tion (countervailing tendency 1) was the basic precondition292 on which the 
Industrial Revolution was built, for it enabled a shift from ‘absolute’ to ‘relative’ 
surplus: ‘from a type of exploitation based upon the lengthening of the working 
day… to a regime where higher wages and shorter hours would be compensated 
with an increase in the productivity of work, and the pace of production’.293 In 
other words, a shift in the qualitative nature of the labour process brought about 
a different configuration of how the ‘means of production [were] combined in 
the act of production itself ’.294
 Second, the absorption of labour into industry – and the ‘real subsump-
tion’ of labour as such – was most pronounced in the production of textiles, 
wool295 and later cotton. In 1840, textiles accounted for 75 per cent of indus-
trial employment in England, with cotton textiles accounting for half of this 
total.296 By 1850, British cotton production employed 374,000 people, of whom 
89 per cent worked in factories where production was almost entirely mech-
anised.297 Here too we find the pervasive influence of the plantation economy 
as a key ‘input’. Both the impulse and conditions for mechanisation came from 
the attempt to lower the costs of inputs in the form of labour and raw materials, 
and improve the quality of textiles produced.298 
 On the one hand, British attempts to emulate and outdo the quality of Indian 
textiles explain the long durational process of experimentation with production 
techniques, of which the Industrial Revolution was the ‘final stage’.299 With 
factories came altogether new techniques in exploitation, many of which were 
borrowed directly from American plantations. The increasing complexity and 
scale of machinery necessitated centralised and concentrated sites of produc-
tion, capable of employing thousands in small areas. While labour methods 
were standardised and deskilled, strict regulations were imposed on ‘working 
hours, expected productivity, breaks and conduct’.300 These were all inventions 
of the American plantation.301
 On the other hand, had it not been for the steady stream of cheap raw cotton 
flowing out of the New World (which supplied nearly three-quarters of Britain’s 
imports of raw cotton), the British cotton industry would have never been able 
to play such a central role in Britain’s industrialisation.302 As David Washbrook 
notes, ‘[c]otton was exceptionally well-placed to lead the move towards mech-
anization: but favourably placed precisely because its raw material came from 
abroad’.303 That the British were able to outsource the production of raw cotton 
to the Americas – where the costs of production and labour in particular were 
considerably lower – was central to their industrial take-off in the 18th century. 
Through the institution of the slave plantation in the colonies, capitalists were 
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able to significantly reduce the costs of constant capital in the form of raw mate-
rials (countervailing tendency 3). Without this key input, it is highly unlikely 
British manufactures could have overcome the formidable competition from 
Indian cotton textiles, which even in the mid-18th century still held a leading 
position in world markets.304 The ‘workshop of the world’ was thus built on the 
foundations of plantation slavery.
Conclusion: Colonies, Merchants and 
the Transition to Capitalism
Emphasising the decisive importance of 1492 on the history of European 
capitalism is, in some respects, a return to the previous orthodoxies of Smith, 
Marx, Weber and Braudel. Each in their own way was able to grasp the origins of 
capitalism not as a single moment of inception, but as a ‘value-added’ process of 
increasing systemic consolidation and complexification, unevenly developing in 
time and space; a cascading and multilayered transformation of states and soci-
eties. The uneven and interactive development between the Atlantic and Europe 
promoted further modalities and relations of unevenness in Europe itself. And it 
was New World colonialism and slavery that catapulted capitalism into the global 
industrial system that it subsequently became. As Fernand Braudel put it some 
years ago, ‘Is not America perhaps the true explanation of Europe’s greatness?’305 
As the preceding analysis has shown, the answer is an emphatic ‘yes’.
 Yet to reiterate, this was not simply because of the effects that the American 
‘discoveries’ had on the sphere of circulation (trade and exchange) in Europe, 
as many WST would have it. More importantly, the ‘discoveries’ decisively 
effected changes in the sphere of production, both in the Atlantic colonies 
and in the metropolitan core, which served to recompose the labour process 
in ways posited by capital itself – that is, real subsumption. In this respect, the 
‘arrival of capitalism was not a natural internal process’. Rather, as Irfan Habib 
writes, the:
[s]ubjugation of other economies was crucial to the formation of industrial capital 
within it. In other words, colonialism, in its harshest forms, was not a mere 
attendant process to the rise of capitalism, it was one of its basic, inescapable 
premises.306
In this chapter, we have examined the various practices of subjugation that took 
place across three nodes of the Atlantic. In the Americas, colonialists annihi-
lated indigenous populations, communities, modes of life and production. This 
scorched earth policy was complemented by a legal and ideological apparatus 
that served to legitimise the violence of and rule by Europeans; Eurocentrism 
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and scientific racism were effectively born in the Americas. In Atlantic Africa, 
Europeans tapped into – and subsequently reordered around their interests – a 
slave trade which would serve to populate the ‘virgin lands’ of the Americas with 
a mass of labourers capable of working the incipient plantation economy. The 
combination of African slave labour with the vast expanse of American land 
created – in the plantation – a sociological amalgamation that proved a boon 
to a British ruling class struggling to escape the limits of agrarian capitalism at 
home, and the freedom of labour abroad. In particular, the brutal exploitation 
of slaves on the plantation provided an array of inputs that contributed to the 
Industrial Revolution. It was in this respect that the real subsumption of labour 
under capital in the British factory, and the establishment of ‘free’ wage labour 
in Europe, needed as their fundamental precondition ‘the unqualified slavery of 
the New World as its pedestal’.307
 We thus see how the productive forces – ‘the way in which the different 
means of production are combined in the act of production itself ’ – cannot be 
properly examined from an ontologically singular perspective, pertaining to a 
single enterprise or society. Rather, such combinations transcend single enter-
prises and take place in an integrated way across multiple sectors, each using 
different means of production and labour processes. In turn the differentials 
in the rates and forms of exploitation generated by uneven but combined 
labour processes can serve to facilitate capitalist accumulation in new and 
unprecedented ways. The global combination of an assortment of different 
productive forces between the American plantation and the British factory was a 
remarkable illustration of this.
 Our argument has two major implications for our understanding of the 
origins of capitalism. First, the Eurocentrism of accounts that focus too narrowly 
on the development of ‘capitalism in one country’ will tend to miss how the 
expanded reproduction of capitalism was only made possible through spheres 
of activity that presupposed the Atlantic. Second, insofar as internal processes 
are insufficient for explaining the transition to capitalism in Europe, the agents 
involved in this process cannot be found exclusively within the confines of any 
given domestic system. On the one hand, our understanding of labour, and of 
exploitation under capitalism, requires a more expansive definition than one 
restricted exclusively to wage-labour. To be clear, none of this is to argue that 
capitalism could exist or even survive without wage-labour (see Chapter 2). 
Rather, the point we are making is that capitalism can benefit (and has bene-
fited) enormously from the exploitation of unfree labour in conditions where 
this is possible, desirable or necessary. As this chapter has shown, the formation 
of ‘free’ wage-labour and the real subsumption of labour under capital – that is, 
the ‘maturation’ of capitalism as a mode of production – in Britain was driven 
by and dependent on slave labour in the Americas. This provides, in our view, 
an important corrective to positions that have attempted to marginalise the 
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nonwaged sphere in analyses of capitalism, since it is precisely in this sphere 
that those most made abject and marginalised by capitalism (and concomi-
tantly the labour movement) reside – women and people of colour. We further 
elaborate these points in Chapter 7 and the Conclusion.
 On the other hand, an ‘internationalist’ view of the origins of capitalism 
requires some scrutiny of those agents that were responsible for tying together 
the various nodes of the transatlantic triangular system: merchants. As we have 
seen, merchants involved in transatlantic trade came to control and intervene in 
the production process itself, through various attempts to overcome the limits 
created by declining rates of profits and competition from Indian textiles.308 In 
doing so, merchants effectively transformed themselves into capitalists proper, 
subsuming labour to capital in one form or another. Hence, the self-expansion 
of merchant capital entailed much more than the simplistic formula of ‘buying 
cheap and selling dear’.309 Rather, under particular circumstances, merchants 
could act in ways that altered and eventually transformed the direct produc-
tion process, thereby reconfiguring their relations of production in a capitalist 
direction.310
 This is precisely what took place on the plantations, where merchants were 
singularly responsible for accumulating slave labour that was then put to work 
for exclusively commercial purposes. But this was not limited to the plantation 
alone; as we discuss in Chapter 7, the Dutch VOC also sought to intervene into 
and control production in the Indonesian spice trades as a means to establish a 
monopoly of supply and squeeze out its competitors.311 A similar process can be 
found at work in the British East India Company’s attempts to establish control 
over the textile producers of the northern Coromandel region in India.312 In 
short, merchants could function as ‘agents’ in the transition to capitalism (see 
also Chapters 4 and 7).
 This point regarding the potential for merchants to become capitalists or for 
merchant activities to promote capitalist development is of critical import given 
that one of the most influential schools of Marxist thought on the origins of 
capitalism – Political Marxism – denies any such possible role for merchants. 
In an often-cited passage on the different ‘paths’ to capitalist development in 
Capital, Volume III, Marx wrote:
The transition from the feudal mode of production takes place in two different 
ways. The producer may become a merchant and capitalist, in contrast to the 
agricultural natural economy and the guild-bound handicraft of medieval 
urban industry. This is the really revolutionary way. Alternatively, however, the 
merchant may take direct control of production himself. But however frequently 
this occurs as a historical transition … it cannot bring about the overthrow of the 
old mode of production by itself, but rather preserves and retains it as its own  
precondition.313
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Political Marxists have all too often taken Marx’s last sentence on the supposed 
impossibility of merchants acting as agents of modal transformation and turned 
it into an article of faith, to which the historical record must either conform, be 
deemed irrelevant or simply ignored.314 Yet having outlined these two ‘paths’ 
to capitalist development, Marx goes on to outline a third possible path315 
whereby the ‘merchant becomes an industrialist directly’: ‘The transition can 
thus take three forms’.316 Or, as Marx put it elsewhere, the activities of merchant 
capital who ‘commissions a number of immediate producers, then collects their 
produce and sells it, perhaps making them advances in the form of raw mate-
rials, etc., or even money’ represents the ‘form that provides the soil from which 
modern capitalism has grown and here and there it still forms the transition to 
capitalism proper’.317
 It seems clear then that Marx never ruled out the possibility of merchants or 
merchant activities forming the basis for the subsumption of labour to capital. 
And why should he have, given the long history of merchants intervening in 
the organisation of the immediate production process? Robert Brenner himself 
– the ‘founder’ of Political Marxism – held a very similar view, specifically 
regarding English colonial merchant operations in the Atlantic. In one of his 
earliest articles, published before his famous interventions in the transition 
debate, Brenner wrote:
In marked contrast to the established London trades colonial operations required 
investment in commodity production, not merely in commodity exchange. The 
growth of American commerce depended in the first instance upon plantation 
development, and it was difficult to participate in the former without financial 
involvement in the latter. The nascent plantation economy needed constant injec-
tions of outside capital to get it started and keep it going. Thus, at least in the 
early years of development, merchants interested in trading on a large scale normally 
could not avoid taking some part in the productive process. Merchants might purchase 
and directly operate their own plantations. Otherwise they could enter into part-
nership with colonial planters, supplying them with land, tools and servants and 
marketing the final product …. As the number of participants grew, competition 
became increasingly fierce.318
Such observations regarding merchants becoming directly involved in the sphere 
of production and transforming social relations have been further borne out by 
more recent research.319 When this is tied to the wider discussion in this chapter, 
it is evident that merchant activities could hasten the rise of capitalist relations 
and not simply act as a solvent on extant feudal relations. Thus, the distinction 
between production and circulation, capitalist agriculture and merchant capi-
talism that underpins the whole of Political Marxist thought is, Jairus Banaji 
writes, a ‘false antithesis’.320
 To be clear, we are not arguing, as do some World-Systems Theorists, that 
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merchants trading on markets or even the intensification of trade and market 
transactions automatically translated into a capitalist logic of development. 
Rather, we suggest that the experience of the Atlantic colonies demonstrates 
how merchants could, in some instances, act on the production process itself 
and subsume labour to capital. This should alert us to the importance of histor-
ical specificity when considering the role of merchants. Against ahistorical 
conceptions of merchant agency in both World-Systems Theory321 and Political 
Marxism,322 we suggest that the character of merchant activity is only discern-
ible when tied to the wider multiplicity of determinations of the historical 
conjuncture merchants operate in. It is this transformation within the sphere of 
production, not circulation, that is really decisive.
 As we have seen, the tendency among merchants to take control of and 
reorganise the direct production process was itself intensified by developments 
in the American colonies. While many merchants pursued ‘super-profits’ in 
the American colonies (or Asian trade), others sought to mimic such profitable 
behaviours by seeking out new areas within Europe that were less resistant 
to their controlling power than the traditional guild-bound cities. Hence, the 
‘export of commodity production into the European countryside meant that 
the growth of the merchants’ hegemony over production, which perhaps ended 
in Bengal, Java, and Martinique, began just outside Bristol, Haarlem, and 
Rouen’.323
   There is, however, an even more direct way that the transformations in the 
activities and modalities of production in the merchant colonial plantations 
of the Atlantic radiated back home to the imperial metropole with hugely 
significant effects. Indeed, we can trace the specific ways by which the colonial 
plantations of the ‘periphery’ were in fact generative of precisely those social 
forces in the ‘core’ that would end up making a decisive contribution to consol-
idating England’s capitalist transition. Here we reconnect to Brenner’s work 
detailing the role of the merchant community in the making of the English 
Revolution of 1640–51, which presents ‘the metropolitan face of the hybrid 
economic forms whose development the other side of the Atlantic is traced 
by Blackburn’.324 Brenner delineates two distinct factions of mercantile capital 
in 17th-century England: one dominant faction centred around the City and 
increasingly tied to the East India Company and merchants importing from the 
Levant; and a second faction of ‘new merchants’ predominantly coming from 
outside the City and connected to the rising colonial trades in the Americas. 
While the former faction relied heavily on the Crown for politically protected 
trade routes and monopolies, the latter were much less dependent on the state 
since – given the merchants’ socio-economic backgrounds – they were excluded 
from government-sanctioned charter companies. 
 Unlike company merchants that relied on extra-economic privileges, new 
colonial merchant activities took place independent of politically constituted, 
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state-backed commerce.325 It was this second faction of colonial mercantile capi-
talists – who had begun the process of subsuming labour to capital – that would 
come to play a leading role in supporting Oliver Cromwell and the Independents 
during the Revolution. This was then another instance in which ‘the merchant 
becomes an industrialist directly’.326 The balance of class forces in England was 
thus directly connected to and constituted by socio-economic developments in 
the New World, paving the way for England’s bourgeois revolution. It is this 
wider phenomenon of the bourgeois revolutions that we examine in the next 
chapter.
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c h a p t e r  6
The ‘Classical’ Bourgeois  
Revolutions in the History 
of Uneven and Combined 
Development
Sometimes Providence condemns the world with universal and evident calamities, 
whose causes we cannot know. This seems to be one of the epochs in which every 
nation is turned upside down, leading some great minds to suspect that we are 
approaching the end of the world.
Count-Duke of Olivares, 16431
Introduction
In previous chapters, we charted the changing geopolitical conditions condu-
cive to the emergence of capitalist social relations in Northwestern Europe. In 
doing so, we sought to demonstrate how ostensibly ‘internal’ processes of social 
transformation were rooted in broader intersocietal dynamics; that intrasocietal 
forms of sociality were continually overlain by distinctly intersocietal determi-
nations. In accounting for this persistently ‘overdetermined’ nature of social 
structures by their interactions with one another, we have drawn on the concept 
of uneven and combined development. This chapter extends our analysis to 
an examination of the causal role of ‘the international’ in the making of the 
‘classical’ bourgeois revolutions in Holland, England and France.
 In Martin Wight’s classic Power Politics he estimated that there were ‘256 
years of international revolution to 212 unrevolutionary’ years.2 This was 
written in 1960. Since that time, the world has experienced a near-perpetual 
state of revolution, illustrated by the vast array of popular revolts, guerrilla wars 
and resistance movements emerging time and again over this period. It would 
then seem that the default setting of modern international relations has been 
one of revolution: an epoch perhaps best understood as a series of continuing 
attempts to confront the challenges of social disorder and revolution wrought 
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by the international expansion of capitalist relations. In short, this is an era 
of permanent counter-revolution, out of which the discipline of International 
Relations (IR) itself crystallised.3
 In the modern era, revolutions have been central to the structure and 
dynamics of international affairs. They have always been international events: 
international in origin, ideology, process and effect, supercharging (both 
ideologically and politically) the rhythms and logics of any given geopolitical 
system. The interactively co-constitutive nature of revolutions and interna-
tional relations is well captured by Arno Mayer when he writes of how ‘at every 
point’ in a revolution’s development, ‘international politics impinges on’ its 
course, while the creation and consolidation of revolutionary states ‘best 
dramatizes the centrality of interstate relations and war’ to modern social 
development.4 
 Yet within the discipline of IR, the study of revolutions has remained some-
thing of a secondary subject. Not only have there have been relatively few 
studies theoretically engaging with revolutions and international relations,5 but 
the dominant theoretical frameworks in IR – realism, liberalism and construc-
tivism – have largely bracketed out revolutions from their conceptions of 
international politics. In the extreme case of structural realism, revolutions have 
been altogether excluded from the study of IR, as they remain outside Kenneth 
Waltz’s discretely conceived international system, which abstracts from the 
historical sociological terrain (the so-called ‘domestic’) through which revolu-
tions are formed.6 Hence revolutions remain at the margins of the discipline, 
constituting ‘the great anomaly’ as Fred Halliday put it, as they are continu-
ally viewed as ‘aberrations’ or ‘abnormalities’ to the anarchic dictates of an 
international system conceived as a realm of perennial great power struggles 
over the balance of power.7 Yet if revolutions are in part both international in 
cause and effect, transcending the confines of ‘second’ (domestic) and ‘third 
image’ (geopolitical) conceptions of international relations,8 we require theo-
retical tools capable of capturing the sociological and geopolitical dimensions 
of these Janus-faced events without reducing one dimension into the other. We 
might think that the historical sociological literature on revolutions, which has 
commonly pointed to ‘the international’ as a structural cause of revolutions,9 
would show us the way. Yet here too, ‘the international’ remains ‘powerfully 
acknowledged but analytically unpenetrated’, leading to continual charges of 
‘attaching an essentialized, Realist conception of the international onto historical 
sociology’.10
 What we need then is a theory of sociohistorical development that organi-
cally fuses both sociological (‘internalist’) and geopolitical (‘externalist’) modes 
of explanation into a single unified theoretical apparatus. And it is perhaps 
no surprise that the most attuned scholar of revolutions in disciplinary IR, 
Fred Halliday, came to identify uneven and combined development as one 
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possible theory.11 Nevertheless, in Halliday’s work the concept remained 
something of an afterthought; Halliday never systematically integrated the 
concept into his own theoretical understandings of revolutions, thus never 
realising the potential of uneven and combined development as a unified 
theory of sociohistorical development as an interactive whole. This task was 
left to one of Halliday’s students, Justin Rosenberg, who has sought to rework 
Trotsky’s concept as a historical sociological theory of ‘the international’.12 
For as argued in Chapter 2, what the concept of uneven and combined devel-
opment uniquely provides is a theoretical internalisation of the distinctly 
international determinants of social development. This then renders ‘the inter-
national’ historically and sociologically intelligible, overcoming both realist 
reifications of the international system as an absolutely autonomous (‘supra- 
social’) sphere and the classical sociological tradition’s tendency to falsely 
subsume its distinctive causal dynamics and behavioural patterns to unisocietal 
abstractions.
 It is surprising that given uneven and combined development’s origins as 
a theoretical tool to explain the Russian Revolution13 and its recent revival in 
disciplinary IR, the theory has yet to be deployed in explaining revolutions.14 
This is the aim of this chapter, which seeks to further draw out the theory’s 
implications in explaining three instances of bourgeois revolution: the Dutch, 
English and French. The chapter is developed in four movements. The first 
section reconsiders the concept of ‘bourgeois revolutions’ in terms of the 
effects of revolutions in creating and consolidating territorially demarcated 
sovereign centres of capital accumulation, rather than defining them in terms 
of their primary agents.15 This ‘consequentalist’ interpretation of bourgeois 
revolutions subverts revisionist and Political Marxist critiques of the concept 
while providing a more apposite framework to understand their effects in their 
domestic and international dimensions. The next section turns to examine 
the origins of Dutch capitalism – a highly disputed subject – and the Dutch 
Revolt against the Habsburg Empire, highlighting the critical importance of the 
changing geopolitical conditions throughout the course of the Revolution.
 The third section analyses the English Civil Wars of 1640–51 and Glorious 
Revolution of 1688–89, again paying close attention to the often overlooked 
international origins and effects of the revolutions theoretically captured by the 
notion of uneven and combined development. The final section then moves to 
an analysis of the French Revolution of 1789–1815, arguing, against revisionist 
and Political Marxist accounts, that the revolution was both capitalist and bour-
geois in origin and effect, subsequently transforming the character and dynamics 
of the European international system over the Long 19th Century. The conclu-
sion then teases out the implications of the preceding theoretically informed 
empirical analysis for understanding the relationship between revolutions and 
the modern international system.
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The Concept of Bourgeois Revolution
Reconceptualising Bourgeois Revolutions: 
A Consequentialist Approach
Before providing our analysis of the classical bourgeois revolutions, we must 
first define what we mean by ‘bourgeois revolution’. For many historians and 
social scientists, the concept of ‘bourgeois revolution’ has been shown to be 
empirically and theoretically untenable. This has been a main finding of the 
revisionist historiographies of the French and English revolutions currently 
fashionable in the academy. These were primarily initiated as a critique of the 
orthodox Marxist model of bourgeois revolution emerging during the interwar 
years and after. For the revisionists, the revolutions were not heralded by the 
ascendancy of a distinctly capitalist bourgeois class; during the revolutions, the 
bourgeoisie were not in the lead of the movements and were often found on 
the opposing sides; after the revolutions, the bourgeoisie did not hold power 
and were often further removed from state control; and the revolutions did not 
result in the emergence or consolidation of capitalism.16 More than anything 
else, the idea of the bourgeoisie as the primary agent in the making of the 
revolutions has taken the most sustained beating by revisionist studies.
 While the bourgeoisie did in fact play some role in the classical revolutions, 
as we examine below, this agent-centred conceptualisation of bourgeois revolu-
tions is itself unnecessary, if not unhelpful. Rather than looking at the intentions 
or composition of the agents involved in the making of revolutions, there is a 
veritable tradition of thinking (Marxist and non-Marxist) that conceptualises 
revolutions in terms of their socio-economic and political consequences.17 The 
most significant factor for this ‘consequentialist’ school of thought in classifying 
a revolution as ‘bourgeois’ is whether or not it removed the sociopolitical and 
ideological ‘obstacles’ (notably, the pre-capitalist state) to the development and 
consolidation of capitalism thereby establishing the state as an autonomous 
site of capital accumulation. For ‘[i]f the definition of a bourgeois revolution 
is restricted to the successful installation of a legal and political framework in 
which the free development of capitalist property relations is assured’, Gareth 
Stedman Jones writes, ‘there is then no necessary reason why a “bourgeois revo-
lution” need be the direct work of a bourgeoisie’.18 Bourgeois revolutions are 
therefore best understood ‘not as revolutions consciously made by capitalist 
agents’, but in terms of their developmental outcomes: revolutions that in one 
form or another promote the further development of capitalism. This then shifts 
the definitional content of the concept from the class that makes the revolu-
tion to the effects a revolution has in promoting and/or consolidating a distinctly 
capitalist form of state, which will in turn benefit the capitalist class irrespective 
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of any role it played in the revolution. Bourgeois or capitalist revolutions there-
fore denote a sociopolitical transformation – ‘a change in state power, which is 
the precondition for large scale capital accumulation and the establishment of 
the bourgeoisie as the dominant class’.19
 Whether a revolution was the necessary condition to bring about capitalism 
or whether it worked to facilitate an already existing capitalism20 varied with 
each case, France largely being an example of the former and the United Prov-
inces and England more or less a case of the latter. The focus of the theory 
of bourgeois – or more precisely capitalist – revolution is then not about the 
origins of capitalism as a socio-economic system, but on the elimination of 
the sociopolitical ‘barriers’21 to ‘its continued existence and the overthrow of 
restrictions to its further expansion’.22 Moreover, rather than bourgeois revo-
lutions being seen as a single episode or event, they more often than not 
entailed much broader processes of long-term sociopolitical transformation 
and restructuring, sometimes involving extended wars and foreign conquests. 
While these processes involved ‘episode[s] of convulsive political transforma-
tion, compressed in time and concentrated in target’,23 it would be a mistake to 
identify bourgeois revolutions as solely comprised of such instances. While we 
must be cautious not to overstretch the concept of revolution to cover develop-
mental tendencies more broadly, it does seem that the extended temporalities 
of the Dutch Revolt and subsequent War of Independence (1566–1648), the 
English Civil Wars of 1640–51 and Glorious Revolution of 1688–89, and 
French Revolution of 1787–1815 can, taken in their totalities, all be conceived 
as forms of bourgeois revolution. They were, in their varied ways, part and 
parcel of more general systemic crises taking both national and international 
dimensions.
 Moreover, as will be shown, the evolving conditions of the international 
system, itself transformed by the ensuing revolutions, had a major causal impact 
on the timing, form and trajectory of the revolutions. Indeed, we might say that 
revolutions are almost universally international in origin, dynamic and impact. 
Structural adaptation to geopolitical-military pressures has been a central causal 
component of modern revolutions, and their resulting effects on the nature of 
the international system have been profound. Once capitalism emerged and was 
consolidated in some regions, the international context in which subsequent 
social developments took place was transformed.24 Dramatically intensifying the 
‘coercive comparison’25 of an interactive multiplicity of differentially developing 
societies and its attendant ‘whip of external necessity’, each successive capitalist 
revolution handed down the geosocial conditions from which the next would 
emerge. The bourgeois revolutions were, as Perry Anderson notes, ‘historically 
interrelated, and the sequence of their connexions enters into the definition of 
their differences. Their order was constitutive of their structure’.26
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Reconstructing Consequentialism through 
Uneven and Combined Development
Rather than discounting different instances of revolution which failed to 
correspond to some ideal-type notion of bourgeois revolution, this approach 
opens the possibility for a more historically sensitive perspective, recog-
nising the inherently interconnected, co-constitutive and variegated nature 
of modern revolutions. Nonetheless, a potential problem with contemporary 
consequentialist approaches to bourgeois revolutions has been their tendency 
to emphasise ‘developmental identity’ over ‘developmental difference’.27 In 
other words, in the shift to conceptualising revolutions in terms of their socio- 
systemic effects, some scholars have fallen into a problematic homogenisation 
of nearly all revolutions in the modern epoch as essentially capitalist, as the 
societies came to incorporate elements of capitalism into their social struc-
tures.28 From this perspective, the very different developmental outcomes of 
revolutions in, say, North Vietnam (1945), China (1949), and Cuba (1959) are 
all conceived as establishing different forms of ‘bureaucratic state capitalism’29 
through ‘deflected permanent revolutions’30 – the ‘modern version or func-
tional equivalent’ of bourgeois revolutions.31 While such regimes undoubtedly 
assimilated features of capitalism over time, to conceive of these revolutions as 
‘bourgeois’ is to stretch the concept beyond breaking point.
 In providing a more satisfactory, historically attuned consequentialist 
approach, it is therefore necessary to root this approach in a more robust 
conception of uneven and combined development which sensitises analyses to 
the interactively generated qualitative differences between revolutions in the 
modern epoch.32 For ‘unevenness’ incorporates developmental variations both 
within and between societies, and the attendant spatial differentiations between 
them; while ‘combination’ denotes the manifold ways in which the internal rela-
tions of societies are determined by their interactive relations with one another, 
producing sociological amalgamations that meld the ‘native’ and ‘foreign’, 
‘backward’ and ‘advanced’, within their social structures (see Chapter 2). From 
this perspective, we would expect the consequences of a revolution to combine 
systemic characteristics of different modes of production, countering their 
subsumption under any single modal classification, whether this is ‘bureaucratic 
state capitalism’, ‘state socialism’, ‘bureaucratic collectivism’ or whatever.33
 Tying a ‘consequentalist’ approach to the theory of uneven and combined 
development solves not only the difficulties of revisionist interpretations of 
bourgeois revolutions, but also the problematic relationship between IR and 
revolutions more generally. It does so, in particular, by specifying the distinctive 
causal dynamics and behavioural patterns of the international system affecting 
capitalist revolutions, while also capturing their different participating agents, 
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methods and outcomes. This helps explain the qualitative differences between 
revolutions as they co-constitutively interconnect in time and space. Since their 
sequentiality was constitutive of their structures, historical repetition – and thus 
the utility of ‘ideal-types’ – is eliminated. This then provides a theoretical expla-
nation of why each capitalist revolution was a ‘bastard birth’ – an exception that 
proved the rule.34 It further explains the dissonance between agents’ intentions 
and their effects; in other words, how the consequences of a given revolution 
can turn out to be capitalist – or some combination thereof establishing the 
conditions under which capitalism becomes the dominant mode of produc-
tion – irrespective of the agents’ original intentions, as the systemic pressures 
and imperatives of ‘the international’ weigh on the outcomes.35 From such a 
perspective we would expect each revolution to diverge (in character, form and 
agents involved) from previous revolutions: the sole criterion to judge whether 
they can be considered capitalist is whether they (re)constructed the state as a 
sovereign territorial site of capital accumulation.
The Origins of Capitalism and the Bourgeois  
Revolution in the Low Countries
The Rise of Dutch Capitalism: An International Perspective
Although it is generally recognised that capitalism had become the dominant 
mode of production in England by the time of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 
1688 (or at least shortly thereafter), the development of capitalism in the Low 
Countries – what would later become the United Provinces – is a more conten-
tious case. Some Marxists have been sceptical of the capitalist credentials of the 
United Provinces in the early modern period. Eric Hobsbawm described the 
Dutch Republic of the 17th century as a ‘“feudal business” economy; a Florence, 
Antwerp or Augsburg on a semi-national scale’.36 Similarly, for Ellen Meiksins 
Wood, the Dutch Republic of the Golden Age was the ‘last and most highly devel-
oped non-capitalist commercial society’.37 While recognising the ‘unprecedented 
degree of commercialization’ of the Dutch economy, and the ‘penetration of trade 
relations into both urban and rural economies’, Wood claims the Dutch Republic 
‘still operated on familiar non-capitalist principles, above all in its dependence 
on extra-economic powers of appropriation’. And although the ‘Dutch pioneered 
many improvements in labour productivity, not least in agriculture, it is not at all 
clear that they were driven by the kinds of competitive pressures associated with 
capitalism’.38 Yet these claims rest on rather spurious grounds.
 In the first place, to compare the Dutch Republic to the Italian city-states 
of the 13th century, as does Hobsbawm, is to seriously underestimate the 
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unprecedented scope and scale of the Dutch commercial empire. For ‘[e]xcept 
for Britain after around 1780’, Jonathan Israel notes, ‘no one power in history 
achieved so great a preponderance of over the processes of world trade as did 
the Dutch’. This was a ‘fully fledged world entrepot’ that not only interconnected 
the markets of all the continents, but dominated them, concentrating economic 
power to a degree found ‘never before – or perhaps since’.39 Not only had the 
Dutch merchant classes tapped into the lucrative trading markets of the Atlantic, 
Mediterranean and Baltics by the mid-17th century, they had also through the 
Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC) largely 
succeeded in displacing Portuguese merchants in the Indian Ocean (see further 
Chapter 7). Dutch primacy in world trade depended, above all, on both this 
‘East–West’ axis of international trade – the ‘rich trades’ of commodities and 
luxuries imported from the Spanish Americas, Levant and East Asia40 – and a 
‘North–South’ commercial axis stretching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean 
– consisting primarily of European bulk carrying.41 Here again we encounter 
the importance of American silver, as it was the principal means by which 
Dutch merchants effected purchases and bought supplies in Asia.
 This was a commercial empire of a magnitude hitherto unknown in human 
history. One factor that made this achievement possible was the dynamism 
of the capitalist social relations that had emerged over the course of the late 
Medieval and early modern eras in the Northern Netherlands. ‘The main asset 
of the upstart republic’, Ronald Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke write, ‘was its 
economic system, certainly the most productive and efficient in Europe at the 
time’.42 For Robert Brenner, the initial catalyst for this capitalist breakthrough 
was an ecologically driven process of ‘primitive accumulation’ in which the 
peasants were pushed off inutile arable lands (those rendered uncultivable), 
divorcing them from their means of subsistence and making them market- 
dependent.43 But rather than effecting depopulation of the countryside as had 
occurred elsewhere in Europe, Dutch peasants took a different course: commer-
cialised farming. One of the preconditions for this shift towards commercial 
farming was the possibility of importing basic foodstuffs. The emergence of 
commercialised agriculture in the Northern Netherlands was directly connected 
to the growth of trade with other grain-producing regions of Europe – notably, 
from the mid-15th century onwards, the Baltics. The various towns of medieval 
Holland thereby acted as key ‘nodal points’ linking the developing capitalist 
agrarian economy ‘to those inter-regional networks of trade’.44
 In this respect, international relations – through foreign trade – played a 
decisive role in the rise of Dutch capitalism, although the geopolitics of the age 
would also play their part. In particular, the favourable ‘systemic circumstances’, 
as Giovanni Arrighi calls them, established by the particular configuration of 
the European market at the time were critical to the success of the capitalist 
relations that took hold throughout the Low Countries by the early modern 
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period. Such systemic conditions were, in the first instance, the interactive 
‘effect of the actions of a multiplicity of agencies’.45 For the Dutch, Arrighi 
writes, ‘these systemic circumstances consisted of a fundamental temporal and 
spatial disequilibrium between the demand for, and the supply of, grain and 
naval stores in the European world-economy at large’. For throughout most of 
the 16th century and up until the mid-17th century, demand was ‘large and 
growing rapidly’, particularly in Western Europe, due to the inflow of American 
silver and the intensification of geopolitical conflicts among the states of the 
Atlantic seaboard.46
 Supplies of grain were, however, soon limited by the precipitous rise in 
demand and concomitant exhaustion of Mediterranean provisions. Conse-
quently, supplies came to be concentrated in the Baltic region. These conditions 
provided the Dutch merchant community with the opportunity, assisted in 
part by the earlier decline of the Hanseatic League, to dominate the European 
market. ‘By stepping in and establishing tight control over the transfer of Baltic 
supplies through the Sound’, the Netherlands came to occupy what over the 
course of the 16th century ‘turned into the most strategic market niche of 
the European world-economy’. In turn, they ‘became the beneficiaries of a 
large and steady stream of money surpluses which they further augmented by 
imposing an inverted fiscal squeeze on Imperial Spain’47 through their war of 
independence (examined below).
 What is particularly important to note here is how the Netherlands’ growing 
trade relations, both before and after their emergence as a dominant world 
economic player, interacted with burgeoning capitalist production relations 
in the countryside. Since as early as the 11th century, the Low Countries had 
functioned as a central nodal point of European trade.48 Vital to the precocious 
development of capitalist social relations there was a particular form of ‘urban-
agrarian symbiosis’.49 Indeed, the role of intra-European and colonial trade in 
the making of Dutch capitalism has been stressed by most scholars in their 
explanations of the high levels of economic growth and technological advances 
that set the Dutch economy apart from the rest of Europe during the early 
modern period.50 The ‘importance of European and colonial trade’ in the devel-
opment of the Dutch economy of the period, Jan Lucassen writes, ‘could hardly 
be overstated’.51 From the earliest stages, then, the development and reproduc-
tion of Dutch capitalism was inextricably bound to international conditions and 
developments (see further Chapter 7).
 Urban industries emerging in Holland and connected to the European-based 
feudal world market were, moreover, intimately tied to rural development for 
supplies of raw materials and labour. Much of this agrarian production was 
oriented around town markets, which acted not only as centres of distribution 
and consumption but also increasingly as independent centres of production.52 
As early as 1500, Peter Hoppenbrouwers notes, ‘the majority of the rural popu-
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lation combined small-scale agriculture with various forms of commercially 
oriented by-employment linked to urban demand’.53 Given the high density 
of urban centres throughout Holland, it was very difficult for any individual 
town to exert political control over the countryside, as it would provoke reac-
tions from other towns.54 This had the effect of enabling pockets of agrarian 
production, uninhibited by the political domination of any single urban centre, 
to further develop, expand and consolidate in increasingly capitalist directions.
 Powerless to control the countryside politically, the bourgeoisie sought to 
extend their reach by economic means. This led to forms of ‘proto-industrial’ 
development, in which urban merchant entrepreneurs invested directly in rural 
industries as peasant production became increasingly geared toward the world 
market.55 Consequently, urban merchants obtained control over the means of 
peasant production at a relatively early stage, aided by the accessibility of the 
capital market and low cost of credit.56 This then ‘set the stage for full prole-
tarianisation once these merchant-entrepreneurs started to move large swathes 
of the production process to the cities. It is this particular urban-agrarian 
symbiosis that set the stage for the transition to capitalism in Holland’.57
 By the middle of the 16th century, almost half of all rural labour in central 
Holland was waged. In the Guelders river area, as much as 60 per cent of work 
was performed by wage-labourers – a proportion reached in most industrialised 
areas of Europe only in the 19th century. As a whole, probably more than a 
third of all labour in the Low Countries during this time was undertaken for 
wages. This was a high proportion compared with estimates from other parts of 
Northwestern Europe, England included.58 In short, by the mid-16th century, 
more or less market-dependent forms of wage-labour had become a structural 
feature, albeit a geographically uneven one, of the Dutch economy.
 Moreover, as Bas van Bavel notes, as early as the 13th century the Low Coun-
tries, particularly in their northwestern regions, saw the early commodification 
of land, with ‘[o]pen, flexible, competitive, and secure land and lease markets’. 
These existed alongside other key preconditions for capitalist social relations 
such as ‘buoyant trade, flourishing markets, a money economy, and booming 
cities’. These were again all more or less established in the 13th century; that 
is, some three centuries before England would experience its capitalist break-
through.59 To be clear, these were ‘key indicators’ for a later transition to 
capitalism, as social relations in the Low Countries at that time were not capi-
talist, nor were these features characteristic of the development of the Low 
Countries as a whole.60 Nonetheless, such developments did provide the crucial 
‘preparatory conditions’ for capitalism’s subsequent emergence there (see also 
Chapter 7). As all of this evidence indicates, claims that the Low Countries was 
merely a ‘highly commercialized feudal’ society seem very difficult to sustain.
  The dynamism of the Dutch economy of the early modern period was 
perhaps its most distinguishing feature. In the early 16th century, agricultural 
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labour productivity in the Low Countries was by far the highest in Europe, with 
some 175 mouths fed by 100 people working in agriculture, compared with 
from 100 (Poland) to 135 (England, France, Italy) in other parts of Europe.61 
Between 1510 and 1795 the total population of the Netherlands doubled, while 
between 1510 and 1810 agricultural productivity tripled,62 with the great bulk 
of this increase occurring before the mid-17th century.63 It seems wise to concur 
with Robert Brenner’s conclusion that:
the Dutch economy as it emerged in the early modern period thus appears to have 
been quite fully capitalist. It was unburdened by systems of ruling class extraction 
by extra-economic compulsion … its producers, notably agricultural producers, 
were entirely dependent on the market and subject to competition in produc-
tion to survive .… [h]igh levels of investment obtained, which issued in rising 
capital:labour ratios, rapid productivity growth and, ultimately, high wages and 
income per person more generally.64
Therefore, even in Brenner’s restrictive view of capitalism as market depen-
dence, the Low Countries are conceived as having been set on a capitalist path 
of development by the early to mid-16th century, even if capitalist development 
there remained ‘limited’ and constricted until 1580, only after which accumu-
lation fully took hold (see Chapter 7).65 Much like the English case (see below), 
capitalist development was pronounced – if still ‘incomplete’ and restricted – in 
the Low Countries preceding the revolutionary settlement which would estab-
lish the sociopolitical conditions for its fuller development and consolidation.
 What are crucially missing in Brenner’s account, however, are the distinctly 
international conditions that facilitated the development and systemic consol-
idation of capitalism in the Low Countries. For it was only through the 
geopolitical and military struggles raging across Europe that provided the 
systemically enabling geopolitical space from which the Dutch Revolt emerged, 
and emerged successfully. Moreover, the economic consequences of these rival-
ries acted to displace the hitherto dominant Genoese high finance that the 
Dutch came to supplant. As Arrighi writes, ‘[t]he withering away of Genoese 
dominance in European high finance, the progressive erosion of the power of 
Imperial Spain’, to which the Genoese financiers were inseparably linked, ‘and 
the break-up of the Genoese–Iberian alliance cannot be understood except in 
the context of the escalating competitive power struggles that made the fortunes 
of Dutch capitalism’.66 This international environment was also crucial to the 
‘combined’ character of Dutch capitalist development, as the Dutch came to 
fuse earlier forms and methods of protocapitalist organisations and institutions 
pioneered by the Genoese (the stock market) and Venetians (such as monopo-
lies and the institutional antecedents that came to form the basis of the Dutch’s 
greatest innovative synthesis, the VOC). They also combined Venetians and 
anievas maintext.indd   184 18/05/2015   12:18:56
185
the ‘classical’  bourgeois  revolutions
Genoese merchant capitalists’ different strategies of capital accumulation: the 
former characterised by regional consolidation based on self-sufficiency in state 
and war-making: the latter by worldwide expansion based on a relationship of 
political exchange with foreign governments.67 All were integral elements to the 
emergence of the Dutch state as the dominant world economic power over the 
late 16th and 17th centuries.
The Making of the Dutch Revolt
The 16th century of absolutist state building was a period riven by interdynastic 
conflict and war. During the century, there were only 25 years without large-scale 
military operations in Europe. As noted in previous chapters, armed conflict 
was intrinsic to the feudal mode of production. For in the absence of the kind 
of economic dynamism afforded by capitalist social relations, ‘war was possibly 
the most rational and rapid single mode of expansion of surplus extraction 
available for any given ruling class under feudalism’.68 This was because feudal 
productive relations gave little incentive for either the peasant or lord to system-
atically introduce labour-saving technologies.69 Rather, lordly interests lay in 
extracting more surpluses by coercive means. This could be done by pushing 
the peasants to the limit of their subsistence or by seizing the demesnes of 
other lords. The latter course resulted in a process of geopolitical accumulation 
amongst the lords themselves – a war-driven process of state formation.70 The 
lords left standing at the end of this process formed the basis of the absolutist 
state. Representing a ‘redeployed and recharged apparatus of feudal domination’,71 
the absolutist state system of early modern European remained driven by the 
systemic imperatives of geopolitical accumulation. This came to interact – and 
in some cases fuse – with the emerging logic of competitive capital accumula-
tion accompanying those states already making the transition to capitalism, and 
this in part explains the endemic state of war marking the epoch.72
 What made this era of permanent war so intense was the generalised crisis of 
feudal production relations besetting Europe. The persistence of armed conflict 
throughout the period was not just a result of the normal structural dynamics 
of the feudal mode – the tendency to geopolitical accumulation – but rather 
because the process of ruling class reproduction was itself in crisis and under 
threat. By this time, the feudal system had virtually exhausted all possibili-
ties for further internal expansion (within Europe). This in turn precipitated a 
sharp fall in seigniorial revenues, which was itself further exacerbated by the 
plague-induced demographic crisis, leading to a dramatic rise in peasant revolts 
and class struggles more generally (see Chapter 3).73 This perilous situation 
was further exacerbated and ‘overdetermined’ by the persistent geopolitical 
threat from the Ottoman Empire (see Chapter 4). Under such conditions, a 
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near-continuous state of war – including both intra-ruling class struggles and 
the incessant efforts to crush peasant rebellions – was a sociological ‘necessity’.
 The uneven and combined development of feudal-absolutist Europe was thus 
rooted in this territorially expansionist dynamic of geopolitical accumulation 
which, more often than not, found its ideological articulation through religious 
conflicts. Not surprisingly, then, the Dutch Revolt was forged in the crucible 
of interstate competition and war infused with deeply religious overtones, for 
overlaying this epoch of war was the religious conflict between Reformation 
and Counter-Reformation states, ‘which never initiated but frequently inten-
sified and exacerbated geopolitical rivalries and provided their contemporary 
ideological idiom’.74
 That religion would play such an omnipresent role in the geopolitics of 
the era is explicable by the structural specificities of pre-capitalist modes of 
production which, unlike capitalism, operated through extra-economic sanctions 
buttressed by the ideopolitical power of religion. In feudal-absolutist Europe, 
religion constituted a fundamental foundation of political authority and its 
legitimation. ‘Political legitimacy’, Michael Braddick notes, ‘was claimed to rest 
in part on the defense of the true religion’.75
 As the Catholic Church provided the key ideological underpinning of 
the feudal system, any attack on the system was necessarily directed against 
the Church. Since the official Roman Catholic Church was ‘part and parcel 
of existing society’, Ivo Schöffer writes, and was ‘one of the intermediaries 
between authority and common man its clergy were blamed for anything which 
went wrong. Poverty, unemployment, inflation, taxes, corruption, all seemed 
to have to do … with clergy and church’.76 The Reformation thus constituted 
the key ideological context for the emerging Dutch opposition movements of 
the 1560s. Dutch politics and society were particularly receptive to the inter-
national diffusion of Reformation ideologies, given ‘[t]he relative openness of 
Dutch society, its urbanisation and its strategic position at a nodal point in the 
European exchange of both material goods and ideas’.77 The Dutch Revolt of 
1566 was then part and parcel of a broader international religious-political 
movement sweeping across Europe.78 It was, moreover, decisively interna-
tional in origin and impact. Indeed, many historians have viewed the Dutch 
Revolt as an early example of a national independence struggle against Spanish 
oppression.79 Cardinal Granvelle wrote, for example, that:
people here universally display discontent with any and all Spaniards in these 
provinces. It would seem that this derives from the suspicion that one might wish 
to subject them to Spain and reduce them to the same state as the Italian provinces 
under the Spanish crown.80
While irreducible to purely socio-economic considerations, the (geo)politics 
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of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation did find an ‘elective affinity’ 
with the emerging struggle between capitalist and feudal social forces. For 
the Reformation flourished in regions where feudalism was weakest, whereas 
the ruling classes in the more advanced areas already dominated the Catholic 
world, and therefore had no need to escape from its control.81 The flowering 
of religious diversity in early modern Europe and its attendant (geo)political 
consequences were thus embedded in a further axis of socio-economic and polit-
ical unevenness, pitting nascent bourgeois orders against the bastions of feudal 
reaction.
 The divergent paths of socio-economic development between feudal Spain 
and an incipiently capitalist Netherlands were therefore a structural precon-
dition for the outbreak of the Dutch Revolt. It was no coincidence that the 
Reformation found its great support in the highly urbanised and less feudal 
western Netherlands, where it played a disproportionately important role in 
the outbreak and subsequent course of the Revolt.82 Here, among other urban-
ised areas, a long-term process of ‘cultural emancipation’ of the rising urban 
middle class took place, in which they began to challenge traditional religious 
practices. This urban middle class came to play a crucial role in the Revolt.83 
Although the Habsburgs’ absorption and unification of the Netherlands was a 
relatively ‘smooth’ transition up to the 1540s, in part due to the ‘absence of the 
pressures associated with waging war’, the reignition of the Habsburg–Valois–
Ottoman wars for hegemony on the European continent in 1551 was critical in 
intensifying Dutch discontent over Habsburg rule.84
 The immediate context for the Dutch Revolt against the Habsburg Empire85 
beginning in 1566 was occasioned by the fiscal-military pressures arising from 
the Habsburgs’ protracted struggle against the Franco-Ottoman alliance.86 Until 
that time, the Habsburg–Valois rivalry for hegemony in Europe had focused 
primarily on the Italian peninsula. By the late 1530s, however, France had been 
effectively shut out of Italy. Seeking to widen the conflict, the king of France, 
François I, shifted the military theatre to the Netherlands frontier, forcing 
Charles V of Spain to follow suit. Consequently, the provinces of the Nether-
lands were subjected to sharply escalating demands for funds, men and supplies 
from the regime in Brussels, leading to ‘an unhealthy financial, logistical, and 
strategic dependence of the Habsburg Crown on its Netherlands provinces’.87 
The prolongation of the conflict with France and the Ottomans became a major 
drain on Dutch finances and a source of great resentment against the Habsburgs. 
As Israel notes:
the [Habsburg] Emperor was routinely using the Netherlands as his chief strategic 
bulwark and resource, in pursuit of goals which were vital to him but had little to 
do with the Netherlands …. With the funded debt overstretched, an unsecured 
deficit accumulated which, by 1557, had reached seven times the level of 1544.88
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The high levels of taxation and centralising policies imposed on the Nether-
lands by the Habsburgs were a major source of grievance among the local elites. 
Another significant issue in the Revolt involved the contrasting conceptions of 
state sovereignty represented by the Catholic absolutist state-building project 
of Philip II, on the one hand, and the more ‘communal, federal and consti-
tutional state’ held by the Dutch oppositionists, on the other.89 In these ways, 
the spatiotemporal unevenness of European development, refracted through 
its conjunctural geosocial consequences, constituted a key factor in the origins 
of the Dutch Revolt. For the war-induced escalation in fiscal pressures on the 
Netherlands had the effect of aggravating deep-seated resentments over the way 
the Spanish Crown had sought to integrate newly obtained provinces into the 
rest of the Habsburg Netherlands, and the powers the central government had 
arrogated to itself.
 The eventual result of all this was the emergence of open rebellion among 
the Dutch population, beginning in April 1566 when 200 members of the lesser 
nobility marched through Brussels to implore the governess, Margaret of Parma, 
to moderate the strict anti-heresy laws. Forming the opening act of the revolt, a 
wave of iconoclasm, known in Dutch as the Beeldenstorm, spread throughout the 
Southern Netherlands. There were spontaneous actions among the poor and 
‘middling sort’ who made up a core constituent of the revolutionaries.90
  Initially the Dutch nobility subdued the revolt, ensuring its suppression six 
months before the arrival of the Duke of Alva, who headed a Spanish-backed 
army of 10,000 to punish the Low Countries. Yet Alva’s reign of terror did not 
spare the Dutch higher nobility. In the midst of Alva’s intensified repression 
and religious persecution of all sections of Dutch society, some of the Dutch 
nobility came to join in open rebellion against Spanish rule. This phase was 
exemplified by William of Orange’s unsuccessful military campaign to defeat 
Alva in 1568.91 A second phase of the revolt was then sparked in April 1572 
when ‘Sea Beggars’, driven from their English base by Queen Elizabeth I, 
captured the small sea-port town of Brill, setting off a series of uprisings which 
spread to urban centres in Holland and Zeeland. Over the course of the revolt, 
many more towns experienced urban uprisings in a complex, uneven pattern of 
religious radicalisation, military struggle and social clashes within the revolu-
tionary camp. This opened a more militarily intensive phase of the revolt, which 
took the form of a land war in the Dutch provinces, and later in the 1590s a sea 
war which took place outside of Europe and was fought largely in the colonies.92
 The survival of the northern Dutch provinces during this period was in part 
dependent on the favourable geopolitical conditions produced by Philip II’s 
decision to redirect military resources to campaigns against the English and 
French, along with the Spanish monarchy’s continual preoccupation with the 
Ottoman challenge in the Mediterranean.93 At a number of crucial points in the 
Spanish campaign against the Dutch, Philip II prioritised the Mediterranean 
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struggle against the Ottomans, to the detriment of Spanish operations in the 
Netherlands. In 1572, in the midst of the steady progress of the Dutch rebels in 
the north, Alva pleaded with Philip to alter these strategic priorities:
Everything spent on the League [against the Ottomans] is wasted …. I beat my 
head against the wall when I hear talk about what we are spending here, since it 
is not the Turks who are disturbing Christendom but the heretics, and they are 
already within the gates.94
Despite Alva’s imploring, Philip refused to change course, and instead continued 
to pour resources into the Mediterranean theatre.
 In the end, the Spanish efforts to divert personnel and resources to other 
military theatres were critical to the success of the Dutch Revolt.95 As Immanuel 
Wallerstein puts it, ‘because after 1559, Spain, France, and England balanced 
each other off, the Netherlanders had the social space to assert their identity 
and throw off the Spanish yoke’.96 In this sense, the military balance of power 
in Europe contributed to tipping the balance of class forces struggling in the 
Netherlands in favour of the Dutch revolutionaries. This was further borne out 
by the French Wars of Religion which also had a crucial impact on the course of 
the Dutch Revolt, especially in 1568 and 1572–73, when the Dutch were able 
to draw on significant military support from the French Huguenots.97 With the 
conclusion of peace in the summer of 1573 in France, the Comte de Montgomery 
sent a contingent of Huguenots and English troops to the Netherlands to aid the 
‘sorely pressed’ William of Orange. In August, a multinational force of ‘English, 
Scottish, French, and Flemish’ companies stormed St Geertruidenberg, defeating 
the Spanish and making it the first city captured by the rebels. This multinational 
force then went on to successfully defend Leiden against the Spanish siege of 
1573–74 – ‘a decisive moment in the history of the Dutch Revolt’.98
 In short, the geopolitical context of the revolt was of primary importance to 
both its origins and outcome, as the specific configuration of geopolitical rela-
tions of the conjuncture was central to its victory. In turn, the Revolt causally 
fed back into these geopolitical dynamics, recombining with and reconstituting 
them in the process. For significantly, the revolt acted as a continual drain on 
Spanish resources, routing the Habsburg drive to hegemony on the European 
continent, thereby precipitating Spain’s decline as a great power. ‘As the imperial 
center weakened, wars and rebellions proliferated until the Peace of Westphalia 
institutionalized the emerging European balance of power’.99
 Lasting nearly 80 years, the conflict only ended with the signing of the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which recognised the sovereignty of the seven 
northern provinces that came to form the Dutch Republic. By that time, the 
Dutch Republic was firmly dominated by the bourgeoisie, in the form of a 
merchant oligarchy, establishing the sociopolitical conditions favourable to the 
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optimisation of capitalist development. Although the indigenous bourgeoisie 
played very little role in leading the Revolt, the effects of the Revolution make it 
an early example of a ‘bourgeois revolution’ laying the sociopolitical conditions 
for the dominance of the capitalist mode of production.100
The English Revolution in the History of 
Uneven and Combined Development
The origins of the English Revolution, whether it is taken as comprising the English 
Civil Wars of 1640–51 or the entire period from 1640 to 1688, have produced an 
enormously rich and varied body of literature. Yet with few exceptions101 ‘virtually 
the whole of this literature’ has been, as Halliday notes, ‘written as if England was 
not just an island, but was a closed entity, separate from the political, economic 
and intellectual world of the rest of Europe’.102 However, the international struc-
ture and context of which England formed a part played a critical role in the causal 
and imaginative coordinates of its revolutionary experience.
 That the events of the English Revolution took place in an era of ‘general 
crisis’ riven by upheavals, rebellions and wars raging across Europe and beyond 
has scarcely been taken into account when explaining its main causal sources. 
Yet this international context of English events was hardly lost on contem-
poraries.103 In 1649, Robert Mentet de Salmonet, a Scottish exile living in 
France, prefaced his account of the English Revolution by noting that Europe 
was proceeding through an ‘Iron Age’ marked by a ‘Desolation of Countries 
commonly attending War’, an era ‘famous for the great and strange revolutions 
that have happen’d in it’ with ‘revolts … frequent both in East and West’.104 
Similarly, in January 1643 shortly after the English Civil War had broken out, 
a protestant preacher, Jeremiah Whitaker, warned the House of Commons, 
‘These days are a days of shaking … and this shaking is universal: the Palatinate, 
Bohemia, Germany, Catalonia, Portugal, Ireland, England’.105
 The crisis that beset the English state was thus European – if not global – in 
nature and scope. The socio-economic, ideological and political roots of both 
the long-term (structural) and immediate (conjunctural) causes of the English-
cum-British Revolution, through all its phases (1640–42, 1688 and 1745), were 
decisively international. How are we to understand the interaction of interna-
tional and domestic conditions leading to the English Revolution?
Rediscovering the English Revolution
The notion that the domestic situation of the Stuart monarchy was reasonably 
stable – a key tenet of revisionist historiography106 – seems gravely misplaced, 
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particularly when we take into account the broader European maelstrom of 
the era, from which the English were hardly immune. Furthermore, over the 
16th and 17th centuries, English society underwent rapid socio-economic and 
demographic change, leading to a prolonged period of economic instability and 
heightened social tensions. Surveying the state of the English agrarian economy 
of the 16th and 17th centuries, Peter Bowden concludes that the 1620s to 1640s 
were times of ‘extreme hardship in England … probably the most terrible years 
through which the country has ever passed’.107 This was a period marked by 
intense social unrest and class conflict (a persistent ‘crisis of order’, as David 
Underwood has described the years between 1560 and 1640108), escalating to 
the point where ‘contemporaries were conscious of a threat of popular revolt at 
least from the depression of the ’twenties onwards’.109
 The immediate events leading to the English Civil War (1640–51) are well 
known. In 1640, under the military pressure of an advancing Scottish force, 
King Charles I convened Parliament for the first time since its disbandment 11 
years earlier. For much of his reign, Charles had been attempting to strengthen 
obedience to the Crown by building up a monarchical absolutism styled on the 
Catholic monarchies of the continent, with comparable Counter-Reformation 
policies. This was seen as an imperative given the military ineffectuality and 
weaknesses of the Stuart monarchy displayed in the wars of the 1620s (the 
Anglo-Spanish war of 1625–30 and the Anglo-French war of 1627–29), which 
imperilled the domestic legitimacy of the Stuart state. Through these wars, the 
fierce political and religious conflicts engulfing the European continent were 
incorporated into the domestic political structures of England. ‘The polarization 
of English politics by 1629–30’, J. L. Reeves notes, ‘can be seen as one aspect of 
the polarization of international politics under the pressure of war’.110
 It had become increasingly clear that on a geopolitical scale, the Stuart 
state was no match for its Catholic absolutist rivals on the continent. It was in 
this sense that England’s ‘failure in war in Europe established the context for 
rebellion and civil war at home’.111 The historical unevenness of state-building 
in Europe, effecting a particular ‘whip of external necessity’, and its military 
consequences were therefore crucial to the outbreak of the English Civil Wars. 
Far from having ‘no influence on the English social revolution and relatively 
little influence on the English political revolution’,112 international military 
pressures were decisive in the making of the English Revolution. The Thirty 
Years’ War was itself rooted in the unevenness of social development on the 
European continent: an ‘example of two civilizations in ideological conflict’113 
in which the ‘political fronts and coalitions of power’ in the war reflected deep 
developmental differences among the states involved.114
 Generally speaking, the war pitted the least developed (in feudal terms) 
areas of Europe, which had nonetheless begun to make the first strides towards 
capitalism – particularly the Netherlands, England and Bohemia – against the 
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regions where feudalism was most entrenched – notably the Spanish and Holy 
Roman empires.115 In this sense, the ‘general crisis’ of 17th-century Europe 
was rooted in the protracted transition from a feudal to capitalist economy. 
The ‘system-wide attempts at geopolitical accumulation in the form of the 
Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years’ War’ were rooted in the intensified but 
differentiated class conflicts over the distribution of income.117
 With the exception of the struggle between the Netherlands and the Spanish 
Habsburgs, this was not a simple case of an aspiring bourgeoisie rising up 
against the feudal aristocracy, as internal divisions within the bourgeoisie 
could be found throughout the German lands.118 Yet it was also no coincidence 
that the war was triggered by a revolt in the economically dynamic Bohemia 
region against the German Hapsburgs. Sixteenth-century Bohemia was the site 
of rapid economic development, containing the richest silver mine in Europe. 
Socio-economic changes were already taking place in the Bohemian countryside 
that were beginning to undermine its feudal character and ‘liberate production 
from its fetters’.119
 Meanwhile, the failed attempts at absolutist state-building during the Tudor 
period (particularly between 1529 and 1547), and Elizabeth’s abandonment 
of all ambitions to develop a continental-style monarchy, had left the English 
monarchy painfully dependent on Parliament for raising the revenues required 
for waging war.120 In terms of military and fiscal effectiveness, the Stuart state 
was backward in comparison with its continental competitors. The centralising 
attempts by the Stuart monarchs, first James I and then Charles I, brought them 
into direct conflict with England’s powerful landed classes who largely domi-
nated Parliament, as the latter had to assent to new taxes or give up some of their 
control over fiscal policy. This was a landlord class that had, over the preceding 
century, become increasingly capitalist-oriented, as ‘the English greater landed 
classes gradually gave up the magnate form of politico-military organization, 
commercialized their relationships with their tenants, rationalized their estates, 
and made use of – but avoided dependence upon – the court’.121
 The conflicts between Crown and Parliament over war funding were a major 
reason for Charles I’s initial dismissal of Parliament in 1629. One conclusion 
from the 1625–29 period was that war was impossible without state reform and 
that a financially exhausted government required peace in order to reform. The 
reprise from war was, however, fatefully interrupted by the Scottish rebellion 
of 1637–40, sparked by Charles I’s attempt to impose Anglican services on 
the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. With the Scottish invasion of 1640, the 
military conflict in Europe moved back to England. To quote Jonathan Scott:
A catholicising king, associated with Spain and catholic Ireland, found himself 
divided from his English and Scots protestant subjects. This was one military 
outcome of the ideological impact made upon the Stuart kingdoms by the Thirty 
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Years’ War. In the period 1637–40, then, the military struggle between refor-
mation and counter-reformation moved to British soil. That it was not followed 
by continental European military intervention was a consequence only of the  
exhaustion of the great powers after more than two decades of war.122
As with the Ottoman–Hapsburg great power rivalry over the Long 16th 
Century (see Chapter 4), the further development and consolidation of capi-
talism in England was again contingent upon the dynamics and direction of 
military conflicts on the European continent, which provided the English with 
a certain (albeit temporary) privilege of geopolitical isolation. They offered the 
geopolitical space in which modern state-building practices and socio-economic 
development could proceed apace. In these ways, the European upheaval of the 
Thirty Years’ War formed the immediate geopolitical context for the English 
Civil War and the eventual collapse of Charles I’s monarchy. It was against this 
international background that the widespread English fears of ‘popery’ must be 
understood, as Catholic Spain spearheaded the Counter-Reformation across 
Europe. Indeed, the majority of parliamentary oppositionists, particularly the 
new merchants involved in the American colonial trades, were ‘militantly anti-
Spanish’ in their foreign policy orientations.123 The ideological (if not military) 
threats of the European Catholic powers were consequently seen as clear and 
present dangers.
 The reconvening of Parliament unleashed a storm of political controver-
sies, as the Parliamentarians sought to reassert their political power against an 
increasingly ‘popish’ and autocratic Crown, while Charles I sought to defend his 
perceived monarchical right to rule without undue parliamentary interference. 
The Irish rebellion of October 1641 added further fuel to the fire, as it raised 
the question of whether Parliament or the Crown would control the English 
armed forces to suppress the rebellion.124 The eventual outcome of these insol-
uble conflicts between Crown and Parliament, representing two fundamentally 
different conceptions of state sovereignty, was the outbreak of civil war in the 
summer of 1642.
Social Forces in the Making of the British Revolution
In examining the character of class conflicts in the making of the first ‘stage’ 
in the English Revolution, the ‘Great Revolution’ of 1640, traditional Marxist 
explanations of the Civil War have focused on the role of the rising gentry, 
conceived as an emerging bourgeois class.125 The two sides in the Civil War, 
parliamentary forces and royalists, are thus conceived as the agents of two 
opposing classes representing antagonistic modes of production: a rising 
capitalism and declining feudalism.
 This interpretation has not fared well with the more contemporary 
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historiography and has been largely abandoned.126 A problem with it has been 
the difficulty in identifying the continuing existence of a distinctly feudal class 
to which the rising capitalist bourgeoisie was opposed. For by the time of the 
English Civil War, the ruling landed classes were, according to Robert Brenner, 
‘by and large – though not of course uniformly – capitalist, in the sense of 
depending on commercial farmers paying competitive rents, rather than one 
that was sharply divided into advanced and backward sectors’.127 For a number 
of Political Marxists, English society in the run-up to the Civil Wars is conceived 
as being essentially capitalist, calling into question the classification of the years 
spanning the Civil Wars to the Glorious Revolution as inaugurating a bour-
geois or capitalist revolution.128 Yet the extent of Brenner’s depiction of such 
a thoroughgoing capitalist transformation of pre-revolutionary England society 
remains open to much debate.
 Henry Heller, for example, has pointed out that the nobility in northwest 
England remained an outpost of feudal reaction, and that this area was a 
royalist stronghold throughout the period.129 Using Brenner’s own conception 
of capitalism as existing with the full commodification of labour-power, Robert 
Albritton has similarly claimed that English agriculture could not be considered 
fully capitalist in the early 17th century.130 Moreover, if we are to take quantita-
tive measures regarding the extent of proletarianisation in England from around 
the mid to late 16th century, it seems that English society was only slightly 
more advanced (in capitalist terms) than the European continent. Jane Whittle 
estimates that in the county of Norfolk around 1525, rural wage-labour consti-
tuted approximately 20–35 per cent of the working rural population, and more 
importantly, that this figure remained more or less constant throughout the 16th 
century.131 In other English counties, such as Leicestershire and Lincolnshire, 
J. P. Cooper has calculated that somewhere between 20 and 33 per cent of the 
total rural population were employed as wage-labours in the 16th century.132 In 
short, England was not very far ahead of the continent in the proletarianisation 
process,133 and even lagged behind the Dutch Republic.
 Put differently, the feudal remnants of English state–society relations had 
yet to be fully washed away by the growing capitalist tide in the period prior 
to the Revolution. It would therefore be more accurate to characterise English 
society over the 16th to 17th centuries as representing a combined form of 
development in which feudalism and capitalism coexisted, interacted and fused 
in various ways, with capitalism progressively coming to predominate. Such 
a combination gave rise to the sorts of ‘contradictions of sociological amalga-
mation’ discussed in Chapter 2, establishing the conditions of possibility for 
revolution.
 These hothouse modalities of combined development and the contradic-
tions of amalgamation they generated during the revolutionary period were 
perhaps most strikingly illustrated by the colonial merchant ships crossing the 
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Atlantic. The ship was fundamental in organising ‘the exploitation of labor’ 
in ways ‘unit[ing] all of the others in the sphere of [capitalist] circulation’.134 
In the ship, we find the bringing together of a vast array of different forms of 
labour drawn from a wide variety of national and ethnic backgrounds: English, 
Irish, American, Dutch, and Portuguese sailors engaged in ‘press-gang’ labour 
working alongside African slaves under the supervision of English shipmasters 
and owners, and accompanied by capitalist merchants and ‘gentleman adven-
turers’. As one observer lucidly put it, ‘The nails that fasten together the planks 
of the boat’s bow are the rivets of the fellowship of the world’.135 These floating 
vessels of combined development functioned as both ‘engines of capital accu-
mulation’ and, not surprisingly, sites of intense class struggle and resistance – ‘a 
place to which and in which the ideas and practices of revolutionaries defeated 
and repressed by Cromwell and then by King Charles escaped, re-formed, circu-
lated, and persisted’.136 The processes of social transformation in England both 
preceding and during the Revolution were then very much ‘a result and part 
of an international process, involving foreign trade, changes in intra-European 
relations following on from the discovery of the Americas, and the rivalry of 
rising mercantile powers in Europe’.137 Developments across the Atlantic were 
thus inscribed in the ‘generative grammar’ of the English Revolution. Indeed, 
overseas colonial expansion in the Atlantic acted to promote and strengthen 
merchant capitalist interests advocating political change in their fight against 
the monarchy.138
 Here we reconnect with Brenner’s analysis of the Civil Wars, and particularly 
his examination of the role played by the different factions of capital comprising 
the London merchant community. As discussed in Chapter 5, Brenner identi-
fies the emergence of a distinctly ‘aristocratic colonizing opposition’ made up of 
‘new merchants’ excluded from the state monopoly privileges and connected to 
the rising colonial trades in the Americas.139 Older merchant elites were mostly 
associated with the East India Company and the Levant trade, whose control 
of trading routes depended on Crown charters. State-granted monopolies gave 
them a stake in the monarchy, explaining their general support of the Crown 
during the Civil War. In contrast, the new merchants, essentially City outsiders, 
sided with the parliamentary opposition. They ‘stood at the head of the City 
popular movement and played a critical role in connecting that movement to the 
national parliamentary opposition’ of which many individual ‘new merchants’ 
formed a crucial part of its leadership.140
 The majority of parliamentary oppositionists were not, however, seeking a 
revolution, but sought instead to roll back Charles’s drive to absolutism. Yet once 
war had broken out, the intervention of social forces from below (the ‘middling 
sort’ comprised of wage-labouring peasants, craftspeople, artisans and indepen-
dent small producers) pushed parliamentary leaders in a more radical direction, 
while driving much of the nobility and gentry into the Royalist camp.141 While 
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the parliamentary opposition in no way fully embraced the radical demands 
of the London crowds and other sections of the ‘middling sort’, they none-
theless utilised the mass movement as a vehicle to victory. This they secured 
in December 1648 through the conclusive victory of Oliver Cromwell’s New 
Model Army. In a precocious case of substitutionism, the New Model Army 
came to act as a surrogate for a capitalist class which, although economically 
dominant, was not yet politically capable of assuming leadership of the new 
state.142 Further, at the head of the new state apparatus, the New Model Army 
functioned as a key agent of capital accumulation, alongside the bourgeois 
class. After the execution of Charles I, the monarchy was overthrown and a 
republican Commonwealth of England declared.
 Although the war had ended, the mass radicalism it had unleashed did not. 
The need to restore social order was foremost in the minds of the conservative 
landowning gentry. Initially fearful of the Republic, the landed classes none-
theless (partly) reconciled themselves to Cromwell’s protectorate, as it proved 
itself an effective bulwark against radicalism and a protector of private property. 
But when Cromwell’s successors proved incapable of providing effective central 
government the gentry ‘panicked, fearing as they had in the early 1650s that a 
social revolution would occur unless effective central government was restored 
without delay’.143 The result was the restoration of the Stuart monarchy, with 
Charles II taking the crown in 1660. Yet the Restoration was not a return 
to the status quo of pre-revolutionary England, but rather continued the 
socio-economic and political reforms of the post-revolutionary period.
 Under the ‘whip of external necessity’ of the Anglo-Dutch wars of 1665–67 
and 1672–74, and the later Anglo-French wars of 1689 to 1714, the English-
cum-British state underwent a number of dramatic transformations, leading to 
the emergence of a modern fiscal-military state capable of harnessing vast fiscal 
and social resources in forging war. English state-building was characterised by 
the assimilation of the most advanced fiscal, military and administrative prac-
tices developed by the Dutch.144 In this sense, the English state enjoyed a certain 
‘privilege of backwardness’ in comparison with its chief Dutch competitor. Yet 
for the English monarchy, it was the continental monarchies that remained the 
chief models of emulation. Indeed, when Charles II’s successor James II sought 
to repeat his father’s effort to build an absolutist regime he was overthrown in 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and replaced by the invading forces of William 
of Orange from the Netherlands.145 The primary aim of the Dutch invasion was 
to co-opt England to the Dutch-led war against the French, and in this William 
was successful. Hence, once again, the geopolitics of the European continent 
decisively intervened in shaping and reshaping English state–society relations.
 The sum result of the socio-economic and political changes taking place 
over the 1640–88 revolutionary epoch was the establishment of a form of state 
conducive to the maximisation of capitalist development:
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a state in which the administrative organs that most impeded capitalist  
development had been abolished: Star Chamber, High Commission, Court of 
Wards, and feudal tenures; in which the executive was subordinated to the men of 
property, deprived of control over the judiciary, and yet strengthened in external 
relations by a powerful navy and the Navigation Act; in which local govern-
ment was safely and cheaply in the hands of the natural ruler, and discipline was 
imposed on the lowers orders by a Church safely subordinated to Parliament.146
In these ways, the English Revolution can indeed be considered a bourgeois 
revolution.
 Nonetheless, the revolutionary process was not yet complete, as the newly 
capitalist English state still faced both internal and external systemic threats. 
Abroad, the single greatest counter-revolutionary threat to England was French 
absolutism. At home, the counter-revolutionary threat lay in Scotland, which 
in contrast to the maturing capitalist order in England remained an outpost 
of feudal reaction. After the Union of 1707 combining the kingdoms of 
England and Scotland into a single nation-state, this systemic unevenness of 
socio-economic development between the two hitherto separate countries was 
transformed into a unique pattern of combined development, juxtaposing and 
fusing the most ‘archaic’ and ‘advanced’ social relations in contradictory and 
explosive ways.
 In the British state, a ruling class of feudal lords persisted in the Scottish 
countryside, drawing their wealth in the form of feudal rents, while in England 
the landed ruling classes were now mostly capitalist. At the same time, in the 
wake of the 1707 Union, Scottish industries began to rapidly assimilate the 
most highly advanced English technologies and organisational methods expe-
riencing, in turn, the contradictions of sociological amalgamation that would 
come to characterise future forms of combined development. ‘By the first quarter 
of the eighteenth century’, Neil Davidson writes, ‘Scotland had a coal industry 
where the most advanced forms of imported English technology were operated 
by men who were, at least formally, judicially bound to their masters as serfs’.147 
As such, Scotland largely ‘skipped the intervening stages’ between peasant self- 
sufficiency and wage labour which England had experienced’.148 Yet in the 
Scottish extractive industries, ‘transitional’ forms of labour persisted, combining 
feudal and capitalist modes of surplus extraction.
 As long as feudalism existed in Scotland, the consolidation of capitalism in 
England and Britain as a whole remained perilously incomplete and liable to 
systemic reversal. The Union was correctly perceived by the Scottish Jacobite 
lords as a threat to their socio-economic status and territorial privileges, and 
they came to gamble on counter-revolution as a means to preserve themselves 
as a ruling class. The final episode came in 1745, when nearly the whole of the 
English army was sent to Belgium to fight France during the War of Austrian 
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Succession, providing the Jacobites with a propitious opportunity to overthrow 
the Hanover monarchy. The Jacobite uprising was crushed and led to the enact-
ment of a number of pieces of legislation (notably the Tenures Abolition Act 
and Disarming Act of 1746, and Heritable Jurisdictions Act of 1747) signal-
ling the end of feudalism in Scotland, and thus the culmination of the British 
bourgeois revolution.149
1789 in the History of Uneven and Combined Development
Peculiarities of the French Revolution?
If the English and Dutch cases of ‘bourgeois revolution’ represent instances 
where an already existing capitalist order was consolidated by the overthrow 
of the sociopolitical conditions obstructing its advancement, the French Revo-
lution signifies a very different case: one where the dominance of the capitalist 
production mode was actually a consequence of the revolutionary settlement. 
This is not to argue that capitalist social relations were absent from pre- 
revolutionary France, or that the absolutist state was fundamentally detrimental 
to capitalist development. Indeed, the putative anti-capitalist nature of French 
absolutism, conceived as the nonmodern ‘Other’ to the impeccably pristine capi-
talist England, has become something of a cardinal tenet in many revisionist 
and Political Marxist works.150
 These writings take their cue from Brenner’s argument regarding the diver-
gent developmental trajectories between England and France in wake of the 
feudal crisis of the 14th century. For Brenner, capitalism emerged in England 
as the outcome of a class struggle in which the lords were too weak to reimpose 
serfdom, but the peasants not strong enough to maintain their independence 
from the market. By contrast, in France peasant revolts were largely successful, 
as the peasants consolidated their control over small and medium-sized farms. 
This meant that the French peasantry escaped reliance on the market, as they 
retained direct control over the means of subsistence and production. Conse-
quently, in France the feudal system of lordly surplus extraction through 
extra-economic means persisted. While it represented ‘a transformed version 
of the old [feudal] system’,151 the development of the French absolutist state 
retained, in restructured form, the extra-economic feudal character of surplus-
value extraction through the ‘tax/office state’. As Wood tells us, after the crisis 
of feudalism, ‘the French ruling class gained new extra-economic powers as 
the absolutist state created a vast apparatus office by means of which a section 
of the propertied class could appropriate the surplus labour of peasants in the 
form of tax’.152 Under such conditions, where the peasants retained direct access 
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to the means of production (land) and the ruling classes continued an extra- 
economic means of surplus extraction, there was no endogenous impetus toward 
capitalist development. Instead, as Teschke notes, ‘the absolutist state-economy 
nexus not only failed to progress towards political and economic modernity, 
but, on the contrary, imposed an economically self-undermining and politically 
highly divisive logic on early modern France as a whole’.153 The absolutist state 
in France, as elsewhere in Europe, is thereby conceived as a fundamental block 
to capitalist development which could only be transformed from without: that 
is, through the competitive pressures from the more advanced British capitalist 
state.154
 What then of the notion of a ‘bourgeois revolution’ in France? Positing the 
‘radically non-capitalist’155 nature of French absolutism, Political Marxists on 
the whole have accepted the main findings of the revisionist historiography on 
the French Revolution; although the leaders of the French Revolution may have 
been bourgeois, they were emphatically not capitalist, and the socio-economic 
order resulting from the revolutionary settlement ‘entrenched rather than 
removed pre-capitalist forms’.156 What is more, for Political Marxists, the entire 
theoretical edifice of Marx and Engels’s conception of bourgeois revolutions 
ushering in capitalist states is questionable, given that Marx and Engels are 
claimed to have ‘uncritically accepted the liberal theory of bourgeois revolution 
in their early works’.157 Thus, on both empirical and theoretical grounds, the 
idea of a bourgeois revolution having occurred in France is refuted, and more 
generally the concept is relegated to the dustbin of history.158
 Here we leave aside the exegetical question whether Marx and Engels’s 
conception of bourgeois revolution reflects an uncritically digested liberal 
theory of sociopolitical change159 and instead concentrate on the empirical 
foundations of the Political Marxist arguments against the French bourgeois 
revolution. This is a particularly significant issue given the widespread claims 
among Political Marxists and revisionist historians that the French Revolution 
was neither led by capitalists nor resulted in the establishment of sociopolitical 
and economic conditions facilitating capitalist development. The latter point 
is particularly problematic for the ‘consequentialist’ conception of bourgeois 
revolutions developed here. So before providing a theorisation of the French 
Revolution from the perspective of uneven and combined development, we 
must first engage with these empirical questions head on.
Capitalism and the Absolutist State in France
The standard argument in the revisionist historiography was that the epoch 
of French absolutism did not see the emergence of capitalist social relations, 
and that it was in fact antithetical to capitalist development. Yet as we shall 
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demonstrate, this is based on an overly static conception of French development 
of the pre-revolutionary period.
 Thanks in part to a number of more recent works by various historians we 
now have a much more rounded picture of socio-economic developments in 
pre-revolutionary France.160 As Henry Heller has shown, capitalist forces were 
already making themselves felt in France by the late 16th century. In partic-
ular, the Religious Wars, despite the general economic decline in France in this 
period, acted as a long-term stimulus on technological and economic innova-
tions during the reign of Henry IV. The Wars of Religion hastened the process 
of primitive accumulation in the French countryside, where poorer peasants 
were uprooted from the land, resulting in widespread proletarianisation and 
the revaluation of land as capital. By the 17th century, nearly three-quarters of 
the peasantry had been deprived of the necessary means of production (land) 
to support themselves. By the beginning of the 17th century, estimates show 
that as much as 22 per cent of the rural workforce in France was engaged in 
industry.161
 Accompanying this process of primitive accumulation was an increasing 
differentiation among the peasantry between a mass of producers dependent 
on wages and a form of nascent rural bourgeoisie.162 At the same time, feudal 
rights over the management, sale and acquisition of property were increasingly 
weakened as peasants became more or less able to dispose of their property.163 
Thus, ‘technological innovation and the spread of rural industries stimulated 
by primitive accumulation’, Heller notes, ‘held out the possibility that the rural 
population could expand buoyed by the opportunities provided by a growing 
capitalist agriculture and industry’.164
 The process of primitive accumulation continued over the 17th and 18th 
centuries. Peasant proprietorship steadily declined, particularly in the last 
decades of the ancien régime, as the French countryside emerged as a region 
of significant capitalist experimentations.165 According to Gérard Béaur, up to 
90 per cent of the rural population in 18th-century France did not have enough 
land to support themselves, with about 20 per cent of the rural population 
being completely landless.166 Hence, by the early 18th century, the ‘availability 
of growing pools of cheap wage-labour became a structural feature of the 
French economy’.167 What is more, while feudal relations remained dominant 
throughout the 18th-century French economy, there were significant counter-
vailing forces at work from within the structures of feudalist domination. For 
example, in their quest for higher feudal incomes, lords often experimented 
with reorganising economic relations. In some cases this led to the development 
of (quasi)capitalist relations on their demesne.168 French economic development 
after 1720 was also marked by an unprecedented development of global trade, 
with a concomitant commercialisation of ‘vast sectors of production (specula-
tive crops, wine production, grain and transport)’. Moreover, ‘industrialization 
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was also progressing, especially on the basis of the proto-industrial model orig-
inating in the cities, with the expansion of the linen and hemp textile trade, 
cotton and small metallurgy’.169
 Consequently, alongside the increasing weight of wage-labour in the French 
rural economy, the 18th century witnessed the emergence of a sizeable capitalist 
bourgeoisie primarily made up of merchants, artisans, shopkeepers and the 
paysannerie marchande. On Colin Jones’s calculations, the French bourgeoisie 
grew over the century from approximately 700,000 or 800,000 individuals in 
1700 to perhaps 2.3 million in 1789, making up nearly 10 per cent of the popu-
lation.170 Citing the spread of commercialisation and the growth of consumer 
society in pre-revolutionary France, Jones goes so far as to suggest that France 
witnessed the ‘bourgeoisification’ of Old Regime society.171 The tastes and atti-
tudes of the bourgeoisie were permeating French society, ‘challenging the former 
hegemony of the aristocracy’.172 As even the revisionist historian William Doyle 
notes, ‘the relative weight of the bourgeoisie in society was increasing ever more 
rapidly than their numbers. Their share of national wealth was enormous. Most 
industrial and all commercial capital, amounting to almost a fifth of all French 
private wealth, was bourgeois owned’.173
 One might criticise the conflation of ‘capitalist’ and ‘bourgeois’ here, since 
the term ‘bourgeois’ was supposedly used in the 18th century to also refer to 
non-capitalist town-dwellers or anyone holding non-noble status.174 This is 
precisely what many Political Marxists have argued, particularly with regard to 
the French Revolution.175 ‘We may be utterly convinced that the Revolution was 
undoubtedly “bourgeois”’, Wood writes, ‘without coming a flea-hop closer to 
determining whether it was also capitalist’. As she goes on to clarify, ‘As long 
as we accept that there is no necessary identification of “bourgeois” (or burgher 
or city) with “capitalist”, the “revolutionary bourgeois” can be far from being a 
fiction, even – or especially – in France, where the model revolutionary bour-
geois was not a capitalist or even an old-fashioned merchant but a lawyer or 
office-holder’.176
 There are two problems with Wood’s (and other Political Marxists’) argument 
here regarding the French bourgeoisie of the late 18th century. First, the Polit-
ical Marxist conceptualisation of a distinctly non-capitalist bourgeoisie is both 
too narrow and ambiguous. It is ambiguous in the sense that it is unclear 
whether they are referring to the non-capitalist bourgeoisie as a class in its own 
right or as a social status group. If the former, then what is the precise rela-
tionship between a non-capitalist and capitalist bourgeoisie, and why can the 
former not be considered an ‘outer layer’ of the latter? If the latter, then what is 
the relationship between this social status group and other classes? Surely if the 
bourgeoisie does not constitute an element of the capitalist class, it must be part 
of some other class.
 The Political Marxist conceptualisation of the French bourgeoisie is too 
anievas maintext.indd   201 18/05/2015   12:18:56
how the west came to rule
202
narrow in the sense that it identifies social actors as forming part of a partic-
ular class in terms of their direct relationship to the means of production. Those 
who are not the direct owners of capital are then not conceived as part of the 
capitalist class. Yet what of lawyers, administrators, managers, ‘organic’ intellec-
tuals and other more diverse social elements who are not directly involved in 
the production process, but who nonetheless share similar life conditions of the 
capitalist class and support them in various ways? Do these social layers belong 
to another class? It therefore seems more helpful to define the bourgeoisie as 
a whole as representing ‘a social penumbra around the hard core of capitalists 
proper, shading out into the diverse social elements that function as servitors or 
hangers-on of capital without themselves owning capital’.177
 The second point regarding the Political Marxists’ denial of the capitalist 
status of the French bourgeoisie in the 18th century is that, as the evidence 
above and below demonstrates, there was indeed a growing fraction of the 
bourgeoisie who derived their incomes from the exploitation of wage-labour. 
While a non-capitalist bourgeoisie surely existed in France (and elsewhere) 
before the rise of distinctly capitalist relations of production, this bourgeoisie 
was decisively transformed over the 17th and 18th centuries as its members 
became both directly and indirectly involved in the exploitation of workers. For 
it was during the 18th century that France underwent an era of dramatic socio- 
economic development, characterised by substantial growth in manufacturing 
and agriculture, making France arguably the ‘strongest economy in continental 
Europe’.178 As Peter Mathias notes, ‘[t]he French record of scientific growth and 
invention in the eighteenth century was a formidable one’.179 Statistical indexes 
confirm the vibrant and dynamic nature of French economic development over 
this period. French industrial output grew, on an annual basis, by 1.9 per cent 
between 1701–10 and 1781–90 compared with 1.1 per cent growth in Britain. 
By the beginning of the 18th century industry accounted for about a quarter 
of France’s total output, compared with a third in Britain. By 1780, however, 
industry accounted for two-thirds in both countries. Further, by 1789, the iron 
industry in France was significantly larger than in Britain, producing nearly 
two and half times the tonnage.180 Overall, France’s manufacturing output was 
approximately three times as great as Britain’s in 1789.181
 Moreover, the increase in industrial output per head in France during 
the 18th century was likely faster than that in Britain. From 1715 to 1785, 
the British economy grew by about 50 per cent, while the French economy 
expanded by nearly 100 per cent,182 and the annual average growth of the French 
economy in 1701–10 and 1781–90 was 1 per cent compared with 0.7 per cent 
for Britain.183 In the years between 1716–20 and 1784–88, France’s external 
commerce multiplied by a factor of 3 against a British expansion of 2.4. By the 
end of the 1780s, France had become the largest trading power in Europe, with 
a total value of long-distance trade equalling £25 million (sterling), trumping 
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Britain, whose trade amounted to £20 million.184 Moreover, in 1715 the value 
of French trade was less than half of Britain’s, but by 1780 it surpassed its rival. 
In addition, throughout the 18th century, rural ‘proto-industry’ developed on a 
massive scale, while the ‘introduction of urban patterns of consumption into the 
countryside further encouraged a growing dependence on the market’.185 The 
Lyonnais silk industry was perhaps one of the most advanced centres of indus-
trial production in 18th-century France, and ‘stood at the apex of European silk 
industries’. It encompassed a huge industrial-commercial complex, employing 
approximately 14,000 adult men and perhaps as many as 20,000 women and 
children in the 1780s. In a city with a total population of about 150,000, nearly 
a quarter of the entire population of the city, or about 40 per cent of the active 
labour force, was employed in the industry.186
 Nonetheless, capitalist social relations were not yet dominant in pre- 
revolutionary France, as feudal methods of extra-economic domination and 
exploitation remained salient.187 Despite impressive growth over the 18th 
century, and while leading in certain economic sectors over Britain, the French 
economy as a whole did remain relatively ‘backward’ vis-à-vis its chief economic 
and geopolitical competitor. Eighteenth-century France thereby reaped a certain 
‘privilege of backwardness’, adopting numerous technological innovations from 
its more advanced British competitor.188 
 Although a substantial bourgeoisie emerged, the aristocracy continued to 
dominate, if not monopolise, political power, with nobles occupying most of the 
key positions in the French army, navy and judiciary.189 In 1773, for example, of the 
40 state councillors, 30 were nobles of whom 12 were nobles to the fourth degree. 
Between 1774 and 1776, only one of the provincial intendants in office was not 
a noble by inheritance.190 In other words, the growing socio-economic weight of 
French capitalists had not yet been transformed into the wielding of direct political 
power. How might we then conceptualise the French social structure?
 Many Marxist and non-Marxist historians have conceived of absolutism as 
a ‘transitional’ social formation amalgamating features of both the feudal and 
capitalist modes of production. This view was perhaps most famously devel-
oped by Perry Anderson in his magisterial Lineages of the Absolutist State. In 
it, he describes the absolutist states of Western Europe as ‘a complex of feudal 
and capitalist modes of production, with a gradually rising urban bourgeois 
and a growing primitive accumulation of capital, on an international scale’. 
‘Immensely magnified and reorganized’, Anderson writes,
the feudal state of Absolutism was nevertheless constantly and profoundly 
over-determined by the growth of capitalism within composite social formations 
of the early modern period. These formations were, of course, a combination of 
different modes of production under the – waning – dominance of one of them: 
feudalism.191
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Specifically regarding pre-revolutionary French society, Davison similarly speaks 
of the ‘transitional, combined nature of the French economy’.192
 On this view, absolutism represented a distinct form of combined devel-
opment, albeit one dominated by its feudal aspects. The absolutist state in 
France represented a transfigured form of the separation of the political and the 
economic that characterised the emergence of capitalism in the Low Countries 
and England. For despite the growing significance of capitalist social relations in 
town and country, which witnessed the socio-economic abstraction of producers 
from direct relations of personal domination and dependency characteristic of 
the feudal mode, the state remained a locus of economic dependency through 
the sale of venal offices. Hence, the social order produced by the absolutist 
state in France was marked by what Kamran Matin has described as ‘personal 
independence based upon dependence mediated by the state’,193 where differ-
ential access to the state apparatus was a key source of conflict. The particular 
‘contradictions of sociological amalgamation’ engendered by this pattern of 
uneven and combined development in France in turn witnessed ‘the precarious 
compromise between the building of a modern state and the preservation of 
principles of social organization inherited from feudal times’.194 In this sense, 
the capitalist revolution in France represented a ‘revolution of backwardness’ 
– a ‘condition of developmental agility generated by the belated entangle-
ment of a premodern country in the internationally driven process of capitalist 
transformation’.195
 Yet absolutist France was far from the developmental ‘dead end’ that revision-
ists and Political Marxists have made it out to be.196 As we have demonstrated, 
the pre-revolutionary French economy, particularly during the 18th century, 
was dynamic and growing, with capitalist social forces playing an increasingly 
significant role. And after 1750 ‘the French economy began to reach the limits 
of merely reproducing the feudal economy’.197
 In conceptualising the prevailing economic aspects of pre-revolutionary 
French society, we are thus in agreement with Anatolii Ado that it is not enough 
simply to claim that feudal and capitalist relations, along with petty peasant 
production, coexisted in France on the eve of revolution. Rather, such rela-
tions were ‘inextricably interlaced in the society of the Old Regime forming 
a conflictual unity’.198 In the run-up to the Revolution, a significant fraction 
of nobles had become involved, in different ways and degrees, in capitalist or 
protocapitalist activities, while merchants had already begun to accumulate 
property and estate incomes based on a combination of feudal and capitalist 
relations. At the same time, larger farmers, wealthier peasants and the great 
landowners constituted the primary forces driving capitalist development in the 
countryside. Hence, as Ado concludes, ‘[m]ixed forms of property and hybrid 
social groups played an important role on the eve of the revolution’.199 This 
‘imbrication of feudal and capitalist interests’ explains the very different reform 
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programmes that developed over the course of the Revolution. The fundamental 
conflicts driving and developing events over the course of the French Revolu-
tion cannot be reduced to either a clear-cut singular struggle between opponents 
(the rising bourgeoisie) and proponents (the entrenched nobility) of feudalism, 
or even less plausibly to an ‘intra-ruling class struggle’ by two sides of the same 
unreformed feudal class, as George C. Comninel and other Political Marxists 
argue.200 Instead, the Revolution was characterised by an ‘intricate overlap-
ping of conflicting interests’ between and within different classes, along with 
more ‘hybrid social groups’, derivative of France’s contradictory, sociologically 
combined form of development. After the overthrow of the monarchy this led 
to a variety of reform programmes that were often in conflict with one another, 
but all more or less promising the ‘radical destruction of the old order’.201 To 
these developments we now turn.
The Origins of the Capitalist Revolution in France
If Political Marxists are mistaken in their characterisations of the French 
absolutist state as radically non-capitalist, they are on much more solid ground in 
foregrounding the causal role of international rivalries in precipitating the revo-
lutionary crisis. ‘It was through state military competition that the backwardness 
of French productive relations was initially, and disastrously, demonstrated’, 
Colin Mooers writes. ‘The coercive force of England’s more advanced system 
of social relations was experienced by France in a succession of military defeats 
and the ultimate bankruptcy of the absolutist state’.202 Indeed, it was the ‘whip 
of external necessity’, represented by the internationally mediated modernising 
challenge of capitalist Britain, that occasioned the revolutionary crisis in France 
– particularly through the costs of the American War of Independence. In this 
sense, the British Revolution of the previous century had laid down the geoso-
cial conditions for the French Revolution. Though French absolutism had been 
formed and strengthened in and through wars and military competition,203 the 
international terrain on which France had to compete in the 18th century was 
radically transformed by the social order inaugurated by the English Civil Wars 
and the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The differential developmental trajecto-
ries of Britain and France (uneven development) and their attendant geopolitical 
and social consequences (combined development) were therefore critical to the 
making of the French Revolution.
  Throughout the 18th century, British power had been steadily increasing, 
buoyed by the country’s stronghold over American trade and markets. Those 
states that held colonies or at least had access to the Atlantic system were 
provided with significant economic-cum-military advantages. In this respect, 
the European balance of power of the 18th century was built on the pedestal of 
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the Atlantic slave trade. As French Secretary of State between 1761 and 1766, 
César Gabriel de Choiseul, put it:
in the present state of Europe it is colonies, trade and in consequence sea power, 
which must determine the balance of power upon the continent. The House of 
Austria, Russia, the King of Prussia are only powers of the second rank, as are all 
those which cannot go to war unless subsidized by the trading powers.204
A central aim of French foreign policy was, then, as Foreign Minister Vergennes 
stated, to ‘reduce England to a position of equality … to take from her a share of 
her strength, her monopoly of American trade and markets’.205 It was with this 
aim in mind that the French regime came to embroil itself in a series of costly 
colonial wars, particularly the Seven Years’ War (1754–63) and the American 
War of Independence (1778–83), which ultimately led the regime to the brink of 
bankruptcy.206 This geopolitically driven bankruptcy was the immediate trigger for 
the revolutionary crisis of 1787–88. Having borrowed until no more money was 
forthcoming, the new contrôleur général, Charles Alexandre de Calonne, sought to 
implement a radical programme of reform – taxes on all landowners irrespective 
of rank and the creation of new provincial assemblies – that provoked the political 
crisis leading to the monarchy’s downfall.207 The state’s fiscal crisis not only came 
to increasingly loosen the ideological and political cohesion of the French ruling 
classes, but also translated into an ‘unbearable’208 tax burden on the peasantry, 
fuelling widespread social discontent and rebellion in the countryside.209
 The economic crisis affecting France at the time was, however, of a more 
general nature. Signs of economic troubles had emerged in several key economic 
sectors as early as the 1760s. According to some historians, ‘the economic 
slowdown marked the exhaustion of further possibilities for accumulation 
within the system’.210 This was a structural crisis affecting the totality of the 
French economy in the second half of the 18th century. Foreign trade had begun 
to show signs of slowing down between 1760 and 1770, with its most dynamic 
element, colonial trade, wearing down around 1783. Maritime profits in Nantes 
and Bordeaux over the second half of the 18th century were in decline, while 
two large sectors of the manufacturing industry – ordinary textiles and linen 
and hemp textiles – levelled off after 1760. There was also a slowing-down in 
total agricultural production between 1781 and 1790 compared with 1770–80, 
with a slight decrease in agricultural production per inhabitant. Despite these 
economic troubles, population continued to expand, further exacerbating the 
socio-economic situation, particularly by forcing food prices upwards.211
 Moreover, during this period further industrial development was blocked 
owing to a shortage of capital; stagnation had become apparent in various 
branches of industries, reflecting insufficient demand at home at a time of 
growing protectionism; the agricultural economy was affected by severe grain 
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shortages in 1788–89; and the state of French manufacturing was further 
weakened by the Treaty of Eden of 1786 which lowered tariffs between France 
and Britain.212 The second half of the 18th century was also marked by a notable 
escalation in urban violence and peasant conflict: nearly three-quarters of the 
4,400 recorded collective protests in the years 1720–88 occurred after 1765, 
mostly in the form of food riots and anti-seigneurialism.213 During this period, 
the burdens of taxes on common people were increasing because of persistent 
budget deficits, and rents on the peasantry were raised. The nobility were also 
further squeezing the peasantry by usurping communal rights and increasing 
other feudal charges on their tenants.214 It is safe to say that the Old Regime was 
in crisis by the 1780s.
 Decisive in the immediate conjuncture of revolution, the causal role of the 
international in the long-term (structural) origins of the Revolution was also 
significant, as France witnessed a series of geopolitically induced social transfor-
mations over the late 17th and 18th centuries. This prepared the sociopolitical 
conditions for the eventual collapse of the regime. Over this period, the French 
regime gradually shifted from a relatively defensive foreign policy posture 
vis-à-vis the Habsburgs to a more expansionist foreign policy on the continent 
and overseas, partially provoked by the rising power of capitalist England. The 
domestic effects of this transformation in France’s foreign relations were decisive 
in laying the socio-economic and political conditions for the 1789 Revolution. 
Bailey Stone lists the key developments emerging from this ‘dynamic interplay 
between international and domestic forces’ as including ‘the proliferation of 
venal offices, the deepening divisions within the army, the gradual reduction of 
social-status-related tax exemptions, and the growing constitutional confronta-
tion between the crown and the tax-resisting parlements of the realm’.215 These 
changes, wrought by the attempt to uphold French absolutism in a changing 
international context, increasingly came into contradiction with the social 
and ideological basis of the ancien régime – upholding noble privilege and the 
monarchical state.
 In order to fund the Bourbon monarchy’s belligerent foreign policy, the 
French state sold off enormous numbers of noble titles, and even more offices 
conferring nobility or at least enhanced social status. Scholars have estimated 
that as many as 10,000 people were ennobled over the century. ‘Multiplied by 
five for the families who inherited noble status from their newly ennobled heads, 
this gives a minimum total of 32,500 or a maximum of 50,000 new nobles 
during the eighteenth century’.216 The purchase of ennobling offices acted as 
a key means of bourgeois infiltration into French society’s elite ranks, ‘into its 
central and provincial administration, its financial apparatus, its judiciary, and 
its armed forces’.217 The overall effect was to decisively increase the social weight 
of the bourgeois within France’s political order, as the ‘French government was 
driven by geostrategic and derivative fiscal necessity to encourage the assimi-
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lation of “new” civilian officeholding (or “robe”) nobility to older military (or 
“sword”) noblesse, and of wealthy bourgeoisie to recent “robe” nobility’. ‘In this 
sense’, Stone notes, ‘the crown was indeed an agent of social evolution – more 
specifically, of the metamorphosis of exclusive nobility into more inclusive 
notability’.218
 Yet despite the mass of office sales to replenish the state’s ailing finances, by 
the second half of the 18th century, if not earlier, it was actually becoming more 
difficult for the bourgeoisie to become nobles, as the increase in offices failed to 
keep pace with the dramatic expansion of the bourgeoisie over the century.219 
Intensified competition and increased office prices meant that a more aspirant 
bourgeoisie than ever was failing to purchase its way up the social ladder, fuelling 
its resentment against the old order.220 For the emergence of a more numerous 
and wealthier upper stratum of the bourgeoisie led to a much greater demand 
for ennoblements. Yet in order to preserve the ideopolitical dominance of the 
established nobility, while safeguarding its dwindling fiscal resources, the ruling 
class and state managers refused to respond adequately to these demands. In 
either ending or relatively reducing access to fiefs, royal offices, and letters of 
nobility, noble–bourgeois class relations were significantly aggravated.221
 The traditional means of social promotion for the bourgeoisie was then 
contracting in the final decades of the Old Regime. In these ways, the absolutist 
state set clear limits to the extent and character of bourgeois advancement. It 
was therefore hardly surprising that when the Estates General met in May and 
June 1789, the bourgeoisie of the Third Estate were overwhelmingly in favour 
of a single chamber that they would dominate.
   The ensuing revolution sparked by the geopolitically induced bankruptcy 
of the state saw the bourgeoisie acting as a chief leader of the revolutionary 
movement throughout its phases. Reviewing the social backgrounds of those 
who held office during the Revolution, Lynn Hunt writes:
The revolutionary political class can be termed ‘bourgeois’ both in terms of social 
position and of class consciousness. The revolutionary officials were the owners of 
the means of production; they were either merchants with capital, professionals 
with skills, artisans with their own shops, or more rarely, peasants with land …. 
The ‘consciousness’ of the revolutionary elite can be labelled bourgeois in so far 
as it was distinctly anti-feudal, anti-aristocratic, and anti-absolutist …. The revo-
lutionary elite was made up of new men dedicated to fashioning a new France.222
In this sense, the capitalist revolution in France was exceptional for the leader-
ship role that the bourgeois played in it even if, as Hunt goes on to note, factions 
of the bourgeoisie could be found on both sides of the struggle. Yet the bour-
geoisie had not originally sought to overthrow the ancien régime, but instead to 
merely reform the state. It was only under the pressure of counter-revolution 
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from both within and without, and popular pressures from below – espe-
cially through the intervention of the peasantry – that drove the bourgeoisie, 
particularly under the Jacobins, to smash the old order.223
 The international effects of the French Revolution reverberated far and wide. 
In Europe, the 1789 revolution and subsequent Napoleonic Wars irrevocably 
transformed the conditions of the 19th-century international system, and the 
form subsequent bourgeois revolutions would take. Regarding the former, 
Metternich’s ‘Concert of Europe’ system inaugurating the so-called ‘Hundred 
Years’ Peace’ was conceived as a conscious reaction to the revolutionary condi-
tions laid down by the French Revolution, as conservative European state 
managers sought to balance against other states in the international system and 
revolutionary social forces at home.224 The radicalisation of the French Revo-
lution was also viewed by the ruling classes throughout Europe as a warning 
sign of things to come, inhibiting the bourgeoisie in future revolutions – as 
witnessed in 1848 – from playing their ‘assigned’ revolutionary roles lest the 
‘underclasses’ get out of hand.
 Subsequent revolutions in Europe and beyond therefore came to take the 
form of ‘revolutions from above’, or what Gramsci called ‘passive revolutions’. 
These were largely elite-driven affairs limiting the popular participation of 
the subaltern classes – as exemplified in the Italian, German and Japanese 
experiences of the late 19th century – involving ‘molecular’ processes of trans-
formation, ‘progressively modify[ing] the pre-existing composition of forces’ 
in the ruling classes’ ‘gradual but continuous absorption’ of its ‘antithesis’ (the 
proletariat).225 The European ruling classes had learned the lessons of the French 
bourgeoisie, heeding Bismarck’s advice of 1866 that ‘[i]f revolution there is to 
be, let us rather undertake it than undergo it’.226 
 In the transformed geosocial milieu handed down by the experience of 
1789, passive revolutions became the primary means through which late- 
developing states achieved their own capitalist revolutions. In these ways, 
passive revolutions can be conceived as organically emerging from the trans-
figured world-historical conditions unleashed by the ‘Great Transformation’227 
and its political consequences. They heralded a particularly intense form of 
uneven and combined development generalised through the rise of a distinctly 
capitalist world economy.228
 There were also more positive international effects of the French Revo-
lution. For just as the American revolutionaries had first injected the notion 
of popular sovereignty into contemporary international discourses, which the 
French revolutionaries drew on and further radicalised, the French Revolution 
inspired popular and often more radical revolts and revolutions in the ‘New 
World’, which eventually came to challenge both the slave system and royal 
power. In these ways and more, the revolts and popular rebellions of the ‘Age 
of Revolution’ – American, French, Haitian and others – must be conceived, 
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as Robin Blackburn suggests, as both interconnected and co-constitutive, with 
‘each helping to radicalize the next’, and in the French and Haitian case, vice 
versa.229
 It was in fact only in the midst of the slave revolts in the French Caribbean 
colonies, and in particular the Haitian Revolution, that the French abolished 
slavery throughout their colonies, with the Decree of 16 Pluvôse An II (4 
February 1794) at the National Convention. This ideologically completed the 
‘bourgeois revolution’ that had begun in 1789. In the United States it was only 
accomplished through the ‘second bourgeois revolution’ of the American Civil 
War of 1861–65.230 The events of the Haitian Revolution were, Laurent Dubois 
claims, the:
most concrete expression of the idea that the rights proclaimed in France’s 1789 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen were indeed universal …. The slave 
insurrection led to the expansion of citizenship beyond racial barriers despite the 
massive political and economic investment in the slave system at that time.231
The interconnected and combined effects of the French and Haitian revolutions 
represent a fundamental historical rupture from which more (formally) inclu-
sive forms of bourgeois democracy developed, albeit much later.232 As Dubois 
puts it, ‘If we live in a world in which democracy is meant to exclude no one, it 
is in no small part because of the actions of the those slaves in Saint-Domingue 
who insisted that human rights were theirs too’.233 In these ways, we find yet 
another striking illustration of the mechanisms through which combined forms 
of development causally feed back into the very unevenness from which they 
emerged. For it was only through the interactive relations among a plurality of 
developmentally differentiated societies that these combinations first arose and 
then subsequently recombined at the level of the international system, trans-
forming its structural dynamics and logics, while simultaneously generating 
new forms and instances of combined development which further reconstituted 
unevenness itself.
Capitalist Consequences of the French Revolution
Thus far, we have examined the driving international and domestic causes of 
the French Revolution along with the agents involved. The important question 
to ask now is: was the sociopolitical order established by the Revolution condu-
cive to capitalist development? A main argument against the idea of a bourgeois 
revolution occurring in France is that the post-revolutionary regime was actually 
adverse to capitalist modernisation. If bourgeois revolutions are to be under-
stood in terms of their outcomes, an anti-capitalist revolutionary settlement 
surely poses a problem. According to Comninel, the French Revolution:
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did very little in the way of transforming the essential social relations of produc-
tion … it did not produce capitalist society. Instead, the Revolution further 
entrenched small-scale peasant production, and with it the extraction of agrarian 
surplus through rent, mortgages, etc., by redistributing church lands among the 
bourgeoisie and peasantry.234
Comninel, like Theda Skocpol, further points to the growth of the bureaucratic 
state as an additional indication of the non-capitalist nature of the Revolution. 
What are we to make of these arguments?
 First, to judge the character of the Revolution we must look at its conse-
quences in its temporal totality (1789–1815). The issue is not whether capitalist 
conditions were immediately established, but whether the outcome of the Revo-
lution was conducive to capitalist development over this broader conjunctural 
period and perhaps even slightly beyond it (say, from 1815–48). As noted, 
revolutions are not simply events, confined to a single moment of their incep-
tion, but processes sometimes spanning many decades, as in the case of both 
the Dutch Revolt and War of Independence (1566–1648) and the English Civil 
Wars and Glorious Revolution (1640–88). From this more holistic perspective, 
it does seem that the 1789 Revolution established the amendable sociopolitical 
conditions for capitalist development. As Albert Soboul notes:
By wiping the slate clean of all feudal vestiges, by liberating the peasants of 
seigniorial rights and ecclesiastical tithes, and to a certain degree from commu-
nity constraints, by destroying the trade monopolies and unifying the national 
market, the French Revolution marked a decisive stage on the path to capitalism. 
Suppressing feudal landed property, it even freed small direct producers, making 
possible the differentiation of the peasant mass and its polarization between 
capital and wage labor. This led to entirely new relations of production; capital, 
once under feudal domination, was able to make the value of work mercenary. 
In this way, the autonomy of capitalist production was finally assured in the  
agricultural domain as well as the industrial sector.235
Furthermore, in an early instance of what can be understood retrospectively 
as a state capitalist form of substitutionism, the Committee of Public Safety 
was vested with the control of all foreign commerce, nationalising the existing 
armouries and building a massive new armaments manufacturer in Paris 
(employing over 5,000 wage-labourers) and more elsewhere. The majority of 
furnaces and forges (over a thousand) were confiscated from the ecclesiastics 
and nobles by the state, and rented out and operated by the so-called maîtres de 
forges, who were bourgeois in origin. Under the Directory and later Napoleon, 
these industries were then sold off to these same individuals, who came to 
rapidly centralise ownership and control over the 1789–1815 period. ‘The stage 
was set for a future transformation of this industry – key to the development of 
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nineteenth century industrial capitalism – under the auspices of the maîtres de 
forges who now operated these means of production as their private property’.236
 Second, the view that the agrarian settlement established by the Revolution 
entrenched a smallholding peasantry who supposedly retarded agricultural 
innovation has been forcefully challenged by a number of more recent studies.237 
Comninel’s and others’ conclusions regarding the detrimental effect of small-
scale peasant production on capitalist development essentially assimilate the 
road taken by French agrarian capitalism to the large-scale capitalist tenant 
farming of the English model. Yet this merely reproduces the kinds of unilinear 
conception of sociohistorical development characteristic of Modernisation 
Theories, in which the ‘raison d’etre of agrarian society should have been to 
increase productivity along English lines’.238
 According to the path-breaking work of Anatolii Ado, if the rapid devel-
opment of agrarian capitalism was inhibited during the 19th century, it was 
an effect of the persistence of large property and the burden of rent, not small 
peasant property. Thus, according the Ado, ‘the popular revolution of the petty 
producers ought to be seen as an essential element of the capitalist dynamic 
characteristic of this upheaval’.239 Hence, as McPhee argues:
the economic, social, and ultimately political changes in the French countryside 
in the nineteenth century are best understood as a slow extension of ‘simple 
commodity production’, that ‘historical premise’ of capitalism, whose full capacity 
as the ‘really revolutionising path’ was limited by the ‘retrograde’ effects of large 
property rented in smallholding.240
Although French agriculture lagged behind Britain throughout the 19th century, 
this does not translate into a denial of its essentially capitalist character. For 
the outcome of the Revolution’s agrarian settlement ‘undoubtedly benefitted the 
“really existing” capitalist class in France as opposed to some ideal construct 
derived from comparison with England’.241 Indeed, we would expect the path 
of French capitalist development taken during the 19th century to diverge from 
England’s previous development, as the international conditions of its emer-
gence had been dramatically transformed. For one of the key reasons why French 
industrialisation, like much of the European continent, diverged from the British 
path was the much more serious threat of revolutionary upheavals from below.242 
Although it deviated from the British model, the consensus is that France was 
indeed relatively successful in its industrial drive, as ‘French industry grew 
relatively rapidly in the period 1815 to 1850 when the era of war ended’.243
 Estimates of annual industrial growth vary from 2.5 to 3.4 per cent during 
this period, while agricultural growth was impressive at approximately 1.2 per 
cent annually between 1820 and 1870. Overall the average annual increase in 
per capita economic growth between 1815 and the First World War stood at 
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1.4 per cent, and by 1914 French economic performance was ‘broadly compa-
rable’ with that of Britain on a per capita basis. Although British per capita 
income remained higher than France by approximately 20 per cent, the gap 
between the two countries did not widen even at the height of British industrial 
dominance during the first half of the 19th century. Thus, Jeff Horn concludes, 
‘France enjoyed impressive long-term growth, both overall and per capita, 
particularly in light of its lower population expansion and less lucrative colonial 
opportunities’.244 Further, the more advanced nature of the French Revolution, 
which witnessed the intense mobilisation of peasants and small producers, 
undeniably set certain limits to the extent of capitalist transformation. In no 
way, however, did such limits alter the fundamentally capitalist nature of the 
Revolutionary settlement. In short, myths of a ‘failed’ industrial revolution in 
France must be dispelled.
Conclusion
As this chapter has shown, international relations have been causally decisive 
in the origins, dynamics and outcomes of revolutions. In turn, revolutions have 
been essential features in the development and reproduction of geopolitical 
orders, instilling them with distinct social logics and purposes. International 
relations have not only been concerned with the problems of war and peace, 
but fundamentally tied to these, they have also ‘been very much about the 
management of change in domestic political orders’.245 Only by grasping revo-
lutions in these international dimensions can we begin to understand their 
world-historical meanings. 
 These basic points fundamentally challenge the persistent theoretical sepa-
ration of domestic and international politics at the heart of mainstream IR. 
Capturing the fused linkages between revolutions and ‘the international’ thus 
requires a fundamental rethinking of some the core categories of IR theory itself, 
such as the ‘balance of power’ and ‘security dilemma’, as their key empirical 
referents necessarily cut across and interconnect with both ‘second’ and ‘third’-
level images of war and peace, scrambling their hitherto assumed meanings. 
This not only means dispensing with the ‘national-territorial totality’246 as the 
primary ontological unit of IR analysis, it also requires the development of 
theoretical concepts capable of capturing the multiple, interconnecting spatial 
fields of social constitution and organisation.
  The multiple and differentiated forms of ‘bourgeois revolution’ in the 
United Provinces, England and France all functioned, in their varied ways, to 
facilitate the development and/or consolidation of capitalist social relations in 
their national domains. They did so, in particular, by clearing away or recon-
stituting the sociopolitical and ideological ‘remnants’ of the pre-capitalist state 
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apparatus, establishing in its place a state form that operated as a more or less 
autonomous vehicle of capital accumulation. In further teasing out the differ-
entiated outcomes of these various instances of ‘bourgeois revolution’ on the 
reconstruction of capitalist state-forms, it is worth making a similar (though in 
no way identical) analogy with Marx’s discussion of the distinct processes of 
subsumption through which capitalism can expand.247
 As you may recall, Marx saw subsumption as involving the possession, subordi-
nation and subsequent transformation of the labour process into a form compatible 
with capital’s tendency to self-valorisation. The chief moments of this process 
– formal, hybrid and real subsumption – refer to specific instances of capital’s 
confrontation with extant labour processes. Formal subsumption denotes capital 
taking hold of pre-existing forms of production, leaving the material organisation 
of them essentially intact, and extracting surplus from the labour process as it is 
given. Hybrid subsumption refers to transitional forms in which the valorisation of 
capital is achieved without a prior ‘freeing’ of labour, but is nonetheless not condi-
tioned by relations of direct domination. Real subsumption, by contrast, refers to 
instances where pre-existing labour processes are either entirely transformed or 
destroyed, and created anew in the image of capital.
 In like fashion, we may conceptualise the differentiated effects of capitalist 
revolutions in the creation and development of distinctly capitalist states, as 
different forms and processes of capital subsuming the state. In the case of 
real state subsumption, the existing pre-capitalist state is entirely transformed 
or altogether destroyed, and political institutions and the state apparatus are 
reconstituted in specifically capitalist ways. Under the formal form of state 
subsumption, some elements of the pre-capitalist state are partially or completely 
retained but others aspects are transformed in the service of optimised capital 
accumulation. By contrast, with hybrid state subsumption, the revolution leaves 
components of the pre-capitalist state intact but nonetheless marshals the state 
apparatus in the service of capital accumulation.
 From this perspective, the consequences of the bourgeois revolutions in the 
development of capitalist state forms in the United Provinces and England may 
be considered examples of ‘real subsumption’; the case of France, as well as 
later ‘passive revolutions’ in late 19th-century Germany and Italy, as forms of 
‘formal subsumption’; and perhaps the cases of post-1861 Tsarist Russia and 
Meiji Japan can be considered examples of ‘hybrid subsumption’. The benefits 
of such a conceptualisation are that it offers a historically sensitive and dynamic 
means of comparing different forms of bourgeois revolution and their resulting 
capitalist state forms. It dispenses with any kind of unilinear perspective that 
takes the Dutch or English examples as the normative model or benchmark, 
from which all other historical instances of capitalist revolution are then 
inevitably judged to be a ‘failure’ or ‘incomplete’.248
anievas maintext.indd   214 18/05/2015   12:18:57
215
c h a p t e r  7
Combined Encounters: Dutch 
Colonisation in  
Southeast Asia and the  
Contradictions of ‘Free Labour’
I have shewn how Situation hath given [Holland] Shipping, and how Shipping 
hath given them in effect all other Trade, and how Foreign Traffick must give them 
as much Manufacture as they can manage themselves, and as for the overplus, 
make the rest of the World but as Workmen to their Shops.
William Petty, 17511
Introduction
In Chapter 3, we saw that a demographic crisis, precipitated by Mongolian 
expansion, created a balance of class forces that eventually proved conducive 
to the ‘freeing’ of the direct producers from the bonds of serfdom. In Chapter 
4, we then demonstrated that the geopolitical pressures of the Ottoman Empire 
on ‘European’ development extended this process to enable the separation of 
the peasantry from their means of subsistence (by methods such as enclosures) 
and created a structural shift from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Each of 
these chapters indicated steps in the formation of capital as a social relation – the 
making of the capital–wage-labour relation. For many Marxists, this formation 
exhausts the processes of primitive accumulation, and the origins of the capi-
talist mode of production as such: the dispossession of the peasantry which, on 
the one hand, leaves peasants with no access to the means of production other 
than by the selling of their labour-power and, on the other hand, a ruling class 
with exclusive ownership of the means of production.
 Here we immediately run into a very simple historical problem. As many 
World-Systems Theorists (WST) insist,2 it is possible to point to numerous 
instances in which the capital relation has been dominant prior to the modern 
epoch. Although these accounts typically emphasise accumulation based on 
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merchant activity, such practices could, at times, make use of wage-labour and 
the extraction of relative surplus-value through the introduction of labour-
saving technologies. In addition to the ‘simple’ mercantile activity of buying 
cheap and selling dear, it is possible to find instances of commercial production 
based on market-dependent wage-labour in what might typically be described 
as ‘pre-capitalist’ social formations. For example, 16th-century diamond mines 
in Kollur, India employed up to 60,000 people, utilising a complex hierarchy 
of managers and workers to regulate production and distribution. ‘Governors’ 
were responsible for providing ‘fixed capital’ in the form of tools while ‘over-
seers’ regulated miners’ output.3 Similarly, in the Sung period (960–1279), 
mining and metallurgical enterprises in Kiangsu employed up to around 3,000 
wage-labourers.4 Across Italy from the 14th century onwards, serfdom had virtu-
ally disappeared and agrarian production was based on a variety of ‘modern’ 
employment arrangements including, in some regions, wage-labour (employed 
either permanently or as day-labourers). In many cases, this was accompanied 
by the reinvestment of capital in labour-saving techniques such as irrigation and 
more efficient crops.5 In short, whether we ascribe to a ‘commercialisation’ or 
‘social property relations’ perspective, it is possible to locate extensive evidence 
of capital before capitalism.6
 As we have seen (in Chapter 1), for WST, the identification of earlier forms 
of capital accumulation led to a theorisation of capitalism that is essentially 
transhistorical. For Political Marxists, the historical specificity of capitalism is 
retained, but at the expense of discarding historical evidence that might contra-
dict their theoretical presuppositions. To both we ask: why did these prior 
instances not entail the wholesale reordering of social relations into a world 
system based on the capitalist mode of production? Why was it specifically the 
outbreak of capitalism in the 16th and 17th centuries in the Northwestern 
European states – England and Holland, to follow both Brenner and Waller-
stein – that marked a definitive epochal shift from the ‘old’ mode of production 
to the ‘new’?
 In order to answer this question it is worth taking our cue from Marx, since 
despite his unrelenting emphasis on the historical specificity of the capitalist 
mode of production, he was also attuned to the existence of what he called ‘ante-
diluvian forms’7 or ‘sporadic traces of capitalist production’8 in the pre-capitalist 
epoch. Marx was keen to emphasise that these antediluvian forms were central to 
understanding the historical dissolution of non-capitalist modes of production, 
and were therefore crucial to identifying concrete historical processes involved 
in the emergence of capitalism.9 It is perhaps for this reason that Marx stated 
that commercial capital was ‘a historical precondition for the development of 
the capitalist mode of production’.10 Nonetheless, he also insisted that these 
forms of capital were unable, on their own, to create a new (that is, capitalist) 
mode of production – a point not lost on those critical of the commercialisation 
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model.11 If merchant or interest-bearing capital could not elicit an epochal shift 
from non-capitalist to capitalist mode of production, what could?12
 Marx addressed this question by confronting the implied circularity of the 
capital–wage-labour relation: if each side of this relation presupposed the other, 
the simple accumulation of one pole was insufficient as an explanation for the 
emergence of the other.13 The hoarding of capital, for example, could not alone 
create the social conditions for the purchase of wage-labour. The possibility of 
using capital to purchase labour-power was instead premised on the existence of 
a class with nothing other than their labour-power to sell – that is, the commod-
ification of labour-power itself – which implied a history beyond simply 
hoarding wealth. For many, primitive accumulation is nothing other than the 
commodification of labour-power – a bloody and violent history in which the 
(English) peasantry were torn from their land, leaving them with nothing other 
than their labour-power to sell.14
 However, a point often missed among those that emphasise such processes 
of ‘accumulation by dispossession’15 is that the simple emergence of a class of 
propertyless workers was also – on its own – not enough to constitute capitalism 
as a mode of production. Consequently, Marx warned:
In so far as [primitive accumulation] is not the direct transformation of slaves 
and serfs into wage-labourers, and therefore a mere change of form, it only means 
the expropriation of the immediate producers, i.e. the dissolution of private property 
based on the labour of its owner. Private property, as the antithesis to social, collec-
tive property exists only where the means of labour and the external conditions 
of labour belong to private individuals. But according to whether these private  
individuals are workers or non-workers, private property has a different character.16
Just as with merchant and interest-bearing capital, the ‘expropriation of the 
immediate producers’ involves ‘only’ the dissolution of extant social property 
relations. Once again, Marx insists that expropriation, while identifying 
perhaps the breakdown of an existing mode of production, does not account 
for why capital and labour come together and confront each other as a social 
relation. This suggests that there must be more to primitive accumulation as a 
historical process beyond the dissolving effects of interest-bearing and merchant 
capital, or the expropriation of the peasantry. Indeed, the prior existence of this 
confrontation between capital and wage-labour is, as we have seen, a transmodal 
(if sporadic and isolated) feature of history. Primitive accumulation is therefore 
better understood as a broader process that not only separates direct producers 
from the means of subsistence and production (that is, expropriation), but 
involves the (often forcible) coming together or encounter of the possessors of 
capital and those who only have their labour-power to sell.
 To understand this process better, we17 suggest a useful distinction can be 
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made between capital as a ‘simple’ transmodal social relation and the histor-
ically specific capitalist mode of production. Or put more simply, a distinction 
must be made between ‘capital’ and ‘capitalism’. While capital – as we have 
seen – refers to a social relation defined by the relation between capital and 
wage-labour, capitalism refers to a broader configuration (or totality) of social 
relations oriented around the systematic reproduction of the capital relation, 
but irreducible – either historically or logically – to the capital relation itself. 
This broader configuration may feature social relations that are specific to the 
modern epoch, but also those that precede it. They would certainly involve the 
‘accumulation of differences, particularly, race, age, and gender, inequalities, 
hierarchies, divisions, which have alienated workers from each other and even 
from themselves’,18 as well as ‘institutional’ (social) formations such as nation-
states, laws, financial and logistical instruments. It would, moreover, include 
coercive apparatuses such as militaries, police, armaments; but also consensual 
apparatus such as (specific) culture(s), ideologies, subjectivities, consciousness, 
psychologies and conducts.
 These broader relations of power oriented around the systematic repro-
duction of the capital relation enable us to distinguish between ‘antediluvian 
forms’ of capital from the historically specific epoch of capitalism. In antedilu-
vian forms, the capital relation was reproduced within a broader configuration 
of relations that pertained to non-capitalist modes of production. As such, 
antediluvian capital was subordinated to the non-capitalist social relations 
within which it existed, and could not posit itself as the condition of its own 
reproduction: that is, as self-valorising capital.
 The Northern Italian city-states constitute an archetypal example of this. 
Between Venice and Genoa, we find formally capitalist institutions and social 
relations, including the extensive use of wage-labour in agrarian and indus-
trial production, as well as sophisticated financial and commercial operations.19 
Nonetheless, Venice was ultimately at the behest of the war-making tenden-
cies of distinctly feudal or tributary states. Similarly, in terms of trade, Genoese 
capital was only able to carve out and protect its commercial interests by piggy-
backing on the coercive capabilities of other feudal states. The Genoese heavily 
depended on the protection of the Iberian powers, most clearly evidenced in 
the Estado da India, for the facilitation of trade. In this manner, they remained 
subordinate partners in an alliance with an otherwise pre-capitalist imperial 
formation.20 The end of Genoese financial dominance in Europe was very 
much marked by their inability to control decision making in this ‘colonial 
alliance’.
 In short, the extensive subordination of labour-power to capital undertaken 
by Genoa and Venice and their colonial possessions were undergirded by the 
most naked forms of feudal power. More significantly, Genoese and Venetian 
capital was itself instrumental in the reproduction of the feudal ruling class, 
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through the loans and provisionism implied in their financial and commer-
cial power, respectively. We must therefore look at the broader configuration 
of social relations both within and between societies along with the modalities 
through which they (collectively) reproduce themselves in order to gauge the 
existence (or non-existence) of a distinct mode of production. Both Italian 
city-states were able to exist as antediluvian social formations based on capital 
because of their very subordination to the feudal mode of production operating 
at this intersocietal level. Without the transformation of this wider intersocietal 
environment21 constituted by the feudal mode of production, any transition to 
capitalism in the Italian city-states remained necessarily partial and subject to 
systemic reversal.
 This also helps explain why these antediluvian forms of capital ultimately 
proved at once exemplary, but also localised, fleeting and unsustainable. 
In both the Genoese and Venetian cases, the immediate problem posed by 
feudalism was that broader configurations of power subordinated both capital 
and labour to their own ‘internal’ requirements. By the same token, there were 
few incentives within feudal pockets of capital accumulation to transform social 
relations, as ‘they had neither the desire nor the capabilities to undertake such 
transformative actions’, for any attempt to shed or destroy such feudal practices 
would have constituted an attack on the conditions of their own reproduction.22 
This goes a long way to explaining why their ruling classes showed little interest 
in revolutionising the mode of production. Consequently, for antediluvian 
forms of capital, limits based on a reliable and cheap supply of labour-power 
were a constant source of crisis and decline,23 since feudal relations on land, 
being dominant, had the tendency to reassert themselves. On the one hand, 
workers had opportunities to return to nonwaged forms of subsistence, 
through either family-oriented labour or subsistence farming. On the other 
hand, the feudal ruling class could swallow up huge amounts of capital and 
deploy it to reproduce feudal power rather than directing it toward productive 
investments.24
 An implication of this argument is that in order for capital to posit itself – to 
become self-reproducing – an array of strategies and techniques had to be (and 
continually have to be) deployed to reproduce the conditions of its own exis-
tence. Jason Read is therefore correct to highlight that ‘the two essential results 
of primitive accumulation – workers with only their labour-power to sell, and 
capital free to invest anywhere – are also effects of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion’s encounter with other modes and economies’.25 The origins of capitalism is 
then a history that not only creatively generates a new social relation between 
capital and labour, but also violently clears away, or appropriates, subsumes 
and subordinates other modes of power to the requirements of its own repro-
duction.26 In Capital, Volume III, Marx delineates this inherent multiplicity of 
capitalism’s becoming as a mode of production:
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Capital as capital, therefore, appears first of all in the circulation process. In 
this circulation process, money develops into capital. It is in circulation that the 
product first develops as an exchange-value, as commodity and money. Capital 
can be formed in the circulation process, and must be formed there, before it learns 
to master its extremes, the various spheres of production between which circulation 
mediates …. When the circulation process becomes independent in this way, as a 
process in which the spheres of production are linked together by a third party, 
this expresses a double situation. On the one hand, that circulation has still not 
mastered production, but is related to it simply as its given precondition. On the 
other hand, that the production process has not yet absorbed circulation into it as 
a mere moment. In capitalist production, on the contrary, both these things are the 
case. The production process is completely based on circulation, and circulation 
is a mere moment and a transition phase of production, simply the realization 
of a product produced as a commodity and the replacement of its elements of  
production produced as commodities.27
This suggests that there are two crucial moments in the transition to capitalism. 
First, capital via circulation masters ‘the extremes’ of the ‘various spheres of 
production’; and, second, through this mastering, circulation becomes absorbed 
into production. Where the commercialisation model emphasises the first 
moment, the social property relations emphasises the second. As the above 
quote indicates, however, these processes are not mutually exclusive or even 
distinct, but can and do form part of the same process. Hence, Marx writes, 
‘[Capitalism] is clearly the result of a past historical development, the product 
of many economic revolutions, of the extinction of a whole series of older 
formations of social production’.28
 Elsewhere, Marx’s fleeting remarks on subsumption taxonomically identify 
three different kinds of encounter between capital and labour which may (or 
may not) be implied in the transition to capitalism: real, formal, and hybrid 
subsumption.29 Each depends not only on the confrontation between capitalist 
and labourer, but also on variations in the control of the production process, 
subsumption of the means of production, and the character of exploitation 
and therefore also the character of surplus appropriation (absolute/relative) 
and level of technological development; that is, an assortment of relations not 
governed exclusively by the capital–wage-labour relation itself. Finally, and 
perhaps most revealingly, in Marx’s account of primitive accumulation we find 
a vast array of different ‘levers’ – themselves irreducible to capital – that bring 
capital into an exploitative relation with labour: the expropriation of serfs, the 
freeing of labour, the creation of a global market, the appropriation of New 
World precious metals, the subjection of indigenous communities, slavery, 
‘plunder’, the public debt, the credit-system, taxation, and so on.30
 Without wishing to labour the point, we think it is clear that the subsump-
tion of labour under capital reveals ‘not the effects of a single strategy or aspects 
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of a single process’,31 but uneven and multiple histories. The multiple vectors 
of causation that fed into the origins of capitalism as a mode of production are 
therefore ‘entirely disparate’.32 The unity or ‘totality’ of capitalism as a mode of 
production in becoming can only be concretely, historically, traced by identi-
fying these multiple vectors and their points of combination and articulation. 
An appreciation of this not only helps us to better understand capitalism, but 
also enables us to properly grasp the historical processes behind the ‘coming 
together’ of capital and labour, and so the origins of capitalism as such.
 The point of this theoretical digression is this: if we recognise that capitalism 
is constituted by practices that are non-identical with, subordinate to, and yet 
constitutive of the capital–wage-labour relation, then an understanding of the 
origins of capitalism must trace these practices, and how they became related 
to the capital–wage-labour relation. When we understand the history of capi-
talism’s origins in this broader sense, we are compelled to move away from any 
singular history (say the freeing of labour in the English countryside) to instead 
investigate those wider – often international – developments that were coeval 
with the emergence of capitalism and which may have influenced or determined 
its very emergence. We argue that once we acknowledge this, we are better able 
to address the historical puzzle posed at the start of this chapter: why Holland 
(or England) and not Venice or Genoa?
 Our argument in this chapter is that the making of capitalism as a mode of 
production was inseparable from the coeval processes of violent subordination 
that took place in Asia at the hands of the Europeans. In particular, we argue 
that colonisation in Asia was central to the mobilisation of capital and the 
subsumption of a dispersed mass of labour-power. We argue that this history 
– a history of the violent coercion of unwaged labour – was crucial to embed-
ding and systematically reproducing the wage-labour relation in Europe itself. 
Put differently, the reproduction of labour-power and capital presupposes for its 
existence a vast ‘unwaged’ sphere as one of the many configurations of power 
that mark capitalism’s birth.33 More specifically, the development of this coerced 
sphere of unwaged labour was crucial to (re)producing forms of subordination, 
exploitation and social stratification that were at the heart of alienating workers 
from their labour and from each other. In Chapter 5, we saw how the origins 
of plantation slavery as a specifically ‘combined’ capitalist enterprise, and the 
creation of social hierarchies of race and gender, emerged as specific functions 
of capitalist accumulation. In this chapter we examine further processes of 
subjugation that took place across the Indian Ocean littoral.
 In the first section, we show that by the turn of the 17th century, the Dutch 
ruling class was suffering from a crisis in the relatively low supply of the single 
most important commodity in the capitalist mode of production: labour-power. 
In the second section, we then examine how the Dutch ruling class, unlike 
the Venetians and Genoese who preceded them, were able to solve this crisis 
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through the accumulation, subordination and bringing together of a vast 
amount of capital and labour-power on a global scale. This involved a combina-
tion of New World surpluses with coerced labour in Asia. It took place through 
the historically specific experience of Dutch colonialism as an encounter – a 
moment of combination – between the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and 
various Asian societies in the Indian Ocean littoral. We argue that were it not 
for this moment of combination, and were it not for the Dutch drawing on an 
extensive – albeit dispersed – mass of labour-power in Asia, Holland’s capitalist 
development would have been unsustainable in the ways other antediluvian 
forms were. We then argue in the third section that the emergence of capitalism 
as a mode of production – as a wider set of practices that enable the reproduc-
tion of the capital–wage-labour relation – was necessarily dependent on, and 
built upon, the exploitation of ‘unfree’ labour. In fact, the vast quantities of 
unfree or unwaged labour exploited in Asia were the foundations on which the 
freedom of waged-labour in the Dutch Republic was built.
The Specificity and Limits of Dutch Capitalism
Dutch Institutional Innovations
Why the Dutch and not the Italian city-states? In his magisterial The Long 
Twentieth Century, Giovanni Arrighi argues that the Dutch represented a break 
from not only prior instances of capital, but also the feudal structure of power 
in Europe more broadly. According to Arrighi, the Dutch were the first to ‘be 
presented with, and seize, the opportunity to transform the European system of 
rule to suit the requirements of the accumulation of capital on a world scale’.34 
As such, they entered into conflict with feudal powers, and simultaneously 
came to be seen as champions of new dynastic rulers seeking to break from the 
hold of the Habsburg Empire and Papacy,35 leading to a broader sociopolitical 
transformation of the European states system. For Arrighi, this transforma-
tion found its clearest expression in the Thirty Years’ War and the subsequent 
conclusion of hostilities with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. The concomitant 
treaties pertaining to the freedom of the seas (and therefore trade) further 
indicate the reordering of the European states system in line with the require-
ments of capital accumulation on an expanded scale of operation. In these 
ways, Dutch policies aimed at transforming the European geopolitical order in 
the service of extended capital accumulation over the 17th century represented 
the kind of ‘hegemonic agency’ (albeit limited and partial) conceived by various 
neo-Gramscian scholars36 as the dialectical fusion of coercion and consent.
 Arrighi suggests that the Dutch were able to undertake this transformation 
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due to the strong affinities between capital accumulation and state-making, 
based on an alliance between Dutch merchants and the House of Orange. In 
contrast to the Venetians, who were ‘too capitalist’,37 and the Genoese, who 
effectively outsourced their territorialism to the Portuguese and Spanish, the 
Dutch were able to uniquely fuse the ‘logics’ of territorialism and capitalism 
better than any preceding state. In particular, Arrighi identifies three activi-
ties that proved vital to the establishment of Dutch – and therefore capitalist 
– hegemony. The first was the emergence and reproduction of Amsterdam as 
the ‘store’ or ‘warehouse’ of Europe, an entrepôt in which global commodity 
chains were concentrated to an unprecedented level. This enabled the Dutch to 
centralise ‘the storage and exchange of what happened to be the most strategic 
supplies of European and world commerce at any given time’.38 The Dutch thus 
seized on the ability to regulate and exploit price differentials, as well as control 
the supply of commodities as wide-ranging as ‘herrings and spices, English cloth 
and French wines, saltpetre from Poland or the East Indies, Swedish copper, 
tobacco from Maryland, cocoa from Venezuela, Russian furs and Spanish wool, 
hemp from the Baltic and silk from the Levant’.39
 Second, the establishment of the Bourse as the first stock exchange in perma-
nent session meant Amsterdam was able to act as a ‘pivot’40 that financially tied 
together the various protagonists engaged in European interstate conflicts.41 
As we have seen, throughout the16th and 17th centuries, wars were a near- 
permanent feature of early modern Europe. Alongside growing taxation, 
lending for war-making was one of the primary levers through which capital 
was accumulated. However, in contrast to the episodic and localised use of 
lenders and foreign credit (as with the Genoese and German creditors) that 
preceded it, sovereign credit practices grew as the Dutch were able to employ 
long term-credit planning and securities to widen the pool of investors. In these 
ways, the Bourse was able to act as a vacuum which sucked up capital from 
around Europe, ‘whether idle or not’.42
 Both the reliability of the Bourse and the scale of Amsterdam’s warehousing 
were tied to the third key development identified by Arrighi: the formation of 
the joint-stock company, the VOC. The VOC, by ‘internalising of protection 
costs’, became the primary institutional hinge through which the logics of terri-
torialism and capitalism were united. According to Niels Steensgaard, the VOC:
integrated the functions of a sovereign power with the functions of a business 
partnership. Political decisions and business decisions were made within the same 
hierarchy of company managers and officials, and failure or success was always in 
the last instance measured in terms of profit.43
With the internalisation of protection costs, the VOC was able to embark on a 
remarkable, unprecedented period of expansion into and subordination of Asian 
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markets, without experiencing the sorts of monetary drainage that typified the 
Spanish and Portuguese imperial projects.44 In the process, the VOC simul-
taneously acted as a remunerative outlet for capital investment and an agent 
capable of carving open new sources from which to procure investments. It was 
an instrument of global expansion and interconnection, ‘the medium through 
which the Dutch capitalist class established direct links between the Amsterdam 
entrepôt on the one side, and producers from all over the world on the other 
side’.45
 The value of Arrighi’s analysis resides in his emphasis on the distinguishing 
features between Dutch capital and that of the previously dominant Italian 
city-states. In doing so, he is able to bring out the importance of territorialism 
to capitalism, and with it, an appreciation for how the expansion of capital-
ism’s spatial scales and sphere of operations was crucial to its supplanting of 
feudalism. Nonetheless, in this very emphasis, Arrighi is unable to avoid 
sliding into the problems typically associated with WST. By not properly distin-
guishing between capital and capitalism, he anachronistically presupposes but 
does not explain the operation of a capitalist mode of production before the 
Dutch ‘generalisation’ of that mode. As such, the Dutch experience represents 
not an epochal break from the feudal mode of production and an instantiation 
of the capitalist production mode, but simply capitalism’s generalisation on a 
continuum of already existing capital. To recall Brenner’s critique of WST in 
Chapter 1, Arrighi’s explanation is a quantitative one: indeed, he explicitly 
states the transition that requires explanation ‘is not that from feudalism to 
capitalism but from scattered to concentrated capitalist power’.46
 As a consequence, his explanation for the emergence and preponderance of 
the Dutch, and through them capitalism, becomes concerned with an articulation 
of the institutional innovations that enabled the generalisation of this already 
existing capitalism.47 The whole process is largely seen from the perspective of 
the minimisation of institutional blockages that might hinder capital accumula-
tion. Institutions such as the Bourse lowered ‘transaction costs’, smoothing the 
investment opportunities of capital.48 Similarly, the VOC internalised ‘protec-
tion costs’,49 enabling the functioning of capital free from the fetters of feudal 
territorialism. Displaying some uneasy affinities with neoclassical institution-
alism, Arrighi therefore presupposes rather than explains the presence and 
functioning of ‘the market’.50 Equally, the capital–labour relation, in either its 
formation or its generalisation, is completely sidelined, and exploitation as a 
source of surplus is removed from the understanding of capitalism.51
 In contrast, we argue that such institutional levers are significant, but 
only inasmuch as they enable the initial and then systematic reproduction 
of the capital relation. That is to say, there is nothing to presuppose that any 
given institution or logistical arrangement is inherently capitalist by virtue of 
its very existence. The situation becomes all the more murky – according to 
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Political Marxists at least – when we consider that the institution at the heart 
of the process – the VOC – relied so heavily on ‘extra-economic’, nonmarket, 
monopoly means for surplus appropriation. As such, the capitalist character 
of such institutions can only be properly ascribed – if at all – when they are 
situated within a broader systemic ‘logic’ of capital accumulation. The key then 
is to understand how Arrighi’s three institutions – and in particular the VOC 
– functioned as levers for capital accumulation by looking at their connections 
with the reordering of specific social relations, and in particular the reproduc-
tion of capital as a social relation. It might perhaps then seem opportunistic for 
us to draw on a tradition we have been at pains to criticise, but insofar as these 
constitute limits in Arrighi’s analysis, some understanding of ‘social property 
relations’ would appear crucial.
The Limits of Dutch ‘Domestic’ Capitalism
As we saw Chapter 6, come the 16th century, Holland was experiencing highly 
urbanised, proto-industrial development, with a concomitant expansion of 
wage-labour in agrarian production and the widespread orientation of production 
towards market activities.53 That is, it bore many of the hallmarks of capitalism, 
but one riddled with a number of contradictions and limits, which were bound 
up in its peculiar trajectory out of serfdom. This trajectory was marked by a 
programme of land reclamation, which opened extensive tracts of land to peasant 
colonisation.54 Although driven mainly by the feudal ruling class, land reclama-
tions provided a material basis that tended to favour the Dutch peasantry because 
of the limited jurisdictional authority of the Dutch nobility, for whom seigniorial 
rights were decoupled from large landownership. The intersection of colonised 
land and the absence of large demesnes meant that the Dutch peasantry held 
exceptionally strong property rights.55 Consequently, ‘even after processes of 
commercialisation and urbanisation had been sped up in late medieval Holland, 
small peasant property proved to be very resilient’.56 In the mid-16th century, 
peasant ownership of arable land was remarkably high, around 50 per cent on 
Peter Hoppenbrouwers’ estimates.57 At the same time, the concentration of land 
into large farms remained ‘a slow and protracted process’.58 Strikingly, of land 
leases in 1500, 70 per cent were smaller than 4.4 hectares; by 1600, this had risen 
to 79 per cent. This suggests that despite strong indications of capitalist develop-
ment through the emergence of wage-labour and commercialised land, these on 
their own did not enable the expropriation of the peasantry and centralisation 
of capital on a significantly large scale.59
 As such, capitalist development was marked, but ‘rare’ in the 15th to early 
16th centuries.60 The strength of the peasantry constituted a block to the ruling 
class centralising the means of production; and these same restrictions on the 
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ruling classes’ ability to engross and enclose land ensured that peasants were not 
‘freed’ from their means of subsistence, which restricted the supply of waged-
labour-power. Where peasant freedom was restricted, it was not by a typically 
feudal class – the landed nobility – but by urban capital, which was able to 
integrate surrounding rural areas through investments in production and short-
term leasing of land on competitive terms.61 This gave Dutch capital in the 16th 
century a distinctly ‘proto-industrial’ character, based primarily on an ‘elastic’ 
supply of wage-labour, in which small-scale agriculture was combined with 
market-oriented waged work.62
 It was only after 1580 that this ‘limited’ or ‘constrictive’ form of capitalist 
development broke down and ‘accumulation got its way’:63 land was concen-
trated in the hands of the ruling class and rural producers were expropriated 
and separated from their means of subsistence. Small-scale protocapitalist 
enterprises based on an elastic labour supply gave way to larger farms worked 
by hired waged labour.64 It was in this same period that the United Provinces 
experienced a large-scale migration of propertyless peasants to urban areas and 
a subsequent ‘enlargement, concentration and proleterianisation in the urban 
(textile) industries’.65 Eventually, through this process of primitive accumula-
tion, ‘the rural proletariat became an urban “real” proletariat no longer capable 
of self-reproduction’ outside of the sphere of wage-labour (see also Chapter 6).66
 Crucially, one outcome of this process was an increase in the demand for 
labour-power concomitant with a reduction in its supply in the 17th century, as 
population growth could not keep pace with economic growth. This ‘continual 
scarcity’ of ‘flexible and ample’ labour-power meant real wages in Holland 
increased in the first half of the 17th century.67 This scarcity and the subsequent 
rise in wages dovetailed with a decline in productivity, as ‘proto-industrialisa-
tion’ in the countryside waned. The rise in wages and decline in productivity 
pointed to an ‘upper limit’ of capitalist growth – indeed, precisely such condi-
tions contributed to the decline of antediluvian experiments in Renaissance 
Italy.68 And yet these very conditions prefigured, of all things, the Dutch Golden 
Age. This suggests that the Dutch ruling class not only managed to survive this 
crisis of scarcity in labour-power, but actually excelled and expanded under 
such conditions. Their expansion was all the more remarkable considering the 
general crisis that beset Europe in the 17th century. So how did they do it? For 
Brenner:
high wages hardly spelled disaster; quite the contrary. Over the same period 
exports rose, attesting to the capacity of van Zanden’s merchant capitalism to 
raise productivity in keeping with rising labour costs. Rising wages must indeed 
have contributed rather significantly to the economy’s growth, for so long as they 
were offset by rising productivity and were prevented from squeezing profits, and 
so long as the products that were produced could find sufficient demand, rising 
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wages could provide the sort of dynamic domestic market available in few if any 
other locations in Europe in this period. In addition, rising wages must have 
spurred the substitution of capital for labour, the introduction of labour-saving 
technological changes that, in many instances, must have accelerated the growth 
of overall productivity.69
However, Brenner’s suggestion presupposes, but does not demonstrate, 
increases in Dutch productivity, the ‘emergence of a domestic market’ and the 
‘introduction of labour-saving technology’. More specifically, he overlooks the 
most striking and controversial feature of Dutch capitalism: that it did not bring 
about the sorts of rapid technological innovation in an industrial revolution 
that would later mark the experience of British capitalism.70
 So if the conditions Brenner outlines did not pertain, how were the Dutch 
able to confront this crisis in the scarcity of labour-power? A clue can be found 
in Capital, Volume I, where Marx describes two ways through which value 
production is made possible ‘by using mechanisms other than increasing relative 
surplus-value’.71 Marx argued that:
by incorporating with itself the two primary creators of wealth, labour-power and 
land, capital acquires a power of expansion that permits it to augment the elements 
of its accumulation beyond the limits apparently fixed by its own magnitude, or by 
the value and the mass of the means of production, already produced, in which it 
has its being.72
This clue helps us understand how the Dutch were able to overcome the limits 
of their ‘domestic’ capitalist development, namely the crisis in the supply of 
labour-power. In the face of falling productivity and rising production costs, 
‘workers increasingly had to be recruited from elsewhere’.73 By incorporating 
labour-power on a global scale, Dutch capital acquired a power of expansion 
it hitherto did not possess. We argue in the following sections that Dutch colo-
nialism played a fundamental role in this ‘recruitment’ strategy.74 As we shall 
see, it not only offset labour scarcity, enabling the expansion of free wage-labour 
at home, but was instrumental in the instantiation of capitalism as a mode of 
production taking an increasingly international form.
 The specificity of the Dutch encounter with these Asian states was marked 
by intersecting levels of unevenness. Advantages derived from the acquisition 
of New World precious metals and from naval capabilities meant that they were 
able to successfully integrate themselves into the Indian Ocean trading system. 
But because of the strength of extant commercial networks and for-market 
production, undergirded by relatively powerful local ruling classes, the Dutch 
had to insert themselves into already existing modes of production. This meant 
that the forms of integration varied depending on the specific society encoun-
tered by the Dutch. Therefore, before we go on to explicate these processes 
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in more detail, a brief snapshot of the uneven and combined developmental 
characteristics of the Indian Ocean littoral is both necessary and revealing. For 
not only did this uneven and combined character prefigure further uneven and 
combined relations with the Dutch, it also constituted the very basis on which 
Dutch dominance in the region – and Dutch capitalism more broadly – was 
founded.
Unevenness and Combination in the Pre-Colonial  
Indian Ocean Littoral
The Intersocietal System of the Indian Ocean
Stretching from the South China Sea to East Africa, subsuming the Arabian 
Sea and the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean littoral was inhabited by an 
immensely uneven constellation of social formations.75 Such was the variation 
of South Asia that some strands in recent historiography have rejected the idea 
of treating the Indian Ocean (or more broadly still ‘South Asia’) as a coherent 
unit of analysis, or reducing these radical differences between different soci-
eties to a single taxonomic type.76 At the same time, the opposite tendency to 
discuss history in this part of the world in terms of micro-sociologies and/or 
histories is encumbered with the opposite issue – that these different parts of 
the Indian Ocean (or again, South Asia) were not disconnected or disarticulated 
social formations existing hermetically side by side. Rather, they were part of 
an interactive multiplicity, and as such were fundamentally bound together in 
terms of their own modalities of social reproduction. Despite the unevenness of 
the Indian Ocean littoral, it was also a loosely combined intersocietal system, 
both sophisticated and complex in its integration.77 Hence, ‘the diversity of 
Southeast Asia and its openness to outside influences were amongst its defining 
characteristics. Every state in the region was built on cultural trade-offs both 
internal and external’.78 These variations, and the interconnections between 
them, meant the Indian Ocean was a world of dizzying multiplicity, interaction 
and hybridity, with various overlapping layers of authority, power, culture and 
social relations.79
 Melaka (or Malacca, in the English spelling) was a particularly striking 
instance of this. According to a (perhaps exaggerated) account by Tome Pires, ‘in 
a single day people there were heard speaking 84 different tongues’.80 Melaka’s 
social norms were, moreover, strikingly ‘tolerant’ and ‘cosmopolitan’. Inter- 
marriages across different religions and ethnic groupings were allowed, different 
faiths were taxed equally, and Hindu traditions permeated and coexisted with 
Muslim ones.81 There were clear material reasons for this: as the central node 
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of trade linking the South China Sea and Indonesian archipelago to the Bengal 
coast, it was a flourishing port of trade in which traders from across Eurasia 
intersected. These combinations were inscribed in the administrative make-up 
of the port. Resident Asian merchants consisted of four groups: the Gujaratis; 
other Indian and Burmese merchants; merchants from Southeast Asia; and, 
merchants from East Asia including Chinese, Japanese and Okinawans. Each 
of these four groups was allowed to have a shahbandar, a harbourmaster who 
managed the affairs of that particular merchant group autonomously of the 
local authorities in return for receiving merchants from their own country of 
origin. Shahbandar performed an administrative function for the local rulers, 
while acting as brokers and intermediaries between their merchant counterparts 
and the local population.82
 Such practices were not specific to Melaka alone, but were instead prev-
alent throughout the region. In various periods, Kelings and Chinese acted 
as shahbandar in Banten. In Ayutthaya, Chinese traders were responsible 
for captaining trading ships in the mid-17th century.83 King Narai of Ayut-
thaya also employed a Persian merchant, Aqa Muhammad, and later a Greek, 
Constantine Phaulkon, as okya phrakhlang – head of the royal guard. In the 
reign of King Boromakot (1732–58), Phaulkon’s grandson became supervisor 
of Christian merchants and an overseer at the royal storehouses.84 In Ayutthaya, 
money changing and accounting was typically assigned to Gujuratis, Sinds and 
Coromandel. The chief accountant of Ayutthaya was Persian, and his subordi-
nates Chinese.85 The Chinese also came to prominence in the Ayutthayan state 
in the 1690s, with a Chinese merchant obtaining the title of okya yomarat (chief 
justice).
 Intermarriage between members of different communities often played a 
crucial role in mediating such ethno-religious ‘combinations’. The Teochiu 
merchant, Cheng Yung, obtained a gambling monopoly in Ayutthaya, subse-
quently settled there and married a Siamese woman. Their child, Taksin, 
subsequently became governor and later ruler at the new capital Thonburi 
(opposite modern Bangkok) after Ayutthaya’s fall in 1767.86 It was also common 
for VOC officials in Batavia to marry Indonesian women, many of whom 
became responsible for their private trade. Others would use intermarriage as 
a way of accessing positions of local power.87 De Brochebourde, a Frenchman, 
travelled to Siam with the VOC, and in 1659 he married a local woman there. 
This enabled him to subsequently enter the service of the King Narai in Ayut-
thaya as his personal physician. Still under VOC employment, he acted as 
mediator between the king and the VOC in commercial relations. His son 
and grandson followed in his footsteps.88 Similarly, a Portuguese mestizo, Jan 
Domingos de Matto, served King Sanphet VIII as an envoy to the English East 
India Company in Madras.89
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South Asia beyond the Eurocentric Gaze
In short, across South Asia, many rulers officially and actively promoted the 
settlement and intermarriage of foreign individuals, and their incorporation 
into state administration. Not only was their know-how of markets and political 
conditions and customs in their own countries valuable, they could also elicit 
trust among their compatriots. This served an especially significant economic 
function, since ‘operations such as long-distance orders, deferred payments, 
and commenda (entrusting capital) could not be carried out without a basis of 
mutual confidence and a common code of moral values, if not a common system 
of law’.90 Hence, the use of non-indigenous administrators extended beyond 
technical know-how and commercial benefits to the political reproduction of 
the local ruling class. As Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells explains, ‘as long as 
they retained their separate identity, foreign merchants posed less of a threat to 
the ruler than their influential counterparts from among the indigenous elite, 
who had manpower and factional loyalties at their command’.91 Equally, the 
segmentation of different autonomous merchant groups served as a mechanism 
through which the rulers could effectively check the power of individuals with 
exceptional access to commercial wealth.92 We thus find within Ayutthaya and 
Melaka the juridical and geographical separation93 and administrative autonomy 
of different trading communities as a fundamental component of local, 
indigenous ruling class strategies of reproduction.
 A grasp of this particular feature of the Indian Ocean helps us understand 
the conditions under which the European-Asian encounter of the 16th and 17th 
centuries took place. As Ulbe Bosma and Remco Raben argue, ‘in light of the 
long history in Asia of ethnic, cultural and legal pluralism, we may conclude 
that a flexible integration of European immigrants was the norm rather than 
exception’.94 Moreover, this alerts us to the specificity of such integration, one 
rooted in the peculiarity of the uneven relations between Europeans and these 
Asian societies. In contrast to the prevalent Eurocentric view of Asian commerce 
as ‘mere peddling’, precolonial merchants were instead integrated into sophis-
ticated political and economic networks that were often deployed in order to 
accumulate extraordinary amounts of wealth and power.95 Precolonial commer-
cial activities involved considerably more than ‘buying cheap and selling dear’, 
with Asian merchants using favourable positions within, or relations with, local 
states to intervene in processes of both production and surplus extraction.96 At 
other times, the intersection of merchant and state interests meant state power 
could be deployed to compete commercially with Europeans should otherwise 
‘friendly’ relations sour. The Portuguese and later Dutch and English found that 
local rulers were capable of producing and deploying military capabilities that 
could – on occasion – match them.97
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 Considering the vibrancy, complexity and strength of these networks, it would 
be a mistake to equate the European arrival in South Asia with a concomitant 
dominance of the region. Faced by large, powerful and wealthy Asian states, 
Europeans’ ability to act autonomously, let alone dictate terms to Asian rulers, 
was extremely limited.98 Unlike the New World, ‘these were lands containing 
large, dense native populations with old and complex military, political, 
economic, and cultural institutions over which the new European conquerors 
claimed suzerainty’.99 The sort of colonialism exercised in the New World was 
not an option here, which in part helps explain some of the problems faced by 
Iberian states seeking to settle and develop agrarian forms of surplus extraction 
in Asia as they had done in the Americas. Unlike the near total control and 
plunder of American resources, South Asia presented a very different challenge 
to the early Europeans who entered the region. Where Europeans were able to 
gain a foothold, it was either through integration into existing networks and 
social relations of surplus appropriation obtained through careful negotiation 
with existing power-holders, or failing that, through brute force.100 As Prakash 
puts it, ‘the Europeans – both the companies as well as the individual traders 
– had no option but to operate within the given organizational structure of 
procurement and trade’.101 Hence, European domination in South Asian was 
initially marked ‘by dispersal through shifting and opportunistically motivated 
combinations with local power holders’.102 For, as Janet Abu-Lughod argues, 
‘the rise of the West was facilitated by the pre-existing world economy that 
it restructured’.103 Taking the examples of Dutch activities in the Indonesian 
archipelago and the subcontinent in turn, we now delineate the manifold tech-
niques used by the Dutch to integrate otherwise disparate arenas of production 
into an integrated logic of accumulation.
The Dutch Encounter: A Policy of Combination
The Specificities and ‘Success’ of Dutch Strategies of 
Integration and Domination in Southeast Asia
The success of the Dutch (and subsequently British) in contrast to the Portuguese 
should be understood in terms of the strategies of integration delineated above. 
In particular, the VOC’s amalgamation of disparate regions of Asian trade into 
a self-sustaining and expanding intraregional network helps us understand the 
success of Dutch colonialism. In contrast, the ‘failed hegemony’ of the Portu-
guese was marked by an inability to adapt sufficiently to the local context they 
entered. Despite achieving some regional integration, centred on the trading 
networks of Melaka, Portuguese activity was based and dependent on the 
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assistance of Tamil merchants operating in the port city.104 Eschewing 
commercial expansion, the activities of the Estado da Índia Oriental were 
primarily directed at the ‘unbridled expropriation of late medieval Eurocentric 
territorialism into judicially alien space’.105 
 Two policies in particular marked out Portuguese activities. First, they 
concentrated largely on ‘redistributive’ or ‘tributary’ activities:
 [The] cartaza system of maritime licenses and tolls and the juridically prescribed 
practice of qufla (convoy transport) flowed from the quintessential feudal insti-
tution of mare clausum; throughout the Indian Ocean economy the Portuguese 
ruthlessly superimposed closed seas upon the indigenous system of mare liberum.106
Second, the experience of Iberian success in colonising the ‘New World’ was 
combined with an emphasis on coercive extraction, which led the Portuguese 
to pursue a territorialist form of administration based on the fortalez-feitoria107 
fortress system and foreiro property rights.108 The impulse for this territorialist 
turn was itself geopolitical, circumscribed first by Commander Afonso de Albu-
querque’s aims of displacing the Venetian spice trade109 and crusading against 
Islam, and second by the subsequent conflict with the Ottoman Empire over 
access to the Indian Ocean (1538–57). Culminating in a series of sieges of the 
Portuguese-held city of Diu (1538, 1541, 1546, 1549), the Ottoman threat 
to Christendom now manifested itself in the ‘East’, thus intersecting with 
commercial concerns over spice markets.110
 The Portuguese knew that for expansion to be sustained in this region they 
would require some form of material support, which was achieved by granting 
land and privileges to those who participated in military campaigns (a practice 
originating in colonial Brazil in the 1530s). Crucially, this necessitated a policy 
of settlement in agricultural areas, which subsequently instigated the tendency 
for ‘land-adventurism’ and geopolitical accumulation among the Portuguese in 
South Asia.111 Otherwise, the Portuguese sought to obtain from local rulers the 
rights to revenue collection in the form of customs and taxes.112 
 The territorialist turn had two important consequences. First, the Estado 
became dependent on what proved to be an unsustainable land-based form of 
surplus extraction via taxation. According to Eric Michael Wilson, this ‘ulti-
mately precluded the fidalgos from commercially exploiting the ultra-lucrative 
inter-Asian “country” trade’.113 Second, surpluses were typically funnelled into 
maintaining these specifically coercive or redistributive enterprises (as well 
as seigneurial consumption), rather than productive investments.114 Hence, 
the pursuit for monopolies on spices was eventually abandoned in favour of 
imposing duties and freight charges,115 and commercial activity did not survive 
the individual merchant undertaking the enterprise.116 In short, there was no 
permanence to, or expansion in, Portuguese commercial operations.
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 In contrast, the Dutch took the very different approach of pursing a ‘large 
scale and systematic participation in intra-Asian trade’.117 This began with 
the spice-producing islands in the Indonesian archipelago, where the Dutch 
managed to monopolise nutmeg, mace and cloves. Pepper proved consider-
ably more difficult to monopolise, due to its ubiquity in Asian trade.118 It was 
produced in multiple regions and was prevalent in wider networks of Euro-
Asian trade that traversed not only the Indian Ocean, but also the Inner Asian 
land routes. Competition among Europeans over pepper intersected with a 
variety of Asian merchant communities also dependent on the commodity. For 
many pepper-producing areas, rice and especially textiles, rather than bullion, 
were the primary medium of exchange. For this reason, the procurement of 
Indian textiles became central to the VOC’s operations, and it inserted them 
into networks of trade centred on the subcontinent. 
 This region, due its own local specificities, presented new challenges to the 
Dutch. In particular, the trade in textiles depended on capital advances and 
exchange with precious metals. With limits to how regular bullion could be 
shipped from European stores bursting with New World silver, the Company 
was compelled to further integrate Asian commercial networks.119 Hence, the 
VOC established a colonial presence in Hirado (Japan) for silver and in Taiwan 
for silks and gold. With access to these commodities, the Dutch were able to 
obtain Indian textiles on the Coromandel coast. Similarly, the VOC established 
trading rights in Persia, accessing silver mines there. Through this process, the 
Dutch established a network of trade that connected Japan to Persia via the 
Indian coast and the Indonesian archipelago.
 How were the Dutch able to do this? The answer is very much rooted in an 
appreciation of the uneven and combined interactions between the Dutch and 
Iberian states. The Dutch were latecomers to the colonial game. While Iberian 
states had experience of territorialist expansion in the Americas, the Dutch were 
relatively peripheral to such activity. This meant that the Portuguese were more 
committed to feudal-territorialist forms of surplus extraction based on mare 
clausum, while, by contrast, the Dutch explored the potential of sustaining and 
exploiting the already existing South Asian system of mare liberum. Moreover, 
the Dutch saw an aggressive commercial policy in Asia as a mechanism through 
which they could undermine Iberian power and aid the efforts of liberation 
from Habsburg Spain back in Europe.120 This striking passage from Grotius’s De 
Indis illustrates these considerations at the heart of the VOC’s operations:
[The Spanish] will be obliged to turn from their attacks upon others in defense 
of themselves, keeping innumerable ships for their protection in East Indian 
waters, strengthening their colonies with fortifications, and (most troublesome of 
all!) maintaining a suspicious vigil over all things at one and the same time. The 
numerous and heavy expenses thus to be incurred will drain away not only all the 
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private profits of the Portuguese, but also the whole of the East Indian revenue 
accruing to their state itself, the unwavering enemy of Dutch liberty... Accordingly, 
if all the produce and revenue from Philip’s East Indian possessions can be encum-
bered with a burden of expense equal to that already laid upon certain European 
possessions of his, it must surely follow that the future management of the war 
will prove much easier for us …. If, then, Spanish revenues fail – and with them, 
the credit necessary to procure additional funds – what outcome is to be expected 
other than a military insurrection leading to a great revolution?121
In line with their ‘privileges of backwardness’, the Dutch sought to dismantle 
the nascent forms of Portuguese colonialism, not by replicating the feudal 
territorialism of the Portuguese, but by circumventing them altogether and inte-
grating and appropriating Asian practices. Further, the Dutch realised that in 
order to supplant the Portuguese, they needed to control all the main sources of 
supply.122 They reasserted the extant principles of mare liberum, leaving existing 
circulation practices largely intact, and focused more resolutely on integrating 
and controlling production.123
 The resultant intra-Asian network proved central to Dutch domination of the 
region, for it provided a way to squeeze Spanish Habsburg revenues, facilitating 
the Dutch rebellion back in Europe. Moreover – and we can only speculate 
whether this was an unintentional byproduct of an otherwise geopolitical 
motive – it helped establish what Banaji calls the permanent and expanding 
circulation of capital:
only here, in the early seventeenth century was there a conscious attempt to build 
a ‘permanent circulating capital’, that is, generate sufficient reserves for further 
expansion of the business. By ‘permanent circulating capital’ Coen meant the 
permanent and expanded circulation of capital mainly in the form of commodities 
extracted from one end of Asia to the other and circulating between the different 
Asian markets where the VOC had factories.124
Contrary to dominant wisdom, this was not the simple operation of mercan-
tile capital ‘buying cheap and selling dear’, or even just the establishment of 
monopoly privileges in the region. Nor was it, as Steensgaard suggests, simply 
the ‘institutional innovation’125 of the joint-stock company in ‘oceanic gover-
nance’126 that placed profit over power in Dutch considerations. Insisting on the 
exploitation of labour-power as the basis for capital accumulation, we argue 
that the integration of intra-Asian trade facilitated capital accumulation beyond 
simply oiling the wheels of commerce. That is, the establishment of permanent 
circulating capital was instead rooted in transformations in the social relations 
of production across South Asia. Ultimately, Dutch preponderance rested on 
intervening and eventually establishing control over production and thus also 
labour-power. The integration of intra-Asian trade, therefore, facilitated for the 
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first time the organisation of ‘a hierarchy of capitals connecting a dispersed mass 
of labour-power’127 on a ‘global’ scale.
 However, it would be a mistake to suggest that this connection of intra-Asian 
trade was the product of some inherent entrepreneurial or ‘capitalist spirit’ in 
the Dutch.128 Rather, Om Prakash argues that the impulse to develop these links 
was specifically devised in Batavia in relation to the ‘realities of Asian trade’.129 
By 1612, Hendrik Brouwer, who would later become governor-general of the 
East Indies, noted, ‘The Coromandel Coast is the left arm of the Moluccas, 
because we have noticed that without the textiles of Coromandel, commerce is 
dead in the Molucca’.130
 The compulsion to bring these different sections of Asian trade together did 
not come from some ‘internal’ capitalist essence at the heart of the VOC, or an 
entrepreneurial spirit among Dutch merchants, but was rather the outcome of 
a series of aleatory encounters with the various social formations of South Asia, 
and the respective ‘external’ challenges each posed to the viability of VOC oper-
ations.131 It was, in short, an uneven and combined development. In the process, 
the VOC fostered a form of colonial control over a dispersed mass of largely 
unfree labour-power,132 enabling it to accumulate capital despite the absence of 
a robust market of labour-power domestically. We now trace this sequence of 
encounters, beginning with the spice trade in the Indonesian archipelago, and 
then turning to textile production in the subcontinent (Coromandel and Bengal 
in particular). Finally, we discuss how the integration of these different nodes 
affected the development of capitalism with specific reference to its relation to 
free labour in Europe.
The Moluccas
Drawn to the highly profitable spice trade, the VOC initially and predomi-
nantly centred its operations around the Indonesian archipelago. It managed 
to negotiate agreements with the rulers of Ambon (1605) and Ternate (1609) 
granting exclusive access to clove production. Similar agreements were obtained 
for mace and nutmeg from the Banda Islands in 1605, and were renewed 
by conquest in 1621. From Banten, the Dutch conquered Jakarta in 1619, 
renaming it Batavia, and established the VOC’s Asian headquarters there. 
Batavia subsequently acted as the base for VOC operations in the region, 
and in particular its campaign to monopolise spice trades in the surrounding 
islands.133
 The VOC’s attempts were in every instance framed by and refracted 
through the social formations it encountered in the region. The kingdoms 
of Melaka, Ternate, Tidore, Bacan and Ayutthaya followed many of the 
features of a classical tributary structure, building relations with neighbouring 
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communities, who would typically pay tribute in kind to the emperor.134 None-
theless, two features separated these kingdoms from archetypal tributary states 
such as the Ottomans, Mughals and Chinese. First, some, such as Melaka, paid 
tribute to the Chinese Empire, and were therefore incorporated into wider trib-
utary relations as ‘peripheral’ rather than ‘central’ agents. Second, the control 
exercised by these kingdoms over neighbouring communities was never 
‘complete’ or ‘total’. Many vied for independence, and acted autonomously 
through piracy, establishing colonies of foreign merchants, and competing 
either geopolitically, culturally or commercially with larger kingdoms (such as 
Siak, Kampar and Pahang).135 As Anthony Reid argues, ‘no state incorporated 
such dependents fully; they remained a stateless penumbra of the state’.136 Due 
to this relative autonomy, the surrounding collection of islands that made up 
the Indonesian archipelago was marked by further relations of unevenness. 
Geographically, the region was resistant to large land-based empires, instead 
consisting of ‘a multiplicity of political forms interlinked by the ease of water-
borne transport’.137 The specificity of the spice producing islands thus informed 
the way in which the VOC sought to integrate into it.
 The Middle Moluccas were relatively parcellised, with village communities 
ruled by a small feudal elite – the orang kaya. Local arrangements meant the 
peasantry were subordinated and ruled via corvée-type modalities of surplus 
extraction,138 which bound them to the land, imposing labour dues such as 
cultivating clove trees and other services. In this context, the VOC’s acquisition 
of cloves, or the award of monopoly rights on cloves produced, was mediated 
not by local brokers, usurers or merchants, but through the orang kaya, who 
were best placed to not only maintain (or increase) peasant cultivation of cloves, 
but also deliver products to the VOC, for which they received a commission.139 
However, due to local arrangements on the land, the population of the Middle 
Moluccas were able to reproduce themselves through means outside of the 
revenue earned from clove production, specifically through fishing, hunting 
and subsistence farming on common land.140 In the Middle Moluccas then, ‘the 
reproduction of labour power in subsistence agriculture was completely sepa-
rated from the production of cloves; the surplus labour was supplied almost 
gratuitously to the VOC and the local elite’.141
 Although the Dutch were able to tap into this gratuitous supply of surplus 
labour, this also meant that some degree of control over labour-power tended 
to escape them. The Dutch responded to this challenge by making use of local 
methods of levying tribute through violence to ‘protect their monopoly’ and 
coerce labour. They organised annual hongi – naval expeditions mobilised 
by Moluccan rulers to extract tribute from other Islands. The VOC adopted 
this practice to extract tribute, but also modified it for the additional purpose 
of attacking villages with smugglers and destroying clove production in 
areas outside of its immediate control.142 By using these extant but modified 
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techniques, the Dutch were able to control production, and in particular prevent 
over-production, while maintaining monopoly privileges.143
 Other similar combined geopolitical methods were used elsewhere. In 1605, 
the VOC conquered the Portuguese fort of Ambon, and subsequently under-
took a long-term project to concentrate clove production on the islands around it 
by eliminating other production areas such as the North Moluccas. They did so, 
in the first instance, by making arrangements with local rulers in the Northern 
Moluccan kingdoms to destroy clove trees on their islands, concentrating clove 
production in the Middle Moluccas.144 In other cases, they destroyed coconut 
and sago, two important means of subsistence, to punish any clove-producing 
peasants who sold spices to smugglers.145
 Unsurprisingly, such actions were met with local resistance. In 1641 and 
again in 1646, Hitu elites rebelled against Dutch incursions, and then in 1651 
another conflict emerged with the ruler of Ternate. Such rebellions were fiercely 
and bloodily crushed by the Dutch, which subsequently led to the wholesale 
destruction of the Hoamol peninsula. On the one hand, this enabled the Dutch 
to annihilate the production of cloves in the North Moluccas and concen-
trate production in the Middle Moluccas in VOC hands. On the other hand, 
as a result of hostilities between 1653 and 1658, ‘the peninsula’s population 
was decimated’, while survivors were brought to Ambon to supplement the 
population, which had declined as a result of the (guerrilla) war.146 In these 
ways, the Dutch were able to subsume and control land and labour-power – 
those two ‘primary creators of wealth’ that imbues capital with a ‘power of 
expansion’ beyond its own limits.
The Banda Islands
Confronted by very different relations of production in the Banda Islands, the 
VOC had to employ altogether different techniques to obtain the mace and 
nutmeg produced there. The Banda Islands were more decentralised than the 
Moluccas, and marked by the absence of any higher tributary or dynastic authority 
standing above and mediating between them.147 The orang kaya, although still 
present to some degree, exercised considerably less power and autonomy in the 
Banda Islands than in the Middle Moluccas. Instead, the small ‘city-states’ (negorij) 
that composed the Banda Islands were relatively autonomous from each other, 
and the ‘free citizens’ in each wielded or influenced political power through the 
medium of village meetings.148 Nutmeg and mace produced in this region were 
central to obtaining rice and textiles from elsewhere, and local producers were 
unable – largely because of geographical constraints – to rely on subsistence 
farming. As a result, each village tended to be more dependent on trade for its 
social reproduction than the communities found in the Middle Moluccas.
anievas maintext.indd   238 18/05/2015   12:19:08
239
combined encounters
 This context made it considerably more challenging for the Dutch to impose 
a monopoly. The forms of ‘gratuitous labour’ of the Middle Moluccas were 
unsustainable in the context of a population heavily dependent on the market 
for their subsistence. In addition, the decentralisation of power and weakness of 
the orang kaya meant there was no autonomous and sufficiently powerful ruling 
class capable of exercising control over the bulk of the population. Conse-
quently, nascent attempts by the Dutch to assert authority in the region were 
met with resistance from the local population. This took the form, for example, 
of guerrilla wars against Dutch attempts to build forts on the islands.149 In other 
cases, local workers went on ‘strike’ by sabotaging production150 or refusing to 
pick spices by migrating to the high hills.151 And although the Dutch set up a 
monopoly agreement with the local orang kaya in return for protection from 
the Portuguese and English, smugglers were regularly able to circumvent this 
agreement and the English were able to establish a fort of their own.152
 Spurred by the resistance of the local population, and competition of other 
European companies and Asian merchants alike (the ‘whip of external neces-
sity’), the VOC resorted to violent means in order to assert its control over 
nutmeg and mace production.153 Acting on the pretext that the Banadanese 
were breaching monopoly agreements, the VOC instigated a remarkably 
brutal military conflict, killing the majority of the Bandanese population 
by 1621. Only a few hundred of a population that had numbered around 
15,000 survived. Many of those that did survive were set to work on nutmeg 
production or sent to Batavia as slave labourers.154
  The genocide of the Bandanese necessitated a ‘rebuilding’ of the social 
relations of production in line with VOC interests. The Dutch, confronted with 
a cultivable but unpopulated land, did not, however, turn to the sort of settler 
colonialism exercised in other contexts, in particular because of the prohibitively 
high costs of ‘free’ labour.155 Instead, they established ‘one of the first modern 
plantation economies based on slave labour’.156 Each plantation produced 
almost exclusively nutmeg and mace, and was divided into 68 parcels called 
perken. Perkeniers were recruited from the VOC, and assigned to each perken to 
manage production by purchasing slaves from the VOC at a fixed price, who 
then worked each parcel of land.157 Through their contractual agreements with 
perkeniers, the VOC was able to set a low price for the spices and ensure that 
products were delivered exclusively to its agents.158
 In the form common to modern plantation slavery, the rate of exploitation 
was exceptionally high, deaths were common and slaves were unable to reliably 
reproduce themselves. According to van Zanden, 200 slaves were imported 
annually to maintain a permanent slave population of around 4,000 on the 
Island.159 Although the VOC was plugged into already existing forms of exploita-
tion and production, its appropriation of these techniques created considerably 
more exploitative practices than what had preceded it. This was not just due to 
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a quantitative increase in the rate of exploitation, but also a qualitative trans-
formation of the role of slavery in the reproduction of the ruling class. Where 
before, slavery was primarily used by the native ruling class in a ‘personalized 
social hierarchy’, the VOC was the first to make slaveholding impersonal and 
institutionalised, a system in which ‘a corporation – not an individual – held 
persons in perpetuity’.160 The variant levels of exploitation between the two are 
evidenced in demographic figures: the percentage of children in the domestic 
Asian slave population was 8–9 per cent, while for those owned by the VOC, 
the figure was 20–25 per cent.161
 Owing to the exceptional rate of exploitation and death in the plantations, 
the reproduction of labour-power took place outside of the VOC’s opera-
tions. Slaves were largely obtained as abductees from what Markus Vink calls 
‘segmented micro-states and stateless societies’162 in ‘peripheral’ areas of the 
region, who were brought to market by local slave traders and bought by the 
VOC.163 Among these groups were hunter-gatherer bands, shifting cultiva-
tors, pastoral nomads and wet rice farmers.164 In many instances, ‘booms’ of 
slave trade were directly connected to the dispossession of these communi-
ties, through famines, revolts or wars in surrounding states.165 Through this 
process of combined development, the VOC melded together the hunter- 
gathering mode of production with plantation slavery via the mechanisms and 
exigencies of merchant capital. Labour-power that was reproduced in the hunter- 
gatherer mode of production was deployed and exploited in the plantation. Since 
the costs of reproducing slaves were far outstripped by the labour performed, 
the VOC was able to appropriate an exceptionally large quantity of surplus 
labour. By pushing down the costs of production, the VOC established both 
the social relations and techniques of exploitation necessary to extract ‘super-
profits’ from the colonies. These were realised through the sale of spices in the 
European ‘core’, where gross profits on spices could exceed 1,000 per cent.166 
Beyond this ‘quantitative’ benefit, this form of exploitation further developed 
techniques and structures of exploitation and accumulation that would, by the 
18th century, be used in the thriving slave trade and plantation production in 
the New World.167
Indian Textiles
An additional mechanism used by the Dutch to ensure monopoly over the spice 
trade was cornering the Indian textile industry, since textiles were the dominant 
medium of exchange through which spices were obtained in the region. Rather 
than pursuing textiles at the point of exchange, the Dutch intervened at the 
point of production, setting up a permanent presence in the form of factories on 
the Coromandel Coast from 1606 and in Gujurat from 1618.168 This put them 
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in contact with the land-based Mughal Empire, which dominated the subcon-
tinent, constituting a pivot around which much of the Indian Ocean trading 
network was centred. The Empire was, by any standards of the age, highly 
‘advanced’, with a standard of living above that of Europe and a population of 
over 100 million in 1600, which would expand over the course of the next two 
centuries.169 Its mode of production was tributary, with a land-holding patri-
monial ruling class – the zamĭndārs – distributed throughout the Empire and 
formally subordinated to the emperor (see Chapter 8).
  The zamĭndārs were responsible for extracting land revenue from the peas-
antry and passing it on to the centre.170 Although this form dominated, there 
were some instances, especially in port towns, where merchants or usurers acted 
as mediators by transferring surpluses to the centre. As we have seen, in many 
instances merchants, especially foreign ones, played a preponderant political and 
economic role, sometimes even in an administrative capacity. Equally, the tribu-
tary ruling class often used their political privileges to participate in commercial 
activities, and mediate between rural production and coastal shipping.171 In this 
respect, ‘mercantile activity and tributary relationships were symbiotic’ and at 
times inseparable.172
 Production in the Mughal Empire took place primarily in villages173 by 
direct producers who had formal control over the production process, means of 
production and their own labour.174 In textile production, the individual weaver 
was the basic ‘unit’ of production, and typically tended to devote all of their 
labour-power to production for the market.175 The weaver manufactured cloths 
for the market at a set quantity, price and date of delivery agreed with merchants. 
These agreements were structured around payments advanced by merchants, 
who offered a large part of the final value of the contract to enable the weaver 
to pay for raw materials as well as the costs of reproduction for them and their 
family. The weaver retained formal control over the production process. None-
theless, this was ultimately an exploitative relation since ‘debt obligations often 
rendered the artisans subject to coercive control by the merchants’.176
 Such a structure necessitated a significant quantity of readily available capital, 
which was facilitated by the exigencies of the tributary mode. The reproduction 
of the Mughal state depended on a reliable system of transferring wealth from 
periphery to centre, and then from the centre back to the periphery, primarily 
for the costs of local administration and warfare. The needs of this tributary 
circulation were often met through a sophisticated network of credit and money 
markets, organised and administered by sarrafs across a complex and broad-
reaching network of money clearing houses – often temples flush with religious 
endowments – throughout the South Asian countryside.177
 Confronted by the vast strength of the Mughal state in the country-
side, and also the competitive wealth and knowledge of local merchants, the 
VOC (and other European companies) was compelled to integrate into these 
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pre-existing social relations of production. Hence, direct producers were tied 
to the VOC through a hierarchy of advance payments mediated by an array of 
local merchants and money lenders. Typically, Asian merchants were respon-
sible for ensuring advances reached weavers at a steady and reliable rate. They 
did so by employing clerks on a monthly salary who ensured weaver produc-
tion remained steady.178 Such was the symbiotic character of these relations 
that European companies at times made use of sarrafs and merchants to obtain 
capital for advances.179
 As Banaji argues, when this strategy was situated in the context of South 
Asia, the self-expansion of capital went well beyond simply buying cheap and 
selling dear. Under the competitive pressures of Asian merchants and other 
chartered companies, it required ‘some measure of control over production’.180 
By inserting its agents into local practices and social relations, the VOC was 
able to oversee an increasing subordination of rural producers to production 
for the market.181 In fact, such strategies of subordination became especially 
pronounced when they were met with local resistance. The VOC found that the 
advance system could be exploited by either intermediaries or direct producers 
trying to cut costs and keep a greater proportion of the value of the product for 
themselves. Such ‘resistance’ became manifest through the dual problem of ‘bad 
debts’182 and the production of poorer-quality textiles. In response, the VOC felt 
compelled to intervene more directly in production, and exert greater control 
over the production process. One of the ways it did so was by setting up facto-
ries that dealt with production, storage and distribution in port cities along the 
Indian Ocean littoral.
 One example of this was a centre for silk-reeling installed in the VOC factory 
at Kasimbazar in Bengal in 1653. It initially employed over 3,000 reelers before 
being reconstructed in 1715 to accommodate over 4,000 workers. Initially, the 
VOC recruited ‘master-reelers’ who were paid in advance against a specified 
amount of reeled silk, while also providing them with equipment, working space, 
and raw materials. In 1674, the VOC sought to impose even greater control 
over the production process by demoting the master reeler and assuming all the 
‘risks’ of capital investment.183 We then see the VOC going beyond activity in 
the circulation process and intervening directly in production, assuming both 
ownership and control of the direct production process. Such factories demon-
strated the possibility of forms of hybrid subsumption giving way to something 
resembling the formal subsumption of labour under capital in the colonies.
Conclusion
If we were to reformulate the above historical overview from the theoret-
ical perspective of uneven and combined development, it would appear that 
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the combination of VOC attempts at monopolisation with pre-existing Asian 
social relations of production enabled the Dutch to construct an integrated 
colonial apparatus that established expanding, self-reproducing, permanently 
circulating capital. Central to this was the integration and subsumption of ‘a 
dispersed mass of labour’ through the combination of a multiplicity of uneven 
forms – advances, debt peonage, corvées, plantations and wage-labour– under a 
single enterprise, the VOC. In these ways, the Dutch ‘went beyond the limits of 
circulation and invaded the arena of production in the process of establishing 
colonial economies’.184 This not only ‘guaranteed for itself the production of 
goods in the world market’, but formed the basis from which ‘super-profits’ 
based on cheap production costs could readily be exploited.185 In turn, these 
returns on colonial trade propelled and underwrote the financial preponder-
ance of Dutch financial institutions, and Amsterdam’s role as the entrepôt 
of Europe.186 As a result, the success of the institutional innovations empha-
sised by the likes of Steensgaard and Arrighi can only be properly understood 
when they are situated in an understanding of the ‘globalised’ subordination of 
labour-power elucidated in this chapter.
 This combined form of primitive accumulation proved central to Dutch 
economic preponderance, for it effectively overcame the limits of Dutch 
‘domestic capitalism’, in particular the lack of readily available labour-power. 
This helps us understand why the peculiar form of social relations of produc-
tion found in the United Provinces proved ultimately sustainable, despite all 
the odds of success seemingly stacked against it. A scarcity of labour-power 
and high wages proved no impediment to further capitalist development, for 
there was a ready store of cheap labour-power available ‘elsewhere’. When the 
European experience is tied to these vectors of colonial exploitation, it becomes 
apparent that the high wages of European workers proved central to the real-
isation of super-profits derived from the sale of colonial commodities back in 
Europe (see Chapter 5). Moreover, the sort of ‘internal market’ created by high 
wages only proved sustainable insofar as a ready supply of commodities for the 
reproduction of wage-labour was made available. Before the Industrial Revolu-
tion, this supply could only reliably come from the colonies. Silvia Federici, in 
comments that focus on capitalist patriarchy and slavery in the New World, but 
that are equally applicable here, succinctly summarises this interrelation:
On one side, a global assembly line was created that cut the cost of the commod-
ities necessary to produce labor-power in Europe …. On the other side, the 
metropolitan wage became the vehicle by which the goods produced by enslaved 
workers went to the market, and the value of the products of enslaved-labor was 
realized.187
Hence, the simple presence of production based on ‘free’ wage-labour in the 
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United Provinces is only one side of the story that enables us to understand 
its capitalist development. This is not to say that the Dutch embarked on their 
colonial path in search of a surplus population capable of bringing down wages. 
What we are after here is not an explanation of how capitalism tends towards 
colonialism. We argue the reverse: that in part, colonialism explains the emer-
gence of capitalism as a mode of production. In this respect, our argument differs 
from WST. Rather than treating South Asian societies as passive agents in this 
process, we have demonstrated the ways in which they were actively – both 
oppositionally and collaboratively – involved in the formation of this process, as 
constitutive agents in the making of capitalism as a global mode of production. 
Moreover, we argue that the specificity of this agency, and the Dutch encounter 
with it, can only be properly explicated – in contrast to WST – by disclosing 
the multiple vectors of uneven and combined development witnessed in this 
co-constitutive process.
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c h a p t e r  8
Origins of the Great  
Divergence over the Longue 
Durée: Rethinking the 
‘Rise of the West’
There are no miracles in nature or history, but every abrupt turn in history... 
presents such a wealth of content, unfolds such unexpected and specific combina-
tions of forms of struggle and alignment of forces of the contestants, that to the lay 
mind there is much that must appear miraculous.
V. I. Lenin, 19171
Force is nothing apart from its effect; its being consists entirely in this coming to 
be and passing away. If the substance of things is force, their mode of existence 
turns out to be appearance. For, a being exists only as ‘vanishing’, one that ‘is per 
se straight-away non-being, we call … a semblance [Schein]’.
Herbert Marcuse, 19412
Introduction
How in the space of some 300 years did the leading edge in global economic 
and military power pass from ‘East’ to ‘West’? What processes led to the break-
through to capitalism in Western Europe and its subsequent ascendency to 
global domination? However formulated, questions concerning the origins of 
the ‘rise of the West’ have been at the forefront of social scientific debates since 
their inception: the topic was central to the works of Max Weber and figured 
prominently (if implicitly) in Marx’s studies and within Marxism ever since. 
Whether focusing on Europe’s unique cultural and institutional inheritance 
(Greek philosophy and science, Roman law, representative forms of gover-
nance, citizenship ideals, politically decentralised forms of governance and 
sovereignty, the rationalising effects of a ‘protestant spirit’ and so on), its distinc-
tively inherent ‘restless rationalism’, and/or its advantageous ecological system 
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(temperate climates, deep soils, navigable rivers and large coastlines, abundant 
and diversified resource endowments), traditional explanations of Europe’s rise 
to global supremacy locate its origins as immanent to Europe itself.3
 The ‘European miracle’ is conceived as one of self-generation emerging from 
the unique if not peculiar attributes of a singular culturally and geographically 
defined sociohistorical experience. ‘The “miracle” of massive economic develop-
ment’, Michael Mann writes, ‘occurred “spontaneously” in Europe, and nowhere 
else’.4 Similarly, Ricardo Duchesne has insisted on the ‘uniqueness of the West’, 
emphasising its ‘higher intellectual and artistic creativity’ and its ‘exceptional’ 
development of reason, and freedom.5 Accordingly, from such perspectives, 
there was – and perhaps still is – something inherently exceptional about ‘the 
West’ that distinguished it from the rest.
 Such self-aggrandising narratives of Western exceptionalism have come 
under heavy criticism from an array of different scholars and disciplinary 
fields.6 While diverging in their analyses and conclusions, these critics share a 
common theme of problematising any notion of a uniquely self-propelling ‘rise 
of the West’. They have instead focused on the purely conjunctural, often ‘acci-
dental’, and sometimes downright lucky factors that they argue explain Europe’s 
rise. These revisionist or ‘decentred’ historical perspectives have offered a signif-
icant challenge to traditional, Eurocentric historical narratives. We share with 
these perspectives a concern with the intersocietal conditions and determina-
tions shaping Europe’s developmental trajectory to global dominance. As our 
argument has so far shown, the revisionists are correct in arguing that there 
was nothing endogenous about Europe’s cultural, socio-economic and political 
development that necessarily led it on the path to global pre-eminence.
 We nonetheless take issue with and challenge the revisionists’ predominately 
conjunctural mode of analysis in explaining Europe’s late breakthrough, along 
with their tendency to deny substantive developmental differences between 
‘West’ and ‘East’ (as well as within Europe itself ). In this chapter, we begin by 
demonstrating the myriad theoretical and methodological difficulties the revi-
sionist historiography runs into when explaining the ‘rise of the West’. We then 
provide an alternative structural and conjunctural explanation by drawing on 
uneven and combined development. First, however, it is important to note how 
much of the debate concerning the ‘rise of the West’ has centred on explaining 
why it was Europe, and particularly Britain, that industrialised first, and why 
other non-European states did not follow its lead. While this is certainly a signif-
icant part of the puzzle, it nonetheless fails to engage with the earlier history 
of European colonialism, which was in fact a key precondition to Europe’s later 
rise to global pre-eminence. For it was this earlier period of British colonialism 
that really laid the foundations for its subsequent global primacy, with India 
in particular providing the material inputs for Britain’s industrialisation. The 
capturing of India also afforded the British Empire crucial strategic advantages. 
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In addition to occupying a territorialised dominion in the very heart of Asia, 
Britain obtained a substantial and relatively cheap military force, which it could 
then use to open up other markets throughout the world.
 Therefore, if there is a single conjunctural factor or moment explaining 
Britain’s – and later Europe’s – rise to global supremacy, it was Britain’s colo-
nisation of India. Before examining this world-historical event in the third 
section of this chapter, we must first understand why and how Britain was 
capable of militarily conquering the Mughal Empire in India. We do so in the 
second section, where we assess one significant structural factor evoked in the 
neo-Weberian literature on the ‘rise’ of Europe over the longue durée: the unusu-
ally competitive and war-prone character of the European feudal states system. 
But before doing so, we first turn to critically examining the key claims of the 
revisionist historiography.
Rethinking the ‘Rise of the West’: Advances and 
Impasses in the Revisionist Challenge
Points of Agreement: European ‘Backwardness’ 
and the Role of the Colonies
Before examining our differences with the revisionist histories of the ‘rise of 
the West’, we must first point out our areas of agreement. For when explaining 
the ‘rise of the West’ revisionists emphasise a key factor that we too have been 
highlighting throughout this book: the ‘privilege of backwardness’ afforded to 
later-developing European societies and the concomitant ‘penalties of progres-
siveness’ eventually encountered by the more advanced tributary empires in 
Asia. For Andre Gunder Frank, the sorts of commercial expansion experienced 
from 1400 onwards were initially more keenly felt by Asian powers than other 
regions, as exemplified by the tributary Ottoman formation (see also Chapter 
4). At a certain point, however, these advantages of progressiveness turned into 
strategic liabilities and ‘a growing absolute and relative disadvantage for one 
Asian region after another in the late eighteenth century’. The very precondi-
tions for growth in Asia led to crisis, ‘as growing population and income, and 
also their economic and social polarization, exerted pressure on resources; 
constrained effective demand at the bottom, and increased the availability of 
cheap labor in Asia more than elsewhere in the world’. Less developed soci-
eties – Europe (and later North America) – subsequently reaped a ‘privilege of 
backwardness’, taking advantage of these crisis conditions in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, developmentally catching up and overtaking Asia in the international 
system. This leads Gunder Frank to conclude that:
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between 1400 and at least 1700 as well as earlier, there was nothing ‘exceptional’ 
about Europe, unless it was Europe’s exceptionally marginal, far-off peninsular 
position on the map and its correspondingly minor role in the world economy. 
That may have afforded it some ‘advantage of backwardness’.7
In this sense, the qualitative unevenness of sociohistorical development, 
exhibited by the asynchronic simultaneity of an interactive multiplicity of different 
societies, afforded latecomers particular advantages in their development. This 
was neither an automatic nor a predestined process, but one where both conjunc-
tural and structural factors (specifically, particular constellations of geopolitical 
relations) and the role of agency were key. It is precisely this ‘privilege of back-
wardness’ afforded to European societies that provides one of the clues to how ‘the 
West’ ascended to global supremacy over the longue durée. However, this factor 
alone is surely not enough for an explanation of its rise, as the opportunities 
opened up to later-developing states to adopt the most cutting-edge technologies, 
organisational forms and state practices from leading states in no way explain how 
and why they adopted such ‘foreign’ materials, nor to what uses they were put.
 Another factor often identified in the revisionist literature is the colonies, 
and particularly the American ‘discoveries’. Again, to quote Frank:
So how did the West rise? The answer, literally in a word, is that the Europeans 
bought themselves a seat, and then even a whole railway car, on the Asian train 
… how so? … The most important answer is that Europeans obtained the money 
from the gold and silver mines they found in the Americas.8
Putting aside the Smithian trappings of Frank’s analysis, it was not so much the 
rise of bullion flows from the New World in itself that was particularly signif-
icant, but the differential uses to which they were put. And these different uses 
of bullion were, in the first instance, influenced by the differential forms of 
developments already taking place across Europe. Hence, those countries where 
protocapitalist relations were emerging or had already emerged – Holland and 
England – made much more productive use of the bullion than did Spain, which 
was set on a course of empire-expanding geopolitical accumulation congruent 
with its feudal relations of production (see Chapter 5).
Late and Lucky: Contingences, the Eurasian 
Homogeneity Thesis, and the Great Divergence
So on these two critical points – the ‘privileges of backwardness’ and the role 
of the New World discoveries in explaining the ‘rise of the West’ – we are in 
agreement with the revisionists. However, we disagree with the revisionist 
account insofar as it denies substantive socio-economic and political differences 
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between the ‘West’ and ‘East’, as well as in Europe itself prior to the ‘rise of 
the West’. For example, Jack Goldstone argues that the ‘conditions in Europe’ 
were no ‘different from those in the advanced regions of Asia until … c. 1800’, 
and that the divergence between the two was the result of ‘chance events’ rather 
than ‘long standing prior differences’.9 He suggests, more radically still, that 
‘the major states of Europe, China, India, and the Ottoman Empire were all 
experiencing a similar course of advanced organic development’.10 Similarly, 
Jack Goody cautions ‘against drawing too sharp a contrast between East and 
West in those features of social organization that could relate to the onset of 
capitalism, modernization and industrialization’. For, as Goody further notes, 
‘economically the distinct qualitative difference between East and West came 
only with industrialization’.11 Kenneth Pomeranz too writes of the ‘variety 
of early modern core regions’ with ‘roughly comparable levels and trends of 
development in their everyday economies’.12
 In attempting to downplay Eurocentric claims regarding the uniqueness of 
the European experience, revisionist scholars wash away important differences 
between the European and non-Western social structures in explaining the 
advent of capitalism and modernity. As laudable as such attempts are in seeking 
to displace narratives of European exceptionalism, the methodological and theo-
retical drawbacks are immense, to say nothing of the empirical difficulties of 
sustaining such arguments.13 Ontologically flattening the myriad social structures 
making up the early modern world makes it very difficult – if not impossible – to 
explain the striking divergences in their developmental trajectories. As Joseph 
Bryant puts it, ‘The conundrum is inescapable: a world flattened of determinant 
social differences makes the local emergence of any historical novelty structurally 
inexplicable, and restricts explanatory options to conjectures aleatory or incidental’.14
   The tendency to deny the forms and sources of differential patterns of devel-
opment between ‘East’ and ‘West’ also leads the revisionists to ignore and often 
blur the distinctions between industrial and merchant capital, resulting in a 
precarious engagement with the emergence of capitalism as a historical mode of 
production.15 Holding to a neo-Smithian interpretation of capitalism as reduc-
ible to ‘the market’ or levels of commercialisation, such approaches fall into a 
somewhat different, though no less problematic ‘tempocentric ahistoricism’ that 
John M. Hobson criticises realist International Relations theory for – a world 
where the market ‘economy’ of the Sung era of the 11th and 12th centuries 
becomes indistinguishable from that of modern industrial capitalism.16 Here 
again we see the significance of differentiating between ‘antediluvian’ capital and 
capitalism as a mode of production, as elaborated in Chapter 7: for conflating 
commerce and markets with capitalism results in a transhistorical extension, 
and thus a naturalisation of capitalism’s existence.
 None of this is to argue for a reinstatement of the kind of essentialist 
understanding of the European experience as somehow ‘exceptional’, marking 
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it off from ‘the rest’. Rather, we call for a recognition of how the interactively 
generated socio-economic and political differences between Europe and other 
societies played a part in the former’s eventual rise to global pre-eminence. For, 
as noted in Chapter 4 and further examined below, the very ‘backwardness’ of 
the European feudal economies – in particular the decentralised and conflict-
ually fragmented nature of their corresponding political structures – facilitated 
the propitious conditions from which capitalist social relations could emerge. 
And crucially, this was structurally conditioned by feudal Europe’s near- 
constant interaction with the more ‘advanced’ tributary Ottoman formation, which 
persistently acted as a ‘whip of external necessity’ on European development. This 
Ottoman whip ultimately offered the structural geopolitical space from which 
both the Netherlands and England could emerge and consolidate themselves as 
capitalist states (see Chapters 4 and 6). Here again we see how the asynchronic 
simultaneity of a plurality of coexisting societies (unevenness) came to interact in 
ways that generated further substantive sociological differences (geopolitical and 
sociological combination), in turn leading to sharp divergences in their develop-
mental trajectories. This is in fact a hallmark of any intersocietal system: they are 
generatively differentiating through the very interactive plurality of their units.
 Moreover, once the initial breakthroughs in capitalist relations were made 
in the Netherlands and England, this led to increasing material disparities – a 
widening of the competitive gulf – between these societies and others. Bryant is 
thus indeed correct when writing that the:
protracted and forcible dominion of the West over the Rest … cannot logically 
be accounted for on the basis of fundamental similarities between conqueror and 
conquered, oppressor and oppressed, but must, in the very nature of so inequitable 
an outcome, register the relational consequences of differences and disparities – 
political, military, economic, technological, cultural, ecological – as these played 
out in a coercive contest for land, resources, mastery.17
It is precisely through the framework of uneven and combined development 
that we may seek to comprehend these ‘relational consequences of differences 
and disparities’. For while unevenness incorporates difference into its very 
premise, ‘it involves a conception of difference that is not neutral with respect to 
the power, and hence the inequality, of its subjects of difference’.18 The substan-
tive sociopolitical and economic differences emerging between Northwestern 
Europe and other societies in the early modern epoch also signified differences 
in material power capabilities which would come to prove crucial in the former’s 
subsequent rise to global domination.
   Without recourse to some form of structural explanation of these diverging 
paths of development over the longue durée, the revisionists are left to account 
for the ‘rise of the West’ in terms of pure contingencies and world-historical 
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accidents. In the words of Hobson, ‘In one sense the rise of the West could 
indeed be explained almost wholly through contingency’.19 Similarly, Gold-
stone describes the conjunctural factors leading to Britain’s transformation 
into a modern, industrialised state as the ‘most freakish of accidents’.20 For 
Pomeranz, the contingent combination of coal and colonies provided Europe 
with the necessary resources to launch itself into self-sustaining economic 
growth, escaping the labour-intensive path of development.21 Without any 
substantive conception of interactive, differentiated sociopolitical multiplicity, 
revisionist accounts can only provide an ‘episodic and atomistic view of social 
change, wherein determinant efficacy is vested not with ongoing trajectories 
and systemic institutional configurations, but with the autonomous play of 
variables and the re-routings occasioned by extraneous contingencies’.22
 This is then a historical sociological approach that erases the ‘historical’ and 
‘sociological’ from analyses, as sociohistorical developments are conceived in 
radically discontinuous terms and sharp breaks in which antecedent conditions 
from which developments usually enfold are entirely displaced. This is not to 
deny that contingent or fortuitous factors may have aided the process of ‘catch-
up’ and ‘overtake’ development that occurred in Northwestern Europe during 
particular conjunctures. Nonetheless, something much deeper – more structural 
– was also clearly at work in the process, as we examine below.
 While marking some important advances over conventional explanations of 
the ‘rise of the West’, conceived in wholly endogenous terms of causal factors 
at play within Europe, the revisionist challenge nonetheless fails in offering a 
viable alternative. It remains beset by the problems of analytical indetermina-
cies, empirical shortcomings, and a reliance on a purely conjunctural mode of 
explanation that forgoes a theorisation of the sociohistorical processes at work 
for the play of free-floating contingencies. In the absence of any such alternative 
theorisation, the revisionist approach is unable to fully overturn or dislodge the 
prevailing ‘rise of the West’ paradigm. As Bryant concludes: ‘[w]e need neither 
a new sociology nor a new history; all that is required is a fully integrative and 
encompassing historical sociology’.23 As we hope to demonstrate, this is exactly 
what the theory of uneven and combined development can provide: a more 
integrative and encompassing international historical sociology.
Structure and Conjuncture in the ‘Rise of the West’
The Geopolitical Competition Model and Its Limits
Such an international historical sociology is precisely what neo-Weberians have 
claimed to offer in their explanations of the genesis of the modern state system 
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and the ‘rise of the West’.24 The basic premise of the neo-Weberian model is that 
geopolitical competition was the fundamental determination driving processes 
of state formation and their variations where in the European context it engen-
dered the modern system of territorialised sovereign states. As Mann puts it, 
‘[t]he growth of the modern state, as measured by finances, is explained primarily 
not in domestic terms but in terms of geopolitical relations of violence’.25 In 
some accounts, these systemic pressures of contending European states are 
also conceived as a fundamental determinant in the rise of capitalism.26 Benno 
Teschke schematically explicates the causal sequence at work here: ‘international 
systemic competition ➜ war ➜ cost increases ➜ increased resource extraction 
➜ new modes of taxation and fiscality ➜ military-technological innovations ➜ 
state monopolization of the means of violence ➜ state centralization and ratio-
nalization’.27 The eventual upshot of this causal sequence was the emergence 
of a more proficient system of territorialised sovereign states which gave Euro-
peans a decisive comparative advantage in the means of violence over the rest of 
the world, laying the foundations for their subsequent rise to global dominance.
   However, there are two key shortcomings of the geopolitical competition 
model as it specifically relates to explaining the ‘rise of the West’. The first 
regards the implicit syllogism underlying the model’s causal sequencing: that is, 
‘political multiplicity – anarchy – competition’. In other words, the significant 
socio-economic and political effects that the neo-Weberians derive from the 
‘whip’ of geopolitical competition in spawning technological and organisational 
innovations in European state-building practices takes for granted precisely 
what needs to be explained: why was the European states system so competitive 
and war-prone?
 Indeed, it is not at all clear why and how political multiplicity itself generates 
a condition of competitive anarchy, or that it can say anything meaningful about 
the frequency or changing forms of geopolitical competition and their effects.28 
To move from political multiplicity to competition requires the dubious realist 
assumption that societies necessarily threaten each other.29 Yet the syllogism 
‘political multiplicity – anarchy – competition’ only works with the addition of 
a further intermediary variable: ‘existential threat’. This is the surely the insight, 
albeit divorced from a political economy of interstate competition, provided 
by social constructivists and the Copenhagen School.30 Hence, neo-Weberians 
smuggle in the highly problematic (neo-)realist assumption that any anarchic 
system of multiple polities will automatically induce geopolitical competition, 
rivalry and war.31 Yet ‘the mere geographical contiguity of polities cannot in 
itself explain why late medieval and early modern inter-state relations were 
bellicose’, writes Teschke, ‘unless we assume the anthropologically questionable 
idea of man as a natural power-maximizer or a psychologizing rational-choice 
model, where risk minimization creates an inherent security dilemma’.32
 Moreover, in emphasising the undifferentiated effects of military rivalry 
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on European state formation processes, there is a partial convergence between 
neo-Weberians and neorealists over the role of geopolitical competition as 
a kind of Darwinian selection mechanism sorting the weak from the strong. 
According to this approach, the competitive logic of the states system will, by 
its very nature, reduce the variety of states. Certain kinds of state will (often 
forcefully) be proven unviable. The military and political rivalries inherent 
to the Europe states system in the late Medieval and early modern period led 
to what Charles Tilly calls ‘a ruthless competition, in which most contenders 
lost’.33 It is in this sense that Kenneth Waltz speaks of geopolitical competition 
producing ‘a tendency towards the sameness of the competitors’.34 For inscribed 
in the very logic of the states system is the tendency for political units to become 
more homogeneous: unfit forms of state are eliminated, while those remaining 
become more like each other through the process of competition. This ‘isomor-
phic logic of geopolitical survival’35 is largely accepted by the neo-Weberians.36 
In this respect, the origins of the modern states system, and thus the ‘rise of 
the West’, is very much a ‘flat’ story of how the world became populated with 
formally equal sovereign states.
 The upshot of all this is that the neo-Weberians incorporate a realist 
conception of ‘the international’, reproducing the same reified, ahistorical 
understanding of geopolitical relations as a suprasocial entity detached from 
any conception of historical social structures. This has in fact been a persistent 
criticism of the historical sociological literature: that ‘the international’ remains 
‘powerfully acknowledged but analytically unpenetrated’, leading to the 
continual charges of ‘attaching an essentialized, Realist conception of the inter-
national onto historical sociology’.37 For the neo-Weberian model, the problem 
is particularly debilitating, as the central factor they posit (geopolitical compe-
tition) in accounting for Europe’s global ascendency is simply assumed but not 
explained. Moreover, the different European states’ responses to the universal 
problem of war facing them in the late Medieval and early modern epochs were 
strikingly different. As Teschke notes:
different states’ responses to military pressures cannot be deduced from geo- 
political factors, but have to be explained with reference to specific domestic class 
constellations and the timing of intensified military exposure. As a rule, the pure 
logic of international rivalry not only fails to cover the differential development 
of non-monarchical state forms, it is equally unable to account for developmental 
variations in the dominant Western monarchies, France, Spain and England.38
What we need, in other words, is a theory that organically embraces both 
sociological and geopolitical factors in a unified conception of sociohistorical 
development. And again, this is what the theory of uneven and combined 
development offers, as the historically specific sources, dynamics and scales 
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of unevenness and combination must be continually related back to their 
foundations in historically distinct social structures. So what then explains the 
particularly war-prone nature of the European states system, and were its effects 
beneficial to processes of state modernisation, particularly by affording certain 
European states a comparative advantage in the means of violence?
Feudalism, Merchants, and the European States 
System in the Transition to Capitalism
The answer lies in Europe’s feudal relations of production. At first sight, this 
answer might seem like an illicit return to the kind of Eurocentric theorising we 
have been at pains to avoid. Yet, when widening the analysis beyond Europe, it is 
important to recognise that while feudal social relations and the geopolitical system 
emerging with them were unique to Europe, their technological, military and 
ideological components all bore a distinctly intersocietal origin. According to Perry 
Anderson, the rise of feudalism in Europe was a consequence of the ‘catastrophic 
collision of two dissolving anterior [ancient and primitive] modes of production’: 
namely, the ‘decomposing slave mode of production on whose foundations the 
whole enormous edifice of the Roman Empire had once been constructed, and the 
distended and deformed primitive modes of production of the Germanic invaders 
which survived in their new homelands’ after the conquests.39 The developmental 
trajectory of Europe’s Germanic forest ‘tribes’ thereby converged with the remnants 
of the ancient Roman Empire, producing an entirely novel, synthesised form of 
sedentary society hitherto unknown in human history – feudalism. Moreover, 
the recombination of the ‘disintegrated elements’ of these two anterior modes of 
production – the ‘Romano-Germanic synthesis’40 – into feudalism proper was 
‘itself a product of the constant and eventually unbearable pressure of the nomadic 
Huns on the Germanic world of the Teutonic tribes’.41
 Hence, the genesis of feudalism in Europe was determined by the systemic 
syncretism of nomadic-sedentary interactions emanating from within and 
outside of Europe. We also saw in Chapter 3 how the nomadic-sedentary inter-
actions generated by the Mongol Empire’s expansion into Europe, and the 
accompanying spread of the Black Death, fundamentally impinged upon and 
(re)directed the trajectory and nature of European development over the late 
Medieval period. However, the ‘extra-European’, intersocietal dimensions of 
feudalism’s development reached far beyond these initial nomadic-sedentary 
interactions. For not only was the feudal system the result of new technologies 
(notably, the stirrup) diffusing from Asia to Europe, but the ideological and 
normative underpinnings of the system (Christendom) were in constant interac-
tion with and continually evolving in response to the geopolitical and ideological 
‘Islamic threat’ emanating from the Ottomans. As Hobson notes, ‘Christendom 
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… was imagined and invented as Catholic Christian in contradistinction to the 
Islamic Middle East’.42 What is more, it was only through the combination of 
the Euro-Ottoman conflict and the Euro-Amerindian colonial encounter that 
Christendom was destroyed as a defining normative order, clearing the way 
for an emergent quasi-secular identity of ‘Europe’ (see Chapters 4 and 5). As 
a result, it would be fundamentally mistaken to conceive of feudalism and 
its crisis as solely European developments.43 But we must now return to the 
original question we had set out to address: how did feudalism generate such a 
competitive and war-prone geopolitical system?
 In the absence of the kind of unprecedented economic dynamism afforded by 
capitalist social relations, war was an expedient mode of expanding surpluses 
available to the ruling classes under feudalism.44 As explained in Chapter 6, 
feudal productive relations in Europe gave few incentives to either peasant or 
lord to continuously and systematically introduce more productive technological 
methods, particularly as peasants had direct access to their means of produc-
tion and subsistence.45 Consequently the lordly interest lay in extracting more 
surplus by directly coercive means. This could be done by pushing the peasants 
to the limit of their subsistence or by seizing the demesnes of other lords. The 
latter course resulted in a process of geopolitical accumulation amongst the 
lords themselves – a war-driven process of state formation.46 This condition 
meant that the aristocratic ruling class required the political, ideological and 
military means to exploit the peasantry and extract a surplus for the purpose 
of lordly consumption.47 However, unlike in the Ottoman Empire, these means 
were not controlled by – or concentrated in – a centralised and unified state, but 
were instead dispersed across the nobility.48 This dispersion of coercive capa-
bilities meant that political authority in Europe was fragmented, parcellised 
and therefore also highly competitive, with heightened intra-lordly struggles 
taking place over territories both within and outside of feudal ‘states’.49 In 
short, military competition and war were more pronounced in Europe than 
they were in the tributary societies such as the Ottoman, Mughal and Chinese 
empires.
 Consequently, one of the primary reasons that geopolitical conflict and war 
in this period was so persistent was not simply due to the structure of feudalism, 
but also because the process of ruling class reproduction was itself under serious 
threat. Not only had the feudal system virtually exhausted all possibilities for 
further internal expansion, but this also precipitated a sharp fall in seigniorial 
revenues, which was further exacerbated by the plague-induced demographic 
crisis spread from the Mongol expansion into Europe, leading to a dramatic rise 
in peasant revolts and processes of class struggle more generally.50 Moreover, 
this perilous situation was continually exacerbated and ‘overdetermined’ by 
the persistent geopolitical-ideological threat emanating from the Ottoman 
Empire (see Chapter 4). Under such conditions, a near-continuous state of 
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war – including both intra-ruling class struggles and the incessant efforts to 
crush peasant rebellions – was a sociological ‘necessity’. And since European 
states ‘did not have the resources of an agrarian empire in cheap manpower’ 
they were therefore unable ‘to substitute “quantity for quality”’.51 By the early 
modern period, this led to an unprecedented dynamism in the military sector in 
European states, which ‘could maintain productivity growth for centuries, a feat 
virtually unknown elsewhere in pre-industrial economies’.52
 The lords left standing at the end of the process of geopolitical accumula-
tion formed the basis for the absolutist state. Representing a ‘redeployed and 
recharged apparatus of feudal domination’,53 the absolutism of early modern 
Europe remained driven by the systemic imperatives of geopolitical accumula-
tion. The uneven and combined development of feudal-absolutist Europe was 
rooted in this territorially expansionist dynamic of geopolitical accumulation. 
The resultant endemic state of warfare entailed a deep systemic pressure (‘whip 
of external necessity’) for European states to continually innovate upon their 
means of violence. Over time, this had the unintended effect of generating 
military and armament industries pioneering distinctly capitalist methods and 
relations of production (Chapter 1).54
   The dynamic of geopolitical accumulation in Europe is, however, not 
enough to explain the forces at work behind states’ technological and organisa-
tional innovations – particularly in the military sphere – which are so heavily 
emphasised by the neo-Weberians. For the effects of warfare were extremely 
uneven within Europe itself, and as examined in Chapter 4, the tributary 
Ottoman Empire was also driven by the imperatives of geopolitical accumula-
tion. However, as we have argued, the systemic demands of the tributary mode 
drove the Ottomans towards territorial expansion based on an exceptionally 
robust agro-military complex, which effectively curtailed merchant autonomy 
and political influence. By contrast, in Mughal India, state managers exhibited 
an attitude of ‘indifferent neutrality’ towards merchants’ maritime activities.55 
There was very little oppression of merchant activities in India, but neither was 
there much support.
 In Europe, however, states were explicitly focused on bringing under direct 
conquest and political control lucrative overseas territories for specifically 
commercial purposes. The reason was the relative ‘backwardness’ of European 
feudal rules of reproduction, which were dependent on the wealth drawn from 
merchants and financiers either to fund geopolitical accumulation (in the case 
of Habsburg Spain and Austria) or for the direct reproduction of the ruling class 
itself (as with city-states such as Genoa and Venice).56 A byproduct of European 
feudal war-making was therefore an attendant rise in the political autonomy, 
power and influence of merchants, with increasing degrees of representation in 
the decision-making structures of states.57 Consequently, feudal-cum-absolutist 
states were particularly sensitive to – or at the behest of – merchant interests, 
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wherein state resources, especially military, were deployed in order to obtain 
(and maintain) commercial advantage.58
 The key difference between the functioning and sociopolitical position of 
merchants in the feudal-absolutist – and later capitalist – states in Europe, 
and those within the tributary societies such as the Ottoman Empire, Mughal 
India and Imperial China, was therefore the structural dependence of the former 
states on merchants for war-financing and social reproduction, which gave 
the merchants a relatively strong position of social and juridical autonomy. In 
Europe, governments often provided merchants with considerable resources 
and state backing. This was most dramatically exemplified in the case of the 
rising capitalist Dutch Republic, where the VOC represented the institu-
tional fusion of political and mercantile interests,59 as the often-quoted 1614 
letter of VOC Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen to his directors well 
demonstrates:
You gentlemen ought to know from experience that trade in Asia should be 
conducted and maintained under the protection and with the aid of your own 
weapons, and that those weapons must be wielded with the profits gained 
by the trade. So trade cannot be maintained without war, nor war without  
trade.60
The overseas orientation of imperial expansionism in the pursuit of commercial 
advantage among the European states in turn led to a number of significant 
military innovations, particularly in the naval field. Over time, this would 
provide them with a decisive competitive edge in the means of naval violence 
in the Indian Ocean over the primarily land-based tributary empires in the 
‘East’, such as the Mughals and the Ottomans. We may therefore partly agree 
with Ronald Findlay’s assessment that ‘it was the long history of naval rivalry 
in the North Sea and the Atlantic that developed the sailing ship as a floating 
gun platform, a combination of the two technologies’ that later enabled the 
Portuguese, Dutch, and British to dominate the Indian Ocean and South 
Pacific.61 It was these latter two burgeoning Dutch and British merchant 
capitalist empires that would come to attain a critical military advantage 
on the seas. ‘Mediterranean naval techniques and conceptions’ – where the 
Ottomans were dominant – would prove ineffective in competing with the 
new, Atlantic-based sea powers of Holland and England. ‘The consequent 
transfer of supremacy at sea to northwestern Europe’, William H. McNeil w 
rites:
had much to do with the general decline of the Mediterranean lands that became 
manifest in the first decades of the seventeenth century. In effect, the roar of Dutch 
and English naval guns closed off the last avenue of escape from the economic and 
ecological impasse confronting the Mediterranean populations.62
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There was therefore something to Walter Raleigh’s often-cited maxim that 
‘[w]hoever commands the sea commands the trade; whoever commands the 
trade of the world commands the riches of the world and consequently the 
world itself ’.63
 A further difference between Europe and the tributary empires of Asia was 
the particular nature of the external enemies facing them, which also dictated 
that very different military strategies and technologies be developed and used. 
Hence, in contrast to Hobson’s essentialist claims that China’s ‘inward turn’ 
and abdication of overseas imperialism was a consequence of its ‘defensive 
identity’,64 it seems more likely that the nomadic threat was key to Chinese 
imperial managers’ focus on territorial consolidation. Given this nomadic threat 
from the northern land frontier, Mann writes:
China concentrated its resources and its trade there, and not in the sea lanes. 
Its military posture on its northern frontier was defensive, geared to containing 
mobile, dispersed enemy forces. It had less incentive than Europeans to intensify 
aggressive fire-power against concentrated forces, since it did not face them. But 
this meant that in the long run the Chinese empire would disintegrate in face of 
the fire-power of European ships and marine.65
Unevenness Combined: North–South 
Interactions in the ‘Rise of the West’
These points go some way in turning on its head the typical Eurocentric concep-
tions of the more ‘backward’ and ‘stagnant’ imperial empires of Asia, since it 
was the less developed nature of European feudal societies – their very repro-
ductive weaknesses – that made them more susceptible to potential capitalist 
breakthroughs.66 However, in order to fully subvert Eurocentric accounts of the 
‘rise of the West’, we must move beyond a simple comparative historical socio-
logical analysis of the differences between the feudal and tributary systems, and 
examine how their interactive developmental dynamics produced the struc-
tural and conjunctural conditions enabling European societies’ transition to 
capitalism, and thus their eventual global ascendency. And in so doing, we see 
again the operation of uneven development, as demonstrated by the ‘privilege 
of backwardness’ granted to feudal Europe by the ‘penalty of progressiveness’ 
characterising the tributary empires of Asia. In the geopolitical interactions 
between feudal and tributary societies, it was the latter that presented the ‘whip 
of external necessity’ to the former.
 In turn, the various state-backed forms of commercial expansion noted 
above were dependent on the geopolitical conditions generated by Europe’s 
constant interaction with non-European societies. In Chapter 3, we saw how 
the Pax Mongolica lowered commercial protection and transaction costs along 
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Asian overland trade routes, providing European merchants with an opening 
to take over the pre-existing trade and exchange links of the ‘world system’. 
In Chapter 4, we then demonstrated how the capitulations given to particular 
European states by the Ottomans and the concomitant economic blockade they 
imposed upon Europe resulted in a structural shift away from the geopolitical 
and commercial centrality of Mediterranean towards the Atlantic. Moreover, 
the Ottoman ‘buffer’ provided the propitious geopolitical conditions (‘isola-
tion’) enabling the modern state-building activities and processes of primitive 
accumulation in England over the Long 16th Century. 
 In Chapter 5, we explicated the hugely significant effects of the Atlantic 
‘discoveries’ on trade and production in Europe, and the emergent forms of 
territorial sovereignty created in the Americas which in turn fed back into the 
geopolitical structure of Europe. These territorial sovereign states were subse-
quently taken over and reconstituted by the capitalist revolutions that stretched 
from the 16th to the 18th centuries, as we saw in Chapter 6. Finally, through 
the colonial activities of merchant companies, we demonstrated in Chapters 
5 and 7 how a globally dispersed mass of labour-power was subsumed under 
the reproductive requirements of capital. In all these ways, we have seen how 
Europe’s ‘unique’ developmental trajectory out of feudalism and into capitalism, 
leading to its subsequent rise to global pre-eminence, was fundamentally rooted 
in and conditioned by extra-European structural determinations and agents. It 
was then the combination of these multiple spatiotemporal vectors of uneven 
development that explains the so-called European ‘miracle’.
 Moreover, why some states and not others were able to make the kind 
of socio-economic and institutional innovations leading to a condition of 
sustained, self-reinforcing military and productive dynamic must be explained 
by the particular geopolitical conditions facing such states. For some states, 
notably Imperial Spain, the (geo)political costs of quickly raising taxes and 
centralising the fiscal system were perhaps too high, as the Habsburg monarchy 
was simultaneously and continually engaged in a two-front struggle against the 
more advanced tributary Ottoman Empire and the breakaway Dutch Republic. 
And this Habsburg–Ottoman struggle in turn meant that other states, specif-
ically the Dutch and English, were afforded the structural geopolitical space 
from which they could pursue rapid processes of developmental catch-up and 
overtaking. In these ways, the overall conditions of uneven and combined devel-
opment emanating from both within and without Europe created the propitious 
geosocial environment in which specific countries could emerge and consoli-
date themselves as capitalist states: territorialised sovereign centres of capital 
accumulation – a particular form of sovereign territoriality that had first been 
forged and proven utile in the Atlantic colonial theatre before radiating back to 
the European imperial metropole (see Chapters 3 to 6).
  As we have seen, the methods and means of geosocial reproduction for 
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Europe and the tributary empires were strikingly different, producing divergent 
forms and trajectories of geopolitical accumulation which, over the course of 
Europe’s development in the early modern period, came to interact and fuse 
with the emerging logic of capital accumulation accompanying those states 
making the transition to capitalism (notably the Netherlands, England and 
later France). These differential geosocial conditions and rules of reproduction 
in Europe, and those in the Asia, in turn required varied types of military capa-
bilities. At the same time, the external threat environments prevailing in the 
two regions were characterised by significant differences lending themselves 
to different systemic incentives and pressures for developing certain military 
techniques and technologies over others.
 In these ways, both ostensibly ‘internal’ (sociological) and ‘external’ (geopolit-
ical) structural factors and conditions interacted and entwined in setting certain 
European states on the path to acquire what would become a decisive compar-
ative advantage in the means of violence, particularly once these means were 
buttressed by and harnessed to dynamically capitalist social structures. This, 
we argue, is what largely explains Europe’s eventual ascendency to global pre- 
eminence. For, as Geoffrey Parker notes, while the advent of industrialisation 
‘helps to explain how the Europeans extended their control over the total land 
area of the globe from 35 percent in 1800 to 84 percent in 1914, it cannot 
explain how they managed to acquire that initial 35 percent’.67 What is more, 
that initial 35 per cent was in fact crucial for conquering much of the other 
84 per cent, as exemplified by the Indian case examined below. We may there-
fore conclude with Philip T. Hoffman that:
one area in which western Europe possessed an undeniable comparative advantage 
well before 1800 seems to have been overlooked – namely, violence. The states of 
western Europe were simply better at making and using artillery, firearms, forti-
fications, and armed ships than other advanced parts of the world and they had 
developed the fiscal and organizational systems that armies and navies equipped 
with this technology required. The Europeans had this advantage long before 
1800. By then, they had conquered some 35 per cent of the globe, and they 
controlled lucrative trade routes as far away as Asia.68
To put all of this in more theoretical terms, we can see how ‘unevenness’, in 
terms of both the differential development between a feudal-cum-capitalist 
‘West’ and tributary ‘East’ and the differential forms of their geopolitical systems, 
and ‘combination’, operating at the level of geopolitical interactions and compe-
tition facilitating military and organisational innovations, were both crucial 
explanatory factors in the ‘rise of the West’. While neo-Weberians are correct 
to single out geopolitical competition as significant, their inability to root this 
factor in a strong historical conception of social structures – and thus examine 
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the differential forms and effects that military competition had – leaves them 
in the well-worn realist cul-de-sac of reification and unit homogenisation. By 
contrast, the theory of uneven and combined development, continually rooted 
in a mode of production-centred framework, solves both these problems: it 
offers a theoretical explanation of geopolitical competition and its effects that 
remains sensitive to substantive differences in historical social structures (in 
this instance, between the feudal and tributary modes of production), while also 
incorporating a distinctly geopolitical causal component into its very conception 
of development thereby eliding any form of reification. But to fully understand 
how ‘the West’ would come to rule we must look at the causes of the Mughal 
Empire’s collapse and its colonisation by the British.
The Conjunctural Moment of ‘Overtaking’:  
Britain’s Colonisation of India
The Significance of India’s Colonisation to the ‘Rise of the West’
The place of Britain’s colonisation of India in the mid-18th century has been 
generally underappreciated in debates surrounding the ‘rise of the West’.69 
As noted, these debates have largely centred around the origins of industrial-
isation in Europe, and in particular on the question of why Britain was first 
to industrialise. Conceived as such, the earlier history of British colonisation 
is relegated to a secondary status in explaining the ‘rise of the West’, if it is 
examined at all. Yet not only was Mughal India the first of the tributary empires 
in the Asia to fall at the hands of the Europeans, it also arguably provided 
the greatest material and strategic benefits of all the colonised states. For not 
only did India offer Britain the material inputs (notably, textiles and cotton) 
and capital crucial to the start of its industrialisation drive but, after its colo-
nisation, it provided the Empire with a relatively cheap and sizeable military 
force that assisted the British in forcibly opening other markets around the 
world.
 Hence even the more restrictive question of the causes of Britain’s industrial-
isation have been both temporally and spatially misplaced within the debates on 
the ‘rise of the West’. They are temporally misplaced in the sense that in order 
to explain Britain’s industrial ascent we must first look at the preceding era of 
British colonialism in both the Atlantic and India, and this in turn means that 
our spatial optic must be substantially widened to include an analysis of these 
extra-European regions’ contributions to Britain’s subsequent industrialisation. 
As we saw in Chapter 5, the Atlantic colonies and India provided Britain with 
the raw materials, mass consumption commodities, capital and external markets 
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crucial to its industrial success. Moreover, the Indian economy was critical to the 
‘formation and consolidation of a UK-centred system of accumulation’, particu-
larly through India’s role in providing a continual balance-of-payments surplus 
for the Empire.70 It was the huge annual surpluses from the Empire’s transac-
tions with India (and through it, China) that allowed Britain to gain ‘mastery of 
world finance’ and sustain substantial deficits with the United States, Germany 
and its white Dominion states.71
 Since the beginning of the 19th century, the East India Company had relied 
on opium exports from Bengal to Canton to finance the growing deficits gener-
ated by its expensive military operations on the subcontinent and elsewhere. 
As Mike Davis explains, ‘[b]y forcibly enlarging the Chinese demand for the 
narcotic and, thus, the taxes collected on its export, the Opium Wars (1839–42, 
1856–8) and the punitive Treaty of Tianjin (1858) revolutionized the revenue 
base of British India’. The extraordinary trade between India and China – 
Indian exports made up 35 per cent of Chinese imports, and Chinese exports 
made up 1 per cent of Indian imports – that Britain orchestrated also subsidised 
the import of US cottons, which fuelled the industrial revolution in Lancashire. 
Hence, ‘England’s systematic exploitation of India depended in large part upon 
India’s commercial exploitation of China’.72
 In 1750, India produced approximately 25 per cent of the world’s manufac-
turing output. By 1800 India’s share had already dropped to less than a fifth, by 
1860 to less than a tenth, and by 1880 to under 3 per cent.73 It is therefore no 
stretch of the imagination to claim that Britain’s industrial ascent was to a large 
degree predicated on India’s forced deindustrialisation.74 And if so, it is then 
no mere coincidence that Britain’s colonisation of India preceded the start of 
Britain’s industrialisation by some 20 years.
 The contribution of the British Indian army to Britain’s overall strategic 
position has also been largely overlooked in the debates on the ‘rise of the West’. 
The British Indian army numbered approximately 160,000 in 1900 and later 
reached a strength of nearly 2 million persons during the Second World War, 
making a substantial contribution to Britain’s war efforts of the period. Conse-
quently, as Tarak Barkawi notes, ‘the British Indian army was not a small part of 
Britain’s overall military power; the “Indian army was the leading British stra-
tegic reserve on land”’.75 Moreover, according to David Washbrook, the British 
Indian army was of great significance not only to the ‘rise of the West’, but for 
the development of capitalism as a global system.76 The Indian contingent not 
only opened markets for British manufactures, but subordinated a previously 
dispersed mass of labourers to the machinations of British capital. The:
Indian army was in a real sense the major coercive force behind the international-
ization of industrial capitalism. Paradoxically (or not!), the martialization of north 
Indian society and, in many ways, the ‘feudalization’ of its agrarian relations, were 
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direct corollaries of the development of capitalism on a world scale during the 
nineteenth century.77
Similarly, Geoffrey Parker writes of how:
the military resources of India, once under European control, were to prove 
decisive for the further rise of the West. For the Europeans now possessed the 
means to challenge even their most powerful opponents. The Western armies that 
invaded China in 1839–42, 1859–60, and 1900 all included important Indian 
contingents. Immediately after the Boxer Rising, even the traffic of Peking was 
directed by Sikhs. In the words of the distinguished Sinologist Louis Dermigny: ‘It 
was as if the British had subjugated the Indian peninsula simply in order to use its 
resources against China’.78
For these reasons and more, the causes of the decline of the Mughal Empire and 
its colonisation are central to the story of how the ‘West’ managed to ascend to 
a position of global supremacy. Examining these causes is the primary aim of 
the following section.
The Mughal Empire and the Tributary Mode of Production
Like the Ottoman Empire, Mughal India was characterised by the tributary 
mode of production.79 In contrast to feudal Europe, where lords directly inter-
vened into the production process in order to coercively extract rent surpluses 
from the peasants,80 the Mughal tributary formation was defined by a state 
bureaucracy taxing the peasants. Throughout most of the Mughal Empire, the 
emperor transferred the rights to land revenue and other taxes within partic-
ular territorial limits to specific subjects on a temporary basis (usually between 
three to four years). These areas were called jāgĭrs, and the assignees, known as 
jāgĭrdārs, were predominantly mansabdārs – subjects holding ranks (mansabs) 
bestowed to them by the emperor, making them high-ranking state officials. The 
primary obligation of the mansabdārs was the maintenance of standing armies, 
and particularly cavalry contingents, which the emperor could call upon for 
the imperial army in times of war.81 In their assigned jāgĭrs, it was the jāgĭrdārs 
who then collected land revenues and other taxes from the peasantry, who were 
nominally free, cultivating the land on behalf of the emperor, who was allotted 
a set share of such revenues. Over the 16th and 17th centuries, approximately 
half the agricultural product was extracted from the peasantry in the form of 
this imperial land revenue.82
   The jāgĭrdārs were therefore not equivalent to feudal lords exercising direct 
personal control over cultivators working and living on the lord’s lands. Rather, 
they approximated more of a ‘state class’, dispersed throughout the empire by 
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a centralised political apparatus to extract surpluses – as tax or outputs – from 
a peasantry they did not personally control. In such ways, these two different 
modalities of surplus extraction (feudal and tributary) entailed very distinct 
dynamics of social (re)production. A key difference between the ruling classes 
of these two systems was, then, their proximity to the production process – 
‘the relative separation of the former and the near-total separation of the latter 
from the production process’. Hence, the tributary state did ‘not need to control 
the economic and social lives of its subjects’, but instead simply required ‘the 
funding that enables it to pursue its chosen objectives’.83
 So, in the feudal mode, the process of exploitation was much more frag-
mented and decentralised. Lords sought to uphold and extend the military and 
juridical powers necessary to control the peasants’ lives while safeguarding a 
steady stream of revenue. At the same time, a comparatively weaker state sought 
to gain access to income and the means of coercion. By contrast, under the trib-
utary mode, the exploiting class’s interest centred on expanding its tax base and 
tax-extracting apparatus, through the use of the state’s coercive functions.84
 The particularly centralised nature of the tributary state, along with its ability 
to effectively monopolise the means of violence in comparison with the frag-
mented and parcellised character of feudal political relations, made for a more 
cohesive and unified ruling class.85 Nonetheless, intra-ruling class tensions still 
remained. In particular, the potential for conflict between local state officials, 
private landowners and the centralised imperial state was a central contradic-
tion of tributary rules of reproduction. Moreover, in the tributary mode, we 
can discern a tendency for the state’s local agents to develop into feudal-like 
lords with their own landed estates and armed contingents or for wealthy land-
owners to emerge with significant independent economic and political powers.86 
Both tendencies could ultimately result in the development of feudalistic power 
relations emerging from the tributary mode’s own ‘laws of motion’.
 In Mughal India, the imperial state sought to counter the former tendency 
of state officials to transform themselves into feudal-like lords by divorcing 
the jāgĭrdārs, as far as possible, from any permanent rights to the land while 
constantly transferring them to different territorial assignments after short 
periods of time, usually between three or four years.87 While this transfer system 
generally worked in countering any potential for jāgĭrdārs to develop into feudal 
lords, in the long term the system tended to subvert agricultural productivity 
and growth, as examined further below. In the case of the Mughal Empire, then, 
it appears that the latter tendency of a landed aristocracy emerging with consid-
erable independent economic and political powers was the most problematic for 
intra-ruling class relations, as demonstrated by the recurring conflicts between 
the zamĭndārs (landowners) and imperial authority.
 The zamĭndārs were a distinct class of potentates with varying claims to the 
shares in the produce of land and/or part of the land revenue. They shared a 
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number of common attributes: particularly, that their rights to the land did not 
(with some exceptions) originate from imperial grants; command over armed 
retainers was usually a complement of this right; and they were frequently 
leaders of a caste group. The key point of potential conflict between the imperial 
authorities and the zamĭndārs was, then, the size of the latter’s share in the land 
revenue or surplus produce. ‘The struggle between the imperial administration 
and the zamĭndārs, breaking out frequently into armed conflict’, Irfan Habib 
writes, ‘was thus an important feature of the political situation’.88
 The most significant of these armed conflicts between the zamĭndārs and 
the imperial authorities was the zamĭndār-led Maratha Revolt of the late 17th 
century.89 As a result of the Maratha Revolt, there emerged a distinct class of 
feudal-like lords, now separate and autonomous from the Mughals, wielding 
significant economic and political powers over their subjects in occupied lands. 
‘Unlike the Mughal jāgĭrdārs’, Hiroshi Fukazawa writes, ‘the big assignees in 
the Deccan Muslim kingdoms exercised wide administrative powers in their 
assigned territories, which tended to become hereditary, unchecked by the central 
authority’.90 This was then a case by which certain features characteristic of one 
mode of production (feudalism) emerged from and combined with the existing 
dominant mode of production (tributary). In this sense, the Mughal Empire 
of the late 17th and early 18th centuries represented a kind of organic mode 
of sociological combination in which two differentiated modes of production 
coexisted and causally interacted in contradictory and crisis-prone ways.91
 The importance of the rise of the Marathas challenging the Mughal Empire 
cannot be overstated, as it ‘constituted the greatest single force responsible for 
the downfall of the Mughal Empire’.92 In particular, the Mughal wars in the 
Deccan (1681–1707) against the Marathas were a major drain on imperial 
institutions and resources, eventually destabilising Mughal rule throughout 
its territories.93 As the imperial demand for revenue increased, so too did the 
exploitative pressures on the peasantry, as the wars drew key resources out of 
the agricultural economy while leading to a considerable destruction of existing 
capital.94 To understand how this translated into widespread peasant unrest and 
flight, we must first examine the contradictions of the jāgĭr system in a little 
more detail.
The Imperial Revenue System and Agricultural 
Decline in the Mughal Empire
The land revenue system created by the Mughal Empire was unequalled by 
any of its contemporaries. It far surpassed any of the revenue structures in 
Europe in both its scale of operation (in the total land area, population and 
resources controlled) and its organisational sophistication and cohesion (the 
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use of paid officials and formal administrative mechanisms). In contrast to the 
French kings of the ancien régime, for example, the Mughal imperial author-
ities did not generally have to resort to private capital, short-term loans and 


























Figure 8.1 Map of the Maratha Kingdom, 1664–1760
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against the Marathas, examined below.95 Nonetheless, despite its organisational 
scale and sophistication, the revenue system developed over time a number of 
problems that came to hinder the overall functioning of the Mughal economy: 
particularly, the tendency to increasingly over-exploit the peasantry.
 As noted, since the time of Akbar (1568), a practice was established in which 
jāgĭrdārs, who held no permanent rights to the land, were transferred to new 
territorial assignments every three to four years. This kept in check any tendency 
for them to develop into feudal-like lords. However, it also had a number of 
unintentional negative consequences, increasing over time, for the agrarian 
economy as a whole. For as the jāgĭrdārs were being continually transferred 
to different territorial assignment every few years, their short-term interest 
was not necessarily in increasing or even maintaining agricultural growth and 
productivity, but rather in maximising the exploitation of the peasantry in their 
assigned territorial domain. This subverted the long-term objectives of the 
imperial authority. As Habib explains:
The imperial administration, which could contemplate the long-term interests 
of the empire and ruling class, did, probably, strive to set a limit to the revenue 
demand …. But there was an element of contradiction between interests of the 
imperial administration and the individual jāgĭdārs. A jāgĭdār, whose assignment 
was liable to be transferred any moment and who never held the same jāgĭr for 
more than three of four years at the most, could have no interest in following a 
far-sighted policy of agricultural development. On the other hand, his personal 
interest would sanction any act of oppression that conferred an immediate benefit 
upon him, even if it ruined the peasantry and so destroyed the revenue-paying 
capacity of that area for a long time.96
Inherent in the Mughal revenue system was therefore a tendency towards the 
absolute ‘maximization of exploitation’ to the point of limiting and potentially 
destabilising the entire agrarian economy.97 Moreover, as military contin-
gents were maintained by the mansabdārs out of the revenues of the jāgĭrs, the 
imperial authorities tended to set the revenue demand at a high enough level to 
secure the greatest amount of military strength for the Empire. However, if the 
revenue rate was set too high, it would leave peasants without enough subsis-
tence to survive. Consequently, revenue collection could soon fall in absolute 
terms. Thus, the revenue demand set by the imperial authorities was ‘designed 
ideally to approximate to the surplus produced, leaving the peasant just the 
barest minimum needed for subsistence’.98
 Yet, with the costly wars with the Marathas straining imperial revenues in 
the late 17th and early 18th centuries, increased revenue demands came to 
press harder still on the lower peasantry. For unlike earlier periods when the 
Mughal Empire had expanded into wealthy regions, making up the costs of their 
conquests, the Deccan campaigns were a very different story. There, Mughal 
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military expenditures consistently outpaced revenues and office holders saw 
their incomes decline. The Mughal state thus sought to step up its ‘revenue 
demands which in turn stirred up resentment in large parts of the empire that, 
when coupled with religious and political rivalries, manifested itself in the emer-
gence of popular movements such as the Sikhs in the Punjab or the Marathas in 
Central India’.99
 State revenue demand had in fact more than doubled between the eras of 
Akbar (1556–1605) and Aurangzeb (1658–1707).100 Moreover, as centralised 
Mughal authority began to crack under the continuing geopolitical pressures 
from the Marathas, the state increasingly resorted to tax farming, which became 
ever more widespread in its successor states.101 This had the effect of raising 
the effective rent share of the state to 50 per cent or higher, greater than the 
40 per cent that the Mughals had previously extracted. ‘With revenue assess-
ment geared to 50 per cent or more, in contrast to China’s 5 to 6 per cent, the 
Indian peasant had little incentive to invest labour or capital’.102 This massive 
fiscal pressure that the Mughal state brought to bear on the peasantry in turn 
led to increasing indebtedness in the villages, causing peasant flight and rebel-
lions. ‘As oppression increased, the number of absconding peasants grew, 
cultivation declined and peasants took to arms giving birth to rural uprisings of 
varying intensity. Consequently the empire fell prey to the wrath of an impover-
ished peasantry’.103 Some scholars have located a generalised ‘agricultural crisis’ 
manifesting itself throughout the Mughal Empire in the late 17th and early 
18th centuries, for which the jāgĭr system and its associated high taxation, land 
desertion and peasant unrest, coupled with the increasing costs of war, were 
primarily to blame.104 ‘The “apparatus of the empire” which was responsible for 
initiating an endless process of raising revenue demand’, writes R. P. Rana, ‘was 
the first to feel the tremor of its diminishing income’. The ‘disturbed peasant 
economy’ at the ‘root’ of the Mughal’s ‘political crisis’ would eventually ruin the 
Empire.105
   Indeed, peasant unrest and rebellion were generally increasing over the 
late 17th and early 18th centuries, politically destabilising many Mughal 
territories.106 At the same time, the political fragmentation and warfare accom-
panying the Marathas Revolt further acted to disrupt India’s major internal 
trade routes, tending to increase transportation costs and insurance rates. As 
most long-distance transport was by bullock, the scarcity of bullocks resulting 
from warfare also increased transport costs.107 In the end, Satish Chandra notes, 
‘[t]he available social surplus [in the Empire] was insufficient to defray the cost 
of administration, pay for wars of one type or another, and to give the ruling 
class a standard of living in keeping with its expectations’.108 Curiously enough, 
Washbrook has suggested that the very vibrancy and strong economic growth 
of the Mughal Empire over the 16th and early 17th centuries may well have 
been a cause of its later troubles, as ‘economic growth started to nurture the 
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political ambitions, and the regional and “community” forces, which even-
tually undermined it’. Here then is another expression of the ‘penalties of 
progressiveness’ besetting the Indian economy.109
European Trade and Colonial Conquest: Towards 1757
There were, moreover, a number of distinctly international factors further 
exacerbating the Mughal Empire’s economic woes during this period. For 
over the course of the 17th and early 18th centuries, the world economic and 
geopolitical environment in which the Mughal Empire was embedded was 
dramatically transformed, as the Portuguese, Dutch, English and later French 
made their excursions into the Indian Ocean. First, the Mughal-Maratha Wars 
(1680–1707) were themselves ‘overdetermined’ by an array of uneven causal 
chains generated by a geopolitical environment fundamentally transformed 
by the entry of the Europeans. Occupying key coastal areas in the commer-
cial shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean, the Marathas experienced extensive 
geopolitical contacts with Europeans from the 16th century onwards. This was 
a relation of ‘contained warfare’, with belligerence and collaboration employed 
in near-equal measure. On the one hand, the Marathas developed a powerful 
naval force that was able to repel European ships if and when they so desired.110 
On land, a large and sophisticated network of fortresses formed the backbone 
of Maratha military might.111 Both land and sea capabilities were often mobil-
ised in response to European penetration into the region. On the other hand, 
the Marathas also sought to reap the ‘privileges of backwardness’ in any areas 
in which Europeans held a comparative advantage – particularly the use of 
firearms and modern military strategy.
 From the Portuguese and French came the main supplies of firearms – 
gunpowder, cannonballs and lead were all purchased and entered into use in 
the Maratha army.112 Such was the integration of the Euro-Maratha military- 
commercial complex that the Marathas allowed the French to build a factory 
at Rajapore in 1679, and ‘employed Portuguese agents to purchase artillery 
from them’.113 But the integration of Europeans extended beyond exchange in 
military goods. As early as 1692, the French Governor Martine was providing 
tactical assistance to the Marathas at the time of their war with the Mughals.114 
A number of European adventurers of Portuguese, French, Dutch and English 
origin were employed as mercenaries and commanders, responsible for training 
and organising armies and assisting Maratha chiefs in battles. The expansion 
of European trained battalions and the purchase of European expertise and 
weaponry proved costly, incentivising processes of geopolitical accumulation.115 
The Maratha confrontation with the Mughals was arguably a direct – if partial 
– outcome of the need to finance the hybridisation of Euro-Maratha military 
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operations. This military combination proved remarkably efficient, and up to 
that point, historically exceptional in challenging the hitherto preponderant 
Mughal Empire.
 Meanwhile, the increasing Dutch and English penetration into Asian markets 
over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries caused serious disturbances in 
the Mughal economy, and intensified the financial difficulties of the ruling 
classes. As the costs of luxury goods consumed by the ruling class increased 
with their diversion from their traditional markets by the Europeans, this meant 
that revenue demands had to also be increased. Consequently, the Indian ruling 
class’s ‘income previously obtained no longer sufficed. Here was a factor for an 
attempt at greater agrarian exploitation; and when that failed, or proved counter- 
productive, for reckless factional activities for individual gain, leading to 
interminable civil wars’.116
 The economic difficulties of the Mughal Empire seem to have been quite 
widespread. K. N. Chaudhuri observes, for example, that ‘the 1730s were a 
bad time for southern India’ and that ‘the great Anglo-French wars of the mid- 
eighteenth century further dislocated trade that was already in serious diffi-
culties’.117 Around the same time, in Jugdia, the most important Bengali 
cotton-producing region, matters were ‘coming to a crisis in the production 
sphere’. For by the middle of the 18th century there were already ‘some signs of 
deindustrialization’ under the impact of strong foreign economic competition 
and weaker local mercantile organisations.118
 More generally, Indian merchant groups throughout the Empire suffered 
from the presence of European traders. ‘With the exception of the wealthy, 
experienced, and tightly organized mercantile houses of Gujerat’, J. F. Richards 
writes, ‘most indigenous traders in each exporting region assumed a position 
subordinate to the servants of the East India companies’.119 What is more, under 
the competitive pressures of European trade, the early 18th century witnessed 
the collapse of one of the Empire’s hitherto greatest commercial marines in 
Gujarat, ‘arguably the most important developments in the trade of the Indian 
Ocean during the period’.120 Similarly, the substantial commerce of the Coro-
mandel Coast was dramatically hindered by the intrusion of Dutch merchants 
over the 17th century, which, as Sinnappah Arasaratnam tells us, ‘cut deep into 
the trade that had been traditionally carried out in the region’, interrupting the 
‘the ancient links between Coromandel and Southeast Asia which had been, in 
many ways, the lifeline of Coromandel’s commerce’. As Arasaratnam goes on:
It was this commercial artery that was punctured violently in the course of the 
17th century …. In a series of military and naval actions, these ports and markets 
were shut off from competitive trading. It meant the denial of a lucrative export 
trade in spices to Coromandel. And it meant the denial of minerals – gold and 
tin – which had formed a profitable import to India. It must be emphasized 
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that all these were achieved by brute force and not by superior commercial  
expertise.121
The last sentence of this quote is particularly important: it was not the ‘superior 
commercial expertise’ of the Dutch merchants that made them so competitive 
and disruptive, but rather their comparative advantage in the means of violence, 
and particularly their naval superiority.122
 Indeed, both the Dutch and English had attained a position of relative naval 
superiority over the Mughal Empire during the 17th century.123 Given their 
continuing inability to outcompete Indian merchants on the open market, the 
Dutch and English continually used or threatened violence to back up their 
commercial activities. In the end, this superiority in the means of violence would 
prove crucial in the final fall of the Mughal Empire to the British, dramatised 
by the Battle of Plassey in Bengal on 23 June 1757. The immediate motivations 
behind Major-General Robert Clive’s coup of 1757 seem to have arisen from 
Britain’s increasing preoccupation with intensified French competition and a 
desire to protect British trading interests in Bengal against the perceived depre-
dations of local rulers.124 In these ways, the competitive pressures of European 
capitalist states, transmitted both economically and geopolitically, ‘overdeter-
mined’ and redirected the pattern and dynamics of India’s development. Again 
we see how the uneven and combined nature of India’s development in relation 
to the European powers came to play a causally decisive role in the Mughal 
Empire’s eventual collapse. The contemporaneous existence of a multiplicity 
of societies, all exhibiting varying forms of development (unevenness), thereby 
came to causally interact (geopolitical combination) in ways that produced 
further axes and layers of sociologically differentiated patterns of develop-
ment (sociological combinations), in turn leading to sharp divergences in their 
developmental trajectories.
 It is important to reiterate, however, that the Mughal Empire was already 
suffering from innumerable economic and political difficulties stemming from 
the competitive pressures European traders had already brought to bear on the 
Empire during the preceding century, well before the time of Britain’s formal 
colonisation of the country over the second half of the 18th century.125 Moreover, 
the British were critically assisted in the process of conquest by various indige-
nous merchant and financial groups, whose political and economic power had 
been steadily growing since the late 17th century as centralised state power 
began to breakdown.126 In this rather perverse sense, ‘Eastern agency’ was then 
a significant part in how the British succeeded in their colonisation efforts. 
With the capture of Bengal, arguably the wealthiest province of Mughal India, 
the East India Company and its servants achieved an enormous advantage in 
dealing with all other states and economies in the subcontinent, further aiding 
subsequent British conquests as they came to bring the entirety of the Mughal 
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Empire under their dominion.127 And with the colonisation of the entire 
Indian landmass completed by the early 19th century, the British state came to 
accrue significant strategic and material advantages in further expanding and 
buttressing its bourgeoning global empire as it sought to open all the markets of 
the world to its industrial products. In these ways, the ‘decline of the East’ and 
the ‘rise of the West’ were mutually conditioning and co-constitutive processes, 
where one state’s gain turned into another’s loss.
Conclusion
If we were to choose a single symbolic moment of the beginning of the West’s 
systemic ‘overtaking’ of the ‘East’ in its rise to global dominance, the years 
between the British taking of Bengal in 1757 and the signing of the Treaty 
of Paris in 1763 would likely suffice. For it was during these seven world- 
transforming years that the first of the great tributary empires in Asia fell at 
the hands of the Europeans, while the final external systemic threat to the 
development of British (and thus world) capitalism, the French monarchy, 
was extinguished in a string of spectacular military victories ending the Seven 
Years’ War. After the defeat of France and Spain in this conflict, Britain acquired 
dominion over a large portion of three continents under the terms of the Treaty 
of 1763. This further meant that the white settlers in North America no longer 
needed protection by British forces.128 The decisive defeat of the French in 1759 
both paved the way for the establishment of the Raj in India, and made the 
emergence of North America possible. Thus, Frank McLynn is correct to claim 
that this was the year that marked the beginning of Britain’s (and subsequently 
Europe’s) dominance of the world, as the ‘entire history of the world would 
have been different but for the events of 1759. If the French had prevailed in 
North America, there would have been no United States (at least in the form we 
know it)’ and if ‘France had won in India, the global hegemony of the English 
language could never have happened’.129 In short, McLynn concludes, ‘[t]he 
consequences of 1759 really were momentous; it really was a hinge on which 
all of world history turned’.130 The end of the war and signing of the peace treaty 
in 1763 not only reconfirmed ‘British command of the seas’, but also, Immanuel 
Wallerstein writes, ‘marked Britain’s definitive achievement of superiority in the 
100 years struggle with France’.131 Britain’s pivotal defeat of France was also 
significant as it ‘marked a global turning point or moment of irreversibility for 
the emergence [of the] capitalist system as a whole’.132
 While anti-capitalist and colonial struggles would continually and forcefully 
challenge capitalism’s global hegemony, the capitalist world system was by this 
time now firmly entrenched and resting on solid (geo)political foundations 
(notably, the British Empire). From the second half of the 18th century to the 
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early 20th century, the world witnessed the steady growth and domination of 
capitalist social relations (spread by force or otherwise). The process of Western 
domination culminated in the imposition of unequal trade treaties on China 
and Japan in the mid to late 19th century. By the beginning of the 20th century, 
the sublime dictatorship of capital over the world had been largely completed. 
 In the process, the Global South came to be subjugated in a tangled web 
of economic, (geo)political and racialised hierarchies, with the Europeans 
and subsequently the United States sitting at the top. The West’s dominance 
continues to this day, even if in a somewhat more hobbled form. We are thus 
still living in the world made between 1757 and 1763; we have yet to awake 
from the ‘Nightmare’ of capitalist history that this dominance was built upon.133 
In an age of impending ecological catastrophe, socio-economic crises and 
continued imperial wars, it is worth recalling Adorno’s admonition that ‘[n]o 
universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one that 
leads from the slingshot to the atom bomb’.134 We must therefore come face to 
face with the distinct possibility that no matter how great and wide the collective 
rage and struggles against the existing order may reach, no matter how grave 
the situation may get, no matter how barbaric the system may become, the sign 
on the wall might just one day read in bright blinding red colours: ‘THIS IS 
NOT AN EXIT’.135 It is for this reason that we conclude in the next chapter 
with a discussion of the implications of our historical analysis for some possible 
‘exit strategies’ from capitalism.
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Conclusion
Once interconnection has been revealed, all theoretical belief in the perpetual 
necessity of the existing conditions collapses, even before the collapse takes place 
in practice.
Karl Marx, 18681
There’s no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons.
Gilles Deleuze, 19922
Try again. Fail again. Fail better.
Samuel Beckett, 19833
The time has come to ‘combine’ or ‘draw together’ the ‘separate steps’4 of the 
preceding argument. Beginning with the Eurasian steppe in the Long 13th 
Century, we saw how the Mongolian Empire was fundamental to the forma-
tion of a number of geopolitical and economic linkages across the Eurasian 
landmass. This had the effect of plugging European actors into an intercon-
nected ‘world system’ of intersocietal relations. The immediate consequence of 
European engagements in the Pax Mongolica was an increased exposure to the 
technical developments and ideas pioneered in the more scientifically advanced 
Asia. While these contributed to an array of developments in Europe, the Pax 
Mongolica also proved to be a transmitter not of only social relations and tech-
nologies but also disease. The Black Death, and the subsequent demographic 
reordering which brought feudalism in Europe into crisis, directly stemmed 
from this widened sphere of intersocietal interaction.
 We then demonstrated in Chapter 4 that the subsequent divergences that 
occurred within Europe in this context were a product of the ‘superpower’ rivalry 
between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. Through military pressure, the 
Ottomans further undermined existing centres of feudal ruing class power – the 
papacy, Habsburg Empire and Italian city-states – and supported or encouraged 
new counter-hegemonic forces – the Protestants, French and Dutch. They acted 
as a geopolitical centre of gravity, which attracted the Habsburg military to the 
Mediterranean and Central East Europe. As a result, Northwestern European 
states were afforded the geopolitical space that proved crucial to their develop-
ment along capitalist lines. In particular, the Ottomans unintentionally created 
for the English a condition of geopolitical ‘isolation’, which directly contrib-
uted to the homogeneity of the English ruling class and in turn its success in 
enclosing and engrossing land. Primitive accumulation and the emergence of 
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capitalist social relations in the English countryside were therefore directly tied 
to the geopolitical threat of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, Ottoman 
territorial dominance of the Mediterranean and land routes to Asia served to 
push Northwestern European states onto an altogether novel global sphere of 
activity – the Atlantic.
 In Chapter 5, we then focused on this Atlantic theatre, where we examined 
the manifold impact of the ‘New World discoveries’ on the development of 
Europe. We first saw how the intersocietal interactions, conflicts and struggles 
between Europeans and Amerindians that took place in the Americas were 
crucial to the emergence of modern conceptions of territorial sovereignty and 
the development of Eurocentrism, scientific racism and the modern institution 
of patriarchy. We then demonstrated that the subsequent plunder of American 
precious metals by Europeans further exacerbated an already nascent diver-
gence between the feudalism of the Iberian states and the incipient capitalisms 
of Northwest Europeans. Moreover, we argued that the development of capi-
talism in England was itself dependent on the widened sphere of activity offered 
by the Atlantic. In particular, we saw that through the sociological combination 
of American land, African slave labour and English capital, the limits of English 
agrarian capitalism were overcome. Not only did the widened sphere of circula-
tion implied by the transatlantic triangular trade offer numerous opportunities 
to British capitalists to expand their domain of activities, but the combination 
of different labour processes across the Atlantic enabled the recomposition of 
labour in Britain through the Industrial Revolution. The development of the 
productive forces – and the real subsumption of labour under capital as such – 
was thus built on the exploitation of a transatlantic subaltern class made up of 
Amerindians, African slaves and Europeans.
 It was through and out of these crucial preconditions of capitalist develop-
ment that the foundations were laid for the bourgeois revolutions in Europe. 
These revolutions had the effect of establishing and consolidating territorially 
demarcated sovereign centres of capital accumulation first in Holland, then 
England, and finally France. Moreover, we showed that international deter-
minations, spurred by the sequential character of these revolutions, with each 
impacting on the next, were crucial to their development.
 In Chapter 7, we examined in more detail the ‘proto’-development of capi-
talism in the Low Countries and its attendant limits based on a relatively low 
supply of labour. This threatened to choke off the United Provinces’ incipient 
form of capitalism, which was only overcome by tapping into a vast well of 
labour elsewhere. In Asia, the VOC was responsible for creating a commercial 
network that combined uneven labour processes spanning the spice-producing 
islands in Indonesia, precious metal production in Japan and China, and 
textile workers in India into a single integrated network of ‘global’ production. 
Crucially, this took place in response to the variegated challenges – of resistance 
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and accommodation – posed by Southeast Asian communities in response to 
Dutch activities in the region. It was in and through these intersocietal inter-
actions with communities across the Indian Ocean littoral – and ultimately 
through their subordination, subjugation and subsumption – that the Dutch 
were able to integrate a disparate yet large mass of labour-power into their own 
operations. The development and ultimate survival of institutional innova-
tions central to the development of Dutch capitalism – the Bourse, Amsterdam 
entrepôt and VOC – were all based on this subjugated and exploited mass of 
unfree Asian labour-power.
 These multiple determinations emanating from various non-European origins 
were then combined in order to produce a conjunctural analysis of the so-called 
‘rise of the West’ in Chapter 8. We demonstrated that the multiple geopolit-
ical advantages that thrust Europe to global ascendancy were based on prior 
influences of more powerful non-European societies. In particular, European 
‘exceptionalism’ – insofar as it existed at all – was rooted in the exceptional 
accrual and deployment of the means of violence against these non-European 
societies. The combinations of these ‘advantages’ were instrumental in the 
British colonisation of India, which marked the historical conjuncture at which 
‘the West’ came to begin its climb to global rule.
 In presenting this history, we have argued that uneven and combined 
development provides a potent theoretical weapon capable of identifying and 
articulating these many variegated yet integrated social relations of power and 
exploitation that make up the capitalist mode of production. Throughout the 
book, we have shown how uneven and combined development – ontologically, 
methodologically and theoretically – provides an illuminating framework, 
through which we can decentre or provincialise Europe as the privileged or 
sole author of history. This ‘Re-Orientation’ has highlighted that many of the 
categories and theories of social development have been built on a problem-
atically singular abstraction of the European experience. In doing so, we have 
called into question the use of ideal-types derived from or in comparison with 
this experience – capitalism, modernity, feudalism, nomadism, tributary and so 
on. Equally we have sought to complicate and overcome any ideal-type concep-
tion of Europe or ‘the West’, and their corollaries – ‘the East’ or ‘the Rest’ – as 
dichotomously opposed essentialisations. We have demonstrated that the study 
of interactive multiplicity, the intersocietal, unevenness and combination, was 
central to overcoming the ontological singularity that lies at the heart of these 
problems of Eurocentrism.
 We have further argued that ontologically singular abstractions of this sort are 
best understood as ‘vantage points’ or ‘windows’ that unveil a necessarily partial 
glimpse into the contradictory and complex ‘concentration of many determina-
tions’5 making up social reality, and subsequently frame our understanding of 
it. Because the view of this complex historical reality from one limited angle, 
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one viewpoint or window will tend to be one-sided, the use of multiple vantage 
points, differentiated but brought together, is required in order to gain a fuller 
picture and grasp of the many determinations that make concrete reality what it 
is. In this regard, taking a panoramic view of the multiform historical processes 
from the vantage point of ‘the international’ is especially instructive, for it 
reveals the spatial multiplicity of determinations that tend to be missed when 
focusing on society in the singular. We have argued that this is precisely how 
uneven and combined development as an analytical framework operates, and 
what gives it a distinct theoretical depth and breadth in contrast to the more 
one-sided approaches considered in this book.
 Utilising this ‘international’ vantage point, our approach has identified a 
multiplicity of interacting ‘causal chains’ emanating from different uneven 
spatiotemporal vectors of development that combined in the various conjunc-
tures examined in this book. We then sought to bring out the relations between 
these determinations, their points of interactivity – their combination – at the 
heart of this broader and more complex conception of sociohistorical devel-
opment. In this way, we have endeavoured to demonstrate that uneven and 
combined development is capable of bringing together – not only theoretically, 
but concretely – historical processes understood from multiple vantage points 
into an interactive totality of social relations.
 We hope an appreciation for these wider sets of historical processes generates 
a sustained engagement in the retheorisation of capitalism as a mode of produc-
tion, for which we have offered some preliminary, if admittedly incomplete, 
ideas. How might the unevenness and combination of productive forces on an 
international scale (as discussed in Chapters 2, 5 and 7) alter our understand-
ings of the reproduction of capitalism, not least in the context of ‘globalisation’? 
How do social relations and processes outside of the formal exploitation of 
wage-labour assist in the reproduction and development of capitalism as a mode 
of production (as discussed in Chapters 5 and 7)? Can we bring actors – such 
a tributary states, nomadic empires and peasant populations of non-European 
lands – previously considered outside of or behind the history of capitalist 
modernity more resolutely into the history of its formation (as discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4)? How might a method that places an emphasis on tracing the 
multiple vectors of uneven sociological development and their various combi-
nations augment conjunctural analyses of other historical developments, such 
as wars and revolutions (as discussed in Chapters 6 and 8)?
 We have only begun to answer these questions through the relatively limited 
historical timeframe of ‘capitalism’s origins’; a more extensive temporal exten-
sion of these problematics – one covering the 19th to 21st centuries – is both 
desirable and necessary. So too is a further spatial extension, incorporating the 
histories of other (indeed Other) societies and actors – more vectors of uneven 
and combined development – into the origins of capitalism. To highlight a 
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few notable gaps, not enough attention has been paid to a geopolitical giant of 
the early modern age, China. Similarly, our inclusion of the African continent 
is unfortunately marginal, and perhaps falls prey to the typically Eurocentric 
tendency of studying African history under the rubric of slavery. As such, we 
recognise that there are numerous histories that have been overlooked or under-
explored. We hope, however, that uneven and combined development offers 
an explanatory framework through which future research can incorporate, and 
further expand upon, the historical sociological research programme offered 
here. That is, we hope the gaps made evident in this study will push readers to 
address, research and fill out such gaps, as there remains a great deal more to 
say.
 Nonetheless, the argument presented in this book necessitates, in our view, 
a rethinking of what historically and theoretically constitutes capitalism. We 
have shown that insofar as the spatial scope of capitalism’s history is limited to 
ontologically singular analyses, so too is the theoretical reach of capitalism as an 
analytical category. An exclusive focus on the English countryside tends to priv-
ilege the formation of the capital–wage-labour relation in agrarian capitalism. 
In contrast, we have argued that although this waged sphere is indeed funda-
mental, it is itself dependent on a variety of different social relations that are 
irreducible to that sphere alone. Vast assemblages of nonwaged labour regimes 
– from debt peonage to plantation slavery, from Banda to Barbados – formed 
the foundational basis on which the (re)production of wage-labour and capital 
in London and Amsterdam was built. And at the heart of these non-European 
processes were histories of violence, terror, subjugation and coercive exploita-
tion meted out by ruling classes to populations across the globe. More often 
than not, states or state-backed institutions were central to these processes. The 
very ability of the capitalist mode of production to subsume, exploit and inte-
grate (combine) such an array of spatially differentiated production processes 
(unevenness) is central to its history and logic.
 This should alert us to the ways in which capitalism utilises exploitation and 
oppression – beyond the formally free exchange of labour-power for wages – as 
(re)sources for its reproduction. The violence that inheres in forms of exploita-
tion such as slavery, debt peonage and domestic labour, practices such as state 
coercion, ‘just wars’ and territorial divisions, and structures of racism and patri-
archy is not external to capitalism as a mode of production, but constitutive of 
its very ontology. When tied to the critique of Eurocentrism, we should thus 
be wary of any account of the origins of capitalism that posits Europeans or 
Westerners as harbingers of a normatively and developmentally privileged 
‘civilisation’ – an exceptionally ‘enlightened’ group that dragged the world 
out of ‘savagery’. The history of violence upon which the social relations of 
capitalism were built should lead us to question the idealised self-image of capi-
talism as a world of expanding fulfilment and freedom, achieved through the 
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abstract mechanisms of exchange. The invisible hand of the market has always 
been undergirded by the iron fist of the state, and an array of systemic separa-
tions between the subjugated and exploited – patriarchy, ‘race’, class and so on.
 The conquest, ecological ruin, slavery, state terrorism, patriarchal subjuga-
tion, racism, mass exploitation and immiseration upon which capitalism was 
built continue unabated today. The violent past explicated in this book was 
therefore not merely a historical contingency, external to the ‘pure’ operation of 
capital, or a phase of ‘incompleteness’ out of which capitalism has emerged or 
will emerge. Rather, these practices and processes are ‘constitutive’ in the sense 
that they remain crucial to capitalism’s ongoing reproduction as a historical 
social structure. This should remind us that capitalism is neither natural nor 
eternal: it has been historically constructed by annihilating or subsuming other 
– non-capitalist – ways of life. But, moreover, these pointers should alert us to 
the possibility of ridding ourselves of a mode of production that continually 
(re)produces such histories of violence, oppression and exploitation.
 As such, we believe the arguments presented in this book raise a key issue 
that must be placed at the heart of any transformative emancipatory politics – 
the issue of political or societal multiplicity.6 Far from being a matter of purely 
scholastic concern, this missing ‘international theory’ has a number of polit-
ical implications. We would therefore argue that this issue is anything but an 
abstract one, since as we have argued, the interjection of the intersocietal is a 
permanent condition of the way in which states, communities, and individuals 
shape their lives politically. And indeed, political challenges to capitalism have 
often identified the ‘universality’ or ‘totality’ of capitalism as the basis on which 
it should be challenged and overcome. This serves as an important warning 
against any endeavour to build ‘socialism in one country’; anticapitalism can 
only be global in scope.
 We agree with this, and an obvious implication of our calls for an inter-
nationalist counter-history of capitalism is that an internationalist politics of 
anticapitalism is a necessity. However, the content of this internationalism is 
not self-evident, and requires working out – and, of course, not through theory 
alone but also through struggle. Insofar as ‘the international’ was central to the 
emergence and reproduction of capitalism, we should be critical of political 
positions that treat this internationality – the system of multiple nation-states 
– as an empty vessel that simply needs to filled with communist or socialist 
content. Indeed, the very internationality of capitalism might well prove funda-
mentally antithetical to communist politics under certain circumstances. For 
if the ‘forgotten’ history of the social sciences – and, in particular, the disci-
pline of International Relations  – has been crucially implicated in confronting 
the dilemmas of social disorder and revolution wrought by the international 
spread of capitalist social relations and empire, the subaltern history of 
20th-century revolutionary politics has been imbricated with the manifold 
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constraints imposed by the ‘inter-stateness’ of capitalism on the potentials for 
emancipatory projects for social transformation.
 That capitalism emerged in conjunction with – and in fact perpetuates – a world 
divided into a multiplicity of interactive, heterogeneous states has held enormous 
significance for revolutionary politics. For in the process of attempting to build 
socialism by taking state power and harnessing it to this end, Marxist-inspired 
revolutions have all too often been transformed into their very negation. Rather 
than constructing the emancipated society of the future, in which the political 
state dissolves into a free association of self-governing producers, the trajecto-
ries of self-proclaimed ‘socialist’ societies witnessed the intensive perfection of 
the oppressive state apparatus they had originally sought to destroy. Hence, the 
creation and consolidation of revolutionary states ‘perhaps best dramatizes the 
centrality of interstate relations and war’ to modern development.7
 The myriad dilemmas arising from the ‘inter-stateness’ of capitalism, this 
international dimension inscribed in all forms of development, confronting any 
revolution was clearly recognised – if not properly addressed – by Lenin. As he 
commented to fellow Bolsheviks in March 1919, ‘We are living not merely in a 
state, but in a system of states, and it is inconceivable for the Soviet Republic to 
exist alongside the imperialist states for any length of time. One or the other 
must triumph in the end’.8 In the field of IR, the apparent fact that revolu-
tionary states quickly adopted the methods of traditional diplomacy and great 
power politics has been viewed as a striking vindication of the ‘timeless’ wisdom 
of political realism – a conclusion we clearly reject.9 But while it would be hope-
lessly naïve, if not intellectually disingenuous, to subsume an explanation of 
the multitude of forces behind any socialist revolution’s ‘degeneration’, revolu-
tionaries travel at their peril without recognition of the socially transformational 
power of ‘power politics’. And this ‘international’ dimension of development 
has much broader implications to revolutionary politics more generally.
 Take, for example, our argument that the multiple labour processes in 
different parts of the world were crucial to the formation and subsequent repro-
duction of capitalism. In the period of the Industrial Revolution, coerced forms 
of surplus extraction in the Americas and Asia enabled capitalists in Britain 
to increase rates of exploitation and subordinate labour to the mechanics of 
the factory. Here the combination of uneven forms of exploitation was consti-
tutive of capitalism’s expanded reproduction, and the real subsumption of 
labour. In the contemporary period, the divesting machinations of capitalism 
have continued and expanded into a global system of geopolitical violence 
and integrated production processes which afford it coercive and disciplinary 
capabilities with an unprecedented international reach. The fluidities of finance 
capital, ‘just-in-time’ production, and logistics have only sharpened this socio-
logical multiplicity – the international – into a machine of tyranny. Today, as 
always, wage repression, deteriorating work conditions and anti-strike practices 
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are actively determined by variegated labour processes in different societies 
across the globe. In these ways, unevenness and combination act as disciplining 
features that maintains the capital relation as the basis of social existence.
 So when considering the challenge of political multiplicity, we must not only 
consider the level of ‘many societies’, but also many oppressions, many powers, 
many struggles, many actors and so on. Historically, sociopolitical differences 
borne of ‘many oppressions’ or ‘many struggles’ have been understood as some-
thing for the Left – and in particular the Party – to negate and sublate into the 
unity and singularity of revolutionary thought and practice.10 In this tradition, 
the programme has been presented as the higher ideological/strategic unity, and 
the Party the organisational form, in which political differences are ironed out, 
unity among disparate parts realised, and a homogenous political perspective 
pursued. In turn, the perspectives constructed by the leadership of parties and 
organisations are presented as the historical prime mover – the royal road – 
which simply needs to replicated everywhere for capitalism to be overthrown. 
This negation of political difference sought by programmatic organisations 
generates a form of political autocentrism, and ontological singularity, where 
any given party or programme is posited as the sole and sovereign author of 
historical change. In this programmatic approach, difference is something not 
to be articulated, but destroyed; something to be redirected onto the True Path 
or – where it cannot be redirected – exiled as a ‘bourgeois deviation’.
 Drawing on our preceding analysis, we would argue that any politics that 
takes a singular – historically and geographically specific – experience and 
generalises beyond its own spatiotemporal conditions and limitations, is inher-
ently limited, problematic and potentially dangerous. It is so precisely because 
it imposes a false universality on the uneven, multiform social experiences 
of proletarians.11 Insofar as capitalism has been built on the subjugation and 
marginalisation of multiplicity – both historically and historiographically – any 
anticapitalist politics that reproduces this subjugation and marginalisation is 
not worthy of the name.
 In contrast, the theoretical and historical observations made in this book 
offer, in our view, a way of integrating into the critique of capitalism an array of 
social relations that have too often been dismissed as ‘externalities’ – nonwaged 
work, forced work, illegal work, state coercion, patriarchy, racism and so on. 
Any prevailing orthodoxy in the labour movement (broadly conceived) that 
relegates the multiplicity of these oppressions to a mere ideological or super-
structural epiphenomenon that is contingent to the reproduction of capitalism 
is empirically and theoretically unsustainable. Any attempt to reduce these 
forms of oppression to the singular relation embodied in wage-labour, or set 
up a political-normative hierarchy of struggles, with those around wage-labour 
taking absolute priority, is to attribute a false, homogenous universality onto 
the many, variegated struggles against oppression.12
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 To be clear, we remain committed to the view that the abolition of wage- 
labour is central to any anticapitalist politics, and that proletarians are the only 
class capable of carrying out this abolition. However, we insist that ‘prole-
tarian’ here does not denote a homogenous category itself derived from the 
Western experience. Indeed, as our preceding historical narrative has shown, 
the sources and structural interconnections between different forms of oppres-
sion (class, racial, national, gender, sexual, cultural and so on) are not reducible 
to a singular relation – that is, a historically particular form of exploitation. The 
forms of oppression mobilised by the capitalist mode of production have been, 
from capitalism’s very origins, ‘intersectional’.
 We therefore consider uneven and combined development to be a potentially 
useful framework for uncovering the ways in which the multiple social relations 
of oppression and exploitation, each originating from a variety of different 
vectors of sociohistorical development, historically combine and intersect with 
each other. This would render, for example, an understanding of the historical 
constitution of racism and patriarchy as tied to, constitutive of, but not reduc-
ible to, the emergence of capitalism. In the same way, it would avoid treating 
struggles that seek to destroy patriarchy and racism as somehow external from – 
or mere supplements to – the cardinal aim of destroying capitalism. Might it be 
time to rethink the privileged revolutionary subject (the proletariat) in broader 
terms than its traditional, singular association with waged-labour? Might this 
then require a decentring or pluralisation of this revolutionary subject in terms 
denoting a series of exploitations, oppressions and abjections which subsume 
individuals in varied, uneven, but intersecting and combined ways?
 With this in mind, the very abolition of wage-labour as a category would 
require that we take the plurality of political experiences seriously; it would 
consider how unevenness and combination might be effectively weaponised 
against capitalism. By acknowledging the differentiated and uneven sociologies 
of different social movements, the politics of revolution must be understood 
not in terms of a singular strategy. Rather, we must be cognisant of the necessity 
for many strategies, each irreducible to each other and specific to the particular 
challenges faced in the course of struggle. And in the spirt of combined devel-
opment, this would also involve considering how such multiple strategies can 
be learned from, adopted and modified, or if necessary discarded and ‘skipped 
over’. That is to say, insofar as unevenness and combination can be understood 
as limits and challenges to revolutionary politics, they can also be repurposed, 
reconfigured, reassembled and ultimately weaponised for political measures 
geared towards abolishing capitalism. It is perhaps the failure to grasp this 
possibility that has hitherto constrained communist horizons and revolutionary 
potentialities in concrete insurrectionary movements. It is this challenge – the 
search for a multiplicity of new weapons among the oppressed and exploited – 
that we pose as our immediate task.
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